THE BUDDHIST SCHOOLS OF THE SMALL VEHICLE

André Bareau

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY Sara Boin-Webb

EDITED BY Andrew Skilton

PUBLISHED IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE BUDDHIST SOCIETY TRUST

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SARA BOIN-WEBB

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Foreword to the English Edition

Although André Bareau's *Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* was first published more than half a century ago in 1955, it remains a standard work of reference in the field of Buddhist Studies. The painstaking scholarship of Bareau's *Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* has meant two things in particular: first, that subsequent scholars have had a reliable work of reference as a starting point for their own researches and discussions, and second, that his work has yet to be superseded.

Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule comprises three main parts. The first part (four chapters) is a general discussion of the formation of Indian Buddhist schools as documented in the ancient Buddhist sources. The second and most substantial part consists of thirty-four chapters, each devoted to a particular school and in which Bareau sets out what is known about each school and lists the main points of doctrine that the ancient sources associate with the school. The final part consists of a set of three appendices: The first takes the form of a comprehensive table of points of doctrine indicating which schools subscribed to them and which did not; on the basis of this first appendix the second attempts to identify and tabulate the doctrinal affiliation of groups of schools; the third appendix briefly discusses the origins of the Mahāyāna from the perspective of school affiliation.

It may be true that since its first publication many significant articles relevant to the formation and history of the Indian schools of Buddhism have appeared, and that our understanding of certain issues—such as the nature of a Buddhist 'sect', of Buddhist 'schism', of Buddhist schools of thought, of *vinaya* lineages—may have been problematized and become more sophisticated, subtle or nuanced, but such progress has only been possible because of the sound foundations laid by such scholars as Bareau.

While in particular instances—with regard to this school or that, one point of doctrine or another—a further fifty years of scholarship means it is possible to question certain of Bareau's interpretations or to add to his material, nevertheless the comprehensive scope of his presentation means that his work remains, and is likely to continue to remain for some time, the standard work of reference on the schools of Indian Buddhism.

In particular, Bareau's documenting of the doctrinal points associated with the schools constitutes an invaluable resource for the issues that were the subject of ancient Abhidharma debate—a resource that has yet to be thoroughly explored and mined. An appreciation of these points of Abhidharma interpretation that preoccupied Indian Buddhist thinkers may sometimes provide a key to understanding the principles that underlay developments in Indian Buddhist thought and practice more generally. It is to be hoped that the appearance of Bareau's work in a reliable English translation will encourage and facilitate such an appreciation.

Sara Boin-Webb's work as English translator of some the most important French language works of Buddhist scholarship is well known and much appreciated by Buddhist scholars throughout the world.[1] Indeed, many scholars make routine use of her translation of Étienne Lamotte's *History of Indian Buddhism* (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1988). I was thus most pleased when some years ago I learnt that she wished to publish her translation of Bareau's *Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule.* Sara contacted me asking if I might read through her translation, paying particular attention to the rendering of technical terminology and points of Abhidharma. I was very happy to do so and thereby perhaps make a very small contribution to Sara's work. Following Sara's death in 2008, the final stages of bringing her translation to press have been overseen by Andrew Skilton, who has compiled a most useful supplementary bibliography of relevant works published since 1955, as well as adding a new index and rearranging appendix 1 as a series of tables to better function as an index of doctrinal points. Without doubt Sara's English translation of Bareau's standard work of reference on the schools of Indian Buddhism gives it a new lease on life,

1. For a list of Sara Boin-Webb's translations, see Hubert Durt's "Obituary for Sara Boin-Webb, 1937–2008," *Buddhist Studies Review* 25 (2008): 244–47.

making it accessible to a new and much wider audience than it has hitherto had. The only sadness is that she did not live to see its final publication. It is, however, a most fitting posthumous addition to her contribution to Buddhist Studies.

Rupert Gethin Bristol

André Bareau in 1989

André Bareau: His Legacy

> "un homme profondément bon . . . un homme de paix et de bonne volonté."
> ('a deeply good man . . . a man of peace and goodwill')
> —G. Fussman

André Bareau not only published landmark research dealing with the complexities of Buddhist history and literature but excited a personal regard, not to say fondness, that finds expression still amongst former colleagues and students. One might not be far wrong to suggest that he was also the last great exemplar of what Constantin Regamey dubbed the 'Franco-Belgian school' of Buddhist Studies. This is an approach to academic scholarship that integrates philological and textual approaches with those of other applicable disciplines, such as anthropology and ethnography, and focusses not just on texts and doctrines and 'origins', but also on the 'developed tradition', the religion as it has evolved over the centuries, and which it regards as of equal validity to its foundation moment. This same breadth of approach can certainly be seen in the work of André Bareau, yet the greater significance of such an observation is not so much biographical but rather that, as Edward Conze puts it, 'the principles of the Franco-Belgian school have been universally adopted by all scholars working in this field, whatever the country they may live in' (Conze, p. 2). This is the approach to the study of Buddhism that has won the day in Western scholarship.

Bareau was born in Saint-Mandé, an eastern suburb of Paris, and from 1941 during the occupation of the city worked as a public school teacher in La Varenne-Saint-Hilaire, not far to the east of there. At the end of the war he engaged in two years of unfunded study at the École Pratique des Hautes Études under the guidance of Jean Filliozat in order to prepare a study of the Theravāda concept of *asaṅkhata*, 'the uncompounded'. This

won him entry as a student to the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) in 1947, where for another four years he pursued the same subject in sources preserved in the other classical languages of Buddhism. The final thesis won him his Doctorat dès Lettres (equivalent to a PhD) and was published in 1951 under the title *L'absolut en philosophie bouddhique: évolution de la notion d'asaṃskṛta* (The Absolute in Buddhist Philosophy: The Evolution of the Idea of *asaṃskṛta*). The same year saw the publication of his study and translation of the primary Theravāda Abhidhamma text the *Dhammasaṅgani* (Enumeration of Phenomena), completed as part of his study for the former.

The appearance of these works supported his appointment for four years as a Research Fellow and a further one as a Senior Fellow at the CNRS. The years of dedicated application to Buddhist philosophy in his work on 'the absolute' led him perhaps inevitably to focus next while at the CNRS on the poorly understood diversity of doctrinal opinion amongst the early Buddhist schools. In this his acquisition of the classical canonical languages of Buddhism—Pali, Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese—stood him in good stead. Scholars had been publishing on this subject since the previous century, but the picture thus formed was partial, confused and based on limited data sources. Bareau's genius was to conceive a plan to draw on an exhaustive range of primary sources preserved in all the major Buddhist languages and to conduct a comprehensive synthetic analysis, thus creating an authoritative picture. This further movement of his historical imagination found expression in two books that appeared in 1955: *Les premiers conciles bouddhiques* (The First Buddhist Councils) and *Le sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* (The Buddhist Schools of the Small Vehicle), i.e., the present volume. From the start the significance of this latter book was recognised: 'The information which has been handed down to us about the "eighteen sects" is in rather a chaotic condition, but in 1955 A. Bareau brought order into the chaos in his *Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule* (308 pp.), a work quite indispensable to all scholars from now on' (Conze, p. 9). The stature, imagination and ambition of this project resulted in a study that has not been superseded in the succeeding fifty-six years. By marshalling definitively the historico-doctrinal evidence, Bareau established a legacy that subsequent scholars have addressed not just by re-examining individual doctrinal points of difference, but also by extending the terms of the enquiry and eliciting evidence from altogether different quarters, not least by re-examining the nondoctrinal bases for differentiation between so-called schools.

The following year Bareau was appointed director of the philological study of Buddhist texts at the prestigious École Pratique des Hautes Études, a post he held until 1973. His next book was a short study of contemporary Buddhist communities in Sri Lanka, *La vie et l'organisation des communautés bouddhiques modernes de Ceylan* (The Life and Organisation of Modern Buddhist Communities in Sri Lanka; 1957), but the next major project in his new post emerged as his attention moved from doctrinal matters towards the biographical mode and he directed his formidable linguistic and analytic abilities towards unpacking the diverse and layered materials in various languages concerning the biography of the Buddha. Again Bareau's linguistic powers were employed, not just to examine the varied sources but to translate all the relevant biographical material and present it to the reader in full. Bareau tracked the chronology and the sectarian context of the emergence of episodes in the Buddha biography and explored how these build into the multifaceted and nuanced biographies preserved by various traditions of Buddhism in Asia. This work resulted in three major volumes appearing under the general title *Recherches sur la biographie du Bouddha dans les Sūtrapiṭaka et les Vinayapiṭaka anciens* (Research in the Biography of the Buddha in the old Sūtra- and Vinaya-piṭakas; 1963, 1970 and 1971). In 1971 he was honoured with a Professorship at the Collège de France and a Chair in Buddhist Studies. He retired in 1991.

This brief survey of his book publications and appointments, which focusses on the major movements of his lifework, is incomplete without mention of a further four books, of which *En suivant Bouddha* (Following the Buddha; 1985) is the last, as well as more than a hundred scholarly articles and an even larger number of scholarly book reviews. Amongst his articles, while it is clearly invidious to select, it would be negligent to omit mention of his studies of the stūpa cult as reflected in the Vinaya sources (1962); the legend material on the Buddha's youth in the Vinaya sources (1962), which he revisited in 1974 in a second study of material from the Sutra- and Vinaya-piṭakas; in the same year his study of the Buddha's death and funeral arrangements as the foundational moment of the Buddhist religion; the anomalies in the canonical narratives of the funeral of the Buddha (1975); and the composition and stages in the formation of the highly important *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (1979); just to mention some

of the longer essays. His bibliography reveals a constant exploration of the Vinaya and Sūtra materials, with which he had become so familiar, but also that was greatly leavened by articles concerning Buddhist philosophy and history, the actuality of Buddhist life in Sri Lanka and Cambodia, and on the archaeology, epigraphy and geography of ancient Buddhism. Nor was he content for his work to be closeted in an academic reserve, since he also wrote numerous encyclopedia articles making his research accessible to a wider audience. The whole of his written oeuvre was informed by repeated sojourns in north and south India, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Cambodia.

His academic appointments, at the pinnacle of the French research establishment, evoke only poorly in the Anglophone imagination an appreciation of the regard in which Bareau was held or of the stature of his achievement, but what is always lost behind the statistics of any illustrious career is the person and his qualities. Francois Bizot recalls him as a rationalist who (citing his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France) wanted to contribute to a better understanding of humanity. Although a Catholic in origin, Bizot says, Bareau had been captivated by the Protestant spirit, which best corresponded to his personal sense of moderation, simplicity and the constraint of reason. Fussman, both a former student and later a colleague of Bareau, recalls his modesty and indifference to academic honours, as well as his scholarly commitment and his constant readiness to help students and other researchers—personal qualities that one has heard recalled with appreciation by others who knew him. One is left with the impression that Bareau was a scholar of vocation. Fussman sums him up as 'a guru who asked for nothing but gave everything'.

In all these ways, Bareau was a profoundly influential scholar working with an approach to scholarship that has come to be taken as exemplary in contemporary Buddhist Studies. We are indebted to him not just for his published works but also as an exemplar of an ethos of research, study and teaching that assumes we must appreciate a tradition in its richness and its diversity.

ANDREW SKILTON

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(*BEFEO* articles are available online at no cost through the Persée Portal: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/befeo.)

Editor's Note

The following changes and additions have been made to this English translation of Bareau's *Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule:*

A foreword by Rupert Gethin and a short appreciation of André Bareau, introducing his life and work to an Anglophone readership, has been included.

The original bibliography has been revised to include all works referenced in the book by the author, and its entries have been completed where necessary, including the addition of English translations of entries for primary sources. It has also been supplemented separately with a review of 'Research on the Early Schools of Buddhism since 1955' in order to give the reader some sense of the work that has been done in this area since 1955. French-language sources originally cited in French in the main text have also been translated into English. Other editorial changes or additions to the main text are acknowledged using the siglum 'Ed.' and where appropriate enclosed within brackets. Comments inserted by Sara Boin-Webb are identified with 'SBW'. Otherwise, Bareau's book is treated as a classic work of scholarship and no attempt is made to revise or update his research line by line.

Bareau's transliteration from Sanskrit, Pali and Chinese has been changed from the EFEO system to the internationally recognised standards for Indic languages and to Pinyin for Chinese.

Appendix 1, originally a single and unmanageable table thirty pages long, has been broken up into fifty-two numbered sections for greater ease of use. A contents list has been provided at the start of this appendix to help with navigation. This appendix now functions effectively as a thematic subject index for the book.

An index of people, places and texts has been introduced.

I would like to record my thanks to Shayne Clarke, who wrote a remarkably detailed and helpful reader report for the publisher; to Russell Webb, who made suggestions for the supplementary bibliography based on his own research on the history of Buddhist studies; and to Peter Skilling, who also suggested some titles for the bibliography and discussed an obscure query on the Tengyur.

Finally, it remains to record briefly the history of this translation. Sara Boin-Webb had initiated a correspondence with André Bareau in 1981, ten years prior to his retirement. She started her translation in January of 1982 and sent a batch of some fifty pages to him for his comment in March of that year. His response was fulsome: 'I have read with great care and much admiration your translation, which is excellent, as accurate and precise as I could wish for, and all the more remarkable since my style is often complex, lacking fluency and likewise clarity' (private correspondence, 17 April 1982, transl. ed.). They discussed by letter specific terms and their best translation. Unfortunately, before the end of the year, other work and then illness intervened and by mutual agreement in September of 1984 Sara Boin-Webb formally put the project aside in favour of pressing work on Étienne Lamotte's voluminous *Traité* and *Histoire.* They continued an amiable and mutually helpful correspondence until Professor Bareau's death from cancer on 2 March 1993 at the age of seventy-two. His last letter to her was dated 2 February of the same year. With the support of Bareau's widow, Mme Suzanne Bareau, Sara Boin-Webb took up the translation again in 1999. She completed it in 2001.

ANDREW SKILTON

Preface

The schools of the Small Vehicle constitute a sphere which is still little known in the field of Buddhist studies, despite the fine works by Mrs Rhys Davids, Messrs Aung, Demiéville, Hiramatsu, Koyama, La Vallée Poussin, Masuda, Teramoto, Walleser, etc., on basic documents such as the *Kathāvatthu, Vibhāṣā,* the treatises by Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva, and the commentaries by Kuiji and Paramārtha. Up until now only Mr N. Dutt has attempted, in a recent work, to assemble the sparse facts, compare them and draw some conclusions. Because of postwar problems, this notable work only came to my knowledge a short time ago, when my own research was already well advanced. In order not to abandon the fruit of the latter or compile a book which might duplicate Mr Dutt's, I resolved to extend the scope of my own work. This is why I have incorporated in it the substance of the commentaries, which very often clarify the somewhat obscure meaning of the bare facts. It was quite difficult, in the present state of our knowledge of Buddhist documents, and because of their dispersal, to produce a truly exhaustive work. While not claiming to have attained this ideal, I have nevertheless tried to get as close to it as possible. I therefore had to undertake a quite lengthy process of abstraction which, more often than not, proved somewhat disappointing. Except in a very few cases of translations which could be fully trusted, the texts themselves were used, their translations, even if they existed, being useful only as clarification.

It is a most pleasant duty for me to express here my profound acknowledgements to the masters who have so generously enabled me to benefit from their teaching, advice and help. I must most especially thank Paul Demiéville, professor at the Collège de France and member of the Institute, who introduced me to the study of the works of Vasumitra and Kuiji and most kindly allowed me to use his personal notes, the richness of which was most valuable to me. Jean Filliozat, professor at the Collège de France,

and Mgr Lamotte, professor at the University of Louvain, also gave me, on particularly difficult questions, excellent advice, the fruit of their long experience and immense erudition. May they find here the expression of my deepest gratitude. I must also thank Louis Renou, professor of the Faculty of Letters in Paris and member of the Institute, and Mr Koyré, director of studies at the École Pratique des Hautes Études, whose strong support along with that of Messrs Demiéville and Filliozat enabled me to remain at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and devote the maximum time to the present work. May Mademoiselle Lalou, director of the École Pratique des Hautes Études and director of the *Buddhica* collection, find here the expression of my gratitude for the great kindness with which she agreed to include my work in the above-mentioned collection. Unfortunately, purely material difficulties prevented the realisation of this project.

Finally, I would like to thank most particularly Louis Malleret, director of the École Française d'Extrême-Orient, who was kind enough to give the present volume a place in the series of works published by the learned establishment he directs.

Abbreviations

ASWI: *Archaeological Survey of West India. Annual Reports,* London, since 1880

BCE: Before the Common Era

CE: Common Era

EN: Era of the Nirvāṇa (c. 480 BCE)

BEFEO: *Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient,* Paris

EFEO: École Française d'Extrême-Orient

Ep. Ind.: *Epigraphia Indica,* Calcutta, since 1892

JA: *Journal Asiatique,* Paris since 1822

LVP: see La Vallée Poussin

NE: Narthang Tibetan edition

PE: Peking Tibetan edition

PTS: Pali Text Society edition

T: Taishō Issaikyō edition

Introduction

From the first century of its history, the Buddhist Community was divided into numerous *schools* or *sects,* on occasion sometimes by quite noticeable *schisms,* and each of these divisions held opinions which were treated as *heresies* by the others. It is with these schools, sects, schisms and heresies that the present work is concerned.

Before approaching the heart of the subject, it is important to specify the meaning of the above terms, which we use for lack of anything better but which do not precisely express the Indian ideas they claim to represent.

We will call *school* what Sanskrit Buddhism terms *nikāya* and Pāli Buddhism *ācariyavāda.*[1] A *nikāya* consists of a group of people subjected to the same regulations. It is also, and more usually, a collection of objects, such as the collection of sūtras, precisely called *nikāya* in Pāli. Compared with the word *kāya,* which also has the same root and means *body,* it can be said that a *nikāya* is an organised *body* or a doctrinal *body,* depending on whether the word is applied to people or things. It therefore renders our word *school* quite well, although it is etymologically quite differently constructed. The Pāli term *ācariyavāda* means oral teaching (*vāda*) from a master (*ācariya*) and corresponds somewhat to our word *school.* Since the Sanskrit texts call *nikāya* what the Pāli texts term *ācariyavāda,* we will use the words *school* and

1. [Ed.: In the French text Bareau indicates that he will use *secte* and *école* interchangeably, but in practice he favours *secte* most of the time. The translator has made the decision to amalgamate Bareau's *secte* and *école* since he was not using them to denote different entities, and translate both simply as 'school'. She has rejected the term 'sect', with its negative connotations in English, as a label for these groupings of the early Sangha. This word now appears in the English version only in cited titles.]

subschool in the same sense.[2] They express the idea of a spiritual association organised under the patronage of a master whose teaching it follows.

The Buddhist schools differ from those of early Christianity in that, since the Buddhist Community did not possess, as did the Christian Church, a supreme authority incarnated in a single person, pope or patriarch, the school was not truly separate from the Community and its *heresy* related purely to the doctrines of other groups. In the majority of cases, even, relations between the various schools were not lacking in peace and harmony, and the Buddhist schools can be compared to the Protestant sects which, even while differing considerably with regard to doctrine and form of worship, are no less united in a certain way within the ecumenical movement.

We will term *schism* what Buddhists call *saṅghabheda,* 'a split in the Community', and which constitutes one of the five major offences, comparable in its gravity to patricide, matricide, the murder of an arhat and the wounding of a buddha. It occurs when an intelligent and virtuous monk, who consequently has great authority, takes in his wake part of the Community and gives it a new master and a new Way.[3] However, once again, since the Community lacks a supreme authority, the Buddhist schism is purely relative and the schismatic claims to be the guardian of moral and doctrinal purity is weakened by the decadence of the Community which produced him and which he purports to reform.

We will term *heresy* what the Buddhists call *dṛṣṭi* (Pāli *diṭṭhi*), mental 'view', a personal opinion which does not conform to the Buddha's teaching. It is also called *mithyādṛṣṭi,* 'false view', as opposed to *samyagdṛṣṭi,* 'right view'. Moreover, these terms are of only relative value; what is heresy or a false view for one school is a right view for another.

With regard to the twenty or thirty schools of the Hīnayāna, we possess only the works of the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins, plus a few works, especially Vinayas, of the Dharmaguptakas, Mahīśāsakas, Mahāsāṃghikas, Lokottaravādins, Mūlasarvāstivādins, Sammatīyas, Kāśyapīyas, Haimavatas, Abhayagirivāsins, Bahuśrutīyas or Prajñaptivādins.[4] Fortunately, there exist collections of theses classified by school, as well as collections of controversies, a few commentaries on both and quite a large amount of data dispersed in several treatises such as the *Vibhāṣā* and *Abhidharmakośa.* A comparative and critical study of all these documents, so varied in origin, turned out to be very much less disappointing than might generally have been expected on the strength of works which are summary, ancient and often badly compiled. It was thus established that certain pessimistic judgements were based on the misreading of texts, the use of faulty editions and quite simply on serious errors of method such as that, all too frequently committed, which consists of placing on the same level documents of greatly varying periods and values and then concluding, after superficial examination, that the contradictions which exist between them make them completely useless. What is worse is that these errors are long-lived; some have been carefully preserved for a century and used, without the least verification, by quite often eminent researchers.

Doubtless, the value and correctness of the documents used, and the wholly provisional conclusions that can be drawn from their study, should not be overrated. The study of Indian Buddhism requires much prudence and it can almost unreservedly be said that, in that field, historical certainty does not exist and that there are only greater or lesser probabilities. This is all the more true in that, despite magnificent efforts made for more than a century, much remains to be discovered in the immense forest of documents which have come down to us, not counting those, certainly more numerous, which sadly have disappeared without a trace. Here, more than anywhere else, it should constantly be recalled that our data are fragile and uncertain, that they always require an interpretation of which it is very difficult and doubtless even impossible to extract the part due to 'the personal equation', that of the reader and that of the author, whatever the integrity and experience of one or the other may be.

The object of the present work has first and foremost been to provide documents and references. In its early form, it was merely to have been a series of notes incorporated into a translation of the treatises by Vasumitra,

2. [Ed.: The translator here uses 'school' and 'subschool' where Bareau juxtaposes *secte* and *école* in the same phrase. Otherwise she employs *school* throughout, and *subschool* for Bareau's *secte-fille* or where he is discussing what are clearly subdivisions of a named group, even if he uses *écoles.*]

3. La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu.* IV, pp. 208–9.

4. [Ed.: Some progress has been made in the identification of texts belonging to the schools since this statement was accurate. See supplementary bibliography.]

Bhavya and Vinītadeva. The general sections and various hypotheses which have resulted from the first direct study of the documents thus collated are no more than mere proposals, mere theses awaiting antitheses, and not definitive conclusions. They have no other aim than to show new aspects of old problems and to pose new questions.

PART ONE

Generalities

CHAPTER I

The Existence and Genealogy of the Hīnayāna Buddhist Schools

Many Buddhist works have preserved for us traditions concerning the schools, more or less detailed genealogical tables, or mere lists. For a long time attempts were made to turn them to account in order to reconstruct the history of the schisms which divided the Buddhist Community of the Small Vehicle. Unfortunately, at first sight these various traditions are far from being in agreement. Furthermore, since most of these documents came down to us through their Chinese or Tibetan versions, their translation and interpretation are sometimes difficult and lead to quite a few errors. With justifiable piety, the majority of these have been preserved for nearly a century, serving as a basis for rash hypotheses and increasing the confusion which seems to characterise the problem of the lists.

A systematic study of the traditions, based on the documents themselves without concerning ourselves with the most authoritative translations, allows this problem to be resolved with a satisfactory coefficient of probability.

It is important, first of all, to establish the very existence of these schools since, because of the confusion which surrounds the matter, some philologists, erring on the side of caution, call it into question. In fact, the existence of the majority of the schools is proved by sound documentation:[1]

(1) *Inscriptions:* Mahāsāṃghika, Bahuśrutīya, Caitika, Aparaśaila, Pūrvaśaila, Rājagirika, Siddhārthika, Sarvāstivādin, Mahīśāsaka, Kāśyapīya, Vātsīputrīya, Sammatīya, Dharmottarīya, Bhadrayānīya schools.

(2) *Literary works:* pertaining to the Theravādin, Sarvāstivādin, Mahā-

1. For references, see part two. [Ed.: Bareau's account of these sources can now be updated. The reader is directed to the supplementary bibliography for further information.]

sāṃghika, Dharmaguptaka, Mahīśāsaka, Haimavata, Sammatīya, Lokottaravādin, Mūlasarvāstivādin schools.

This, therefore, makes a total in all of nineteen schools whose existence is verified by unimpeachable documents. There remain only six of them of which the existence is not proved in this way: the Gokulikas, Ekavyāvahārikas, Prajñaptivādins, Sautrāntikas (or Saṅkrāntikas), Tāmraśātiyas and Ṣaṇṇagarikas. It does indeed seem, however, that chance alone has not enabled us to discover traces of their existence and there is no real reason to doubt they existed. Furthermore, the Sautrāntikas are too well known from the Sarvāstivādin treatises which frequently attack them for their reality to be doubted, and it does seem as though the Lokottaravādins were wholly or partly Ekavyāvahārikas, as we shall see.

Consequently, the existence of some twenty to thirty schools mentioned by the traditions cannot be questioned.

The works that have transmitted the tables and lists of schools to us are not very old. None goes back with certainty further than 300 CE, that is, some five hundred years after the events on which they report. We are fortunate, however, in possessing amongst these old texts those whose geographical and sectarian origins were the most distant, Kashmir and Ceylon, the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Theravādins.

The classification of these documents requires a distinction to be made between three chronological groups.

I. The Traditions of the First Period

They predate the sixth century CE and are characterised by a division of the schools into two main groups. They should be classified according to their geographical origin.

A. The Sinhalese Tradition

This is given for the first time by the *Dīpavaṃsa*,[2] which dates from the fourth century CE and is of Theravādin inspiration. According to this work, all the schisms supposedly occurred during the second century after the Nirvāṇa.

Buddhaghosa records, in the following century, in the introduction to

2. *Dīpavaṃsa* V, beginning; *Mahāvaṃsa* V, beginning.



his commentary on the *Kathāvatthu*, the existence of six new schools: the Rājagirikas, Siddhatthikas, Pubbaseliyas, Aparaseliyas, Haimavatas and Vājirīyas. He groups the first four under the generic term of Andhakas. It is a fact that the inscriptions record their presence only in Andhra country, around Amarāvatī. In the same work Buddhaghosa attributes several of the *Kathāvatthu*'s theses to schools or groups of schools which he does not define: the Uttarāpaṭhakas, Hetuvādins and Vetullakas.

Nothing is known of the Vājiriyas. Buddhaghosa describes the northern-based schools by the name of Uttarāpaṭhakas, which he is unable to define more precisely. One tradition recorded by Bhavya (List 1) identifies the Hetuvādins with the Sarvāstivādins, but Buddhaghosa makes a clear distinction between these two schools. He attributes clearly Mahāyānist opinions to the Vetullakas.

B. The Sammatīya Tradition

This is supplied to us by Bhavya (List 3). It locates the first schism in 137 EN (Era of the Nirvāṇa), the second in 200 EN, the third in 400 EN.



C. The Kashmirian Tradition

This is represented by several works.

(1) The *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra*[3] is a work of Mahāsāṃghika origin, but it really belongs to the Kashmirian tradition, as is proved by a comparison with those that follow. The dates of the appearance of the different schools are given in parentheses. It was translated into Chinese between 317 and 420 and therefore dates from the beginning of the fourth century at the latest.



(2) The *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* by Vasumitra. This exists in a Tibetan translation and three Chinese translations, the oldest of which dates from about 400. It is certainly Sarvāstivādin in origin.

If this list is compared to the three previous ones, it will immediately be seen that it is directly related to the last, that of the *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra.* In fact:

(a) the dates of the appearance of the schools are the same;

(b) the order of the first five Mahāsāṃghika schools and that of the four Vātsīputrīya schools are the same in both cases.

The differences are much more noticeable with the other two lists. However, there are divergences even between the two Kashmirian lists:

3. T (Taishō Issaikyō) 1465, p. 900b–c.



(a) the last three Mahāsāṃghika schools do not have the same names; those given by the Sūtra are even unknown elsewhere; they could be little-used synonyms;

(b) the Sūtra is unaware of the Haimavatas, as is the Sinhalese Dīpavaṃsa; this school poses a problem to which we will return further on;

(c) the Sūtra distinguishes the Sūtravādins and Kāśyapīyas from the Suvarṣakas while Vasumitra considers them to be identical; it seems the latter was right;

(d) Vasumitra, who was a Sarvāstivādin, tended to give much greater importance to his own school than it had; in contrast to the other three lists he makes all the Sthavira schools, with the exception of the Haimavatas, derive from the Sarvāstivādins; evidently this trait is a falsification of Sarvāstivādin origin and should not be considered to have any historical value.

Thus it is possible to reconstruct a common Kashmirian list (leaving out the dates over which, however, there is agreement) [see figure on p. 8].

(3) The *Mañjuśrīparipṛcchāsūtra*:[4] according to this work, all the schisms supposedly took place in the first century of the Era of the Nirvāṇa. The schools derive from each other in a line [see figure on p. 9].

Obviously this list is merely a misreading of the table given by Vasumi-

4. T 468, p. 510a–b.



tra, in which all the secondary affiliations have been eliminated and the Prajñaptivādin school omitted in order to obtain the traditional number of eighteen schools. The Sūtra, translated into Chinese in 518 by Saṅghavara, dates from the end of the fifth century at the latest. It postdates Vasumitra's treatise from which it draws its inspiration. It gives a simple list and not a table, which is characteristic of a more recent period.

The translation of the terms in this list has given rise to several errors, since the Chinese *Mahāvyutpatti*[5] has been used as the basis. Chapter 274 of the latter, devoted to the names of the schools, includes several interpretations which are wrong, as Professor Anesaki clearly noted in his edition of this work, where he indicates them with the sign (!). It is high time to go further and correct these errors.

(a) The sixth term in the first column, 只底舸, which the *Mahāvyutpatti* reads as *Jetavanīya,* should be read as *Caitika,* since the old pronunciation is *'t'śie-'tiei-ka* (Karlgren), the modern pronunciation *zhi-di-ge* and the Japanese *shi-tai-ka.* It can clearly be seen that the initial is the voiceless palatal corresponding to the Sanskrit *c* and not the sonant which corresponds to *j* in that language. Consequently, 只底舸 (*zhi-di-ge*) must indeed be read as *Caitika* and not as *Jetavanīya.* Moreover, it is *Caitika* that would be expected here.

5. The errors seem to come from Julien, "Listes diverses des dix-huit écoles schismatiques qui sont sorties du Bouddhisme", pp. 327–61, in which the first line is a re-edition of that in the *Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā.* We will see that Przyluski himself did not correct it.



(b) The eighth term in the second column, 祇山, is translated as *Abhayagirivāsin* in the *Mahāvyutpatti.* This expression in fact means 'mount of wild grasses' and not 'mount of fearlessness' as does *Abhayagiri.* Conversely, it is a very good translation of *Ṣaṇḍagiri,* 'mount of bushes', a form close to *Ṣaṇṇagiri(ka),* the name of the fourth Vātsīputrīya subschool, precisely what one would expect here.

(c) The ninth term in the second column, 大不可棄, is translated as *Mahā-Avantaka* by the *Mahāvyutpatti.* Furthermore, a note in our Sūtra gives another translation of the Sanskrit term: 能射. In fact, the correct interpretation of 棄 is not 'to vomit', Sanskrit VAM, as suggested by the *Mahāvyutpatti,* but rather 'to leave, abandon, neglect', which corresponds to the Sanskrit ŚIṢ. Furthermore, *Mahā-Avantaka* by no means represents the Chinese expression, since it disregards the potential value of 可. Strictly, it can only correspond to 大不棄. In order to render the Chinese expression correctly, retaining the root VAM, it would call for *Mahā-Avamya,* which is quite different from *Mahā-Avantaka.* Conversely, it is possible to reconstruct, from the Sanskrit root ŚIṢ, a form which retains the potential value: *Mahā-Aśeṣya* which, because of the internal sandhi, becomes *Mahāśeṣya* and is phonetically very close to *Mahāśāsa(ka),* which is a common doublet for *Mahīśāsaka.* The first sibilant is retained and the second replaced by another sibilant, a common occurrence in Prākritised forms. The second Chinese translation, given in a note, 能射, means 'able to draw a bow' and corresponds to the Sanskrit *Maheṣvāsaka,* 'great archer', an epithet of Śiva. This form is also very close to *Mahāśāsaka.* This time the *ī* is replaced by *e,* a vowel which is precisely related to *ī* in Sanskrit phonetics. The first sibilant, *ś,* is rendered by the consonantal group *ṣv,* since it can be considered that *ś* was a Prākrit consonant representing the Sanskrit group *ṣv.* The successive passage of *ṣv* to *ss* then to *s,* followed by the confusion of the sibilants *ś* for *ṣ,* is easily explained in Prākrit phonetics. Finally, the last sibilant is retained. Consequently, the two Chinese expressions very well cover, in their translation, the Sanskrit *Mahīśāsaka,* which is precisely what one expects here. Przyluski's hypothesis,[6] identifying by means of this last fact *Mahīśāsaka* with *Mahā-Avantaka* and deducing the residence of the Mahīśāsakas in Avanti, is completely without foundation.

(4) *Bhavya's first list:* although Tāranātha, who reproduces it, attributes it to the Sthaviras, it is of Kashmirian and Sarvāstivādin origin. Like the preceding list, it is a misreading of Vasumitra's table, transformed into a list. The tradition allied to it dates to the first schism in 160 EN, but this date is more than suspect for reasons that we will point out elsewhere.

6. Przyluski, *Le Concile de Rājagṛha*, p. 235.

Mahāsāṃghikas	Sthaviras (= Haimavatas)
Ekavyāvahārikas	Sarvāstivādins (= Vibhajyavādins, Hetuvādins, Muruṇṭakas)
Lokottaravādins	Vātsīputrīyas
Bahuśrutīyas	Dhamottarīyas
Prajñaptivādins	Bhadrayānīyas
Caitikas	Sammitīyas (= Avantakas, Kurukulas)
Pūrvaśailas	Mahīśāsakas
Aparaśailas	Dharmaguptakas
	Dharmasuvarṣakas (= Kāśyapīyas)
	Uttarīyas (= Sāṅkrāntivādins)

It can be seen that:

(a) The Kukkuṭikas have been omitted, but the Prajñaptivādins appear in the first column; as in the preceding list, a term was omitted in order to obtain the total of eighteen schools, but the choice was different.

(b) The Ṣaṇṇagarikas are missing in the second column, and the Haimavatas are identified with the Sthaviras, allowing a total of eighteen schools to be obtained.

It is easy to reconstruct the list which inspired both this and the preceding one. We have:

Mahāsāṃghikas	Sthaviras
Ekavyāvahārikas	Haimavatas
Lokottaravādins	Sarvāstivādins
Kukkuṭikas	Vātsīputrīyas
Bahuśrutīyas	Dharmottarīyas
Prajñaptivādins	Bhadrayānīyas
Caitikas	Sammatīyas
Pūrvaśailas	Ṣaṇṇagarikas
Aparaśailas (= Uttaraśailas)	Mahīśāsakas
	Dharmaguptakas
	Kāśyapīyas (= Suvarṣakas)
	Sautrāntikas (= Uttarīyas, Sāṅkrāntivādins)

This is merely listing what Vasumitra gave as a table. Chronologically, this common list postdates that table, but predates the third and fourth Kashmirian lists which are derived from it. By basing ourselves on the dates of the Chinese translations, we find:

(1) Table of the *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra*, c. 300

↓

(2) Table of Vasumitra, c. 350

↓

(3) List compiled from Vasumitra's table, c. 400

↙ ↘

(4) List of the *Mañjuśrīparipṛcchāsūtra* c. 450 — 5) Bhavya's list No. 1 c. 450

(5) *The list of five schools in Uḍḍiyāna:* Chinese historians of Buddhism have preserved the memory of a classification into five schools, which were sometimes given as the five trunks of the eighteen schools.[7] Apart from the fact that this classification is known in India only in works from this region, these give a satisfactory explanation for it. The *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra*, translated between 317 and 420,[8] after giving the table of the schools, states that at the time it was compiled, about 300, only five of these schools remained, namely the Mahāsāṃghikas, Dharmaguptakas, Sarvāstivādins, Kāśyapīyas and Mahīśāsakas. We know from irrefutable evidence (inscriptions, Pāli literature, narrations of their travels by Xuanzang and Yijing) that in fact quite a few more schools were still prospering in that time, but outside Uḍḍiyāna, which explains the Sūtra's mistake on this point. It was in Uḍḍiyāna that Xuanzang met the last survivors of this group of five schools[9] who were studying their five Vinaya-piṭakas but who had fallen into the ways of magic. Nearly a century later, Yijing records them still in the same

7. See especially Chavannes, *Mémoire sur les religieux éminents*, p. 131, note, which quotes the texts and attempts to interpret them, and, more recently, Lin, *L'Aide-Mémoire*, pp. 193–4.

8. T 1465, p. 900c.

9. Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels in India*, pp. 226–7.

region.[10] Another Indian work,[11] translated about the same period as the Sūtra, gives a description of the five schools which is practically identical to that given by the latter but places the Sarvāstivādins first, which seems to mean that the author belonged to that school. It is noteworthy that in their description these two works praise the five schools equally. This implies that the latter lived in perfect agreement in Uḍḍiyāna. At all events, neither of these two documents claims that these five schools were the five original schools nor attempts a classification of the eighteen schools as deriving from them. On the contrary, one of them, probably the oldest, clearly explains that they represented all that remained (in that region, at least) of the eighteen schools at the time it was compiled. In fact no Indian document substantiating the Chinese classifications based on these five schools can be found. We should therefore consider them as being completely false, all the more so in that they are gainsaid by all the other classifications of the eighteen schools, which we will study more thoroughly here.

II. The Traditions of the Second Period

These date from the sixth and seventh centuries and are characterized by their division of the schools into three or four main groups.

A. The Mahāsāṃghika Tradition

This is Bhavya's second list. Tāranātha attributes it to the Mahāsāṃghikas, which is possible since it differs from all the others we have seen previously. It is a classification into three main groups, which enables us to place it chronologically between the last Kashmirian lists of the fifth century and the seventh-century Mūlasarvāstivādin lists, therefore in the sixth century.

We note that:

(a) the Vibhajyavādins form a separate group, quite distinct from the Sarvāstivādins; this indicates a southern origin, since the Sarvāstivādins were absent from the south, in contrast to the Vibhajyavādins; furthermore, the fact that the memory of the relationship between the two groups has been lost indicates a fairly late date;

10. Takakusu, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, p. xxiv.

11. T 1470, pp. 925c–926a.

Sthaviras	Sarvāstivādins	Sarvāstivādins
		Sautrāntikas
	Vātsīputrīyas	Sammatīyas
		Dharmottarīyas
		Bhadrayānīyas
		Ṣaṇṇagarikas
Mahāsāṃghikas	Mahāsāṃghikas	
	Pūrvaśailas	
	Aparaśailas	
	Rājagirikas	
	Haimavatas	
	Caitikas	
	Siddhārthikas	
	Gokulikas	
Vibhajyavādins	Mahīśāsakas	
	Kāśyapīyas	
	Dharmaguptakas	
	Tāmraśātīyas	

(b) the Vātsīputrīyas derive directly from the Sthaviras and not, as Vasumitra maintained, from the Sarvāstivādins;

(c) the order of the four Vātsīputrīya subschools is new; more particularly, the Sammatīyas are in the first place, which is no doubt not unconnected with the importance attached to them at the beginning of the seventh century, as Xuanzang and Yijing recorded;

(d) the great Mahāsāṃghika schools, except for the Gokulikas who are moreover named last, have disappeared; conversely, the four Andhaka schools of Buddhaghosa are named, which seems to indicate a southern origin;

(e) the Haimavatas are placed among the Mahāsāṃghika schools, in contrast to the preceding lists, which placed them among the Sthaviras, but in agreement with Vinītadeva;

(f) the Tāmraśātīyas are named, as in the Sammatīya list given above; perhaps we should see here a geographical indication, the country of Andhra being very near Mahārāṣṭra and Mālva, the main domains of the Sammatīyas and their affiliates.

This tradition is clearly of southern origin. If Tāranātha is correct, it was current among the Mahāsāṃghikas of the south, that is, in Andhra country, around Amarāvatī. This is all the more plausible in that it clearly differs from the other two southern traditions, those of the Theravādins of Ceylon and the Sammatīyas from the west. It is therefore of great documentary value. Furthermore, it pertains to a relatively late period and is doubtless the most recent of the three lists given by Bhavya. By reflecting the state of the schools at that time, probably the sixth century, it supplies an appreciable rung on the chronological ladder of our data.

B. The Mūlasarvāstivādin Tradition

This has been transmitted to us for the end of the seventh century by Yijing, but in incomplete form, and for the eighth century by Vinītadeva. It consists of four main groups.

(I) *Yijing's list*:[12]

(1) Ārya-Mahāsāṃghikas:	7 subdivisions, unspecified.
(2) Ārya-Sthaviras:	3 subdivisions, unspecified.
(3) Ārya-Mūlasarvāstivādins:	4 subdivisions: (a) Mūlasarvāstivādins (b) Dharmaguptakas (c) Mahīśāsakas (d) Kāśyapīyas
(4) Ārya-Sammatīyas:	4 subdivisions, unspecified.

12. Takakusu, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, pp. xxiii–xxiv and 7–20.

It is possible to reconstruct this in part, especially with the help of Vinītadeva's list:

(1) Ārya-Mahāsāṃghikas	Mahāsāṃghikas ? Lokottaravādins ? Bahuśrutīyas ? Prajñaptivādins ? Haimavatas ? Pūrvaśailas ? Aparaśailas ?	*(with strong reservations)*
(2) Ārya-Sthaviras	Jetavanīyas Abhayagirivāsins Mahāvihāravāsins	*(very probable)*
(3) Ārya-Mūlasarvāstivādins	Mūlasarvāstivādins Dharmaguptakas Mahīśāsakas Kāśyapīyas	
(4) Ārya-Sammatīyas	Sammatīyas (or Vātsīputrīyas) Dharmottarīyas Bhadrayānīyas Ṣaṇṇagarikas	*(probable)*

(II) *Vinītadeva's list:*

This differs appreciably from the preceding one and contains some considerable mistakes.

In this list, it should be noted that:

(a) the Haimavatas are classed among the Mahāsāṃghikas, as in the Mahāsāṃghika list above;

(b) the Mahāsāṃghika schools of the north and south seem to be equally poorly known, either because they had disappeared by that time, which is probable, or because the list was compiled in a region remote from both Kashmir and Andhra country, in this case Magadha or Madhyadeśa, where, according to Yijing, the Mūlasarvāstivādins were then the most numerous (there is not the slightest doubt that Yijing's list comes from this region);

(c) the Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas, Kāśyapīyas, Tāmraśātīyas and Vibhajyavādins are classed among the Sarvāstivādins, which is an indication of Sarvāstivādin origin;

(d) the Bahuśrutīyas are also classed among the Sarvāstivādins and not

Mahāsāṃghikas	Pūrvaśailas Aparaśailas Haimavatas Lokottaravādins Prajñaptivādins
Sarvāstivādins	Mūlasarvāstivādins Kāśyapīyas Mahīśāsakas Dharmaguptakas Bahuśrutīyas Tāmraśātīyas Vibhajyavādins
Sthaviras	Jetavanīyas Abhayagirivāsins Mahāvihāravāsins
Sammatīyas	Kaurukullakas (?) Avantakas (?) Vātsīputrīyas

among the Mahāsāṃghikas, as in the older lists; we should recall that Vasumitra points out the doctrinal relationship which existed between the Bahuśrutīyas and the Sarvāstivādins;

(e) for the first time a Vibhajyavādin school appears, distinct from but affiliated to the Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas, Kāśyapīyas and Tāmraśātīyas, which poses a problem;

(f) the three Sinhalese Sthavira schools are named: this proves that the geographical origin of this list was in close contact with Ceylon, and it reinforces the hypothesis of a Magadhan origin;

(g) the Sammatīyas have eclipsed all their affiliated schools and have become head of the group; Xuanzang, in the second quarter of the seventh century, had already noted their great numerical importance;

(h) the three small Vātsīputrīya subschools, the Dharmottarīyas, Bhadrayānīyas and Ṣaṇṇagarikas, have disappeared.

III. The Traditions of the Third Period

These are more or less emended re-editions of the earlier lists.

A. The Chinese Lists

These are given in particular by the *Sanlunyiguan* translated by Stanislas Julien[13] and are no more than faithful copies of the tables and lists of the Kashmirian tradition of the first period. The only notable differences arise from errors in Julien's translation. There is no point in repeating them here.

B. Tāranātha's Tibetan Lists

These are fairly faithful copies of Bhavya's three lists and the one by Vinītadeva. The worst mistakes come from Schiefner's misreadings: it is not the Tibetan text that is at fault; it is the German translation.

In his copy of Bhavya's list 1, which he attributes to the Sthaviras, Tāranātha only omits to quote the synonyms given by Bhavya.

His copy of Bhavya's list 2, which he attributes to the Mahāsāṃghikas, is entirely correct. Schiefner erred by translating *don-grub-pa,* which means Siddhārthika, as Saṃkrānti.

Tāranātha copies Bhavya's table 3, which he correctly attributes to the Sammatīyas, by transforming it into a simple list of four groups: Sarvāstivādins, Vātsīputrīyas, Haimavatas and Mahāsāṃghikas. Schiefner erred by translating *man-ston-pa,* which means Mahīśāsaka, as Bahuśrutīya, in the first group.

C. The Other Tibetan Lists

These are all connected with the Mūlasarvāstivādin traditions of the second period. They are later by several centuries but still consist of the same four groups: Sarvāstivādins or Mūlasarvāstivādins, Mahāsāṃghikas, Sammatīyas and Sthaviras. In general they are content, like Yijing, to give the number of the subdivisions of each group without specifying their composition, and these numbers vary considerably.

The *Varṣāgraprcchāsūtras,*[14] translated in the eleventh century, give:

13. Julien, "Listes diverses des dix-huit écoles schismatiques qui sont sorties du Bouddhisme."

14. *mdo* LXXIV, 2; XCV, 16; XC, 2, 6 and 21; W. W. Rockhill, *The Life of the Buddha,* London 1884, p. 183, n. 1. [Ed.: XC, 6 = *Bhikṣuvarṣāgraprcchā*; XC, 21 = *Śrāmaṇeravarṣāgraprcchā*. Bareau cites the Peking edition of the Tengyur where both texts are located in the *mdo* (sūtra) section. In the Derge edition they are located in the *'dul ba* (*vinaya*) section (Tohoku catalogue numbers 4132 and 4133).]

Ārya-Sarvāstivādins	Kāśyapīyas Mahīśāsakas Dharmaguptakas Mūlasarvāstivādins
Ārya-Mahāsāṃghikas	Pūrvaśailas Aparaśailas Haimavatas Vibhajyavādins Prajñaptivādins Lokottaravādins
Ārya-Sammatīyas	Tāmraśātīyas Avantakas Kurukullas Bahuśrutīyas Vātsīputrīyas
Ārya-Sthaviras	Jetavanīyas Abhayagirivāsins Mahāvihāravāsins

It should be noted that:

(a) the Sarvāstivādin group is that of Yijing, even though the order is changed, and it agrees with the older lists;

(b) the Mahāsāṃghika group is identical to that of Vinītadeva, which is correct, but for some obscure reason the Vibhajyavādins have been incorporated into it, which is certainly an error;

(c) the inclusion of the Tāmraśātīyas and Bahuśrutīyas in the Sammatīya group is an obvious error; apart from that, this group is identical to that of Vinītadeva;

(d) the Sthavira group is identical to that of Vinītadeva.

Consequently, this list is merely a copy of Vinītadeva's, with some flagrant errors. It provides nothing new that could be of use.

In brief, all the lists of the third period are more or less correct copies of the lists of the two preceding periods and there is nothing that can be derived from them that was not known to the older documents.

As might have been expected, the traditions diverge the more among themselves the later they are. A comparison of the three great traditions of the first period should allow a reconstruction of a table of the schools which reflects the historical truth quite clearly.

It could be objected that such an endeavour is worthless, that we possess only traditions and not trustworthy documents. This argument is of little validity because:

(a) we have shown that the existence of nearly all the schools is a certain fact;

(b) the five traditions which have come down to us originated in the most distant points from each other in India, Kashmir, Ceylon, the west, Andhra and Magadha, which would make it difficult for each of these regions to accept a common tradition;

(c) these traditions differ in characteristic details, proving satisfactorily that they are not all derived from the same common tradition.

Consequently, we find ourselves in the presence of independent traditions, each school having retained the memory of the schisms which broke up the Buddhist Community and especially of the one which brought itself into being. Each of these traditions represents the history of these schisms as seen from a particular angle, a cause of certain errors.

Let us therefore compare the three traditions of the first period, group by group.

I. The *Mahāsāṃghikas*

(1) The three traditions are agreed in bringing forward two great schools first: the *Ekavyāvahārikas* and the *Gokulikas* or *Kukkuṭikas.*

(2) Only the northern tradition knows of the *Lokottaravādins.* The only information we have on their residence comes from Xuanzang, who locates them in Bāmiyān, in northern Afghanistan, which goes some way to explaining why the southern tradition would have been unaware of them. Moreover, the Sammatīya tradition attributes theses characteristic of the Lokottaravādins to the Ekavyāvahārikas. Vasumitra attributes them jointly to the Mahāsāṃghikas, Ekavyāvahārikas and Kukkuṭikas, and Vinītadeva attributes to the Lokottaravādins all the theses which the other two attribute to the Ekavyāvahārikas and Mahāsāṃghikas. It is therefore probable that the Lokottaravādins were hardly distinguishable from the Ekavyāvahārikas.

(3) The three traditions agree in having the *Bahuśrutīyas* and *Prajñaptivādins* emerge together, at a date later than that of the appearance of the preceding two or three great schools. The two non-Kashmirian traditions have them spring from the Gokulikas, which is quite possible. This assertion could come from information supplied by the Bahuśrutīyas, whose

presence in Andhra country near the centres of those two traditions is authenticated by an inscription.

(4) The three traditions agree in having the *Caitikas* emerge at an even later date. The Sammatīya tradition has them spring from the Gokulikas. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that the presence of the Caitikas in Andhra country is authenticated by some inscriptions, like that of the Bahuśrutīyas to whom the same origin is attributed.

(5) The *Pūrvaśailas, Aparaśailas* or *Uttaraśailas* are unknown to the old Theravādin and Sammatīya traditions. This justifies the Kashmirian tradition, which places their appearance much later still.

(6) The *Rājagirikas* and *Siddhārthikas* are unknown to the traditions of the first period. However, the Mahāsāṃghika tradition of the second period places them in this group, and Buddhaghosa, in the fourth century, attributes clearly Mahāsāṃghika theses to them.

II. The *Sthaviras*

(1) The *Haimavatas* are unknown to the early Sinhalese tradition and the Kashmirian Mahāsāṃghika tradition of the same period. Vasumitra and the Sammatīyas consider them to be an extremely orthodox Sthavira school, completely separated from other schools of this group. Bhavya's Kashmirian tradition, which also dates to the first period, even makes their name a synonym of the Sthaviras. Conversely, the two traditions of the second period make them a Mahāsāṃghika school and place them among the Mahāsāṃghika schools from Andhra country, which seems to be a contradiction with their name, which clearly reflects a northern origin. We would not go far wrong in considering the Haimavatas as a group, isolated in the Himalayas, of Sthaviras who remained extremely orthodox because of their very isolation and who were not at first distinguished from the Sthaviras. Later, around the fourth century, they were made into a separate school. Later still, in the fifth or sixth century, they were profoundly influenced by the Mahāsāṃghika schools, perhaps by missionaries who had come from the centre in Andhra, and could hence be considered as belonging to the Mahāsāṃghika group.

(2) The *Vātsīputrīyas* are recognized by the three traditions (apart from Vasumitra and with good cause) as having emerged directly and in the first place from the Sthaviras. The three traditions are in agreement in establishing that the *Dharmottarīyas, Bhadrayānīyas, Sammatīyas* and *Saṇṇagarikas*

are the four subdivisions of this group. Therefore, no doubts can be entertained on this point.

(3) Unlike Vasumitra, who has all the Sthavira schools emerge from the *Sarvāstivādins,* the Theravādin tradition has them emerge from the *Mahīśāsakas,* except for the Vātsīputrīya group. However, Vasumitra was a Sarvāstivādin, whereas in the south these were unknown, unlike the Mahīśāsakas. These two traditions, therefore, twist the truth, each to the profit of their own school. The Sammatīya tradition and that of the Mahāsāṃghikas of Kashmir are agreed over an intermediate solution: apart from the Haimavatas and the Vātsīputrīya group, all the other Sthavira schools sprang from the Sarvāstivādins. In fact, we possess a whole collection of documents (*Kathāvatthu, Vijñānakāya,* Vasumitra, Bhavya, Vinītadeva) which prove to us that the Theravādins, Mahīśāsakas and Kāśyapīyas rejected the fundamental thesis of the Sarvāstivādins. In such a case it seems excessive to call the Sthaviras Sarvāstivādin before they divided into Sarvāstivādins and non-Sarvāstivādins (Theravādins, Mahīśāsakas, Kāśyapīyas, etc.) or Vibhajyavādins. It is better to retain their name of Sthaviras.

(4) The Kashmirian and Sinhalese traditions are agreed in having the *Dharmaguptakas* emerge from the Mahīśāsakas, and this does not contradict the Sammatīya tradition.

(5) All the traditions are in agreement in having the *Kāśyapīyas* emerge after the Mahīśāsakas, but are in disagreement over their origin. The Sinhalese have them spring directly from the Sarvāstivādins and, hence, indirectly from the Mahīśāsakas; the Sammatīyas and southern Mahāsāṃghikas place them beside the Mahīśāsakas in the subgroup of the Sarvāstivādins. Since we know (*Kathāvatthu, Satyasiddhiśāstra,* Vasumitra, Bhavya, Vinītadeva) that their basic thesis represents a compromise between the Sarvāstivādin and non-Sarvāstivādin theses, it could be that they emerged directly from the Sthavira group, but a little later than the Sarvāstivādins and Mahīśāsakas.

(6) Vasumitra and the Sammatīyas identify the *Sautrāntikas* with the *Sāṅkrāntivādins.* The Mahāsāṃghikas of Kashmir and the Theravādins make them two distinct but closely related schools. Only the Mahāsāṃghikas of Kashmir have them emerge directly from the Sthaviras and not, like all the other traditions, from the Sarvāstivādins. All the traditions seem to be in agreement in considering them as one of the last schools to appear in the Sthavira group.

(7) The *Sinhalese Sthaviras* form a separate group, consisting of three

schools, in the Mūlasarvāstivādin lists. Their composition is confirmed by the Sinhalese Chronicles, but it is difficult to locate this group in the tables from the first period; even the one from Ceylon does not mention it. A study of the *Kathāvatthu* and the Vinayas shows us that it belongs to the non-Sarvāstivādin Sthavira group, but it is also distinct from the Mahīśāsakas, to whom however it is closest, the Dharmaguptakas, whose Vinaya is very different, and the Kāśyapīyas. We should therefore decide to make it a separate group.

Here, then, is a table which should represent the true affiliation between the schools fairly accurately:



CHAPTER 2

The Appearance of the Schools

The title of this chapter is highly ambitious since the paucity of our documents on this question makes the project of ever writing anything specific and definitive on the matter most uncertain.

1. The Mahāsāṃghikas

The first great schism which split the until then undivided Community into Sthaviras and Mahāsāṃghikas is the one about which we have by far the most documents. Unfortunately, the latter are far from being in agreement and it is necessary to postpone a critical and detailed study of them to a forthcoming work.[1] Here we will give only a quick recapitulation, although based on serious research.

The first great schism postdates the [Second] Council of Vaiśālī, of which all the schools give a noticeably matching account in their Vinayapiṭakas, and which they are agreed in dating from 100 to 110 EN (Era of the Nirvāṇa).[2] Had it been prior to this, the account in the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya would have differed more from the others and, since it would have been a matter of narrating an argument, the schools would have chosen the account of the highly important first schism, rather than that of the lesser Council of Vaiśālī.

The various sources are agreed in explaining the great schism by means of Mahādeva's five propositions concerning the nature of the Arhat, which were rejected by the numerically few but knowledgeable Sthaviras, and adopted by the Mahāsāṃghikas, who were numerically greater but less

1. Bareau, *Les premiers conciles bouddhiques*, chapter 3.
2. Hofinger, *Étude sur le concile de Vaiśālī*, passim.

knowledgeable. According to these same sources, the event took place in Pāṭaliputra in the first half of the second century EN, and Bhavya's Sammatīyas state the same: in 137 EN, in the reign of Nanda and Mahāpadma, that is, in 480 - 137 = 343 BCE approximately.[3] Later Kashmirian sources (Vasumitra) give 100, 110 or 116 EN, under Dharmāśoka, but this is contested by other earlier Kashmirian sources of varying origins (*Vibhāṣā*, *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra*), which, while formally acknowledging the role of arbitrator played by the king of Magadha on that occasion, do not give his name or specify the date. If the king had been Dharmāśoka, the great protector of Buddhism, his name would not have been forgotten by these two texts. Furthermore, to place Dharmāśoka at the beginning of the second century EN is impossible.[4]

Consequently, we can situate the Mahāsāṃghika schism about 140 EN, that is, in 340 BCE, in Pāṭaliputra, under the kings Nanda and Mahāpadma, who arbitrated in the dispute and declared the majority, namely the Mahāsāṃghikas, to be in the right. The latter adopted Mahādeva's five propositions on the Arhat and separated from the Sthaviras, who rejected them.

2. The Ekavyāvahārikas, Lokottaravādins and Gokulikas

The sources from the northwest are agreed in dating their appearance in the second century EN, and Paramārtha attributes the origin of their separation to differences over the authenticity of the Mahāyāna sūtras.[5] It is impossible to verify one or the other of these facts. However, the time which elapsed between the first schism and this one, half a century at the most, is apparently much too short to take into account the evolution of the Mahāsāṃghikas towards the Mahāyāna and the compilation of the latter's main sūtras. Either the schism was a century or two later or it had another dispute as its origin. The problem is all the more complicated because we do not know whether we should or should not identify the Ekavyāvahārikas with the Lokottaravādins or what the exact form of the Gokulikas' name

3. If we have Nanda and Mahāpadma in 137 EN, the Nirvāṇa must have occurred about 480. The Sammatīyas and Theravādins are in agreement.
4. Bareau, "La date du Nirvāṇa," pp. 27–62.
5. Demiéville, "L'Origine des sectes bouddhiques d'après Paramārtha," pp. 15–64, here p. 43.

was and consequently its interpretation, which would have been useful for us. It is possible that the schism took place around the end of the second century EN, that is, about 300 BCE, and was caused by controversies over certain pre-Mahāyānist tendencies of the Mahāsāṃghikas, either their Buddhology, as is suggested by the name Lokottaravādin, or their ontology, as could be believed from the name Ekavyāvahārika, and that these tendencies were consigned to new sūtras, the first skeletons of the Mahāyāna sūtras. This is only a hypothesis, but we must not forget that in the second century EN we are still right in the middle of the period of elaboration and compilation of the Sūtra-piṭakas, as is confirmed by the many texts in these collections which exist in Pāli but not in Chinese, and the reverse.

3. The Bahuśrutīyas and Prajñaptivādins

These two schools seem to have emerged from an internal split provoked among the Gokulikas by a controversy which, according to Paramārtha, concerned the superficial and profound meanings of the texts, relative truth and absolute truth.

According to the sources from Kashmir, this schism was the last of the second century EN, and was therefore located in the first quarter of the third century BCE, about 290. However, since the sources have a very strong tendency to have all the schools that emerged from the Mahāsāṃghikas appear before those that sprang from the Sthaviras, which is *a priori* suspect as being too systematic, it is acceptable for us to believe that the schism of the Bahuśrutīyas and Prajñaptivādins postdates this period. By locating it in the first half of the third century EN, that is, in approximately 250 BCE, we cannot be too far from the truth.

4. The Caitikas

The date of the appearance of this school is equally unknown. The sources from the northwest locate it either at the end of the second century EN or the beginning of the third, that is, about 200 EN, 280 BCE. The Caitikas may have appeared towards the end of the third century EN, that is, approximately 200 BCE. According to Paramārtha, a new Mahādeva sowed seeds of discontent in people's minds because of false ordinations and, banished by all, he withdrew his disciples into the mountains. Since the only

inscription which names them was found in Amarāvatī and as all the traditions and lists connect them with schools called Andhakas, it is possible to believe that the Caitikas, expelled from the Ganges valley, were the founders of the great Buddhist centre in Andhra country.

5. The Pūrvaśailas and Aparaśailas

These are unknown to two out of the three oldest lists, which come from regions near their chosen area, Andhra country. This silence seems to indicate a later origin, possibly in the course of the first century BCE. These two schools represent two which emerged from the Caitikas, but we are in complete ignorance as to the way in which they differed from the latter or even from each other, unless it is a question of two separate, but neighbouring, residences.

6. The Rājagirikas and Siddhārthikas

Unknown to all the oldest lists, these two schools from Andhra country seem to be quite late, perhaps even from the third or fourth century CE. We know nothing of what gave rise to them or of what differentiates them from the other Andhaka schools, apart from theses of secondary interest.

7. The Vātsīputrīyas

All the traditions are agreed in making the schism from which the Vātsīputrīyas emerged the first of those that split the Sthavira group, and in locating it around 200 EN, that is, 280 BCE. It was provoked by Vātsīputra's teaching on personalism (*pudgalavāda*).

8. The Sammatīyas, Bhadrayānīyas, Dharmottarīyas and Ṣaṇṇagarikas

These four schools, all emerging from the Vātsīputrīyas, appeared between the third century BCE and the first CE, but their exact dates are not known. Their order of emerging seems to be Dharmottarīyas, Bhadrayānīyas, Sammatīyas and Ṣaṇṇagarikas. We do not know what provoked their appearance and we are ill-informed on what differentiated them.

9. The Sarvāstivādins and Vibhajyavādins

The second controversy which divided the Sthaviras was concerned with pan-realism (*sarvāstivāda*) as taught by Kātyāyanīputra and refuted by Maudgalīputra. It can be located in the middle of the third century BCE, and we may suppose that it was this which caused Dharmāśoka to convene the second Pāṭaliputra Council, as a consequence of which Maudgalīputra and the Vibhajyavādins won the case against Kātyāyanīputra and the Sarvāstivādins, who were exiled, or who exiled themselves, and went to convert Kashmir.[6]

10. The Kāśyapīyas

The appearance of the Kāśyapīyas, whose main thesis represents a compromise between that of the Sarvāstivādins and that of the Vibhajyavādins, must be a little later than the schism that separated the latter two schools, since it must have occurred at a time when the debate concerning realism was still heated. If the Second Council of Pāṭaliputra dates from 244 BCE, we can fix the emergence of the Kāśyapīyas approximately in the decade 240–230 BCE.

11. The Mahīśāsakas and Theravādins

It does indeed seem that these two schools are merely subcontinental and Sinhalese variations of the Vibhajyavādins, who became distinct in the course of time due to their geographical separation augmented by certain political events, such as the Sinhalese war against the Tamil invaders in the second and first centuries BCE. This separation would have favoured a distinct evolution of these two sections from the Vibhajyavādin school.

12. The Dharmaguptakas

All the sources agree in having these emerge from the Mahīśāsakas and in giving them, more or less formally and directly, the Kāśyapīyas as a

6. Cf. La Vallée Poussin, *L'Inde aux temps des Maurya*, pp. 133–39.

subschool. However, it appears difficult to situate the appearance of the Dharmaguptakas in the ten or fifteen years which we have just attributed to the interval that separated the emergence of the Vibhajyavādins, therefore of the Mahīśāsakas, from that of the Kāśyapīyas. However it may be, it would not be too serious a mistake to have them appear in the second half of the third century BCE. It seems as though the schism which separated them from the Mahīśāsakas originated in controversies over the respective value of giving to the Buddha and giving to the Saṃgha and over the identity or distinction between the career of the Buddha and that of the Śrāvakas.

13. The Sautrāntikas

All the sources are agreed in considering these as the last of the schools to emerge from the Sthaviras, and the lists from the northwest place their appearance in the fourth century EN, that is, around 150 BCE, at the earliest. The two names of this school, Sautrāntika and Saṅkrāntivādin, lead us to hesitate over the propositions which obliged them to separate from the Sarvāstivādins: they only recognised the authority of the sūtras and not that of the Abhidharma, and maintained that the five aggregates pass from one existence to another.

14. The Haimavatas

Everything that concerns the nature and history of this school, albeit of little importance, remains an enigma.

CHAPTER 3

The Expansion of Buddhism and the Geographical Distribution of the Schools

The whole history of the Buddha took place in the territory extending from Kapilavastu in the north to Bodh-Gayā in the south, and from Kauśāmbī in the west to Rājagṛha in the east, a territory which also included the towns of Śrāvastī in the northwest, Vārāṇasī and Pāṭaliputra on the Ganges and Vaiśālī on the lower Gandak. This represents a rectangle measuring about 500 km from east to west and 400 km from north to south, centred on the middle Ganges.

The accounts of the Council of Vaiśālī, which all except one of the Vinayas are agreed in placing in 100 or 110 after the Nirvāṇa, name Saṃkāśya, Kaṇyākubja and Mathurā,[1] which indicates that at that time the Buddhist territory extended towards the northwest, mounting the course of the Ganges and its tributaries on the right bank and expanding about 500 km in that direction.

However, the great movement of expansion certainly dates from the reign of Aśoka. Buddhism must obviously have profited from the vast extent of the influence of his faithful zeal. As the traditions of the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins claim, it is probably during this period that Ceylon and Kashmir were converted, as well as Gandhāra, Surāṣṭra and Mahārāṣṭra. This immense expansion of Buddhism across the whole of India undoubtedly favoured regional peculiarities of doctrine and hastened and emphasised internal divisions in the Community. It was particularly in this light that we attempted to explain the distinction between the Theravādins and Mahīśāsakas earlier.

Basing themselves on a comparison of the accounts of the Council of

1. Hofinger, *Étude sur le concile de Vaiśālī*, p. 191.

Vaiśālī in the different Vinayas, Przyluski and Hofinger[2] believed they were able to deduce the directions towards which each of the schools had bent its proselytising efforts outwards from the original terrain. According to them, the Mahāsāṃghikas occupied the eastern part of this, the Sarvāstivādins made their way up the Ganges valley in the direction of Kashmir and the northwest, the Dharmaguptakas moved towards the west, while the Mahīśāsakas and Theravādins wended their way through Avanti to the ports of Surāṣṭra. This state of affairs would refer back to the period immediately preceding the great Aśokan expansion, when the major schools had just separated. Such are the first indications that we have on the geographical distribution of the schools, but Przyluski and Hofinger's interpretation is not entirely immune from criticism.[3]

We have no further information prior to the second century CE. At that time, inscriptions inform us of the presence of:[4]

Sarvāstivādins: near Peshawar, in western Kashmir, Mathurā and Śrāvastī;
Mahāsāṃghikas: in Mathurā, Karle and near Kabul;
Caitikas: in Amarāvatī;
Sammatīyas: in Mathurā;
Dharmottarīyas: in Karle and Junnar;
Bhadrayānīyas: in Nāsik and Kanheri.

Inscriptions from the third century attest the presence of:

Mahīśāsakas: in Nāgārjunikoṇḍa and Banavasī;
Pūrvaśailas and *Aparaśailas:* in Nāgārjunikoṇḍa;
Bahuśrutīyas: in Nāgārjunikoṇḍa;
Kāśyapīyas: in Takṣaśilā and the surrounding area.

Inscriptions from the fourth century note the presence of:

Sarvāstivādins: in northeastern Baluchistan;
Sammatīyas: in Sārnāth.

Inscriptions from the fifth century attest the presence of:

Bahuśrutīyas: near Peshawar;

2. Przyluski, *Concile de Rājagṛha*, pp. 307–30; Hofinger, *Étude sur le concile de Vaiśālī*, pp. 183–5. We saw above that the argument based on the Mahāvāntaka-Mahīśāsaka identification presented by Przyluski (p. 325) and taken up again by Hofinger (p. 192) is without foundation, being derived from a misreading.

3. Cf. Bareau, *Les premiers conciles bouddhiques*, ch. 2.

4. For references, see the various chapters in part two.

Kāśyapīyas: near Peshawar;
Mahīśāsakas: in southern Takṣaśilā.

Finally, in the seventh century, Xuanzang, then Yijing, supply us with valuable information on the geographical and numerical distribution of the schools. At the beginning of that century, the former gives the following distribution, with the number of monasteries (M) and monks (m):[5]

Sarvāstivādins: Karashahr (10 M, 2,000 m), Kucha (100 M, 5,000 m), Aksu (50 M, 1,000 m), Kunduz (10 M, 300 m), Tamavāsana [between Śākala and Jālandhara] (1 M, 300 m), Matipur (10 M, 600 m), Kanauj (3 M, 500 m), Ayamukha [near Prayāga] (1 M, 200 m), Vārāṇasī (2,000 m), near Nālandā (1 M, 200 m), Iraṇaparvata [Mungyr] (2 M, 1,000 m), Bhilmal (1 M, 100 m), Khabanda [Pamir] (10 M, 500 m), Wusa [near Tash-Kurgan] (10 M, 1,000 m), Kashgar (some 100 M, 1,000 m), Niya (1 M, few m).

Sammatīyas: Ahicchatra [near Saṃkāśya] (10 M, 1,000 m), Saṃkāśya (5 M, 2,000 m), Ayamukha [near Prayāga] (5 M, 1,000 m), Viśokha [between Kauśāmbī and Śrāvastī] (920 M, 3,000 m), Śrāvastī (some 100 M, few m), Kapilavastu (1 M, 30 or 3,000 m?), Vārāṇasī (30 M, 4,500 m), Vaiśālī (1 M, few m), Iraṇaparvata [Mungyr] (10 M, 3,000 m), Karṇasuvarṇa [north of Orissa] (10 M, 2,000 m), Mālava (some 100 M, 20,000 m), Valabhī (100 M, 6,000 m), Anandapura (10 M, 1,000 m), Sindh [west of Multān] (some 100 M, 10,000 m), Pārvata [northeast of Multān] (not specified), the mouths of the Ganges (10 M, 4,000 m), Pitāśilā [Pattala] (50 M, 3,000 m), Avaṇṭa [northeast of Pattala] (20 M, 1,500 m).

Mahāsāṃghikas: western province of Kashmir (1 M, 100 m), Dhanakaṭaka (20 M, 800 m), Andarab [northern Afghanistan] (3 M, 50 m).

Sthaviras: Samataṭa (30 M, 2,000 m), Draviḍa (100 M, 10,000 m).

Mahāyāna Sthaviras:[6] Bodh-Gayā (1 M, 1,000 m), Kaliṅga (10 M, 500 m), Ceylon (not specified); Bhārukaccha (10 M, 300 m), Surāṣṭra (50 M, 2,500 m).

Sautrāntikas: Śrughna [near Sthāneśvara] (not specified).

Lokottaravādins: Bāmiyān (some 10 M, some 1,000 m).

Mahīśāsakas, Kāśyapīyas, Dharmaguptakas: their Vinayas were studied by degenerate monks, in Uḍḍiyāṇa.

5. Some of these figures are calculated according to the approximate indications given by Xuanzang: 'most of . . .', 'nearly all . . .', etc.

6. Perhaps Mahāyāna *and* Sthaviras should be understood.

Hīnayāna (unspecified): Balkh (100 M, 3,000 m), Paluṣa [near Puṣkaravatī] (1 M, 50 m), Kapiśa (20 M, 1,000 m), Gulutuo [southeast of Jālandhara] (4 M, 200 m), Khotan (10 M, 1,000 m), Śākala (1 M, 100 m), Pārayātra [near Mathurā] (8 M, few m), Sthāneśvara (3 M, 700 m), Śrughna [near Sthāneswar] (4 M, 800 m), Goviśana [near Saṃkāśya] (2 M, 100 m), Prayāga (2 M, few m), Kauśāmbī (1 M, 50 m), Zhanzhu (?) [east of Vaiśālī] (10 M, 1,000 m), near Nālandā (1 M, 50 m), Champā (some 10 M, 200 m), Magadha (10 M, 2,000 m).

Mahāyāna: Kapiśa (80 M, 5,000 m), Lampaka (10 M, few m), Paluṣa [near Puṣkaravatī] (1 M, 50 m), Uḍḍiyāṇa (long before: 1,400 M, 18,000 m; at the beginning of the seventh century, few monks), Takṣaśilā (many M, few m), region east of Takṣaśilā (2 M, 300 m), Gulutuo [southeast of Jālandhara] (16 M, 800 m), Piluoshan-na [west of Saṃkāśya] (2 M, 300 m), Mahāśāla [west of Vaiśālī] (several M, some m), Śvetapura [south of Vaiśālī] (not specified), Magadha (40 M, 8,000 m), Puṇyavardhana [at the starting point of the Ganges delta] (1 M, 700 m), Orissa (100 M, 10,000 m), Mahākośala [Nagpur region] (100 M, 10,000 m), Parvata [northeast of Multān] (1 M, 100 m), Varaṇa [south of Multān] (some 10 M, 300 m), Zaoguta [Ghazni region] (some 100 M, 10,000 m), Yarkhand (some 10 M, 100 m), Khotan (80 M, 4,000 m), Śrughna [near Sthāneswar] (1 M, 200 m), Kashmir (1 M, 30 m), Harīpur (1 M, few m).

Both Vehicles (together): Jālandhara (50 M, 2,000 m), Mathurā (20 M, 2,000 m), Kanauj (100 M, 10,000 m), Ayodhyā (100 M, 3,000 m), Vṛjji (10 M, 1,000 m), Nepal (2,000 m), Puṇyavardhana [at the starting point of the Ganges delta] (20 M, 3,000 m), Koṅkaṇapura [Bombay region] (100 M, 10,000 m), Mahārāṣṭra (100 M, 5,000 m), Kita [Kheda, northwest of Mālava] (10 M, 1,000 m), Ujjayinī (some 10 M, 300 m), Parvata [northeast of Multān] (10 M, 1,000 m), Lang-galuo [coast of Baluchistan] (100 M, 6,000 m), Huo [near Kunduz] (10 M, 100 m).

Undetermined: Termed (10 M, 1,000 m), Hulin [between Termed and Kunduz) (10 M, 500 m), region between Termed and Hulin (12 M, 300 m), Nagarahāra (many M, few m), Gandhāra (1,000 M, no m), Bolor [east of Uḍḍiyāṇa] (some 100 M, some 1,000 m), Kashmir (100 M, 5,000 m), Punach [western Kashmir] (5 M, few m), Rājapura [western Kashmir] (10 M, few m), Ṭakka [western Kashmir] (10 M, few m), Zhinabudi [south of Śākala] (10 M), Shidotulu [south of Jālandhara] (10 M, few m), Brahmapura [southeast of Matipur] (5 M, few m), Vaiśālī (some 100

M, few m), Nālandā (some 1,000 m), Kajaṅgala [east of Champā] (6 or 7 M, 300 m), Tāmralipti (10 M, 1,000 m), Veṅgī (20 M, 3,000 m), Malakuṭa [southern tip of India] (many M, few m), Zhizhito [northeast of Ujjayinī] (some 10 M, few m), Multān (10 M, few m), Khost [south of Kunduz] (3 M, few m), Badakshan (3 or 4 M, few m), Kuraṇa [near Badakshan] (few M, few m), Dharmasthiti [on the upper Oxus] (10 M, few m), Shangmi [in Pamir] (2 M, few m).

In sum, Xuanzang does not know of much beyond the three great Hīnayāna schools, the Sammatīyas, Sarvāstivādins and Sthaviras. The *Sammatīyas,* with more than 65,000 monks in some 1,000 monasteries, are present everywhere, especially in Mālava, in Valabhī, on the lower Indus and the lower Ganges, but they are also found dispersed through Madhyadeśa in the whole area between the lower Indus and the lower Ganges with a strong predominance in the west. The *Sarvāstivādins,* with more than 16,000 monks in more than 500 monasteries, are especially numerous in Kashgar, Aksu and Kucha, therefore in Central Asia, but they are also found in northern Afghanistan, dispersed throughout Madhyadeśa, on the lower Ganges, radiating out towards the northeast and southwest from their centre in the extreme northwest of India. The *Sthaviras,* with 20,000 monks in more than 200 monasteries, are very numerous in the Draviḍa country and Ceylon and well represented in Samataṭa and Surāṣṭra, their main base clearly being in south India, their secondary bases the mouth of the Ganges and that of the Narbadā, the two ports passed through when coming from the south in order to make a pilgrimage to Magadha. The *Lokottaravādins,* still very numerous, are concentrated in Bāmiyān, in western Afghanistan. The *Mahāsāṃghikas,* although they have nearly disappeared entirely with 1,000 monks in 20 monasteries, are still represented in Kashmir and northeastern Afghanistan on the one hand, and on the lower Kṛṣṇā, their last important stronghold. The adherents of the *Mahāyāna,* with more than 70,000 monks in more than 1,000 monasteries, are particularly numerous in Kapiśa, but are also found in the extreme northwest of India, scattered throughout Madhyadeśa, on the lower Ganges, the middle Indus and in Yarkhand, their main base being northeastern Afghanistan, especially in the Magadha-Orissa-Mahākośala cluster.

Buddhism is therefore represented more or less everywhere in India and Central Asia. Xuanzang counts more than 200,000 monks living in some 7,000 monasteries, a third of which are in ruins. Certain regions,

where it prospers, seem to be characterised by the fact that very divergent schools and both vehicles lived there side by side. Such are Kashmir; the whole Ganges basin with Jālandhara, Mathurā, Ayodhyā, Puṇyavardhana and especially Nālandā and Kanauj; Veṅgī at the mouth of the Godavarī; Konkan and Mahārāṣṭra.

Xuanzang, however, sorrowfully notes the ruins he encountered in the areas where Buddhism, flourishing greatly not long before, has nearly disappeared. Such are Gandhāra and Uḍḍiyāṇa, rich with vestiges of their former greatness; the extreme north of Punjab with Takṣaśilā, Punach and especially Ṭakka; Pāryātra and Kauśāmbī but also Śrāvastī, Kapilavastu, those most holy towns of all Buddhism, and Champā; Dhanakaṭaka, near the ancient Amarāvatī, Choḷya, southwest of the latter; Malakuṭa, in the extreme south of India; Ujjayinī and its neighbour called Zhizhito by the Chinese pilgrim; Multān and Varaṇa on the middle Indus; Yarkhand in Central Asia.

Yijing's report is much shorter. According to him, the *Mahāsāṃghikas* are present in Magadha, not very numerous in western India (Lāṭa and Sindhu), as in the south and the north. They are found mixed with other Buddhists in eastern India, but not in Ceylon. They are belatedly introduced into Sumatra and Java. A few are found in Shensi.

The *Sthaviras* are numerous in southern India, where they form nearly the whole of the Community. They are found in small numbers in the west (Lāṭa and Sindhu) and east, but not in the north. They are belatedly introduced into Sumatra and Java, but are not found in China.

The *Mūlasarvāstivādins* are in the majority in Magadha and constitute nearly the entire Community in northern India. A few are to be found in the west and south, and they are present in the east along with adherents of other schools. They form nearly the whole of the Community in Java and Sumatra. A few are found in Champā. They are flourishing throughout southern China.

The *Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas* and *Kāśyapīyas* have disappeared completely from India proper, but still have a few adherents in Uḍḍiyāṇa, Karashahr and Khotan, though not in Ceylon. They are flourishing in the whole of southern China. The *Dharmaguptakas* are found in eastern China and Shensi. They are numerous in Java and Sumatra.

The *Sammatīyas* are flourishing strongly in western India (Lāṭa and Sindhu). They are found in Magadha and the east, but only a few in the

south and none in the north or Ceylon. There are a few in Java and Sumatra and they are in a clear majority in Champā. They are not found in China.

In the seventy-odd years which separate Yijing's journey from that of Xuanzang, the situation had therefore hardly changed.

In fact, it seems that the geographical distribution of the schools varied little between the first inscriptions of the second century and Yijing's report in the last years of the seventh century, that is, an interval of more than five hundred years. All that can be noted with certainty is the disappearance of some schools, even of Buddhism itself, in certain regions.

In the first seven centuries CE, the distribution was as follows:

In Madhyadeśa and Magadha, lands of great pilgrimages and common holy territory, all the schools are represented, living side by side.

The *Mahāsāṃghikas* have two large centres: the extreme northwest (Kashmir, Gandhāra, Kapiśa, Uḍḍiyāṇa, Bāmiyān), the domain of the oldest schools, Mahasāṃghikas proper and Lokottaravādins, and the region of Amarāvatī, domain of the more recent schools, Caitikas, Pūrvaśailas and Aparaśailas; the Bahuśrutīyas, who appeared in an intermediate period, are present here and there, thus ensuring a kind of liaison. However, the Hun invasion in the sixth century and the revival of Śaivism a little later, both in the northwest and southeast of India, had the effect of hastening their disappearance. On the other hand, the rise of the Mahāyāna, from the beginning of the Common Era, must have affected the Mahāsāṃghikas much more than it affected the adherents of the other schools, because of the trend of their doctrines.

The *Sarvāstivādins* have their main centres in the extreme northwest (Kashmir, Gandhāra, Uḍḍiyāṇa, Kapiśa) and the Ganges valley. The Hun invasion in the sixth century considerably reduced their numbers at the first domain, no doubt to the profit of the second. Their literature proves that the northwest was their main centre at the beginning of the Common Era, the rise of the second domain certainly being much later.

The *Sthaviras* have their main centre in Ceylon and southern India and, as secondary centres, Samataṭa and Surāṣṭra.

The *Sammatīyas* have become the predominant Vātsīputrīya school and by far the most numerous of the Hīnayānist schools in the seventh century. Well represented everywhere between the lower Ganges and the lower Indus, their main centre is in western India and the secondary centre the lower Ganges.

The *Bhadrayānīyas* and *Dharmottarīyas* are only recorded, in the second century, in a narrow area to the east of Bombay, therefore at the southern limit of the main Sammatīya centre.

The *Kāśyapīyas* are recorded only in the northwest (Gandhāra, Uḍḍiyāṇa), and they had disappeared from India proper by 600, probably because of the Huns.

The *Mahīśāsakas* are recorded in the northwest (Gandhāra, Uḍḍiyāṇa) and the south (Nāgārjunikoṇḍa, Banavasī), but they had completely disappeared from India by 600.

The *Dharmaguptakas* do not seem to have been represented except in the northwest (Uḍḍiyāṇa) and had disappeared from India by 600.

According to Tāranātha, between the time of Vasubandhu (fourth century) and that of Dharmapāla and Dharmakīrti (seventh century), several schools had disappeared: the Pūrvaśailas, Aparaśailas, Haimavatas, Kāśyapīyas, Vibhajyavādins, Mahāvihāravāsins and Avantakas. It is not true that the Mahāvihāravāsins had disappeared; they had merely undergone a temporary eclipse in their prestige. Still according to Tāranātha, under the Pāla kings (ninth to tenth century), only six schools remained: the Vātsīputrīyas, Kaurakullakas, Prajñaptivādins, Lokottaravādins, Tāmraśatīyas and Mūlasarvāstivādins. He forgets the Mahāvihāravāsins of Ceylon, but it seems Tāranātha's information is only valid for the lower Ganges, the realm of the Pālas and the final refuge of Buddhism on Indian territory proper.

The geographical distribution of the schools should not be considered as a system of strictly limited territories constituting the exclusive stronghold of a particular school. On the contrary, the collection of documents which we have just quoted and studied leads us to see things in quite another light. Few are the regions in which they record only the adherents of a single school. At the very most, a specific city seems to be exclusively attached to a particular school for reasons which are unknown but probably accidental. In the main, if one school is more or less markedly predominant in a given region, other schools also live there. It does seem that according to various indications, the order of this predominance varied in the course of the centuries, some schools declining or even disappearing while others sprang into life. Very diverse circumstances, changing in the course of history, played their part in this distribution: geographical circumstances, such as insular or mountainous isolation protecting some schools from too strong external influences, or the reverse, such as the huge exchange of ideas

which occurred all along the great transit routes; religious circumstances, such as the flocking of pilgrims around the great pilgrimage centres; historical circumstances, such as the favour or disfavour shown by a particular prince, a particular dynasty, towards a particular school, or such as the invasion of barbarian peoples, Scythians, Kushans, Huns or Muslims; economic circumstances, such as famines obliging the monks to leave somewhere they had lived for a long time, or such as the favour shown by some rich merchants, especially those 'sea merchants' who seem to have played an important part in the dissemination of Buddhism.

However, just because several schools were represented jointly in nearly all the regions of immense India, it does not follow that all the schools were present everywhere. The attestations of Xuanzang and particularly of Yijing are quite clear on this point. Nevertheless, there was a region where all the schools had adherents: the area of the great pilgrimages, that is, the middle Ganges basin, Magadha and Madhyadeśa, where Buddhism was born and flourished. The Chinese pilgrims noted, in that vast territory, the existence of huge monastery-hostelries founded and maintained by princes or rich merchants from distant lands in order to give shelter to the pilgrims who came from their countries to the holy places. Yijing formally attests the presence of representatives of all the schools in this region, as mere reasoning would lead one to expect.

CHAPTER 4

The Causes of the Division and Relations between the Schools

There is no example of a spiritual or intellectual movement with a large number of adherents and lasting for some time which has not soon been divided. Divisions of this kind have many causes, varying with the circumstances. It is possible to determine some of the causes which provoked the appearance of the schools and subschools of the early Buddhist Community.[1]

The first cause is obviously the lack of a supreme authority. When the Buddha entered Parinirvāṇa, the Community, for reasons which elude us, did not provide him with a successor. In Buddhism, there is no central body corresponding to the papacy in Christianity or the *khalifat* in Islam. The later lists of most of the schools nevertheless are based on lists of patriarchs, supreme leaders who successively directed the Community after the Buddha's decease. However, these lists, of which we possess a good half dozen, differ greatly from each other,[2] and this very disagreement proves that despite the traditions, there never was a central authority in the Buddhist Community capable of safeguarding its unity. The existence of these lists also proves that at a certain time, after the great divisions had occurred,

1. See Dutt, *Early Monastic Buddhism*, II, pp. 5–21; Dutt, *Early History of the Spread of Buddhism and the Buddhist Schools*; Przyluski, *La légende de l'empereur Açoka*, pp. 1 ff.; *idem.*, *Le concile de Rājagṛha*, pp. 307–31, esp. 329–31; Hofinger, *Étude sur le concile de Vaiśālī*, pp. 183–95; Demiéville, "À propos du concile de Vaiśālī," pp. 239–96, here pp. 258–61. I have taken my inspiration largely from these works in preparing the present chapter, contenting myself with stressing a particular theory, not so much because of its importance as because I thought I should emphasise specific features.

2. Przyluski, *La légende de l'empereur Açoka*, pp. 61, 63, 118; Hofinger, *Étude sur le concile de Vaiśālī*, pp. 158, 206–12.

several if not all the schools felt the need for such an authority and founded a patriarchate. The history of the Theravādins, the only school about which we know a little, shows however that this partial authority never prevented the appearance of dissensions.

Division into schools and subschools is a particularly frequent occurrence in India since it is found, outside Buddhism, in Hinduism and Jainism. There were, apparently, many reasons for this. The Indian is a profound individualist, as is proved by his religions, which all seek individual salvation in a sort of universal stampede. India is the country in which mixtures of race are perhaps the most numerous and varied, and the rigid and extremely complex caste system is but a reflection, on the juridical level, of an ethnographical reality. From all of this it follows that, throughout its history, India, which from the civilisation point of view achieved powerful unity, never did so politically except once. In fact, a close link exists between spiritual and political unity. This link is manifest in Islam, where the *khalifa* retained both spiritual and temporal authority until the day the empire broke up and the schools appeared. Shi'ism, which is the traditional school in Iran, betrays the resistance of the Iranian empire to the both political and religious ascendancy of the Umayyad *khalifas.* Christianity was organised along the lines of the Roman Empire, and when the latter split into two, Christianity was not long in mirroring it by dividing into the Western and Eastern churches. The omnipotence of the pope ended at the close of the Middle Ages, when the great northern states of Europe became aware of their temporal primacy. Two hundred years earlier, the attempt at rebellion by Philip the Fair, then the most powerful sovereign in Europe, came up against the demands of the temporal supremacy of the papacy. Conversely, in India, apart from Aśoka's short-lived empire, nothing supplied a political model for religious centralisation. The permanent example of ever-changing political fragmentation could but abort any attempt at a supreme religious authority.

We have mentioned Indian individualism. An important consequence of that is the existence of those monks (*śramaṇas*) who, like the Buddha, the Jina and many others, broke all social, clan, family and even caste ties, 'left home' in order to live as wanderers, respected by all, enjoying such absolute freedom that there were few other examples of them in the world. Some were doubtless individuals of little interest, lazy, mentally weak, etc., but there were many who sincerely lived in the most complete renunciation, in

search of Truth and Deliverance. Their freedom was most noticeable on the mental level, and even when they were grouped in communities, the taste for intellectual independence remained strong in them. To this should be added, there was among the Indians as among the Greeks, a veritable passion for philosophical debate which did not disdain sophism.

If the Indians, like most men, willingly based their arguments on the teachings of a master, it should be recognised that, due to their talents as exegeticists and sophists, it was easy for them to extract all they wanted from the words of a text. Their dogmatism, if it even existed, was purely formal; it was an act of veneration for a master, no more no less. They made use of a text when they needed it, without feeling obliged to respect its meaning or always conform to it. This basic independence of thought, together with a very wide tolerance, even though it did not go so far as to prevent disputes, had a twofold consequence. On the one hand, it was one of the main causes of the multiplication of the schools and subschools. On the other, it enabled India, like Greece, to attain a wondrous richness of thought. As we shall see, everything does not consist of mere sophisms worthy of contempt in Indian thought and, especially, in Buddhist thought. The whim of circumstances obliged the Indians, through ways certainly very different from ours, to reflect on the great problems of universal philosophy and to propose solutions, some of which appeared in India fifteen or twenty centuries earlier than in Europe.[3]

The institution of these itinerant monks, old as it is in India, is still a cause of social division for another reason. The habit and even the necessity of wandering unendingly, alone or in small groups, throughout vast territories favours the dissemination of the doctrine but also, by preventing the continuity of relations between groups of a particular community, the appearance of local peculiarities. Whenever, benefiting from the long-term generosity of a dynasty or merchants' guild, each of these groups settled in a monastery, definitively giving up the wandering life for the sedentary life, the unity of these local communities was maintained more easily, but divisions between these various regions or various monasteries already existed and they continued or were even accentuated.

3. The opposite case also occurs and it is very difficult, with regard to Antiquity and the Middle Ages, to decide over Indian or Western philosophical superiority.

The expansion of Buddhism under Aśoka is directly linked with the political expansion of the Magadhan Empire to the extreme borders of India. The circulation of the Community throughout such a vast territory, at a time when communication was long and difficult, perhaps contributed more than anything else to the division of the Community. When that vast empire crumbled, the relations between the various local communities were made even more difficult through the hostility of certain Indian princes, such as Puśyamitra, and several local communities had, for longer or shorter periods, to evolve separately, cut off from all relations with each other. Various influences, spiritual, economic, juridical, climatic, etc., could have been exerted over each of them, slowly transforming their way of thought and life and emphasising their distinctive characteristics.

The Buddhist movement of expansion under the reign of Aśoka is linked with his missionary spirit and perhaps even originates from the wish of the great Indian emperor to spread the Dharma, not only in India but also in the Hellenistic kingdoms, as is announced by the famous 13th Rock Edict. It is practically certain that the tradition, according to which Aśoka sent missionaries to convert the furthermost regions of India and the borderlands to the east and west to Buddhism, is only a reflection of this both political and spiritual endeavour. Nevertheless, if there is any reason to suspect the official nature of the Buddhist missionary movement under Aśoka, there is no doubt that during his reign, favoured by the direct support of the sovereign, being himself a devout Buddhist, the Buddha's teaching circulated throughout the whole of India and even outside India, to the western and eastern borders of the empire. In fact, it is during this period, quite short and the only one in which the whole of India was united under an indigenous monarch, that the political conditions most favourable to this missionary movement occurred.

The latter, moreover, was neither limited to this short period nor to India proper. From the beginning of the Common Era, Buddhist missionaries, accompanying the most intrepid Indian merchants across the South Seas and Central Asian deserts, disseminated the teaching in Malaysia and Indochina, Serindia and China. In many a Buddhist tale incorporated into the *Jātakas, Mahāvastu* and Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya, the echo of innumerable perils encountered by these pious travellers is found, and this shows both their ardour in promulgating the Buddhist faith, as far as possible from its cradle, and the difficulties of communication between the various sec-

ondary bases established by them in distant lands. Under such conditions, local peculiarities must have developed easily and, in fact, even if we possess hardly any documentation on the early Buddhism of Malaysia, Indochina and Serindia, we know very well that that of China, Korea, Japan and Tibet was very different from that of India. It is obvious that in these four cases, the characteristics natural to each of these countries reacted strongly and often victoriously over those of Indian Buddhism. The Indian schools exported to the Far East only vegetated for some quinquennia before disappearing completely, while new schools, new subschools, adapted to the psychological, cultural, political and economic conditions of the various countries, soon arose and continued illustriously until our time.

What occurred outside India may well, in fact must, have occurred in India itself. We have two very clear examples of these local peculiarities: the Sinhalese Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins of Kashmir, distinct from those of Gandhāra and all the more so from those of Madhyadeśa. The insular isolation of the Theravādins, due to the battles between the Sinhalese and Tamils in the second and first centuries BCE, is probably the main reason for the archaic and conservative nature of their teaching, through a lack of evolution during the period when all the schools were developing their particular doctrines before consigning them to and fixing them in the Abhidharma-piṭakas.

We now come to the deeper causes of the itinerant spirit of Buddhism. It seems that, basically, these are economic causes. Firstly, here is an example of this mechanism, which here is in fact a consequence of the divisions that are being explained. Traditions of greatly varying origins relate that during certain disputes, royal arbitration having decided in favour of one or other of the disputing parties—either because it was numerically greater (a wholly democratic principle) or because the sovereign had submitted to certain influences—the defeated party was exiled, sometimes at its own wish but more often because it was banished on royal orders or by the pressure of circumstances. This is easily explained. Officially known as heretics, as 'disrupters of the Community,' an extremely serious offence, subjected to the scorn and anger of the laity, or at least a large part of it, the vanquished had hardly any chance of being provisioned at their residence and were therefore compelled to leave their own land in search of what one might call a 'prospecting area'. In fact, they were hardly likely to find this except in territory where Buddhism had not yet germinated and where they

would not risk possible rivalry with other communities. This phenomenon of spiritual colonisation is found elsewhere than in Buddhism. The *Mayflower* expedition is a good example of this in respect of Christianity.

Leaving aside this phenomenon, which is in fact a consequence of the divisions, let us return to the economic origins of the expansion which often provoked them. The itinerant nature of Buddhism, which only stopped each year during the rainy season when it was impossible to travel, resulted from the way of life of the monks. In fact, the latter devoted themselves entirely to the contemplative life and the teaching of the doctrine. They engaged in no manual work, therefore no materially productive work, such as cultivation, animal husbandry, cottage industry. Conversely, they subsisted on alms which, however meagre, created a twofold disadvantage, from the economic point of view, for the society within which they lived. It is quite clear that this social parasitism on the strictly economic level in no way detracted from the breadth of the civilising, spiritual and cultural role of Buddhism, which cannot be too highly praised. However, this phenomenon had, from the start, an important consequence which the canonical texts clearly recognised: the necessity for the monks not to settle in a fixed geographical site, but to travel ceaselessly except at the time of the rainy season when all movement became impossible. Furthermore, as the Community progressively grew in numbers, it was obvious that it could not survive in a compact block, hence its fragmentation into several groups, each consisting, owing to the force of circumstances, in a strictly limited number of people able to have their food provided by means of alms-rounds in each village or small town they encountered on their travels.

Not all the agglomerations were large towns such as Vaiśālī, Rājagṛha, Kauśāmbī or Kāśī, important commercial centres located in lands rich with rice and barley. Not all of them contained within their walls entire populations full of fervour for Buddhism. Not all were residences of powerful kings such as Bimbisāra or wealthy merchants such as Anāthapiṇḍada, rich citizens such as Viśākhā or successful courtesans such as Amrapālī, able to present the whole Community with vast parks and to support all the monks with copious meals for several days. Between two of these prosperous and friendly towns, often more than a hundred kilometres had to be crossed, encountering on the way only poor hamlets, capable of feeding, and even then scantily, no more than a few monks. The latter were even more fortunate if rival schools or overstrict brahmins did not oppose their being provisioned.

The force of circumstances soon led to a system of prospecting areas, according to which each group of monks possessed territory in which it was wont to travel in search of sustenance, the territory being large enough and the group small enough so that the source of food did not become exhausted too quickly. This system, gradually instituted by custom and the needs of economic equilibrium, in no way prevented the monks going on pilgrimage or making long journeys for whatever reason from reprovisioning when crossing the prospecting areas of other groups. More often than not, these groups had a town or large village as their general quarters where they withdrew to spend the rainy season protected from bad weather as well as famine, the community of donors being more numerous and consequently able to provide longer for the needs of the monastic group. The records of the Second Council fully confirm this geographical distribution[4] and its consequences from the point of view of the doctrine and discipline, namely, the appearance of regional peculiarities in such matters, as was particularly the case from the monks of Vaiśālī. The recruiting of monks locally tended to introduce into the life and thought of each group particular elements derived from the manners and customs, folklore and spiritual traditions of the region, elements which distinguished it from other groups.

If geographical distribution, due to needs of an economic kind, favoured the appearance of these local peculiarities (seeds of the great division of the Community into schools and subschools), relations were nevertheless not broken off between the various groups. In fact, pilgrim-monks, emissaries and possibly even overseers maintained communications. This is, moreover, why the disintegration caused by the schisms only occurred slowly, in connection with often very secondary points; why, despite the divergences, common doctrinal directions were preserved in the whole of the Community and why it was possible for a long time for the various schools to borrow numerous doctrinal, disciplinary and literary elements from each other and to copy each other.

It was above all the great pilgrimages to Magadha, territory sacred to Buddhism, which contributed to the maintenance of relations between the local communities. The fashion for pilgrimages was always very strong in

4. Przyluski, *Concile de Rājagṛha*, pp. 307–33; Hofinger, *Étude sur le concile de Vaiśālī*, pp. 22–148, 183–96 and 253.

Buddhism and if foreigners, Chinese, Kucheans, Tibetans, Parthians, did not shrink from the risks and even perils of long journeys across the mountains and deserts of Central Asia or the southern seas in order to go and visit the holy places of Buddhism and bring back written texts and oral teachings, or else some precious relics, the Indians themselves were more than likely to undertake shorter and less dangerous pilgrimages in their own land. The texts themselves emphasise the merit to be gained by making such journeys, with a pious aim, not only to places where the Buddha had really lived (Kapilavastu, Lumbinī, Bodh-Gayā, Vārāṇasī, Śrāvastī, Kauśāmbī, Kuśīnagara), but also even further away, to the great sanctuaries sheltering the Master's relics or those of his main disciples, in Ceylon, at Amarāvatī, or in Kashmir and Gandhāra. The Chinese pilgrims noted the strength of the pious crowds which made these journeys. Even better, epigraphy supplies us with numerous documents, inscriptions left at Sānchī, Amarāvatī or Lumbinī by monks and laymen who had come from the four corners of India. There is little doubt that many of these pilgrims, gathered together under such circumstances, discussed the Buddhist teaching among themselves and compared their different opinions, reciprocally playing the part of informants.

Furthermore, the geographical distribution of the schools should not be overemphasised. If it is certain that some of them were particularly dominant in regions where they first settled and then developed, it is just as certain that in one and the same region or town there could be found different schools, sometimes hostile, but more often than not, so it seems, living on good terms.

On examining the doctrines we will see that in most cases, even if opinions differ, the problems they claim to resolve are the same. Doubtless some of them must have arisen simultaneously, through logical development, in the different regional or spiritual centres, without there being any influence of communication between them. However, there are too many of these problems and, if some of them originate in the old canonical texts common to the various schools, there are many others which could not have belonged to the relatively restricted circle of the intellectual and spiritual preoccupations of the earliest periods; such is, to mention only one, possibly the most important of all, the problem of Buddhist ontology. All this does indeed prove the existence of reciprocal influences, and therefore of communications, sometimes distant, between the schools. On the other

hand, even if the latter covered an extensive area, their different residences must have been in regular contact in order to ensure the doctrinal unity of each of them.

Finally, collections such as the *Kathāvatthu* and its commentary, the *Vibhāṣā*, the treatises by Vasubandhu, Bhavya and Vinītadeva, through the quantity and variety of information they contain, necessarily presuppose an important communications network between the various schools, a network served by pilgrims and travelling monks.

It seems that it was Magadha, the great focal point for pilgrimages, which above all played the role of information centre. The accounts by the Chinese pilgrims tell us that in this holy land, monks from every school and every region were encountered. In the holy places of Buddhism each regional community maintained monasteries endowed with rich donations and charged with receiving its own pilgrims. The central geographical position of this region must have made these pilgrimages easy. Conversely, it must have been much rarer for a monk from Kashmir to go to Ceylon, or vice versa, because of the length and difficulty of the journey on the one hand, and because of the minor interest of such a pilgrimage. Even if each regional community soon sanctified its domain by the acquisition of relics, the construction of sanctuaries and the elaboration of appropriate legends, it is highly likely that this sanctification was of only purely local value.

We should now examine the nature of the relations between the communities with different doctrines. Assuredly, it was accepted from the beginning and by all schools that schism, along with matricide, parricide, the murder of an arhat and the wounding of a buddha, is one of the five major offences, leading to immediate and irremissible punishment. However, it does not seem that, apart from some local conflicts which were quickly suppressed, this theory was used among the different schools. Anyhow, no tradition makes the slightest allusion, in India, to conflicts between schools having led to the shedding of blood among monks, and, in the most serious cases, the punishment was banishment. We do indeed sometimes encounter the echo of brutalities due to sectarian, or rather authoritarian, princes, but such cases are rare, even if the excessive imagination of the Indians did not exaggerate them, and there is nothing to indicate that they acted under the direct influence of particularly fanatical monks.

Conversely, examples of good terms between monks of different schools abound. In Uḍḍiyāṇa, the Mahāsāṃghikas, Sarvāstivādins, Mahīśāsakas,

Dharmaguptakas and Kāśyapīyas lived for centuries in perfect accord and even in veritable symbiosis, since texts of different origin, using the same terms, in common praise these five schools, each being characterised by particular virtues. The profound doctrinal agreement between schools of such different derivation as the Mahāsāṃghikas, Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas and other Vibhajyavādins in northwestern India is undoubtedly the most convincing philological proof of this. It does indeed seem that, in this particular case, proximity on the geographical level, far from causing enmity between these diverse schools, on the contrary brought them closer together. It was the same with the outside influence which the Mahāsāṃghikas and also, it seems, the Sarvāstivādins had on the Haimavatas, or with the doctrinal affinities between the Sammatīyas and the Andhakas of the Deccan. We can grasp this spirit of mutual tolerance even more directly in the accounts of the Chinese pilgrims who stayed, sometimes for a long time, in communities belonging to the very diverse schools even without mentioning, in fact quite the opposite, that they had felt the effects of sectarianism and intolerance. This enables us to see more clearly into the implicit reasons for and manifestations of this spirit of mutual tolerance. In fact, during their long journeys the pilgrims would generally have had little chance to spend each night in monasteries belonging to their own school. Consequently, if a sectarian spirit had been prominent, pilgrimages would have been impossible for all the schools. It was therefore necessary to respect the opinions and customs of others, whilst accepting, as the works do, that 'the same goal can be reached by various paths'.

The crises which from time to time erupted in the various communities were provoked as much by practices which could legitimately be considered as scandalous as by divergent doctrinal ideas. There can be no doubt that, as the traditions record and as, presumably, could only be expected, suspect elements penetrated a particular community in order to benefit from the liberality of especially generous and devout princes or merchants and in order to live without worries. Such individuals must soon have caused a scandal through their idleness, taste for luxury, greed and even lax ways. It was normal that in such conditions, the sound part of the community reacted with vigorous indignation and sought to get rid of the corrupt members who were capable of destroying the whole community. The history of the Council of Vaiśālī, that of Mahādeva and that of Tissa Moggaliputta are very clear examples of the procedure by means of which

the community reacted against the growing laxity of certain elements, even if it entailed breaking up the Community itself. This phenomenon is not peculiar to Buddhism, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation at the heart of Christianity, and Wahhabism in Islam being well-known examples of it.

If we have laid stress on the sociological causes of the division of the Community into rival schools, we should nevertheless not neglect a very important cause, in that India of strong spiritual individualism, and that is the influence of certain masters whose powerful personalities, asserting themselves in new doctrinal directions, led their disciples towards schism. The names of some schools have retained the memory of these, Vātsīputra, Dharmagupta and Kāśyapa, and the traditions tell us of the parts played by Mahādeva, Kātyāyanīputra and Maudgalyāyana in the formation of the Mahāsāṃghika, Sarvāstivādin and Vibhajyavādin schools. Here as elsewhere, sociological and personal factors were equally necessary to the development of events. Insofar as we can credit the narratives, even in transposition, it can be maintained that if the schism led by Devadatta was abortive, this was because it did not correspond to the social circumstances of the life of the Community, at the time minimal and wholly concentrated in a relatively limited area, and that if the laxity of the Vaiśālī monks did not conclude in a schism, this, on the contrary, was because there could not be found among them any personality strong enough to set them on the path to secession. The function of these guides seems precisely to have been to retire within themselves and to organise all those sociological, economic, geographical, etc., factors, all those latent and implicit tendencies, then to crystallise them and express the outcome in an action or work. It is doubtless that which constitutes genius and confers on it both its novelty and its power, and it is because of this that genius requires so much intelligence, knowledge and audacity.

Yet other factors played a part in the division of the Community. If Przyluski and Hofinger above all emphasised the sociological and geographical causes we have just examined, Dutt and Demiéville more especially favoured strictly religious causes: 'the system of specialisation in the different branches of Buddhist literature'[5] and 'the conflict between rigor-

5. Dutt, *Early Monastic Buddhism*, II, p. 14.

ism and laxity, between monachism and laicism, between "holy ones" and "worldlings"'.[6]

Texts from all sources, as well as inscriptions from Bharhut, Sānchī, Nāgārjunikoṇḍa, etc., supply us with ample proof on the first point by mentioning *dhammadharas, vinayadharas, mātikādharas, suttantikas, dhammakathikas, dīghabhānakas, majjhimabhānakas, saṃyuktāgaminas, ābhidharmikas,* etc., that is, monks who specialised in the study and recitation of the Sūtras, Vinayas, Mātṛkās, or in sections of them. The reason for these divisions lies in the volume of the canon which could never be learned by heart or memorised in full even by monks. The canon had to be preserved orally as it could not be communicated to certain categories of people. Monks thus specialised gathered in groups living in the same main buildings in the monasteries and enjoyed privileges which varied from one group to another. This, therefore, resulted in a corporate feeling which was often to culminate in intergroup rivalries, to the great detriment of the Community of which they formed part, as is attested by many a Vinaya story. Paramārtha goes even further, since in the fragments which have been preserved of his commentary on Vasumitra, he records that the Gokulikas were specialists in the Abhidharma, the Sautrāntikas in the Sūtras, the Sarvāstivādins in the Abhidharma, the Haimavatas in the Sūtras, the Sammatīyas in the Vinaya.[7] Thus it was that, according to Paramārtha, the Gokulikas were so specialised in the study of the Abhidharma that they refused to teach, which would have wasted their time, and considered themselves free from any disciplinary obligation, adopting the bodhisattva career,[8] which is in keeping with the practices and teachings of the Mahāyāna.

This last fact enables us to pass to the study of the second cause, that of the contention between rigorism and laxity. Traces of this are found in the narratives of the life of the Buddha, such as the story of Subaddha, who rejoiced in the Buddha's decease, explaining that it freed him from the strict discipline that the Master had imposed on the Community. Again, it was the laxity of the monks of Vaiśālī which provoked the convention of the Second Council. Finally, a comparative study of the Vinaya-piṭakas

6. Demiéville, "À propos du Concile de Vaiśālī," pp. 259–60.
7. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 22, 23, 42, 53, 54, 56.
8. Ibid., pp. 22 and 43.

reveals the laxist tendencies of certain schools and the rigorist tendencies of some others. The Mahāsāṃghika schism, caused by Mahādeva's five propositions, is also a good example of this conflict which, ever latent at the heart of the Community, sometimes erupted in serious crises. On the other hand, this last case demonstrates the degree to which it was confused with that which opposed monachism to laicism, since the victory of Mahādeva's propositions initiated the decline of the Arhat at the same time that it constituted the first success of laxity. Later on, certain northern schools maintained, to the indignation of the austere Theravādins, that a layman could become an arhat and, for a full appreciation of the profound meaning of this thesis, it should be remembered that the Bodhisattva was normally a layman. As Buddhism continued to evolve, the rift continued to widen between rigoristic and aristocratic monachism, mainly represented by the Sinhalese Theravādins, and the more popular and laxist monachism which more and more characterised certain northern schools of Mahāsāṃghika derivation. Moreover, between these two extreme positions there existed a whole range of faint differences, fragile bridges between the two banks of the abyss. The second tendency gradually acquired new elements which changed its nature. By becoming closer to the laity and ordinary people, the laxist schools were influenced by them and gradually replaced the path of moral practices (*śīla*) with the path of faith (*śraddhā*), through homage to the Buddha and ritual practices, supported by a whole mythology. The latter found its emotional and ingenuous expression in the *Jātakas,* ever growing in number until in certain cases it formed a special basket, the Bodhisattva-piṭaka.[9]

The division of the Community into numerous schools is thus due to very diverse and complex causes, which we have not always been able to discern too clearly and which must have varied in the course of time.

9. The whole of this aspect of the evolution of Buddhism in the sense of the decline of the Arhat and the popularisation of Buddhism was explained in a remarkable way by É. Lamotte in the lectures he gave at the Collège de France in March 1951. [SBW: cf. also his "Sur la formation du Mahāyāna," in *Asiatica, Festschrift F. Weller*, Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1954, pp. 377–96; "Le bouddhisme des laïcs," in *Studies in Indology and Buddhology presented in honour of Prof. S. Yamaguchi*, Kyoto, 1955, pp. 73–89; "Mahāyāna Buddhism," in *The World of Buddhism*, London: Thames and Hudson, 1984, 1991, pp. 90–3, and many other relevant works.]

PART TWO

The Schools

CHAPTER 5

The Mahāsāṃghikas

The Mahāsāṃgika school arose as a result of the first schism, in about 140 EN, i.e., approximately 340 BCE. Mahādeva, a monk renowned for his knowledge and virtue, was said to uphold a group of five propositions according to which the Arhat can be seduced in his dreams, have doubts, be nescient particularly with regard to his quality of Arhatship, be led onto the Path of Deliverance by another person, and utter the word 'suffering!' while contemplating. These five propositions were allegedly approved by certain venerable and learned monks, such as Nāga, Sthiramati and Prācya. The conflict supposedly provoked a council, convened in Pāṭaliputra, the capital of Magadha. The local king, probably one of the Nandas, invited to arbitrate, decided in favour of the most numerous group, in conformity, it seems, with the prescriptions of the Buddha. Mahādeva's supporters, being the most numerous, purportedly won the case and took the name of Mahāsāṃghikas. Their adversaries, who claimed to redeem their inferiority in numbers by greater orthodoxy, took the name of Sthaviras.

What seems to result from a study of the records of the councils of Rājagṛha and Vaiśālī in the different Vinayas is that the Mahāsāṃghikas at first had their main residence to the east of Magadha,[1] at a time which appears to be well prior to Aśoka, let us say at the end of the fourth century and the beginning of the third century BCE.

In the second century CE, inscriptions attest their presence in Mathurā, Karle and the region of Kabul.[2]

1. Przyluski, *Concile de Rājagṛha*, pp. 309 ff.; Hofinger, *Étude sur le concile de Vaiśālī*, pp. 183–7.

2. Konow, *Kharoṣṭhī Inscriptions*, pp. 49 N and 170; Hultzsch, *Ep. Ind.* VII, 1902–3, pp. 65 and 72; *Ep. Ind.* IX, 1907–8, p. 146; Sastri, *Ep. Ind.* XIX, 1927–8, p. 69.

At the beginning of the fifth century CE, Faxian found their Vinaya-piṭaka and Abhidharma-piṭaka in Pāṭaliputra.[3]

At the beginning of the seventh century CE, Xuanzang noted their presence in western Kashmir (1 monastery, 100 monks), Andarab, northern Afghanistan (3 monasteries, some tens of monks) and Dhanakaṭaka (nearly 20 monasteries, nearly 1,000 monks), and that of their Vinaya, together with four others, in Uḍḍiyāṇa.[4]

At the end of the seventh century CE, Yijing gave a more complete picture. The Mahāsāṃghikas were then encountered in Magadha and eastern India, a few in Lāṭa and Sindhu, a few in northern and southern India. They were rejected in Ceylon. They came late to the islands of the Southern Seas and had a few representatives in Shensi.[5]

Their Vinaya-piṭaka and the later preface to the Chinese *Ekottarāgama* which must have pertained to them give some indications of their canon. This was first composed of a Vinaya-piṭaka in five parts, an Abhidharma-piṭaka, and a Sūtra-piṭaka consisting of five *Āgamas: Dīrgha, Madhyama, Saṃyukta, Ekottara* and *Kṣudraka.* However, the *Kṣudrakāgama* was soon transformed into a fourth piṭaka, the Saṃyukta-piṭaka, which supposedly contained 'the developed (*vaipulya*) profound meaning of the Mahāyāna', which leads us to suppose that in the course of time in it were set down Mahāyāna sūtras, as is claimed by Paramārtha.[6] According to Xuanzang, they added a fifth piṭaka, the Dhāraṇī-piṭaka,[7] but undoubtedly much later.

Two late sūtras, one of which pertained to them, the *Śāriputraparipṛcchā-sūtra,* attest to the existence, on the northwest borders of India, doubtless more precisely in Uḍḍiyāṇa, of a community in which five schools lived in perfect harmony: the Mahāsāṃghikas, Sarvāstivādins, Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas and Kāśyapīyas. According to these two works, the Mahāsāṃghikas were conspicuous for their yellow clothing and the diligence with which they studied the sūtras and developed the right principles in them.[8]

3. Legge, *A Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms,* pp. 98–9.
4. Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels* I, pp. 226 and 282; II, p. 268.
5. Takakusu, *Record of the Buddhist Religion,* pp. xxiii, 7–20.
6. Przyluski, *Concile de Rājagṛha,* pp. 211 and 217; T 1425, pp. 489c–492c; T 125, versified preface; Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 21, 41 and 43.
7. Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels* II, pp. 160–1.
8. T 1465, p. 900c; T 1470, p. 926a; Lin, *Aide-Mémoire,* pp. 80–1.

According to later works, their master was the brahmin Kāśyapa and their emblem a conch (*śaṅkhā*), their robe consisted of twenty-seven strips of material and their language was Prākrit.[9] The names of the Mahāsāṃghikas ended in *-mitra, -jñāna, -gupta, -garbha,*[10] but it does not seem that these preferences of an onomastic kind were exclusive. We should note that the *Mahāvastu* of the Lokottaravādins, one of the main Mahāsāṃghika schools, is in hybrid Sanskrit and not Prākrit. Lin Li-kouang suggests that [tr.]: 'These "Prākrit" language Mahāsāṃghikas can only be the Mahāsāṃghikas of the Deccan; nothing prevents us from accepting that, at least, the Mahāsāṃghikas of Dhanyakaṭaka (Madras), dwelling in the domain of the Mahārāṣṭrī, used that language as a sacred language',[11] and that the hybrid Sanskrit–using Mahāsāṃghikas are those from the northwest. There would be nothing unusual in the branches of one and the same school, separated geographically by more than 2,000 km, having used different idioms. Yijing recounts how the Mahāsāṃghikas draped their undergarment in the manner of Indian women, placing the right hem on the left side and pressing it tight under a belt so as not to let it float loose.[12] They received their food, not directly from hand to hand, but by having placed it in a designated spot.[13]

On the evidence of certain indications, Lin Li-kouang writes [tr.]: 'we think that, in the history of Buddhism, there were two different schools known by the name of Mahāsāṃghika: 1. the unreformed Mahāsāṃghikas proper, representing the old liberal and Mahāyānist tendency of the school . . . and 2. the reformed Mahāsāṃghikas, conservative and strictly Hīnayānist in tendency, who claimed to have derived from the Sthavira or Vātsīputrīya orthodoxy, and who would have represented a sort of return to the Buddhism of the Small Vehicle'.[14] This is contradicted by all the most reliable traditions on the affiliation of the schools[15] and is based on a misinterpretation of two texts. On the one hand, it is not true that the

9. *Varṣāgraprcchā,* cited by Lin, *Aide-Mémoire,* p. 181. Cf. also ibid., p.177 ff.
10. Ibid., p. 178.
11. Ibid., pp. 202–5 and esp. 203–4.
12. Takakusu, *Record of the Buddhist Religion,* p. 66.
13. Ibid., p.7.
14. Lin, *Aide-Mémoire,* p. 302 and also pp. 190, 194 and 295–302.
15. See above, part one, ch. 1.

beginning of the account of the schisms in the *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra* concerns a reformation of the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya.[16] In fact, the expression *dazhong, mahāsaṃgha,* designates the Great Community as it was before the first schism, that which separated the Mahāsāṃghikas from the Sthaviras. The four translations of the *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* by Vasumitra use the same expression, *dazhong* or *daseng* in Chinese, *dge 'dun phal chen* in Tibetan, to designate the Great Community (*mahāsaṃgha*) prior to any schism.[17] When, some lines later in the Sūtra, there is a question of the Mahāsāṃghikas, the latter's name is translated by *dazhong* but transcribed as *mo-he-seng-qi.* On the other hand, the confusion made by the Chinese Sengyu between the Vātsīputrīyas and the Mahāsāṃghikas[18] itself results from a confusion between the schisms which gave rise to each of the schools. Furthermore, it is not so surprising that the tendencies of the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya and those of the *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra* are so different, when it is pointed out that several centuries separate their respective compilations.[19]

We possess a certain part of their canon. In fact, the Chinese translation of their Vinaya-piṭaka has come down to us. Furthermore, indications contained in the preface to the Chinese translation of the *Ekottarāgama* show that in all likelihood, its compilation as translated belonged to a Mahāsāṃghika subschool. Finally, an examination of the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra,* probably of Dharmaguptaka origin, shows that this treatise contains a large number of theses proper to the Mahāsāṃghikas of the north and those of the south, and only disagrees with them over a few secondary points. The absence of any *Lokottaravādin* doctrine and ontological speculation leads us to suppose that this treatise is quite close to the Abhidharma-piṭaka of the early Mahāsāṃghikas and fixed before the elaboration of these doctrines.

These are the theses attributed to them:[20]

16. Lin, *Aide-Mémoire,* p. 296; T 1465, p. 900b, end.

17. First sentence in prose after the introductory stanzas.

18. Lin, *Aide-Mémoire,* p. 297.

19. For more details, see Bareau, "Une confusion entre Mahāsāṅghika et Vātsīputrīya," pp. 399–406.

20. The numbering of these theses adopted here for the treatises by Vasubandhu, Bhavya and Vinītadeva is that which appears in my translation of these three works and which concords fully with the Japanese edition by Teramoto and Hiramatsu. As the system is very different in the works by Masuda and Walleser, it was possible for me to adopt one of my choice and which seemed to me the best adapted.

(1) The buddhas are transcendental (*lokottara*):[21]

The body of the buddhas is entirely transcendental since it is unsurpassable (*asamatikramaṇīya*) and only pure (*anāsravamātra*). Even the body of the Holy Ones (*aśaikṣa*) does not surpass the body of the buddhas. Their body, being destructible, is called worldly (*laukika*). Only the buddhas leave all beings below them since they are supreme (*anuttara*) and transcend all destructibility; that is why they are entirely transcendental.[22]

(2) The Tathāgatas are free from impurities (*anāsrava*) and worldly (*laukika*) things (*dharma*).[23]

The eighteen elements (*dhātu*), when they are found in the body of the buddhas, are all called free from impurities because they are neither associated with impurities (*āsravasaṃprayukta*) nor bound to impurities (*āsravasaṃbaddha*). The three kinds of action (*karma*) which the buddhas accomplish are also free from impurities. That is, the Tathāgatas are entirely free from impure things.[24]

According to the *Vibhāṣā,* the Mahāsāṃghikas assert that the birth-body of the buddhas is free from impurities since, while the buddha is born (*jāta*) in the world (*loka*), if he grew up (*saṃvṛddha*) in the world, he only dwells (*viharati*) there after having overcome (*abhibhūya*) the world and without being stained (*anupalipta*) by the world.[25]

(3) In all their words (*vācā*), the Tathāgatas set turning the Wheel of the Dharma (*dharmacakraṃ pravartayanti*).[26]

The Wheel of the Dharma (*dharmacakra*) is not only the path of vision (*darśanamārga*) which wins over beings, but all the words uttered by the Buddha, since there is not one that is not useful to beings. Here we call wheel (*cakra*) that which subdues, tames and turns. In fact, all the words of the Buddha subdue and tame other persons and what, in them, is nescience (*ajñāna*), delusion (*moha*), etc. Even the most anodyne of words, such as 'Is

21. Vasumitra, thesis 1; Bhavya, thesis 1 of the Ekavyāvahārikas; Vinītadeva, thesis 1 of the Lokottaravādins. See *Kathāvatthu* XVIII, 1, thesis attributed to the Vetullakas, and II, 10, thesis attributed to the Andhakas.

22. Kuiji, II, pp. 12b–13b.

23. Vasumitra, thesis 2; Bhavya, theses 2 and 5; *Vibhāṣā,* T 1545, pp. 229a, 391c, 871c.

24. Kuiji, II, p. 13b.

25. *Vibhāṣā,* T 1545, pp. 299a, 391c, 871c. See also *Kathāvatthu* XVIII, 1, end.

26. Vasumitra, thesis 3; Bhavya, thesis 3 (incorrect negation); Vinītadeva, thesis 7; *Vibhāṣā,* T 1545, p. 912b.

it raining?', 'How are you?', have a profound meaning aimed at leading beings to enter the Path of Deliverance.[27]

(4) The Buddha, with a single sound (*śabda*), utters all the elements of the Dharma (*dharmadhātu*).[28]

After having fully cultivated the practices for a long time, the Buddha is endowed with merit (*puṇya*) and inconceivable supernormal powers. With a single sound, speaking only one word, he can act so that all living beings hear his Dharma, while understanding it differently according to their nature, in order to dispel their own defilements (*kleśa*). With a single sound, he can utter the whole Dharma and consequently cause all his listeners to understand its coarse (*sthūla*) or subtle (*sūkṣma*) meaning (*artha*) according to their particular species.[29]

(5) In what the Bhagavat says, there is nothing that does not conform to the meaning (*yathārtha*).[30]

According to Kuiji, all the words uttered by the Buddha are profitable to others, not one of them is in vain or without benefit to beings. Furthermore, everything said by the Buddha is entirely free from error, rational, and poses no difficulty. Everything he says is free from the four kinds of faults, not being contrary to either place, time, recipient or the Dharma, since everything he says is adapted to the circumstances of the place and the moment, to the listeners and to the teaching.[31]

The corresponding thesis in Bhavya is formulated thus: the words of the Tathāgatas manifest (*abhimuñcanti*) their essence (*garbha*); and that of the *Vibhāṣā:* the words of the Wheel of the Dharma (*dharmacakravācā*) have an own-nature (*svabhāva*).

(6) The material body (*rūpakāya*) of the Tathāgatas is truly unlimited (*ananta*).[32]

Having cultivated merit for many cosmic periods (*kalpa*), the Buddha has in fruition acquired a body (*kāya*) which is perfect, a Dharma-element (*dharmadhātu*), unlimited. The visible body of the Buddha, six feet in

27. Kuiji, II, pp. 14a–16a.
28. Vasumitra, thesis 4.
29. Kuiji, II, p. 16a.
30. Vasumitra, thesis 5; Bhavya, thesis 4; *Vibhāṣā*, T 1545, p. 912b.
31. Kuiji, II, pp. 16b–17a.
32. Vasumitra, thesis 6; Vinītadeva, thesis 3.

height, is not the true body of the Buddha but his transformation-body (*nirmāṇakāya*), in which he appears to beings and which is adapted to the aims of his teachings. Paramārtha says that the body of the Buddha is unlimited in three ways: (1) It is unlimited in measure. Depending on what is most suitable, he manifests himself with a large or small body. Not being able to say with precision that the size of the Buddha's body is merely large, it is said to be unlimited. (2) It is unlimited in number. As there are many beings in a given period, each one sees the Buddha as is useful to them, and the Buddha can manifest himself in many bodies. (3) It is unlimited in causes. The things (*dharma*) which constitute the body of the Buddha, each being produced by causes which are so many innumerable good roots (*kuśalamūla*), it is said to be unlimited in causes.[33]

(7) The might (*prabhāva*) of the Tathāgata is also unlimited.[34]

The supernormal powers which the Buddha possesses are called might, mighty virtue. In a single instant (*ekakṣaṇa*), he can deploy his might everywhere, in all directions and all universes, without any special intention.[35]

(8) The life span of the Buddha is also unlimited.[36]

Since the fruition-body of the Buddha was acquired by him through having cultivated merit for many infinite cosmic periods (*kalpa*), his life is truly endless and indestructible. It is for the profit of living beings that he cultivated the Path (*mārga*) for many cosmic periods and received an unlimited life span. Since the different species of beings are infinite, the life of the Buddha must also be infinite so that he can work to their advantage according to whatever suits each one.[37]

(9) The buddha, while winning over living beings and arousing pure (*śuddha*) faith (*śraddhā*) in them, has no thought of satisfaction.[38]

It is because the Buddha, with his thought of benefiting beings, feels no satisfaction, that he does not enter Nirvāṇa. His compassion (*karuṇā*) is unlimited; his life span is unlimited. If there are beings to whom it is appropriate for the Buddha to manifest his benefits and happiness of tran-

33. Kuiji, II, p. 17a–b.
34. Vasumitra, thesis 7.
35. Kuiji, II, p. 18a–b.
36. Vasumitra, thesis 8; Vinītadeva, thesis 3.
37. Kuiji, II, pp. 18b–19a.
38. Vasumitra, thesis 9.

quillity, he is born in a royal palace, etc., he attains Awakening (*bodhi*), he wins over and guides those beings. If there are beings to whom it is appropriate to manifest the ceasing of causality, he fictitiously (*nirmāṇa*) enters Nirvāṇa. As his thought entails no satisfaction, he dwells in the form of the bliss-body (*saṃbhogakāya*) and until the end of time he creates (*nirmāti*) forms adapted to the various species of beings and teaches through skilful means (*upāya*).[39]

(10) The Buddha neither sleeps nor dreams.[40]

In sleep, thought (*citta*) is obscured and exclusively reduced to a state of dispersion. However, for a buddha there is no thought that is not accomplished (*samāpanna*), that is, concentrated. That is why they do not sleep (*svapna*). A dream being incurred by intention (*cetanā*), notions (*saṃjñā*), desires (*kāma*), etc., since the buddhas are free from all of that, neither do they dream.[41]

(11) The Tathāgatas answer questions without reflecting.[42]

For the buddhas, there is no preparation (*prayoga*), they do not reflect (*cintayanti*) on words, phrases, etc., in order to teach others, but are capable of responding spontaneously.[43]

(12) The buddhas never utter a word, since they dwell perpetually in concentration (*samādhi*), but beings, thinking they have uttered words, jump for joy.[44]

The buddhas expound the Dharma spontaneously, without needing to reflect on words, phrases, etc., since they are constantly concentrating. For them, words, phrases, etc., form by themselves so as to set forth the Dharma in conformity with the truth.[45]

(13) In a single thought-moment (*ekakṣaṇikacitta*), they understand all things (*dharma*).[46]

Having cultivated their thought (*citta*) for numerous cosmic periods (*kalpa*), the buddhas alone can, in a single thought-moment, understand all things, that is, both the different aspects of all things and their own-nature.[47]

39. Kuiji, II, p. 19a–b.
40. Vasumitra, thesis 10.
41. Kuiji, II, p. 20a.
42. Vasumitra, thesis 11.
43. Kuiji, II, p. 20b.
44. Vasumitra, thesis 12; Vinītadeva, thesis 4; *Kathāvatthu* XVIII, 2, thesis of the Vetullakas.
45. Kuiji, II, p. 21a.
46. Vasumitra, thesis 13; Vinītadeva, thesis 5; *Kathāvatthu* V, 9, thesis of the Andhakas.

(14) Through wisdom (*prajñā*) associated (*saṃprayukta*) with a single thought-moment (*ekakṣaṇikacitta*), they know all things (*dharma*).[48]

Their wisdom associated with a single thought-moment can know all things that are completely destroyed (*kṣīṇa*), since that wisdom is perfect. When they reach the Path of Deliverance (*vimuktimārga*), in the space of a single state of mindfulness (*smṛti*) which immediately follows the Diamond Path (*vajramārga*), they can know the own-nature (*svabhāva*) of all things. They then have no further need of a mental series (*santati*) in order to know that all things are destroyed, since they know perfectly the own-nature of wisdom.[49]

(15) For the Bhagavat buddhas, the knowledge of destruction (*kṣayajñāna*) and the knowledge of non-arising (*anutpādajñāna*) continue unceasingly until they enter Parinirvāṇa.[50]

The eighteen elements (*dhātu*) which constitute the person of the buddhas are entirely free from impurities (*anāsrava*). Therefore, knowledges free from impurities (*anāsravajñāna*) are constantly present from instant to instant until Parinirvāṇa. There are two knowledges (*jñāna*), *kṣayajñāna* and *anutpādajñāna,* which are thus *anāsrava.* At all times, these two activities of a single substance, wisdom (*prajñā*), function together continually.[51]

(16) The buddhas abide (*tiṭṭhanti*) in all (*sabbā*) the directions (*disā*).[52]

There are buddhas in the four directions, below (*heṭṭhā*), above (*upari*), in all the universes (*sabbalokadhātu*), in the commonality of all the universes (*lokadhātusannivāsaṃ*), everywhere (*samantato*).

(17) The buddhas exist as substances (*dravya*).[53]

No demonstration of this thesis is mentioned.

(18) When the bodhisattvas enter (*avakrāmanti*) a womb (*garbha*), they

47. Kuiji, II, p. 22a.
48. Vasumitra, thesis 14; Vinītadeva, thesis 5.
49. Kuiji, II, pp. 22b–23a.
50. Vasumitra, thesis 15; Vinītadeva, thesis 6.
51. Kuiji, II, p. 23a–b.
52. *Kathāvatthu* XXI, 6; Vinītadeva, thesis 27.
53. Vinītadeva, thesis 2.

do not acquire the embryonic forms of *kalala, arbuda, peśī* and *ghana* as their own substance (*svabhāva*).[54]

When the bodhisattvas enter the embryo, there is nothing impure about them, and that is why they do not pass through that gradual development of impure forms. They enter the embryo fully endowed with organs (*indriya*) and great elements (*mahābhūta*). Being entirely perfect, they quickly arrive at the embryonic stage of *paraśākhā,* that is, of the embryo endowed with limbs. For the bodhisattvas, there is matter (*rūpa*) derived (*upādāya*) from the great elements which is pure and which enables the organs to develop quickly so as to become their own substance. Since they have no need of impure substances, such as sperm, they do not develop gradually like other beings. We are concerned here only with bodhisattvas who have reached their last existence.[55]

(19) When they enter a womb (*garbha*), the bodhisattvas assume the appearance of a white elephant.[56]

Since the Mahāsāṃghikas deny the intermediate existence (*antarābhava*), this form of a white elephant is a fictitious (*nirmita*) body and not an *antarābhava* body. This form is symbolic since a bodhisattva is both extremely powerful and very gentle.[57]

(20) When they leave the womb, the bodhisattvas emerge from the right side.[58]

The bodhisattvas are born from the side, located in the middle of the body, to symbolise the middle way which they will expound. They spare their mother the torments of gestation and parturition.[59]

(21) The bodhisattvas arouse neither a thought of desire (*kāmasaṃjñā*) nor a thought of ill-will (*vyāpādasaṃjñā*) nor a thought of harmfulness (*vihiṃsāsaṃjñā*).[60]

On entering the second incalculable cosmic period (*asaṃkhyeyakalpa*) of the bodhisattva career, one becomes noble (*ārya*) and, from that moment

54. Vasumitra, thesis 16; Bhavya, thesis 6; Vinītadeva, thesis 9; *Kathāvatthu* XIV, 2, thesis of the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas.
55. Kuiji, II, pp. 24b–25b.
56. Vasumitra, thesis 17; Bhavya, thesis 7.
57. Kuiji, II, pp. 25b–26a.
58. Vasumitra, thesis 18; Bhavya, thesis 7.
59. Kuiji, II, pp. 26b–27a.
60. Vasumitra, thesis 19; Bhavya, thesis 8; Vinītadeva, thesis 8.

until the end of a hundred cosmic periods (*kalpa*), one does not arouse these three kinds of notions (*saṃjñā*), and with all the more reason in the ensuing periods.[61]

(22) The bodhisattvas, because they desire to improve (*paripācayiṣanti*) beings (*sattva*), make an aspiration (*praṇidhāna*) to be reborn in the bad destinies (*durgati*), where they can stay as they so wish (*īśvarīyakāma*).[62]

The bodhisattvas are reborn in the bad destinies in order to: (1) lessen the suffering (*duḥkha*) of beings through the joy that the presence of the bodhisattva causes them; (2) augment their own thought (*citta*) of repugnance for the world, since suffering increases repugnance; (3) bring about universal deliverance by arousing good thoughts in beings; (4) practise patience (*kṣānti*) and suffering and thus increase their great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*). There are three stages in the bodhisattva career: (1) undefined, during the first incalculable period (*asaṃkhyeyakalpa*); (2) defined, during the second incalculable period; (3) reception of the prediction, during the third incalculable period. It is only during the last two stages that the bodhisattva can be reborn at will in the bad destinies.[63]

(23) Through the knowledge (*jñāna*) that follows (*antika*) a single instant (*ekakṣaṇika*) of clear comprehension (*abhisamaya*), one knows in entirety the different aspects (*ākāra*) of the Four Truths (*satya*).[64]

They base their opinion on the sūtras. One of the latter states, 'If, with regard to the Truth of Suffering, there are no doubts, with regard to the Truth of the Origin, cessation and the Path, there are also no doubts'. Another sūtra teaches, 'O monks, the moment that there arises (*udapādi*) for the noble listener (*ariyasāvaka*) the Dhamma-Eye (*dhammacakkhu*) without dust (*viraja*) or stain (*vītamala*), everything that is (*yaṃkiñci*) the Dhamma of the origin (*samudayadhamma*) is the Dhamma of cessation (*nirodhadhamma*) in entirety (*sabbantaṃ*)'. Since when one sees the Truths clearly, one sees their common natures and their own-natures, clear comprehension should take place in a single instant. In the path of vision (*darśanamārga*), one sees

61. Kuiji, II, p. 27b.
62. Vasumitra, thesis 20; Bhavya, thesis 9; *Kathāvatthu* XXIII, 3, thesis of the Andhakas.
63. Kuiji, II, p. 28a–b.
64. Vasumitra, thesis 21; Bhavya, thesis 10; Vinītadeva, thesis 10; T 1545, pp. 405a–b and 533a; LVP, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu* (hereafter *Kośa*) V, p. 185, nn. 2 and 5; Kuiji, II, p. 29a–b; III, p. 31a.

the common natures of the Truths, emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and impersonality (*anātmya*). When one sees emptiness and impersonality, one sees the Four Truths in full. If one examines separately the own-natures of each of the Four Truths in the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*), when one sees the Truth of Suffering, one can understand the other three Truths, in the same way that a single mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*), having as its object (*ālambana*) both the five aggregates (*skandha*) and the ten kinds of form (*rūpa*), can know them separately. At the final limit of the path of vision, a knowledge (*jñāna*) arises which in a single instant (*ekakṣaṇa*) can know all the distinctive natures of the Four Truths. In the path of vision, although one may also know the Four Truths instantaneously, one can only know them globally, but one cannot yet know them separately.

(24) The five or six sense-consciousnesses (*vijñānadhātu*) of the eye (*cakṣus*), etc., are both endowed with craving (*sarāga*) and free from craving (*virāga*).[65]

(25) In the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) and the formless realm (*arūpadhātu*), the six consciousnesses (*vijñāna*) exist together.[66]

In the three realms (*dhātu*), there exists a subtle (*sūkṣma*) matter (*rūpa*) which constitutes the five sense faculties (*indriya*) and the four great elements (*mahābhūta*). Consequently, the possibility of discernment of the latter by the former exists, which entails the existence of the sense-consciousnesses.

(26) The five sense faculties (*indriya*) consist of balls of flesh (*maṃsapeśī*). The eye (*cakṣus*) does not see forms (*rūpa*), the ear (*śrotra*) does not hear sounds (*śabda*), the nose (*ghrāṇa*) does not smell odours (*gandha*), the tongue (*jihva*) does not taste flavours (*rasa*), the body (*kāya*) does not discern tangibles (*spraṣṭavya*).[67]

Our sources are in complete disagreement over the Mahāsāṃghikas' position in the matter.

It is said in a sūtra that the eye is formed from matter (*rūpa*) derived (*upādāya*) from the great elements (*mahābhūta*) in the same way as the other

65. Vasumitra, thesis 22; Bhavya, thesis 11; Vinītadeva, thesis 11; *Kathāvatthu* X, 3 and 4; theses of the Mahāsāṃghikas.

66. Vasumitra, thesis 23; Vinītadeva, thesis 12; *Kathāvatthu* VIII, 7 and 8, and XVI, 9, theses of the Andhakas.

67. Vasumitra, thesis 24; Vinītadeva, thesis 13; Bhavya, thesis 12, says the reverse; *Kathāvatthu* XVIII, 9, thesis of the Mahāsāṃghikas, also says the reverse.

four sense organs and that each of them has the nature of solidity, hardness, and pertains to the type of solid and hard things. Being merely balls of flesh formed from impure matter, the sense organs cannot see, hear, etc. Only the sense-consciousnesses (*vijñāna*) can see, hear, etc.

According to Bhavya and the *Kathāvatthu*, the Mahāsāṃghikas supposedly upheld the reverse thesis. Hence they relied on a sūtra: 'O monks, the monk sees with his eye, hears with his ear . . . '.

(27) When one is in a state of concentration (*samāhitāvasthā*) there is vocal utterance (*vacibheda*), disciplined (*saṃvṛta*) thought (*citta*) and attention (*manasikāra*) to the discussion.[68]

The thought of him who is in a state of concentration does not objectify the objects (*viṣaya*) of concentration (*samādhi*), but within concentrated thought (*ekacittatva*) there are many objects (*ālambana*), such as vocal action (*vākkarman*) which allows for vocal utterance. When one is not yet in the attainment of vision (*darśana*), the first level of concentration, one can arouse bodily actions (*kāyakarman*) since, the body (*kāya*) being the support (*āśraya*) of concentration, when that support moves, thought follows that movement and, whilst it should remain stable (*sthita*), it is dispersed (*vikṣipta*). Disciplined thought is thought that objectifies the object of concentration. Since that thought is docile, it is called disciplined. This shows that there can also be vocal utterance during concentration, but when thought is not called stable, it is a dispersed thought. At that moment, one can arouse a vocal action. Within the thought of concentration, there is also attention to the discussion but, its objects having dispersed, that thought is restless and no longer docile or disciplined; that is why it is said there is discussion. Discussion is the name given to a diversity of faults. The thought which objectifies the dispersed objects is called attention to the discussion. In it mental activity (*manas*) is manifested. In a concentrated thought there is vocal utterance. A single thought can therefore have two objects. At the preparatory (*prayoga*) stage of concentration, thought only objectifies the objects of concentration, but later, when the state of concentration lasts for a long time, thought objectifies other objects without abandoning the earlier ones. Although its objects are dispersed, it is still called

68. Vasumitra, thesis 25; Bhavya, thesis 14; Vinītadeva, thesis 14; *Kathāvatthu* II, 5 and XVIII, 8, theses of the Pubbaseliyas.

concentrated thought. However, these words and discussions which appear in concentrated thought do not allow a defiled consciousness (*kliṣṭavijñāna*) to arise, since there would be a contradiction between that defiled thought and the purity of concentration.[69]

(28) What had to be done (*karaṇīya*) having been done (*kṛta*), there are no more grounds (*sthāna*).[70]

For the learned (*aśaikṣa*), that is, arhats, there are no more reasons, since they no longer take objects (*viṣaya*) in their different aspects. When they take objects, they know only the things which causality (*hetupratyaya*) caused to arise. There are no more things to receive means that one does not firmly grasp the meaning (*artha*) of things, one does not cling to it. The old translation said: free from two grounds (*sthāna*): (1) ground of clinging, like form (*rūpa*) or thought (*citta*); (2) ground of rebirth. The former is cause (*hetu*), the latter is fruit (*phala*).[71]

(29) Those who are streamwinners (*srotāpanna*) can understand the own-nature (*svabhāva*) of their mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta dharma*).[72]

The *srotāpannas* know for themselves that they have obtained the fruit (*phala*) of *srotāpanna,* they have no need for anyone to inform them of this. Others say it can be understood in this way: the mind and mental factors can understand their own-nature in a single instant (*ekakṣaṇa*). For worldlings (*pṛthagjana*) and those who possess the other three fruits, it is so.[73]

(30) There are arhats who are seduced by others (*paropahṛta*), who are subject to nescience (*ajñāna*), who entertain doubts (*kaṅkṣā*), who are advised by others (*paravitīrṇa*) and who utter words (*vacibheda*) when they are on the Path (*mārga*).[74]

The arhats can be seduced by others, that is, can have emissions (*visṛṣṭi*) of impure (*asuci*) semen (*śukla*) while they sleep, emissions accompanied by erotic dreams which they attribute to goddesses (*devatā*) with demoniacal bodies (*mārakāyika*) assuming female appearances. The arhat is not responsible for this since, in such circumstances, he does not play an active part (*na paṭikkhipati*) but only a passive role since it is the demoniacal goddesses seen in a dream who alone act (*aññesampi sukkhaṃ gahetvā*) without there being any blameworthy intention (*byavasāya*) on his part. If, on the other hand, the material impurity of the thing is invoked and judged incompatible with the nature of an arhat, one can respond that the body of the arhat emits plenty of other impure liquids, such as saliva, tears, urine, etc., without cause for complaint. Furthermore, other (*pare*) people can take away (*upasaṃhareyyuṃ*) from the arhat his robe (*cīvara*), alms-food (*piṇḍapāta*), bed (*sena*), seat (*āsana*), etc., without anyone thinking of reproaching him for it. In consequence, demons may well draw off semen from him.

69. Kuiji, II, pp. 32b–33b.
70. Vasumitra, thesis 26.
71. Kuiji, II, p. 34a–b.
72. Vasumitra, thesis 27; *Vibhāṣā*, T 1545, p. 42c.
73. Kuiji, II, pp. 34b–35a.
74. Vasumitra, thesis 28; Bhavya, theses 13 and 15; Vinītadeva, thesis 16; *Kathāvatthu* II, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, theses of the Pubbaseliyas.

The arhats are still subject to nescience (*ajñāna*), but this should not be confused with ignorance (*avidyā*), the first link in the chain of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). It is not hard to accept that the arhat cannot know (*na jāneyya*) the lineage (*nāmagotta*) of men (*purisa*) and women (*itthī*) or what is the right or wrong path (*maggāmagga*), or the names (*nāma*) of the trees which are lords of the forest (*vanappati*), [kinds of] wood (*kaṭṭha*) and grasses (*tiṇa*). In consequence, nescience still exists in an arhat, but it is pure nescience different from ignorance which is always impure.

The arhat has doubts. It is easily accepted that he may have doubts (*kaṅkheyya*) with regard to the lineage of men and women, the right or wrong paths, the names of trees, [kinds of] wood and grasses. In consequence the arhat still has doubts, particularly concerning the possible (*sthāna*) and the impossible (*asthāna*), but he has definitively abandoned uncertainty (*saṃsaya*), which has the nature (*bhāva*) of latent tendencies (*anusaya*).

The arhats are advised by others. It is easily accepted that it is other (*pare*) people who show (*pakāsanti*) the arhat the lineage of men and women, the right and wrong paths, the names of trees, [kinds of] wood and grasses. In consequence, the arhat is advised by others and can owe his deliverance to another person. Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana only became aware of their arhat nature through the intermediary of a proclamation (*vyākaraṇa*) by the Buddha.

One can utter words when one comes into possession of the Path. At the moment of entering the path of streamwinning (*sotāpattimaggakkhaṇe*), he who enters into possession of the first absorption (*patthamajjhāna*) exclaims (*vācā bhijjati*): 'O suffering (*dukkhanti*)!' In fact, the first absorption is

accompanied by reasoning (*vitakka*) and deliberation (*vicāra*). Indeed, the Buddha himself said that reasoning and deliberation are the determining conditions of speech (*vacīsaṅkhāra*). Entry into possession of the Path, which occurs during the first absorption, is therefore accompanied by reasoning and deliberation and, consequently, by vocal utterance. Moreover, the Buddha said that speech has its origin in reasoning (*vitakka-samuṭṭhāna*), which confirms the thesis. The Buddha also said that for him who has entered into possession of the first absorption, sound (*sadda*) is a thorn (*kaṇṭaka*). He himself narrated how a listener (*sāvaka*) of the former Buddha Sikhī, named Abhibhū, residing (*ṭhita*) in the Brahmaloka, addressed (*viññāpesi*) a thousand worlds (*sahassīlokadhātu*) with this exclamation (*sara*): 'Bestir yourselves (*ārabhhatha*), exert yourselves (*nikkamatha*), apply yourselves (*yuñjatha*) to the message (*sāsana*) of the Buddha! Shake off (*dhunātha*) the army (*sena*) of death (*maccu*), just as an elephant (*kuñjara*) does a reed-hut (*nalāgāra*)! He who dwells (*vihessati*), vigilant (*appamatta*), here below (*imasmiṃ*) in the discipline of the teaching (*dhammavinaya*), having abandoned (*pahāya*) the round of rebirths (*jātisaṃsāra*), will put an end (*antaṃ karissati*) to suffering'. The exclamation, 'O suffering' may also be the means aimed at inducing the appearance of the Path.

(31) Saying: 'O suffering (*duḥkha*)' can lead to the Path (*mārga*).[75]

The exclamation 'O suffering' can lead instantly to the Path, as much to the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*) as to the initial stage of the path of vision (*darśanamārga*).[76]

(32) Saying 'O suffering!' can be a help (*upakāra*).[77]

Often saying 'O suffering!' causes disgust for the world (*loka*) and also helps to accomplish the Noble Path (*āryamārga*).[78]

(33) Wisdom (*prajñā*) is a means (*prayoga*) which can cause suffering (*duḥkha*) to cease (*niruṇadhi*) and which can also bestow (*pariṣkṛṇoti*) happiness (*sukha*).[79]

Morality (*śīla*) and contemplation (*samādhi*) cannot be means leading to the cessation of suffering and preparation for the acquisition of Nirvāṇa,

75. Vasumitra, thesis 29; see the preceding one.
76. Kuiji, II, p. 35b.
77. Vasumitra, thesis 30; *Kathāvatthu* XI, 4, thesis of the Andhakas.
78. Kuiji, II, p. 36a.
79. Vasumitra, thesis 31.

which is the supreme fruit (*phala*) of Awakening (*bodhi*). Wisdom alone is able to attain such results.[80] This predominance of wisdom links this thesis to the doctrine of the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras and also seems to confirm the information supplied by Paramārtha according to which the Mahāsāṃghikas allegedly introduced these sūtras into their canon.

(34) Suffering (*duḥkha*) is also a nutriment (*āhāra*).[81]

According to Kuiji, in the hells (*niraya*), beings (*sattva*) are given burning iron balls and preserve their lives, because for them suffering is a nutriment. According to the *Kathāvatthu* and Buddhaghosa, suffering procures (*āharati*) the knowledge (*ñāṇa*) of suffering in him who utters (*bhāsanto*) the word (*vāca*): 'O suffering!', and he who gives that utterance cultivates (*bhāveti*) the Path (*magga*) by that very deed.

(35) In the eighth stage (*bhūmi*) one can also dwell for a long time.[82]

The eighth stage is the first level of the Path of Deliverance, that of the aspirant to the fruit of streamwinning (*srotāpannaphala*). Since the sūtras attest that an individual who has reached that stage may receive alms-food, he can therefore withdraw from the contemplation of the initial path of vision (*darśanamārga*) and remain at that level for a long time. Nonetheless, that state should not last for numerous existences, since the full level of *srotāpanna* should not exceed the duration of seven existences.[83]

(36) Until one has reached the element of the level of the lineage (*gotrabhūmidharma*), it can be said that there is overall regression (*parihāṇi*).[84]

The *gotrabhūmidharma* consists of the supreme worldly dharmas (*laukikāgradharma*), that is, the four constituents of penetration (*nirvedhabhāgīya*) which lead to the acquisition of the first fruit (*phala*). From the arousal of the decision (*cittotpāda*) to attain deliverance until the *laukikāgradharmas*, there is overall regression, because the *laukikāgradharmas* constitute a series (*saṃtāna*) of numerous mindful states (*smṛti*). There is regression as long as one has not gained the stable acquisition of the first fruit, that of *srotāpanna*.[85]

80. Kuiji, II, p. 36a–b.
81. Vasumitra, thesis 32; *Kathāvatthu* II, 6, thesis of the Pubbaseliyas.
82. Vasumitra, thesis 33a; Vinītadeva, thesis 18.
83. Kuiji, II, pp. 37a–38a.
84. Vasumitra, thesis 33b; Vinītadeva, thesis 19.
85. Kuiji, II, p. 38a–b.

(37) The streamwinner (*srotāpanna*) can have elements of regression (*parihāṇidharma*), but the arhat has no elements of regression.[86]

When one has reached the status of *srotāpanna,* having abandoned the defilements by means of a single vision (*darśana*) and not yet by means of cultivation (*bhāvanā*), that is, by means of often repeated practices, one is still possessed of delusion (*moha*) and, consequently, not yet being consolidated in one's position on the Path of Deliverance, one can regress. For the reverse reasons, the arhat cannot have any elements of regression.

(38) There is no worldly (*laukika*) right view (*saṃyagdṛṣṭi*), nor worldly faculty of faith (*śraddhendriya*).[87]

There certainly exist faith, vigour, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom that are worldly when they concern worldly things, but they cannot be identified with the five faculties which are factors of progress on the Path of Deliverance. Worldly faith, vigour, etc., are not firm, they change and do not grow, that is why they cannot be called sovereignties-faculties (*indriya*). Only pure (*anāsrava*) wisdom which engenders the abandonment of delusion (*moha*) and the experience of cessation, and pure faith which, acting upon morality (*śīla*) and the Three Jewels (*triratna*), engenders the experience of purity, are called sovereignties-faculties because they serve to destroy the passions.

(39) There are no undefined (*avyākṛta*) things (*dharma*).[88]

Depending on their objects (*viṣaya*), actions (*karman*) are good (*kuśala*) or bad (*akuśala*). The result of a good action is good, that of a bad action is bad, both are essentially distinct and there are no undefined things, that is, neither good nor bad.[89]

(40) When one enters the certainty of rightness (*samyaktvaniyāma*), it can be said that one has forsaken (*prahīṇa*) all the bonds (*saṃyojana*).[90]

The bonds are of the same nature as the defilements (*kleśa*). When one

86. Vasumitra, thesis 34; Vinītadeva, thesis 20; *Vibhāṣā*, T 1545, pp. 931b–933c: the *srotāpanna* can regress. *Kathāvatthu* II, 2, contrary thesis among certain Mahāsāṃghikas according to whom the arhat has regressive elements.

87. Vasumitra, thesis 35; Bhavya, thesis 17; Vinītadeva, thesis 22; T 1548, pp. 559b, 567c.

88. Vasumitra, thesis 36; Vinītadeva, thesis 23 (?).

89. Kuiji, II, p. 42b.

90. Vasumitra, thesis 37; Bhavya, thesis 16.

has entered the Noble Path of Deliverance, there are no more defilements, nor any confusion, and that is why it is said that, when one enters the initial path of vision (*darśanamārga*), one has forsaken all the bonds.[91]

(41) Streamwinners (*srotāpanna*) can commit any misdeeds (*pāpa*), except the offences of immediate fruition (*ānantarya*).[92]

The *srotāpannas* can commit ten wrong actions, that is, lapses regarding the ten rules imposed on monks, but they cannot commit the five offences of immediate fruition, which are too grave. It is, therefore, difficult to distinguish a worldling (*pṛthagjana*) from a noble one (*ārya*), that is, a Buddhist. How can he who has acquired the first *srotāpanna* fruit (*phala*) commit the ten wrong actions without destroying his faith (*śraddhā*)? By contemplating the Truths (*satya*), he is purified, but when having withdrawn from contemplation, he commits a misdeed, there is no contradiction in it.[93]

(42) All the sūtras uttered by the Buddha have an entirely intelligible meaning (*nitārtha*).[94]

All the words spoken by the Buddha, which entails setting the Wheel of the Dharma in motion (*dharmacakrapravartana*), therefore represent the true Dharma and consequently are intelligible in meaning.[95]

(43) There are nine kinds of unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) things (*dharma*): (1) cessation through acquired knowledge (*pratisaṃkhyanirodha*); (2) cessation without acquired knowledge (*apratisaṃkhyanirodha*); (3) space (*ākāśa*); (4) the sphere of the infinity of space (*ākāśānantyāyatana*); (5) the sphere of the infinity of consciousness (*vijñānāntyāyatana*); (6) the sphere of nothingness (*ākiñcanyāyatana*); (7) the sphere of neither perception nor nonperception (*nevasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana*); (8) the own-nature of the links of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpādāṅgasvabhāva*); (9) the own-nature of the sections of the Path (*mārgāṅgasvabhāva*).[96]

(44) The own-nature of the mind (*cittasvabhāva*) is originally clear (*prabhāsvara*). It is the adventitious defilements (*āgantukopakleśa*) that sully it.[97]

91. Kuiji, II, p. 41a; Supplement, p. 225a.

92. Vasumitra, thesis 38; Vinītadeva, thesis 21.

93. Kuiji, II, p. 41b; Supplement, p. 225a.

94. Vasumitra, thesis 39; Vinītadeva, thesis 23 (?).

95. Kuiji, II, p. 42a; Supplement, p. 225b.

96. Vasumitra, thesis 40; Vinītadeva, thesis 25.

97. Vasumitra, thesis 41; Bhavya, thesis 18; Vinītadeva, thesis 32; *Kathāvatthu* III, 3, thesis of the Andhakas.

The substance itself of the mind is eternally clear. But because defilements (*kleśa*) appear and besmirch it, it is said to be sullied. However, these defilements, not being the original nature of the mind, are called adventitious.[98]

(45) Latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) are not thoughts (*citta*) or mental factors (*caitta*), and they are devoid of an object (*anālambana*).[99]

Latent tendencies exist only in the body (*kāya*) since, were they to reside in thought, when the latter disappears, they would disappear with it and a worldling would then be called noble (*ārya*). Furthermore, since they are neither thoughts nor mental faculties, they are devoid of an object.

(46) Latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) are different from obsessions (*paryavasthāna*), and obsessions are different from latent tendencies, since it should be said that tendencies are dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayukta*), whereas obsessions are associated with thought (*cittasaṃprayukta*).[100]

Latent tendencies are essentially different from obsessions since they are the seeds (*bīja*) from which the latter are born. Latent tendencies are dissociated from thought since a worldling (*puthujjana*) who abides (*vattamāna*) with a good or undefined (*kusalābyākata*) thought (*citta*) is endowed with latent tendencies (*sānusaya*). Indeed, these tendencies cannot be said to be associated with such a thought.

(47) The past (*atīta*) and the future (*anāgata*) do not exist in reality.[101]

(48) The sphere of mental phenomena (*dharmāyatana*) is neither knowable (*jñeya*) nor perceptible by consciousness (*vijñeya*), but it is comprehensible (*prajñeya*).[102]

The sphere of mental phenomena is what is revealed directly to the mind (*manas*). It is not something that hesitant conventional knowledge (*saṃvṛtijñāna*) can know or what impure (*sāsrava*) dispersed consciousness can perceive. It is that which can be penetrated by those who possess the six superknowledges (*abhijñā*) and those who see the principles of the Truth.

98. Kuiji, II, p. 45a; T 1548, p. 697b.
99. Vasumitra, thesis 42; *Kathāvatthu* IX, 4, thesis of the Andhakas.
100. Vasumitra, thesis 43; Bhavya, thesis 19; Vinītadeva, thesis 33; *Kathāvatthu* XI, 1, thesis of the Mahāsāṃghikas, and XIV, 5 and 6, theses of the Andhakas; T 1548, p. 690b.
101. Vasumitra, thesis 44; Bhavya, thesis 20.
102. Vasumitra, thesis 45; Vinītadeva, thesis 36.

It is extremely subtle (*sūkṣma*) in nature and beyond the means of coarse knowledge.

(49) There is no intermediate existence (*antarābhava*).[103]

At issue here is an existence which would occur between the moment of death and that of rebirth. The Mahāsāṃghikas' argumentation on this point is unknown to us.

(50) The streamwinners (*srotāpanna*) also obtain the absorptive meditations (*dhyāna*).[104]

Since they enter the preparation (*prayoga*) for the Path (*mārga*) freed from impurities (*anāsrava*) and since they can forsake the bonds (*saṃyojana*), they can overcome the defilements (*kleśa*) and, consequently, obtain the absorptive meditations. If they could not forsake the bonds, they would not be able to acquire the *srotāpanna* fruit (*phala*).[105]

(51) Even in thought (*citta*) there is matter (*rūpa*).[106]

(52) Destruction (*bhaṅga*) [or fear (*bhaya*)?] also exists.[107]

(53) There is no conventional meaning (*saṃvṛtyartha*).[108]

(54) Only thoughts (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) are both causes of fruition (*vipākahetu*) and fruits of fruition (*vipākaphala*).[109]

(55) The form (*rūpa*) of him who is equipped with the Path (*maggasamaṅgī*) is the Path (*magga*).[110]

Right speech (*sammāvācā*), right conduct (*sammākammanta*) and right livelihood (*sammājīva*) are form and yet are part of the Path.

(56) For him who is equipped with the five kinds of consciousness (*pañcaviññāṇasamaṅgī*) there is cultivation of the Path (*maggabhāvanā*).[111]

The Buddha said, 'Having seen (*disvā*) form (*rūpa*) with the eye (*cakkhu*), without grasping at its characteristics (*nimittaggāhī*) or its minor characteristics (*anubyañjanaggāhī*) . . . having heard (*sutvā*) sound (*sadda*) with the ear

103. Vasumitra, thesis 46; Vinītadeva, thesis 34; T 1548, p. 587b.
104. Vasumitra, thesis 47; Bhavya, thesis 21; Vinītadeva, thesis 35.
105. Kuiji, II, p. 48a.
106. Vinītadeva, thesis 15; see above thesis 25.
107. Vinītadeva, thesis 17; the meaning remains enigmatic.
108. Vinītadeva, thesis 24; the meaning remains enigmatic.
109. *Vibhāṣā*, T 1545, p. 96a; cf. LVP, *Kośa* II, pp. 271 and 287. We know of no argumentation concerning this thesis, the meaning of which is very clear.
110. *Kathāvatthu* X, 2 [SBW: correction to original note].
111. Ibid. X, 3. [SBW: again correcting original note].

(*sota*) . . . having smelled (*ghāyitvā*) odour (*gandha*) with the nose (*ghāna*) . . . having tasted (*sāyitvā*) flavour (*rasa*) with the tongue (*jihvā*) . . . having touched (*phusitvā*) the tangible (*phoṭṭhabba*) with the body (*kāya*) . . .'. Consequently, he who cultivates the Path is equipped with the five kinds of consciousness.

(57) He who is equipped with the Path (*maggasamaṅgī*) is endowed (*samannāgata*) with two kinds of morality (*sīla*).[112]

'The man (*nara*) who is firmly established (*patiṭṭhāya*) in morality is wise (*sapañña*)', it is said. Since the moral (*sīlavā*) man, endowed with worldly (*lokiya*) morality, cultivates (*bhāveti*) the transcendental Path (*lokuttaramagga*), he is endowed with two kinds of morality, one, the oldest (*purima*), being worldly, and the other, incurred at the moment of the Path (*maggakkhaṇa*), being transcendental (*lokuttara*).

(58) Morality (*sīla*) is not a mental factor (*acetasika*).[113]

Since when one has aroused (*uppajjitvā*) morality, there is that which goes by the name (*nāma*) of accumulation of morality (*sīlopacaya*) caused by commitment (*samādānahetuka*) by him who is precisely called moral (*sīlavā*), morality is not a mental factor.

(59) Morality (*sīla*) is not consequent to thought (*cittānuparivattī*).[114]

This thesis is parallel to the preceding one and its demonstration is identical.

(60) Morality (*sīla*) caused by commitment (*samādānahetuka*) increases (*vaḍḍhati*).[115]

The Buddha said, 'Those who plant parks (*ārāmaropa*), who plant woods (*vanaropa*) [for monks to dwell in] . . . who are established in the Teaching (*dhammaṭṭha*), who practise morality (*sīlasampanna*), those people (*jana*) are destined to go to the heavens (*saggagāmī*)'. Consequently, merit (*puñña*) always (*sadā*) increases (*pavaḍḍhati*).

(61) Intimation (*viññatti*) is morality (*sīla*).[116]

Intimation by the body (*kāyaviññatti*) is bodily action (*kāyakamma*) and intimation by speech (*vacīviññatti*) is vocal action (*vacīkamma*). In fact,

112. Ibid. X, 6.
113. Ibid. X, 7 [SBW: again correcting original note].
114. Ibid. X 8 [SBW: cor.]; see T 1548, p. 575a.
115. Ibid. X 9 [SBW: cor.].
116. Ibid. X, 10 [SBW: cor.].

morality is bodily action and vocal action. Therefore, intimation by the body and intimation by speech are morality. Furthermore, it cannot truly be said (*na hevaṃ vattabbe*) that intimation is immoral (*dussīlya*).

(62) Non-intimation (*aviññatti*) is immoral (*dussīlya*).[117]

Non-intimation is action known only to its agent. Wrongdoing (*pāpakamma*) was (*āsi*) decided on (*samādinna*), and that decision was known only to the agent, therefore non-intimation is immoral. Non-intimation is fully equipped with its factors (*aṅgapāripūri*) in murder (*pāṇātipāta*) and other offences. Being the order (*āṇatti*) to commit them, it is an accumulation of demerit (*apuññupacaya*) dissociated from thought (*cittavippayutta*), since it is part both of the aggregate of form (*rūpakkhandha*) and the spheres and element of mental phenomena (*dhammāyatana, dhammadhātu*).

(63) Latent tendencies (*anusaya*) are undefined (*abyākata*), uncaused (*ahetuka*) and dissociated from thought (*cittavippayutta*).[118]

A worldling (*puthujjana*) could be said (*vattabba*) to have latent tendencies (*sānusaya*) when his thought (*citta*) remains (*vattamāna*) good (*kusala*) or undefined (*abyākata*). However, it cannot truly be said (*na hevaṃ vattabbe*) that for him good and bad (*kusalākusala*) things (*dhamma*) come (*āgacchanti*) into confrontation (*sammukhībhāva*). Therefore, latent tendencies are undefined. Similarly, since it cannot be said that they are caused (*sahetuka*) by a cause (*hetu*), latent tendencies are uncaused. Finally, since it cannot be said that they are associated with thought (*citta*), latent tendencies are dissociated from thought.

(64) Nescience (*aññāna*) being dispelled (*vigata*) and thought (*citta*) remaining (*vattamāna*) dissociated from knowledge (*ñāṇavippayutta*), such a state cannot be called (*na vattabba*) knower (*ñāṇī*).[119]

When nescience is dispelled by the knowledge of the Path (*maggañāṇa*) and when thought remains dissociated from knowledge due to (*vasena*) visual consciousness and the other (*cakkuviññānādi*) kinds of sense-consciousness, since the thought of the Path (*maggacitta*) does not function (*nappavattati*), that state cannot be called knower.

117. Ibid. X 11 [SBW: cor.]. See LVP, *Kośa* I, pp. 20–1, IV, p. 13 ff.; T 1548, pp. 518a–526c, 535c and 543a.
118. *Kathāvatthu* XI, 1. See above, thesis 46.
119. Ibid. XI, 2.

(65) He who is endowed (*samannāgata*) with supernormal power (*iddhibala*) can continue to live (*tiṭṭheyya*) for a cosmic period (*kappa*).[120]

The Buddha said, 'For him whose bases of supernormal power (*iddhipāda*) are cultivated (*bhāvita*), repeated (*bahulīkata*), habituated (*yānīkata*), fundamental (*vatthukata*), practised (*anuṭṭhita*), familiar (*paricita*), well undertaken (*susamāraddha*), he, should he so wish (*ākaṅkhamāna*), can continue to live for a cosmic period or the remains of a cosmic period (*kappāvasesa*)'. Therefore, he who is endowed with supernormal power can continue to live for a cosmic period.

(66) Restraint (*saṃvara*) and lack of restraint (*asaṃvara*) of the senses are actions (*kamma*).[121]

The Buddha said, 'Having seen (*disvā*) form (*rūpa*) with the eye (*cakkhu*), having heard (*sutvā*) sound (*sadda*) with the ear (*sota*) . . . having known (*viññāya*) a mental phenomenon (*dhamma*) with the mind (*mano*), having grasped at their characteristics (*nimittaggāhi*) . . . not having grasped at their characteristics . . .' in order to define restraint and lack of restraint. Therefore, restraint and lack of restraint are actions.

(67) All (*sabba*) actions (*kamma*) are endowed with fruition (*savipāka*).[122]

The Buddha said, 'As long as I have not experienced (*appaṭisaṃviditvā*) accumulated (*upacita*) and volitional (*sañcetanika*) performed (*kata*) actions (*kamma*), I do not speak (*nāhaṃ vadāmi*) of their destruction (*byantībhāva*), but [I say that] visible (*diṭṭha*) things (*dhamma*) in this world are of present (*upapajja*) or future (*apara*) mode (*pariyāya*)'.

(68) Sound (*sadda*) is fruition (*vipāka*).[123]

The Buddha said, 'From the accomplishment (*katatta*), accumulation (*upacitatta*), heaping up (*ussannatta*), development (*vipulatta*) of actions (*kamma*) comes a heavenly sound (*brahmasara*) like the voice of a cuckoo (*karavikabhāṇī*)'. Consequently, sound is fruition.

(69) The six sense-spheres (*saḷāyatana*) are fruition (*vipāka*).[124]

Since the six sense-spheres are aroused (*uppanna*) due to the accomplishment (*katatta*) of action (*kamma*), they are fruition.

120. Ibid. XI, 5.
121. Ibid. XII, 1.
122. Ibid. XII, 2.
123. Ibid. XII, 3; T 1548, pp. 540a–b, 531c. See thesis 22 of the Vātsīputrīyas.
124. *Kathāvatthu* XII, 4.

(70) A bad root (*akusalamūla*) and a good root (*kusalamūla*) are mutually adjustable (*paṭisandahanti*).[125]

One detaches oneself (*virajati*) from the object (*vatthu*) to which one is attached (*rajjati*), and one attaches oneself to the object from which one is detached. Since one attaches and detaches oneself from the one and the same object (*ekavatthusmiññeva*), the good and bad roots are mutually adjustable (*aññamaññaṃ*).

(71) Causality (*paccayatā*) is determined (*vavatthitā*).[126]

For example, a thing (*dhamma*) which is a condition (*paccaya*) in relation to cause (*hetupaccaya*) is not a condition in relation to an object (*ārammaṇapaccaya*), or in relation to immediacy (*anantarapaccaya*) or in relation to immediate contiguity (*samanantarapaccaya*). Therefore, a thing can only be a condition in a single way, and causality is determined.

(72) Mental formations (*saṅkhāra*) are conditioned by ignorance (*avijjāpaccaya*), but it cannot be said (*na vattabaṃ*) that ignorance (*avijjā*) is conditioned by mental formations (*saṅkhārapaccaya*).[127]

In other words, causal relations are not reciprocal. No argumentation on this thesis is mentioned by Buddhaghosa.

(73) The aging and death (*jarāmaraṇa*) of transcendental (*lokuttara*) things (*dhamma*) are transcendental.[128]

Since the aging and death of transcendental things are not worldly (*lokiya*), they are transcendental.

(74) One (*para*) controls (*niggaṇhāti*) the mind (*citta*) of another (*para*).[129]

If those who have acquired increased power (*balappatta*) and mastery (*vasībhūta*) in the world (*loka*) were not able (*na sakkuṇeyyuṃ*) to control another's mind, what would be their increased power and mastery? In reality it is by means of that increased power and that mastery that they control another's mind.

(75) There is a certain (*kiñci*) fetter (*saññojana*) which he who has attained holiness (*arahattappatti*) has not forsaken (*appahāya*).[130]

125. Ibid. XIV, 1.
126. Ibid. XV, 1.
127. Ibid. XV, 2.
128. Ibid. XV, 6.
129. Ibid. XVI, 1.
130. Ibid. XXI, 3.

Since the arahant does not know (*na jānāti*) all (*sabba*) the objective domain of the Buddha (*buddhavisaya*), he cannot have forsaken (*appahīna*) ignorance (*avijjā*) and uncertainty (*vicikicchā*).

(76) The five kinds of consciousness (*viññāṇa*) are endowed with ideation (*sābhoga*).[131]

In a sutta the Buddha said, 'Having seen (*disvā*) form (*rūpa*) with the eye (*cakkhu*) . . . having touched (*phusitvā*) tangibles (*phoṭṭhabba*) with the body (*kāya*), having grasped at their characteristics, not having grasped at their characteristics . . .'. Consequently, the five kinds of consciousness are endowed with ideation.

(77) The supreme worldly dharmas (*laukikāgradharma*) are included (*paryāpanna*) in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) and in the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*).[132]

In fact if, in one stage (*bhūmi*), there are conventional knowledges (*saṃvṛtijñāna*) adjacent to clear comprehension (*abhisamaya*) [of the Truths], in that stage there are supreme worldly dharmas.

(78) There is a root-consciousness (*mūlavijñāna*) which serves as a support (*āśraya*) to the eye-consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*) and the other kinds of sense-consciousness, just as the root of a tree is the mainspring of leaves, etc.[133]

The kinds of sense-consciousness cannot have the value of a root. The root-consciousness of which the Mahāsāṃghika Āgamas speak in an 'esoteric' way would be the forerunner of the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) of the Mahāyāna.

(79) The kinds of evolved consciousness (*pravṛttivijñāna*) can be simultaneous (*sahabhū*). The notion of pervasion (*vāsanā*) being rejected, the kinds of evolved consciousness are not pervadable and do not bear seeds (*bīja*).[134]

(80) Faith (*śraddhā*) is adaptation (*anukūlatā?*) by nature. It would therefore be of three kinds, good (*kuśala*), bad (*akuśala*) or undefined (*avyākṛta*), according to the type of object to which it adapts; it would be resolve (*adhimokṣa*) or desire (*chanda*). If it is an adaptation of adherence, it is

131. Ibid. X, 5 [SBW: cor.].
132. *Vibhāṣā*, T 1545, p. 14a; T 1546, p. 9b (does not mention the *rūpadhātu*).
133. LVP, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, pp. 178–9.
134. Ibid., pp. 184, n. 2, and 186.

resolve; if it is an adaptation of pleasure, it is desire. Beyond resolve and desire, there is no adaptation.[135]

(81) Diligence (*apramāda*) is the guardian (*ārakṣā*) of the mind (*citta*), which it shelters from defiled (*sāṃkleśika*) things (*dharma*).[136]

According to Vasumitra, the four schools of the Mahāsāṃgikas, Lokottaravādins, Ekavyāvahārikas and Gokulikas were in disagreement over certain questions. He is doubtless trying to say that at least one of these schools upheld the following theses:

(1) There are as many different clear comprehensions (*abhisamaya*) as the Noble Truths (*āryasatya*) have different aspects (*ākāra*).[137]

(2) There are a few things (*dharma*) that are self-made (*svayaṃkṛta*), a few things that are made by others (*parakṛta*), a few things that are made in both ways (*ubhayakṛta*), a few things which are engendered due to conditions (*pratītyajāta*).[138]

(3) In a single moment, two thoughts (*citta*) arise together.[139]

The original schools maintained that the kinds of consciousness (*vijñāna*) each arise separately. The secondary schools claimed that two thoughts occur at the same time, because the objects (*viṣaya*) of the faculties (*indriya*) arise together through the power (*bala*) of mental action (*manasikāra*).[140]

(4) The Path (*mārga*) and the defilements (*kleśa*) appear together.[141]

The original schools asserted that, although the latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) can exist separately, when the Path arises, it cannot be said that it appears at the same time as the latent tendencies. The new schools say that since the latent tendencies constantly exist, when the Path arises, it appears at the same time as them. Since the *kleśas* appear at the same time as the Path, they are now called *anuśayas*.[142]

135. Ibid., p. 322. However, this seems to contradict thesis 38 above since, if faith is transcendental only, it is only good. Besides, the attribution of this thesis to the Mahāsāṃghikas is uncertain.
136. LVP, *Kośa* II, p. 157.
137. Vasumitra, thesis 1 of the 2nd series; it is the opposite of thesis 23 above.
138. Vasumitra, thesis 2 of the 2nd series. Kuiji's commentary, II, p. 49b, is reduced to one line which does not clarify the text at all.
139. Vasumitra, thesis 3 of the 2nd series; Vinītadeva, thesis 27; *Vibhāṣā*, T 1545, p. 47b; *Kathāvatthu* V, 9, thesis of the Andhakas. See above, thesis 27.
140. Kuiji, III, p. 1b.
141. Vasumitra, thesis 4 of the 2nd series; Vinītadeva, thesis 28.
142. Kuiji, III, p. 1b.

(5) Action (*karman*) and its fruition (*vipāka*) evolve at the same time.[143]

Since the past (*atīta*) does not exist as a substance and since action and its fruit (*phala*) occur at different times, so long as an action is not exhausted it exists in a perpetual present (*pratyutpanna*), and the fruit, since its fruition is also present, exists at the same time as action. Action that has fructified is exhausted; it no longer exists, has entered the past and it necessarily no longer exists at the same time.[144] This solution to the problem of the fruition of action is very close to that maintained by the Kāśyapīyas.

(6) Seeds (*bīja*) themselves are shoots (*aṅkura*).[145]

Matter (*rūpa*) lasts for a long time [and is not destroyed at each instant]. Since it involves arising (*utpāda*) and ceasing (*nirodha*), the substance (*dravya*) of the seeds is transformed into shoots and no longer exists. As soon as the seeds have ceased to exist, the shoots arise.[146] This evolutionist thesis reacts against the instantaneousness often found in the teachings of other schools.

(7) The great elements (*mahābhūta*) of the material (*rūpa*) faculties (*indriya*) evolve (*pariṇamanti*). The mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) do not evolve.[147]

Material (*rūpin*) things (*dharma*) last for a long time. Hence, because of arising (*utpāda*) and destruction (*kṣaya*), the substance (*dravya*) of milk (*kṣīra*) is transformed into curds (*dadhi*). The mind and mental factors, subject to instantaneous (*kṣaṇika*) arising and ceasing (*nirodha*), are not transformed from an earlier state to a later state [as their existence is too short]. These schools maintained therefore that since the sense faculties consist of balls of flesh (*maṃsapeśī*),[148] the great elements which constitute them are transformed, whilst the mind and mental factors are not transformed.[149]

143. Vasumitra, thesis 5 of the 2nd series; Vinītadeva, thesis 29; *Kathāvatthu* XV, 11, thesis of the Andhakas and Sammatīyas.

144. Kuiji, III, p. 2a.

145. Vasumitra, thesis 6 of the 2nd series; Vinītadeva, thesis 30: seeds and shoots occur at the same time.

146. Kuiji, III, p. 2ab.

147. Vasumitra, thesis 7.

148. See above, thesis 26.

149. Kuiji, III, p. 2b.

(8) The mind (*citta*) can penetrate the whole body (*kāya*) and, depending on the object (*viṣaya*) and the support (*āśraya*), can contract or expand.[150]

Subtle (*sūkṣma*) mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) [that is, the mind] resides in the whole body which constitutes its support. If a hand is struck or a foot pricked, both blows can be perceived and felt simultaneously. That is why we know that subtle mental consciousness resides throughout the body. Since not even a single second (*ekakṣaṇa*) passes between those two sensations, enabling one to assert that they are successive [and not simultaneous], we therefore know with certainty that subtle mental consciousness resides throughout the body.[151] There is no combination of the support (*āśraya*) [that is, the sense organ] and its object (*ālambana*) first, then another combination in which the corresponding consciousness (*vijñāna*) is added to the preceding two, by conforming [to the modalities] of that organ (*indriya*) and that object. If one relies on a large organ and, furthermore, one objectifies a large object (*viṣaya*) [such as a huge mountain or the sound of thunder], the mind becomes consistent (*anurūpa*) with that organ and that objective domain and is then called unfurled, that is, opened out. If, in contrast, one relies on a small organ and, furthermore, one objectifies a small object [such as a hair-tip or the buzzing of a mosquito], the mind becomes consistent with that organ and that object and is then called furled up, that is, contracted.[152]

According to Vasumitra, these new schools maintained many other theses through which they were distinguished from each other.

150. Vasumitra, thesis 8; Vinītadeva, thesis 31.

151. Kuiji, III, p. 3b.

152. Ibid., III, pp. 3b–4a.

CHAPTER 6

The Lokottaravādins

According to the sources from the northwest (*Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra* and Vasumitra), the Lokottaravādin school arose after the first internal schism of the Mahāsāṃghikas, in the course of the second century EN, doubtless towards its end, at the same time as those of the Ekavyāvahārikas and Gokulikas. Paramārtha, commenting upon Vasumitra, states that this schism was supposedly due to discussions over the authenticity of the Mahāyāna sūtras.[1]

However, the northwestern lists are the only ones to distinguish the Lokottaravādins from the Ekavyāvahārikas. The Theravādins and Sammatīyas knew only of the Ekavyāvahārikas and Gokulikas. Vinītadeva and the authors influenced by him (*Varṣāgraprcchā*) in contrast knew only of the Lokottaravādins. As for the list of Mahāsāṃghikas cited by Bhavya, it mentions only the Mahāsāṃghikas and Gokulikas.

Vasumitra does not differentiate the Mahāsāṃghika theses from those of the Ekavyāvahārikas, Lokottaravādins and Gokulikas. The Sammatīyas of Bhavya attribute to the Ekavyāvahārikas alone the theses which Vasumitra attributes jointly to the four schools, and he does not give those of the Gokulikas. Vinītadeva ascribes these same theses to the Lokottaravādins, ignoring the other two secondary schools. Tāranātha says that the Lokottaravādins and Gokulikas formed a single school, and that the term Ekavyāvahārika designated the Mahāsāṃghikas.[2]

In fact, it seems that the Lokottaravādins are identical to the Ekavyāvahārikas who retained the name of Mahāsāṃghika after the schism that separated them from the Gokulikas. Nonetheless, the Lokottaravādins appear to have been the main school of the Ekavyāvahārikas.

1. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 21 and 43.
2. Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte*, p. 273.

Xuanzang is the only one to tell us of their residence. He met several thousand of them, living in tens of monasteries, in Bāmiyān.[3] It does indeed seem that it is to the Lokottaravādins that we owe the gigantic statues at that famous site [SBW: destroyed as I was working on this translation, March 2001].

According to Tāranātha, the Lokottaravādins were still in existence at the time of the seven Pāla kings (ninth and tenth century CE),[4] which seems to be confirmed by the fact that Vinītadeva still cites them. However, they could only have resided in Magadha and Bengal,[5] in the Pāla kingdom, since the Muslim invasion reached Afghanistan at the end of the eighth century.[6]

The first part of their Vinaya-piṭaka, the *Mahāvastu,* has been preserved for us in the original text. It is a voluminous collection of *Jātakas* written in very corrupt Sanskrit or hybrid Sanskrit. Theses which are clearly Lokottaravādin are found in it.[7]

According to Paramārtha, the Lokottaravādins maintained that the *laukikadharmas* have no reality, since they are the fruits of actions (*karman*), which are themselves the product of perversion (*viparyaya*). Conversely, the *lokottaradharmas* exist, since they are not produced by perversion. 'It is in them that exist the Path and the fruit of the Path. The fruit of the Path consists of the two kinds of *śūnyatā* [*pudgalaśūnyatā* and *dharmaśūnyatā;* the latter pertains to the Great Vehicle]; the Path is the knowledge which enables understanding of the two kinds of emptiness. The principle of the two kinds of emptiness is real, and the knowledge of the two kinds of emptiness is also real (true): an object (*viṣaya*) can produce a real knowledge, and with a real (true) knowledge one can understand a real object; that is why the Path also has (like its fruit) a real existence'.[8]

Among the theses attributed in common to the Mahāsāṃghikas, Ekavyāvahārikas, Lokottaravādins[9] and even the Gokulikas and Andhakas, there

3. Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels* I, pp. 116–20.
4. Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte*, p. 274.
5. Ibid., p. 236, notes the presence of Mahāsāṃghikas in Vikramaśilā under the Senas (twelfth century).
6. Grousset, *L'Asie orientale*, p. 96.
7. *Mahāvastu*, I, pp. 48, 159, 167, 170, 193, etc.
8. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 21, 42 and 45; Kuiji, *Vasumitra Comm.*, p. 40a–b.
9. For all these common theses, see above, ch. 5.

are certain ones which seem peculiarly Lokottaravādin, in the sense that they present the buddhas and, to a certain degree, the bodhisattvas as transcendental (*lokottara*) beings.

(1) The buddhas are transcendental (*lokottara*).[10]

(2) They are free from impurities (*āsrava*) or from worldly (*laukika*) dharmas.[11]

(3) With each of their words (*vāca*), the buddhas set turning the Wheel of the Dharma (*dharmacakra pravartayanti*).[12]

(4) The buddhas, with a single sound (*śabda*), utter all the elements of the Dharma (*dharmadhātu*).[13]

(5) In what the buddhas say there is nothing that does not conform to the meaning.[14]

(6) The words of the buddhas manifest their essence (*garbha*).[15]

(7) The material body (*rūpakāya*) of the buddhas is unlimited (*ananta*).[16]

(8) The life span of the buddhas is infinite (*ananta*).[17]

(9) The might (*prabhāva*) of the buddhas is unlimited (*ananta*).[18]

(10) The buddhas exist as substance (*dravya*).[19]

(11) The buddhas dwell perpetually in concentration (*samādhi*).[20]

(12) The buddhas never utter a single word but beings, thinking they speak, jump for joy.[21]

(13) The buddhas neither sleep nor dream.[22]

(14) The buddhas, in order to win over beings (*sattva*), arouse in them a pure (*śuddha*) faith (*śraddhā*) without them having a thought of satiety.[23]

10. Vasumitra, thesis 1; Bhavya, thesis 1; Vinītadeva, thesis 1; *Kathāvatthu* II, 10 [cor.]: thesis of the Andhakas.
11. Vasumitra, thesis 2; Bhavya, theses 2 and 5.
12. Vasumitra, thesis 3; Vinītadeva, thesis 7; Bhavya, thesis 3, says the opposite.
13. Vasumitra, thesis 4.
14. Vasumitra, thesis 5.
15. Bhavya, thesis 4.
16. Vasumitra, thesis 6; Vinītadeva, thesis 3.
17. Vasumitra, thesis 8; Vinītadeva, thesis 3.
18. Vasumitra, thesis 7.
19. Vasumitra, thesis 2.
20. Vasumitra, thesis 12; Vinītadeva, thesis 4.
21. Vasumitra, thesis 12.
22. Vasumitra, thesis 10.
23. Vasumitra, thesis 9.

(15) The buddhas answer questions from beings without needing to reflect.[24]

(16) In a single thought-moment (*ekakṣaṇikacitta*), the buddhas understand all things.[25]

(17) Through wisdom (*prajñā*) associated (*saṃprayukta*) with a single thought-moment (*ekakṣaṇikacitta*), the buddhas know all things.[26]

(18) For the buddhas, the knowledge of destruction (*kṣayajñāna*) and the knowledge of non-arising (*anutpādajñāna*) continue unceasingly until they enter Parinirvāṇa.[27]

(19) The bodhisattvas do not receive the forms of *kalala, arbuda, peśī* and *ghana* as their own substance when they enter a womb.[28]

(20) The bodhisattvas do not arouse a thought (*citta*) of craving (*kāma*), ill-will (*vyāpāda*) or harmfulness (*vihiṃsā*).[29]

(21) The bodhisattvas enter the womb through the mother's side and in the form of a white elephant.[30]

(22) The bodhisattvas are born from their mother's right side and of their own accord.[31]

(23) The bodhisattvas are born in the bad destinies (*durgati*) of their own accord, in order to perfect beings (*sattva*).[32]

The main features of the Lokottaravādin teaching, in that it concerns ontology as much as concepts of the Buddha and bodhisattvas, are very close to the basic elements of the Mahāyāna teaching. It seems that it is most particularly to the Lokottaravādins that we owe the concept of the transcendental Buddha, docetism and insistence on the bodhisattva career which characterise the Mahāyāna, the Great Vehicle being, by definition, the vehicle of the bodhisattvas. The doctrine of the transcendence of the buddhas is clearly the seed of the teaching on the three bodies (*trikāya*) of the Buddha so dear to Mahāyāna thinkers.

24. Vasumitra, thesis 11.
25. Vasumitra, thesis 13.
26. Vasumitra, thesis 14; Vinītadeva, thesis 5.
27. Vasumitra, thesis 15; Vinītadeva, thesis 6.
28. Vasumitra, thesis 16; Bhavya, thesis 6; Vinītadeva, thesis 9.
29. Vasumitra, thesis 19; Bhavya, thesis 8; Vinītadeva, thesis 8.
30. Vasumitra, thesis 17; Bhavya, thesis 7.
31. Vasumitra, thesis 18; Bhavya, thesis 7.
32. Vasumitra, thesis 20; Bhavya, thesis 9; *Kathāvatthu* XXIII, 3, thesis of the Andhakas.

CHAPTER 7

The Ekavyāvahārikas

This is one of the two or three schools which emerged from the first internal schism of the Mahāsāṃghikas in the course of the second century EN, doubtless towards its end, according to the traditions from the northwest. From Paramārtha's evidence, the schism supposedly resulted from discussions over the authenticity of the Mahāyāna sūtras.[1]

We have seen that the Ekavyāvahārikas seem to be confused with the Lokottaravādins and orthodox Mahāsāṃghikas.[2]

We have no information concerning their particular residence, probably because they were better known by the name of Mahāsāṃghikas.

According to Paramārtha, they maintained that everything was fictitious, the absolute as much as the conventional, which was, it seems, the teaching of the Mahāsāṃghika mother school prior to the schism. For them, Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa, the *laukika-* and *lokottaradharmas* were merely designations (*prajñapti*) and were devoid of any real substance. 'Hence, to all those dharmas applies one and the same designation, otherwise called a "single expression"; hence the name of the school'.[3]

This fundamental nonreality, which identifies the most different of entities by relying on their insubstantiality, is extremely close to the teaching on emptiness (*śūnyatā*) which characterises the Mahāyāna and which is explained in particular by the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras.[4]

1. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 21 and 43.
2. Cf. above, ch. 6.
3. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 21, 42 and 45; Kuiji, *Vasumitra Comm.*, pp. 39b–40a.
4. For the rest of their teaching, cf. above, ch. 5, the theses held in common with the Mahāsāṃghikas.

CHAPTER 10

The Prajñaptivādins

According to the traditions of the northwest, the Prajñaptivādins formed a school which separated from the Mahāsāṃghikas immediately after the Bahśrutīyas, at the end of the second century EN. According to the Theravādins and Sammatīyas, they detached themselves from the Gokulikas along with the Bahuśrutīyas. We may well wonder whether they constituted, with the latter, the two parts of the Gokulika school after the schism which divided it.

Their name means 'the designators', those who uphold the doctrine of designation (*prajñapti*).

Paramārtha, although commenting on Vasumitra who represents the tradition from the northwest, says that the Prajñaptivādins consisted of a reforming school of Bahuśrutīyas and calls them Bahuśrutīya-Vibhajyavādins, 'those who made distinctions (*vibhajya*) [in the doctrines of the] Bahuśrutīyas'. They distinguish the fictitious from the real, the absolute (*paramārtha*) truth from the conventional (*saṃvṛti*) truth. Their founder was said to be Mahākātyāyana, who had lived on Lake Anavatapta in the Himalayas, at the source of the Sutlej, since the Nirvāṇa, and left it two hundred years later to go to Magadha to carry out his reforms. The latter led to a new school.[1]

According to Kuiji, they said that the *laukika-* and *lokottaradharmas* are partly fictitious. However, since for them dharmas are not unambiguously designations, the Prajñaptivādins should not be identified with the Ekavyāvahārikas, and since all the *lokottaradharmas* are not in their eyes entirely real, they should not be confused with the Lokottaravādins. For them the *laukika-* and *lokottaradharmas* are partly fictitious and partly real.[2]

1. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 22 and 49; Kuiji, pp. 42b–43a.
2. Kuiji, p. 42b.

Saṅghabhadra attributes to them a thesis in the terms of which present dharmas are purely fictitious, distinguishing them from both the Vibhajyavādins, for whom exist only the present and past action which has not yet yielded its fruit, from the Instantaneists, and from the Nihilists, for whom all dharmas are devoid of an own-nature (*svabhāva*) and are like sky flowers (*khapuṣpa*).[3]

Vasuvarman also distinguishes the Prajñaptivādins from the Vibhajyavādins, which Paramārtha and Kuiji tend to confuse. According to him, the Prajñaptivādins said, 'Truth (*satya*) is of three kinds: the group of suffering (*duḥkhavarga*), conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*) and noble truth (*āryasatya*). The group of suffering is the suffering of the five aggregates of attachment (*upādānaskandha*). Conventional truth is suffering characterised by hatred and violence. Noble truth is the unique flavour (*ekarasa*) of suffering'. For the Vibhajyavādins, 'All conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*) are entirely suffering because they are impermanent (*anitya*)'.[4] The thesis attributed here to the Prajñaptivādins is ascribed to the Bahuśrutīyas by Bhavya.[5] As for that which Vasuvarman attributes to the Vibhajyavādins, Vasumitra ascribes it to the Prajñaptivādins.[6] We might wonder whether Vasuvarman was mistaken. It is possible, but it also seems that the doctrinal differences were not so great between the Bahuśrutīyas and Prajñaptivādins, since the *Satyasiddhiśāstra,* which must have belonged to the former, explains as its own the thesis in the terms of which all dharmas are nothing but pure designations (*prajñapti*).[7]

Here are the theses attributed to them by Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva:

(1) Suffering (*duḥkha*) is neither an aggregate (*skandha*) nor exists outside the aggregates.[8]

Suffering is that which oppresses, which causes violence. In fact, this is not the meaning of the term 'aggregate'. Consequently, the aggregates are not suffering.[9]

3. T 1563, p. 901b–c; T 1562, p. 630c.
4. T 1647, p. 380a. See below, thesis 3.
5. Bhavya, thesis 2 of the Bahuśrutīyas.
6. Vasumitra, thesis 3 of the Prajñaptivādins.
7. T 1646, pp. 327a–c and 328–334.
8. Vasumitra, thesis 1; Bhavya, thesis 1. Cf. *Kathāvatthu* XXIII, 5.
9. Kuiji, III, p. 6a.

(2) The twelve spheres (*āyatana*) are not finished and complete realities.[10]

Things, being merely an accumulation of elements, are fictitious. Since their nature varies with time, it cannot be said they are finished realities.[11]

(3) Conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*), which evolve interdependently, being mere designations (*prajñapti*), are suffering (*duḥkha*).[12]

Kuiji's commentary adds nothing to the meaning of this proposition.

(4) Suffering (*duḥkha*) is an absolute (*paramārtha*) reality.[13]

No commentary on this thesis is given.

(5) A man (*puruṣa*) is not an agent (*kārtṛ*).[14]

Kuiji's commentary seems to be erroneous.

(6) There is no untimely death (*akālamaraṇa*); it is previous actions (*pūrvakarman*) that cause death.[15]

Kuiji's commentary adds nothing to the very clear meaning of this proposition.

(7) All suffering (*duḥkha*) comes from actions (*karman*).[16]

No commentary on this thesis is given.

(8) The Path (*mārga*) is not a mental factor (*caitta*).[17]

For lack of a commentary, it is impossible to understand the meaning of this proposition.

(9) Because of the accumulation of actions (*karmanupacaya*), development of the fruit of fruition (*vipākaphala*) occurs.[18]

Kuiji's commentary adds nothing to the meaning of this proposition.

(10) The Noble Path (*āryamārga*) is attained through merit (*puṇya*).[19]

It is through moral practices (*śīla*) and the merit these entail that the undefiled (*anāsrava*) knowledges (*jñāna*) are acquired.

10. Vasumitra, thesis 2; Bhavya, thesis 2. Cf. *Kathāvatthu* XXIII, 5.
11. Kuiji, III, p. 7a–b.
12. Vasumitra, thesis 3; Bhavya, thesis 3 (part).
13. Bhavya, thesis 4. See *Kathāvatthu* XXIII, 5.
14. Vasumitra, thesis 3b; Bhavya, thesis 7; Vinītadeva, thesis 1a.
15. Vasumitra, thesis 4; Bhavya, thesis 6; Vinītadeva, thesis 1b. See LVP, *Kośa* II, p. 218; III, p. 176; *Kathāvatthu* XVII, 2.
16. Bhavya, thesis 8.
17. Bhavya, thesis 5. Contrary thesis of the Theravādins (*Vibhaṅga* XI, 3), Sarvāstivādins (LVP, *Kośa* II, pp. 149–77) and in the *Śāriputrābhidharma* (T 1548, p. 555c).
18. Vasumitra, thesis 5.
19. Vasumitra, thesis 6a; Vinītadeva, thesis 2.

(11) The Path (*mārga*) cannot be cultivated (*bhāvayitavya*).[20]

According to Kuiji, this proposition would be a corollary to the preceding one.

(12) The Path (*mārga*) cannot be destroyed (*bhaṅgya*).[21]

When one has attained the Noble Path, one remains there definitively.

Vasumitra notes that the other theses of the Prajñaptivādins were similar to those of the Mahāsāṃghikas. This is not surprising in view of their origin, but they differ in this from the Bahuśrutīyas, whom Vasumitra and Vinītadeva present as having undergone Sarvāstivādin influences. Perhaps even the main difference between the two schools basically resides in that one remained faithful to the Mahāsāṃghika tendencies while the other was attracted to a certain extent to the Sarvāstivādin doctrine.

We know nothing of either the residences of the Prajñaptivādins or of their literature.

Tāranātha notes that the Prajñaptivādins still existed in Magadha under the Pāla dynasty (ninth and tenth centuries).[22]

20. Vasumitra, thesis 6b; Vinītadeva, thesis 3 (PE), but NE says the opposite, doubtless wrongly.
21. Vasumitra, thesis 7; Vinītadeva, thesis 4.
22. Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte*, p. 274.

CHAPTER II

The Caitīyas or Caitikas

According to the sources from the northwest, the Caitīyas appeared right at the beginning of the third century EN, following an internal schism of the Mahāsāṃghikas. According to the Sammatīyas, they emerged from a later schism which occurred at the heart of the Gokulika school.

Vasumitra explains the birth of the Caitīyas thus: 'When the second century had turned, there was a heretic who had left home (*pravrājaka*), abandoned the wrong (*mithyātva*) and taken refuge in the right (*samyaktva*), and whose name was also Mahādeva. Having 'left home' in the Mahāsāṃghika school, he received full ordination. Learned (*bahuśruta*) and filled with vigour (*vīrya*), he dwelled on the Mount of the Sanctuary (*caityaśilā*). Along with the community (*saṃgha*) of that school, he again examined the five propositions [of the first Mahādeva],[1] which provoked discussions and a division into three schools: Caityaśaila, Aparaśaila and Uttaraśaila'.[2]

According to Paramārtha, the discussions concerned ordination and morality (*śīla*): 'If the master violates the *śīlas*, can the disciple acquire them?' This resulted in a division of the community into five schools which quarrelled among themselves, the confusion being reinforced by the fact that the heretics, having ordained themselves, were introduced into the Community. Rejected by all and excommunicated by the Mahāsāṃghikas, the new Mahādeva and his disciples finally retreated to the mountains, where they split into two schools, Caityaśailas and Uttaraśailas.[3]

Kuiji tells how a king of Magadha, Fine-Cloud (Xiaoyun = Sumegha?), unknown elsewhere, had favoured Buddhism to such a degree that some

1. See above, ch. 5.
2. The Sammatīya tradition recorded by Bhavya says the same.
3. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 22, 51 and 52.

heretics (*tīrthika*) had ordained themselves and, through their vast intelligence put into the service of the wrong, had inflicted considerable harm on the Buddha's Teaching. The head of these heretics was supposedly named Mahādeva and lived on a mountain on which were one or more sanctuaries (*caitya*), that is, temples dedicated to the spirit of a saint. This Mahādeva provoked renewed discussions concerning the five propositions of the earlier Mahādeva, which caused the appearance of three other schools.[4]

This story of a second Mahādeva, provoking a new schism by debating the five theses of the first, seems to be due only to a confusion between the two schisms. Even so, Paramārtha's information, according to which the debate was said to concern morality (*śīla*), seems to be based on a bad pun involving *śīla* (morality) and *śilā* (rock) to explain the names of the Pūrvaśailas and Uttaraśailas.

Inscriptions record the presence of the Caitīyas in Amarāvatī in the reign of Vāsiṭhiputa sāmi Siri Pulumāvi, that is, in the first half of the second century CE.[5] The Caitīyas must therefore have been one of the first schools of the Mahāsāṃghika group in the south. Although Buddhaghosa does not record them among the Andhaka schools, there is no doubt that the Caitīyas were part of that group. Not only do inscriptions prove it, but Vasumitra and Bhavya's Mahāsāṃghikas attest the fact. The Caitīyas are the oldest school whose presence in Andhra country is indicated by the inscriptions. We might well wonder whether it was this school which set out to convert that land and established there the important Buddhist centre the existence of which has been revealed by archaeology and epigraphy. It also seems that the other Andhaka schools, Aparaśailas, Pūrvaśailas or Uttaraśailas, Rājagirikas and Siddhārthikas, were merely subschools detached from the Caitīya school at various times. It is also possible to consider their probable relationship with the Bahuśrutīyas whose presence in this region is also attested by the epigraphy, and to seek for their origin among the latter, or at least among the Gokulikas, as the Sarvāstivādin tradition would have it.

We know nothing about their literature or the time of their disappearance.

Vasumitra is the only one to give us some information on their doctrine,

4. Kuiji, pp. 43a–45a.

5. *Archaeological Survey of South India* I, pp. 100 and 101. *Ep. Ind.*, X, 1912, Nos. 1248 and 1263.

which, moreover, he does not distinguish from that of the Aparaśailas and Uttaraśailas.

(1) The bodhisattvas do not avoid the bad destinies (*durgati*).[6]

This is a thesis common to the Mahāsāṃghikas of the north and the south.[7]

(2) The act of paying homage (*pūjākāra*) to a reliquary (*stūpa*) does not procure a great fruit (*mahāphala*).[8]

(3) The five propositions of the first Mahādeva.[9]

There is nothing surprising about this in a school derived from the Mahāsāṃghikas. Furthermore, Vasumitra states that the rest of their doctrine was similar to that of the Mahāsāṃghikas.

If, as it does indeed seem, the Caitīyas formed the mother school of the Andhaka schools, we should also be able to attribute to them a large part of the theses which Buddhaghosa ascribes to the latter.

6. Vasumitra, thesis 1.

7. Vasumitra, thesis 20 of the Mahāsāṃghikas; Bhavya, thesis 9 of the Ekavyāvahārikas; *Kathāvatthu* XXIII, 3, thesis attributed to the Andhakas.

8. Vasumitra, thesis 2.

9. Vasumitra, thesis 3.

CHAPTER 12

The Andhakas

This is the designation given by Buddhaghosa to all the Pubbaseliyas, Aparaseliyas, Rājagiriyas and Siddhatthikas.[1] He attributes to them in common seventy-two theses in the *Kathāvatthu*, thus making the group by far the best known doctrinally to the Sinhalese tradition. Inscriptions and Xuanzang's evidence attest that at least the first two of these four schools resided in the Kista delta, around Amarāvatī and Nāgārjunikoṇḍa, that is, eastern Andhra, whence their name. Although the Sinhalese tradition, represented by the Chronicles and by Buddhaghosa's commentary, does not formally specify the relationship between the Andhakas and the classical schools, the other traditions and the body of opinions attributed to them by Buddhaghosa agree in making them a comparatively late subschool of the Mahāsāṃghikas, more particularly associated with the Caitikas. The fact that the presence of the latter is attested by inscriptions at Amarāvatī in the second century CE, and there alone, shows that the four Andhaka schools must probably have sprung from the Caitikas of that region. Consequently, it is probable that the majority of the theses ascribed to the Andhakas by Buddhaghosa equally pertained to the Caitika mother school. A number of them were, moreover, also upheld by the northern Mahāsāṃghikas as we know them from non-Sinhalese sources.

These are their theses:

(1) All (*sabbe*) things (*dhamma*) are applications of mindfulness (*satipaṭṭhāna*).[2]

Since mindfulness (*sati*) is established (*santiṭṭhati*) concerning (*ārabbha*) all things (*sabbe dhamme*), all things can be applications of mindfulness.

1. *Kathāvatthu* I, 9.
2. Ibid.

Furthermore, it was taught by the Buddha: 'O monks, I am going to teach (*desissāmi*) you the origin (*samutthāna*) and the disappearance (*atthaṅgama*) of the four applications of mindfulness: as it was said (*vuttanayena*), the body, etc., (*kāyādaya*) are attached (*saṃyutta*) to the applications of mindfulness and are objects (*ārammaṇadhamma*) of mindfulness'.

(2) The past (*atīta*), future (*anāgata*), present (*paccupanna*), form (*rūpa*) and the other aggregates (*khandha*), all things truly (*heva*) exist (*atthi*) and truly do not exist (*natthi*).[3]

Hence the past exists as past, but does not exist as future or present; form exists as form, but does not exist as feeling, perception, etc.

(3) A single (*eka*) thought (*citta*) lasts (*tiṭṭhati*) for a day (*divasa*) or more.[4]

Having noted that thought as attainment (*samāpatti*) or of the life continuum (*bhavaṅga*) exists (*pavattamāna*) without interruption (*anuppabandhena*), it can be deduced that a single thought lasts for a long time (*ciraṃ*).

(4) Clear comprehension (*abhisamaya*) of the fruits and the Truths is progressive (*anupubba*).[5]

It is said in the suttas: 'Just as, O monks, the great ocean (*mahāsamudda*) is progressively deeper (*anupubbaninna*), progressively slanting (*anupubbapoṇa*), progressively sloping (*anupubbapabbhāra*) and does not drop away (*papāta*) abruptly (*āyatakena*), so, O monks, with regard to the Dhamma and discipline (*dhammavinaya*), there is progressive training (*anupubbasikkhā*), progressive achievement (*anupubbakiriyā*), progressive practice (*anupubbapaṭipadā*), and no sudden penetration of supreme knowledge (*āyatakeneva aññāpaṭivedha*)', and again, 'An intelligent (*medhāvī*) smith (*kammāra*) removes (*niddhamme*) impurity (*mala*) from silver (*rajata*) progressively (*anupubbena*), little by little (*thokaṃ thokaṃ*), from one moment to another (*khaṇe khaṇe*)', and again, 'He, O monks, who sees (*passati*) suffering (*dukkha*) sees also the origin (*dukkhasamudayampi*), sees also the cessation of suffering (*dukkhanirodhampi*), sees also the path which leads to the cessation of suffering (*dukkhanirodha gāminīpaṭipādampi*). He who sees the origin of suffering sees suffering, sees the cessation of suffering, sees the path which leads to the cessation of suffering. He who sees the cessation of suffering sees suffering, sees the origin

3. Ibid. I, 10.
4. Ibid. II, 7.
5. Ibid. II, 9.

of suffering, sees the path which leads to the cessation of suffering. He who sees the path which leads to the cessation of suffering sees suffering, sees the origin of suffering, sees the cessation of suffering'.

(5) The speech (*vohāra*) of the Bhagavant Buddha is transcendental (*lokuttara*).[6]

This thesis is clearly Lokottaravādin.

(6) There are two (*dve*) cessations (*nirodha*) which are unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*).[7]

These two kinds of cessation, both of them unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*), are cessation without acquired knowledge (*appaṭisaṅkhānirodha*) and cessation by means of acquired knowledge (*paṭisaṅkhānirodha*).

(7) The power (*bala*) of the Tathāgata is common (*sādhāraṇa*) to the listeners (*sāvaka*).[8]

In order to maintain this thesis, the Andhakas base themselves on suttas whose meaning is not clear.

(8) The power (*bala*) of the Tathāgata, which is real (*yathābhūta*) knowledge (*ñāṇa*) of conclusions both sound and unsound (*ṭhānāṭhāna*), is noble (*ariya*). More generally, the ten powers of the Tathāgata, consisting of real knowledge, are noble.[9]

No justification for this thesis is cited by Buddhaghosa.

(9) A thought (*citta*) containing craving (*sarāga*) is delivered (*vimuccati*).[10]

Just as a soiled (*malīna*) garment (*vattha*), once washed (*dhoviyamāna*), is freed (*vimuccati*) from its stains (*mala*), a thought containing craving is delivered from craving (*rāga*). Just as one cannot remove stains it does not have from a clean garment, so one cannot deliver a pure thought from craving it does not have.

(10) In the eighth-level (*aṭṭhamaka*) person (*puggala*), obsession with false views (*diṭṭhipariyuṭṭhāna*) and obsession with doubts (*vicikicchāpariyuṭṭhāna*) are abandoned (*pahīna*).[11]

The eighth-level person is he who has reached the path of streamwinning (*sotāpattimaggaṭṭha*), the lowest stage of holiness. Being on the point of conversion, of entering the stream of the religious life, and having already left the worldly life, he abandons the first two corruptions, those which characterise worldlings and heretics.

(11) In the eighth-level (*aṭṭhamaka*) person (*puggala*), there is no faculty of faith (*saddhindriya*) nor any of the other four holy faculties of vigour (*viriya*), mindfulness (*sati*), concentration (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*paññā*), although he possesses faith, vigour, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom.[12]

Buddhaghosa does not mention the argumentation by means of which the Andhakas upheld this thesis.

(12) The divine eye (*dibbacakkhu*) is the fleshly eye (*maṃsacakkhu*) based on things (*dhammūpatthaddha*).[13]

The divine eye is the supernormal faculty by means of which the Buddha sees (*passati*), that is, knows the lives of all beings. Buddhaghosa does not mention the Andhakas' argumentation on this subject.

(13) There is perception (*saññā*) among nonperceptive beings (*asaññasatta*).[14]

Nonperceptive beings are the gods (*deva*) of the fourth level of the sphere of form (*rūpāvacara*) corresponding to the fourth absorption (*catutthajjhāna*). According to a sutta, there is perception in nonperceptive beings at the moment of their rebirth and their death (*cutipaṭisandhikkhaṇe*).

(14) It should not be said (*na vattabbaṃ*) that there is perception (*saññā*) in the sphere of neither perception nor nonperception (*nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*).[15]

(15) The bodhisatta, that is, here, the future Buddha Sakkamuni, became a practitioner of celibacy (*caritabrahmacariya*) and developed fixity (*okkantaniyāma*) on the Path of Deliverance due to the discourses (*pāvacana*) of the Bhagavant Kassapa, a previous Buddha.[16]

This thesis is based on the suttas in which the Buddha acknowledges that he was a disciple of this Kassapa, who initiated him into the holy life

6. Ibid. II, 10.
7. Ibid. II, 11.
8. Ibid. III, 1.
9. Ibid. III, 2.
10. Ibid. III, 3.
11. Ibid. III, 5.
12. Ibid. III, 6.
13. Ibid. III, 7.
14. Ibid. III, 11.
15. Ibid. III, 12.
16. Ibid. IV, 8.

and led him to full awakening (*sambodhi*). Consequently, the historical Buddha did not attain full awakening through his power alone.

(16) The person (*puggala*) who has attained (*paṭipanna*) the realisation of holiness (*arahattasacchikiriyā*) is endowed (*samannāgata*) with the three lower fruits (*phala*).[17]

In fact, the person who has attained the realisation of holiness has already obtained (*paṭiladdha*) the three lower fruits and since he has evidently not abandoned (*aparihīna*) them, he is therefore still endowed with them. It is the same for persons who have attained the realisation of the second and third levels of holiness, who are endowed with the fruits of the levels below theirs.

(17) Holiness (*arahatta*) is the abandonment (*pahāna*) of all the fetters (*sabbasaññojana*).[18]

No demonstration of this thesis is mentioned by Buddhaghosa.

(18) He who possesses the knowledge of deliverance (*vimuttiñāṇa*) is delivered (*vimutta*).[19]

Buddhaghosa's explanation of this thesis is not clear.

(19) An attainment (*samāpatti*) based on the earth-device (*paṭhavīkasiṇa*) produces perverse (*viparīta*) knowledge (*ñāṇa*).[20]

The earth-device, used to enter meditation, consists of concentrating on a piece of earth and, through meditation, seeing only that earth in the whole universe. Since this vision does not correspond to reality, the earth-device therefore produces perverse knowledge.

(20) All (*sabba*) knowledge (*ñāṇa*) is analytical (*paṭisambhidā*) knowledge.[21]

All knowledge is transcendental (*lokuttara*) wisdom (*paññā*) and, consequently, analytical knowledge.

(21) It should not be said (*na vattabba*) that conventional knowledge (*sammatiñāṇa*) has only the truth as its object (*saccārammaṇaññeva*) and has no other object (*na aññārammaṇa*).[22]

17. Ibid. IV, 9. Thesis of certain Andhakas.
18. Ibid. IV, 10. Thesis of certain Andhakas.
19. Ibid. V, 1.
20. Ibid. V, 3.
21. Ibid. V, 5. See *Vibhaṅga*, ch. XV.
22. *Kathāvatthu* V, 6. See LVP, *Kośa*, ch. VII, particularly p. 15, n. 4.

There are two truths, conventional truth (*sammatisacca*) and absolute truth (*paramatthasaccca*). No demonstration of this thesis is recorded by Buddhaghosa.

(22) Knowledge (*ñāṇa*) of the thought processes (*cetopariyāya*) of another person has only thought as its object (*cittarammaṇaññeva*) and has no other object (*na aññārammaṇa*).[23]

No demonstration of this thesis is recorded by Buddhaghosa.

(23) Knowledge (*ñāṇa*) of the future (*anāgata*) exists (*atthi*).[24]

This thesis is based on the fact that in some suttas, the Buddha predicts the future, thus proving that, for him at least, a certain knowledge of the future exists.

(24) Knowledge (*ñāṇa*) of the present (*paccuppanna*) exists (*atthi*).[25]

This thesis is based on the fact that in some suttas, a certain knowledge of the present is affirmed. In particular, since all conditioned things (*sabbasaṅkhāra*) are seen (*diṭṭha*) as impermanent (*anicca*), the knowledge one has of them is equally impermanent and concerns the present.

(25) There exists, for a listener (*sāvaka*), a knowledge (*ñāṇa*) concerning the fruit (*phala*).[26]

The buddhas teach (*desenti*) the doctrine (*dhamma*) of the arising (*uppatti*) of the noble fruits (*ariyaphala*) of beings (*satta*), but so do the listeners (*sāvakāpi*). Consequently, there is among the listeners, just as among the buddhas (*sāmaññena buddhānaṃ viya*), knowledge concerning the fruit which can be acquired (*pattabba*) by such and such a being.

(26) Certainty (*niyāma*) is unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*).[27]

Since he who is capable (*bhabba*) of entering (*okkamituṃ*) into certainty on the Path of Deliverance is by that fact certain of rightness (*sammatta*), in good (*kusala*) things (*dhamma*), that certainty is called (*vuccati*) Noble Path (*ariyamagga*). Since the person (*puggala*) who is reborn (*uppajjitvā*) there is not known as (*nāma*) uncertain (*aniyata*) with regard to what has ceased (*niruddha*), that certainty is called unconditioned in the permanent sense (*niccaṭṭhena*).

23. *Kathāvatthu* V, 7. Cf. LVP, *Kośa*, ch. VII, especially p. 15, n. 6.
24. *Kathāvatthu* V, 8.
25. Ibid. V, 9.
26. Ibid. V, 10.
27. Ibid. VI, 1.

(27) The attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*) is unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*).[28]

The attainment of cessation is one of the highest stages of meditation. Once one has reached it, there is no further functioning (*appavatti*) of four aggregates (*khandha*). Since it does not display the characteristics of conditioned things (*saṅkhatalakkhaṇa*) it is therefore unconditioned.

(28) Space (*ākāsa*) is visible (*sanidassana*).[29]

One sees (*passati*) a gap (*antara*) between two trees (*rukkha*) or between two pillars (*thambha*), one sees a keyhole (*tāḷachidda*) or an opening in a window (*vātapānachidda*), therefore space is visible.

(29) The earth element (*paṭhavīdhātu*), water element (*āpodhātu*), fire element (*tejodhātu*) and air element (*vāyodhātu*) are visible (*sanidassana*).[30]

One sees (*passati*) the ground (*bhūmi*), a rock (*pāsāṇa*), a mountain (*pabbata*), therefore the earth element is visible. One sees water (*udaka*), therefore the water element is visible. One sees a fire (*aggi*) and flames (*jalanta*), therefore the fire element is visible. One sees trees (*rukkha*) waving (*sañcāliyamāna*) under the effect of wind (*vāta*), therefore the air element is visible.

(30) The earth (*paṭhavī*) is a fruition of action (*kammavipāka*).[31]

Since there exists action (*kamma*) leading to sovereignty (*issariyasaṃvattaniya*), and action leading to supremacy (*adhipaccasaṃvattaniya*), sovereignty and supremacy being practised in relation to the earth, the latter is therefore a fruition of action.

(31) Aging and death (*jarāmaraṇa*) are fruition (*vipāka*).[32]

Since there exists action (*kamma*) leading to ugliness (*dubbaṇṇasaṃvattaniya*) and action leading to the shortening of life (*appāyukasaṃvattaniya*), that is, leading the former to aging and the latter to death, they are therefore the fruition of action.

(32) Fruition (*vipāka*) of the noble things (*ariyadhamma*) does not exist.[33]

The noble things are those which concern the Path (*maggasaṅkhāta*) and,

28. Ibid. VI, 5.
29. Ibid. VI, 7.
30. Ibid. VI, 8.
31. Ibid. VII, 7.
32. Ibid. VII, 8.
33. Ibid. VII, 9.

in particular, the fruits of the religious life (*sāmaññaphala*). These are in fact nothing but the abandonment of the corruptions (*kilesappahānamattameva*) and are neither thoughts (*citta*) nor mental factors (*cetasika dhamma*). They are therefore not fruition.

(33) The fruition [of action] (*vipāka*) is a phenomenon that has the character of giving rise to [further] fruition [of action] (*vipākadhammadhamma*).[34]

Since in mutually conditioning one another (*aññamaññapaccaya*), the four immaterial (*arūpī*) aggregates (*khandha*) are fruitions which themselves are phenomena that give rise to fruitions, the fruition [of action] is therefore a phenomenon that has the character of giving rise to further fruition.

(34) There are six (*cha*) destinies (*gati*).[35]

As well as the five destinies of the hells (*niraya*), animals (*tiracchānayoni*), ghosts (*pittivisaya*), humans (*manussa*) and gods (*deva*), the Andhakas include that of the titans (*asura*), which the other schools class among the ghosts.

(35) The realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) consists of formed (*rūpī*) things (*dhamma*).[36]

No demonstration of this thesis is recorded by Buddhaghosa.

(36) In the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*), the personality (*attabhāva*) is constituted of the six spheres (*saḷāyatanika*).[37]

Based on a sutta according to which 'The whole faculty (*ahīnindriya*) endowed with all its limbs and appendages (*sabbaṅgapaccaṅgī*), mind-made (*manomaya*), is formed (*rūpī*)', the Andhakas deduced from this that the gods of the realm of form, the followers of Brahmā (*brahmakāyika*) and others, were endowed with all the attributes (*nimitta*) of the nose (*ghāna*), tongue (*jihvā*) and body (*kāya*), as well as those of the eye (*cakkhu*), ear (*sota*) and mind (*mano*).

(37) Form (*rūpa*) exists among formless things (*arūpa*).[38]

Since name and form (*nāmarūpa*), which constitute the individual in its formed and formless elements, are conditioned by consciousness (*viññāṇapaccaya*), in the formless existence (*arūpabhava*) itself there exists subtle form (*sukhumarūpa*) not derived (*anissita*) from coarse form (*oḷārikarūpa*).

34. Ibid. VII, 10.
35. Ibid. VIII, 1.
36. Ibid. VIII, 5.
37. Ibid. VIII, 7.
38. Ibid. VIII, 8.

(38) For him who sees the advantage (*ānisaṃdassāvī*), there is abandonment (*pahāṇa*) of the fetters (*saññojana*).[39]

We are concerned here with the five advantages of morality (*sīla*): great wealth, good renown, self-confidence, a peaceful death and a good rebirth. The Andhakas relied on a sutta: 'O monks (*bhikkhave*), he dwells (*viharati*) in Nibbāna, the monk (*bhikkhu*) who contemplates happiness (*sukhānupassī*), who perceives happiness (*sukhasaññī*), who experiences happiness (*sukhapaṭisaṃvedī*), adhering (*adhimuccamāna*) mentally (*ceto*) to continuance (*satata*), to the calm (*samita*) and to the uninterrupted (*abbokiṇṇa*), fathoming it (*pariyogāhamāna*) with wisdom (*paññā*)'.

(39) The latent tendencies (*anusaya*) are devoid of an object (*anārammaṇa*).[40]

The worldling (*puthujjana*) who abides (*vattamāna*) with good or neutral (*kusalābyākata*) thought (*citta*) can be said (*vattabba*) to be endowed with latent tendencies (*sānusaya*). Since, in this case, there is no object of the latent tendencies, such tendencies have no object.

(40) Knowledge (*ñāṇa*) is devoid of an object (*anārammaṇa*).[41]

Since the arahant is endowed with visual consciousness (*cakkhuviññāṇasamaṅgī*), he is called (*vuccati*) knower (*ñāṇi*). However, for him this knowledge has no object.

(41) One is endowed (*samannāgata*) with the past (*atīta*) and the future (*anāgata*) as well as the present (*paccupanna*).[42]

He who knows the eight deliverances (*aṭṭhavimokkhañāyī*), who is possessed as he so wishes (*nikāmalābhī*) of the four absorptions (*jhāna*), is possessed (*lābhī*) of the nine attainments of the successive abodes (*anupubbavihārasamāpatti*). He is therefore endowed with both the past and future stages of meditation.

(42) The five aggregates (*khandha*) seeking to re-arise (*upapattesiya*) not yet having ceased (*aniruddha*), the five active (*kiriya*) aggregates arise (*uppajjanti*).[43]

The five aggregates seeking to re-arise are those which exist at the instant

39. Ibid. IX, 1.
40. Ibid. IX, 4.
41. Ibid. IX, 5.
42. Ibid. IX, 12.
43. Ibid. X, 1 [SBW: cor.].

of the breaking off (*bhaṅgakkhaṇa*) of the thought of the life continuum (*bhavaṅgacitta*), that is, the precise moment of rebirth. If the thought of the life continuum had ceased while the new aggregates had not yet arisen (*anuppanna*), there would then have been (*bhaveyya*) an interruption of continuity (*santativiccheda*) in the life sequence, and the new being would be absolutely different from the old being.

(43) By saying (*bhāsata*) the word (*vāca*) 'This (*idaṃ*) is suffering (*dukkha*)', the knowledge (*ñāṇa*) 'This is suffering' appears (*pavattati*).[44]

(44) The stability of things (*dhammaṭṭhitatā*) is perfected (*paripphanna*).[45]

No demonstration of this thesis is recorded by Buddhaghosa.

(45) Impermanence (*aniccatā*), aging (*jarā*) and death (*maraṇa*) are perfected (*paripphanna*).[46]

No demonstration of this thesis is recorded by Buddhaghosa.

(46) He who has entered attainment (*samāpanna*) tastes (*assādeti*), desires absorptive meditation (*jhānanikanti*) and has absorptive meditation as his object (*jhānārammaṇa*).[47]

This idea is based on a passage in a sutta which says, 'O monks (*bhikkhave*), the monk (*bhikkhu*) . . . having attained (*upasampajja*) the first . . . second . . . third . . . fourth absorption (*jhāna*), dwells (*viharati*) [there], he tastes that (*tad*), he desires that'.

(47) Different (*aññā*) is a latent tendency (*anusaya*); different is an obsession (*pariyuṭṭhāna*).[48]

The worldling (*puthujjana*) who abides (*vattamāna*) with a good or neutral (*kusalābyākata*) thought (*citta*) can be said (*vattabba*) to be endowed with latent tendencies (*sānusaya*), but he cannot be said to be obsessed (*pariyuṭṭhita*). Consequently, obsessions are different from latent tendencies.

(48) Obsession (*pariyuṭṭhāna*) is dissociated from thought (*cittavippayutta*).[49]

(49) Craving for form (*rūparāga*) prevails (*anuseti*) in the realm of form

44. Ibid. XI, 4.
45. Ibid. XI, 7.
46. Ibid. XI, 8.
47. Ibid. XIII, 7.
48. Ibid. XIV, 5.
49. Ibid. XIV, 6.

(*rūpadhātu*), is included in the realm of form (*rūpadhātupariyāpanna*). Craving for the formless (*arūparāga*) prevails in the formless realm (*arūpadhātu*), is included in the formless realm (*arūpadhātupariyāpanna*).[50]

This thesis is based by analogy on that, adopted by all the schools, according to which sensual craving (*kāmarāga*) prevails in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) and is included in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātupariyāpanna*).

(50) A speculative view (*diṭṭhigata*) is neutral (*abyākata*).[51]

This thesis is based on a sutta also admitted by the Theravādins, who contest it. In reality, the Andhakas misinterpreted the word *abyākata*. When the Buddha, in the sutta, declares that contradictory speculative views are neutral, he evidently means that they are not certain, that they are wrong, illusory, and that it is foolish to believe them (see *Brahmajālasutta*, accepted by all the schools). The Theravādins' criticism proves that the Andhakas gave the word 'neutral' (*abyākata*) the meaning that it usually has in Buddhist scholasticism: neither good (*kusala*) nor bad (*akusala*).

(51) Action (*kamma*) is one thing (*aññа*), the accumulation of actions (*kammūpacaya*) another.[52]

No demonstration of this thesis is recorded by Buddhaghosa, who merely notes that the Andhakas considered the accumulation of actions as different from action (*kammato aññа*), dissociated from thought (*cittavippayutta*), neutral (*abyākata*) and without an object (*anārammaṇa*).

(52) Form (*rūpa*) is a fruition (*vipāka*) of action.[53]

Just as things (*dhamma*) that are thought and mental factors (*cittacetasika*) are produced (*uppanna*) because of the accomplishment (*katatta*) of action (*kamma*), form (*rūpa*) is produced because of the accomplishment of action.

(53) There is form (*rūpa*) in the sphere of form (*rūpāvacara*) and the formless sphere (*arūpāvacara*).[54]

Since the accomplishment (*katatta*) of action (*kamma*) in the sphere of desire (*kāmāvacara*) is form (*rūpa*) from the sphere of desire, the accomplishment of action in the sphere of form is form from the sphere of form and

50. Ibid. XIV, 7. See thesis 54 below.
51. Ibid. XIV, 8.
52. Ibid. XV, 11. See LVP, *Kośa* IV, pp. 242–4.
53. *Kathāvatthu* XVI, 8.
54. Ibid. XVI, 9.

that of the formless sphere form from the formless sphere. Therefore, there is form in the two higher spheres.

(54) Craving for form (*rūparāga*) is included in the realm of form (*rūpadhātupariyāpanna*), and craving for the formless (*arūparāga*) is included in the formless realm (*arūpadhātupariyāpanna*).[55]

(55) There is an accumulation of merit (*puññūpacaya*) in an arahant.[56]

Since an arahant can accomplish good actions (*kamma*) such as the distribution of gifts (*dānasaṃvibhāga*) or veneration of a sanctuary (*cetiyavandana*), he accumulates merit.

(56) The excrement and urine (*uccārapassāva*) of a Bhagavant Buddha greatly (*ativiya*) surpass (*adhigaṇhāti*) other (*aññа*) perfumes (*gandhajāta*).[57]

Buddhaghosa does not mention the demonstration of this thesis, merely noting it as due to misguided (*ayoniso*) fervour (*pemavasena*) for the Bhagavant Buddha.

(57) By means of a single (*eka*) path (*magga*) one realises (*saccikaroti*) the four fruits of the religious life (*sāmaññaphala*).[58]

This thesis is based on the fact acknowledged by all the schools that the Bhagavant realised the four fruits successively.

(58) One passes (*saṅkamati*) directly from one absorption (*jhāna*) to another.[59]

Certain Andhakas maintain that one passes directly from one level of absorption to another, without (*vinā*) an intermediate access level (*upacārappavatti*).

(59) There are intermediate levels between the absorptions (*jhānantarika*).[60]

Andhakas other than those above thought that, on the contrary, there are certain intermediate levels between consecutive levels of absorption.

(60) Emptiness (*suññatā*) is included in the aggregate of mental formations (*saṅkhārakkhandhapariyāpanna*).[61]

55. Ibid. XVI, 10. See thesis 49 above: the demonstration is identical.
56. Ibid. XVII, 1.
57. Ibid. XVIII, 4. Thesis of certain Andhakas.
58. Ibid. XVIII, 5. See thesis 16 above. Thesis of certain Andhakas.
59. Ibid. XVIII, 6. Thesis of certain Andhakas.
60. Ibid. XVIII, 7. Thesis of certain Andhakas.
61. Ibid. XIX, 2.

There are two kinds of emptiness accepted by the Hīnayāna: one concerns the characteristic of impersonality (*anattalakkhaṇa*) of the aggregates (*khandha*), the other the empty aspect of Nibbāna. We are concerned here with the first. This thesis is based on the sutta: 'O monks (*bhikkhave*), the mental formations constitute the empty (*suññamidaṃ*) with respect to the self (*atta*) and what pertains to the self (*attaniya*)'.

(61) The Nibbāna element (*nibbānadhātu*) is good (*kusala*).[62]

The Nibbāna element, being reputedly irreproachable (*anavajja*), is therefore good. This proves that, among the Andhakas, the word *kusala*, 'good', had a less restricted meaning than among the Theravādins. For them what is 'good' is what engenders the desired result (*iṭṭhavipāka*).

(62) There are no infernal guardians (*nirayapāla*) in the hells (*niraya*).[63]

It is actions (*kamma*) which, in the form of infernal guardians (*nirayapālarūpena*), punish (*vadhenti*) beings who fall into the hells (*nerayika*), but there are no beings (*satta*) called (*nāma*) infernal guardians.

(63) There are animals (*tiracchānagata*) among the gods (*deva*).[64]

Certain Indian gods have animal aspects (*tiracchānavaṇṇa*), such as Erāvaṇa, Indra's elephant (*hattināga*).

(64) There is a certain intentional supernormal power (*adhippāya iddhi*) among the buddhas or among the listeners (*sāvaka*).[65]

Some stories of wonders show that the listeners as well as the buddhas can perform marvels intentionally.

(65) There is little (*hīna*) difference in superiority (*atirekatā*) between the buddhas.[66]

The buddhas display only minor differences (*vemattaka*) among themselves in respect of body (*sarīra*), life span (*āyu*), radiance (*pabhā*), etc.

(66) All (*sabbe*) things (*dhamma*) are fixed (*niyata*).[67]

Just as form (*rūpa*) etc., is fixed to the own-nature of form, etc. (*rūpāsabhāva*) and does not give up (*vijahati*) that own-nature, so all things are fixed to their own-nature.

(67) All (*sabbe*) actions (*kamma*) are fixed (*niyata*).[68]

This proposition is a corollary of the previous one. The fruition of actions is fixed, that is, determined by the latter, just as the latter are determined by the circumstances of their accomplishment (*diṭṭhadhammavedaniya*), their own nature thus being fixed.

(68) There is a certain (*kiñci*) fetter (*saññojana*) which is not abandoned (*appahāya*) in Parinibbāna.[69]

The arahant enters complete Nibbāna (*parinibbāti*) while possessing a fetter that has not yet been abandoned (*appahīnasaññojana*) concerning the objective domain of omniscience (*sabbaññūvisaya*), since he does not know (*jānāti*) all (*sabba*) of the objective domain of the Buddha's knowledge (*buddhavisaya*).

(69) The arahant who possesses a good thought (*kusalacitta*) has entered complete Nibbāna (*parinibbāyati*).[70]

Since the arahant who has acquired developed mindfulness (*sativepullappatta*), presence of mind (*upaṭṭhitasati*), who is mindful (*sata*) and aware (*sampajāna*), enters complete Nibbāna, he does so with a good thought.

(70) The undertaking (*dhamma*) of sexual relations (*methuna*) should only be practised (*paṭisevitabba*) with a united resolve (*ekādhippāyena*).[71]

With a united resolve means, according to Buddhaghosa, either compassion (*kāruñña*) or aspiration (*paṇidhi*): 'We shall be (*bhavissāma*) united (*ekato*) in the round of rebirth (*saṃsāra*)' uttered after having paid homage to the Buddha (*buddhapūjā*) with a woman (*itthi*).

(71) The bodhisatta goes (*gacchati*) into a wretched destiny (*vinipāta*) with the aim of realising his sovereign wish (*issariyakāmakārikāhetu*).[72]

This thesis is based on the *Chaddanta Jātaka*, which gives an example of this type. The Andhakas also maintained, for the same reasons, that the bodhisatta, with a view to realising his sovereign wish, descends

62. Ibid. XIX, 6. See LVP, *Kośa* IV, pp. 33–4; T 1541, pp. 632c and 649b; T 1542, pp. 697a–b and 716c; T 1548, pp. 530c and 539b.
63. *Kathāvatthu* XX, 3.
64. Ibid. XX, 4.
65. Ibid. XXI, 4.
66. Ibid. XXI, 5.
67. Ibid. XXI, 7.
68. Ibid. XXI, 8.
69. Ibid. XXII, 1. Thesis of certain Andhakas.
70. Ibid. XXII, 2.
71. Ibid. XXIII, 1.
72. Ibid. XXIII, 3.

(*okkamati*) into a womb (*gabbhaseyya*), has performed (*akāsi*) painful deeds (*dukkharakārikā*), has caused (*akāsi*) harm to others (*aparantapa*), has indicated (*uddisi*) another (*aññā*) master (*satthāraṃ*) and expounded heretical theses.

(72) There are noncravings (*na rāga*) resembling craving (*rāgapaṭirūpaka*).[73]

Thus, goodwill (*mettā*), compassion (*karuṇā*) and joy (*muditā*) resemble cravings and yet are not so.

73. Ibid. XXIII, 4.

CHAPTER 13

The Pūrvaśailas or Uttaraśailas

This school is unknown to the Sammatīya tradition cited by Bhavya, and the Sinhalese Chronicles do not include it in the table of the affiliation of the schools but in a group of six schools which were late in appearing. The *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra* and Vasumitra know of them and place them alongside the Caitīyas and Aparaśailas among the much later Mahāsāṃghika schools. The list of Mahāsāṃghikas cited by Bhavya as well as Vinītadeva class them among the Mahāsāṃghikas along with the Aparaśailas. Buddhaghosa makes them one of the four Andhaka subschools.

According to Vasumitra and his commentators Kuiji and Paramārtha,[1] the Pūrvaśailas, or rather the Uttaraśailas, since that is the name by which they knew them, appeared at the beginning of the third century after the Nirvāṇa, that is, by placing the latter in approximately 480 BCE, in about 260 BCE, at the beginning of Aśoka's reign. Like the Caitīyas, with whom they were closely connected and from whom they certainly derived, they would have appeared following the schism provoked by the second Mahādeva among the Mahāsāṃghikas and would have withdrawn with them to an unspecified mountainous region.

An inscription dating from the fourteenth year of Māṭharīputa, an Ikṣvāku king, therefore from the third century CE, in Nāgārjunikoṇḍa, mentions them.[2] This confirms information drawn from other sources. Buddhaghosa considers them to be an Andhaka subschool,[3] therefore from that region. Xuanzang found a Pūrvaśaila monastery on a mountain to the east of

1. Kuiji, I, p. 45a–b; Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 22 and 51.
2. Sastri, *Ep. Ind.* XX, p. 23.
3. *Kathāvatthu* I, 9.

Dhaṇyakaṭaka, and recalls the past grandeur of that Buddhist centre, where he met more than a thousand Mahāsāṃghika monks sharing twenty monasteries.[4] Finally, it is in Amarāvatī and Nāgārjunikoṇḍa that were rediscovered, in inscriptions dating from the second and third centuries CE, traces of the presence in those places of the Caitīyas and Aparaśailas with whom the Pūrvaśailas were closely connected. As the *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra* and Vasumitra knew them by the name of Uttaraśailas, it is possible that the monastery from which they took their name and origin had been built on a rock (*śilā*) located to the northwest (*uttarapūrva*) of Dhaṇyakaṭaka or Amarāvatī.

Tāranātha records that at the time of Dharmapāla and Dharmakīrti, therefore in about the seventh century CE, the Pūrvaśailas had disappeared.[5] Xuanzang attests that at the beginning of the seventh century the Pūrvaśaila monastery had been deserted for more than one hundred years.[6]

It seems that the Pūrvaśailas were one of the most important Andhaka subschools, since Buddhaghosa attributes to them no less than thirty-one heresies denounced by the *Kathāvatthu*. According to Vasumitra, the majority of their theses were identical to those of the Mahāsāṃghikas. These are the theses they purportedly upheld:

(1) The bodhisattvas are not delivered (*vimukta*) from the bad destinies (*durgati*).[7]

According to Kuiji, the bodhisattvas, not having yet reached the stage of patience (*kṣānti*), are similar to worldlings (*pṛthagjana*) and that is why they are not delivered from the bad destinies.[8]

(2) Veneration (*pūjā*) of a reliquary (*stūpa*) or sanctuary (*caitya*) does not produce a great fruit (*mahāphala*).[9]

Kuiji explains that reliquaries or sanctuaries, being lifeless things, cannot experience the benefit of a gift made to them, but it is the giver himself

4. Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels* II, pp. 214, 215.
5. Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte*, p. 175.
6. Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels* II, pp. 214, 215.
7. Vasumitra, thesis 1; Vinītadeva, thesis 1; *Kathāvatthu* XXIII, 3, attributed to the Andhakas, therefore the Pūrvaśailas. See thesis 71 of the Andhakas.
8. Kuiji, III, p. 10a.
9. Vasumitra, thesis 3; Vinītadeva, thesis 2. The Chinese versions translate *stūpa*, the Tibetan versions *caitya*.

who arouses joyful thoughts in himself. This is why that veneration can produce not a great fruit, but a little happiness.

(3) An arahant has an impure seminal discharge (*asucisukkavisaṭṭhi*).[10]

(4) The arahant has nescience (*aññāṇa*).[11]

(5) The arahant has doubts (*kaṅkhā*).[12]

(6) The arahant is advised by others (*paravitāraṇa*).[13]

(7) There is an uttering of words (*vacībheda*) in him who is possessed of attainment (*samāpanna*).[14]

(8) The nutriment of suffering (*dukkhāhāra*) is a constituent of the Path (*maggaṅga*) and included in the Path (*maggapariyāpanna*).[15]

(9) Dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) is unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*).[16]

It has been said by the Blessed One: 'Because of birth (*jātipaccaya*), O monks, there is old age and death (*jarāmaraṇa*). Whether the Tathāgata appears (*uppādā*) or the Tathāgata does not appear, this element (*dhātu*) is stable (*ṭhitāva*), this stability of things (*dhammaṭṭhitatā*), this fixity of things (*dhammaniyāmatā*), this conditioning by some thing (*idappaccayatā*). . . . That is, O monks, suchness (*tathatā*), the absence of change (*avitathatā*), the absence of deterioration (*anaññathatā*), conditioning by some thing, that is what is called dependent origination'. Being essentially stable, dependent origination is therefore unconditioned.

(10) The Four Truths (*sacca*) are unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*).[17]

It has been said by the Blessed One: 'There are, O monks, four things which are similar to themselves, without change, without deterioration. What are those four things? Suffering, O monks, is similar to itself, without change, without deterioration. The origin of suffering. . . . The cessation of suffering. . . . The path which leads to the cessation of suffering is similar to itself, without change, without deterioration. Such are, O monks, the four things . . .'.

10. *Kathāvatthu* II, 1. See above, thesis 30 of the Mahāsāṃghikas; Vasumitra, thesis 3.
11. *Kathāvatthu* II, 2. See above, thesis 30 of the Mahāsāṃghikas; Vasumitra, thesis 3.
12. *Kathāvatthu* II, 3. See above, thesis 30 of the Mahāsāṃghikas; Vasumitra, thesis 3.
13. *Kathāvatthu* II, 4. See above, thesis 30 of the Mahāsāṃghikas; Vasumitra, thesis 3.
14. *Kathāvatthu* II, 5. See above, thesis 30 of the Mahāsāṃghikas; Vasumitra, thesis 3.
15. *Kathāvatthu* II, 6.
16. Ibid. VI, 2.
17. Ibid. VI, 3.

(11) The intermediate existence (*antarābhava*) exists.[18]

Since there is a category of individuals who disappear completely in the interval (*antarāparinibbāyipuggala*), this is because there is an intermediate existence between death and the next birth.

(12) The five kinds of sense-desires (*kāmaguṇa*) pertain to the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*).[19]

This thesis is based on the sutta in which the Buddha taught that the five kinds of sense-desires, that is, forms (*rūpa*) cognisable by the eye (*cakkhuviññeyya*), sounds (*sadda*) cognisable by the ear (*sotaviññeyya*), odours (*gandha*) cognisable by the nose (*ghānaviññeyya*), flavours (*rasa*) cognisable by the tongue (*jivhāviññeyya*) and tangibles (*phoṭṭhabba*) cognisable by the body (*kāyaviññeyya*), are desirable (*iṭṭha*), likeable (*kanta*), attractive (*manāpa*), pleasing (*piyarūpa*), accompanied by desire (*kāmūpasaṃhita*), alluring (*rajaniya*).

(13) The five spheres (*āyatana*) constitute desire (*kāma*).[20]

This thesis is a corollary of the preceding one and based on the same sutta.

(14) There is no material (*rūpa*) life faculty (*jīvitindriya*).[21]

(15) Because of his actions (*kammahetu*), the arahant regresses (*parihāyati*) from holiness (*arahatta*).[22]

The arahant who, in a former life (*purimabhava*), slandered (*abbācikkhati*) other arahants regresses from arahantship because of that action.

(16) Whatever has the immortal as its object (*amatārammaṇa*) is a fetter (*saññojana*).[23]

This thesis relies on the teaching of the Buddha according to which, having perceived (*sañjānitvā*) Nibbāna, one imagines (*maññati*) it and delights (*abhinandati*) in it, the immortal (*amata*) being Nibbāna. Since one delights in the immortal, the fact of having it as an object develops craving for it, hence a fetter.

(17) Sound (*sadda*) is the diffusion of reasoning (*vitakkavipphāra*) everywhere (*sabbaso*) emanating from reasoning (*vitakkayato*) and deliberation (*vicārayato*).[24]

Since reasoning (*vitakka*) and deliberation (*vicāra*) are called (*vutta*) conditions necessary for speech (*vacīsaṅkhāra*), sound is the diffusion of reasoning everywhere emanating from reasoning and deliberation, from the ending (*antamaso*) of the latter, at the very moment when the mental element enters into action (*manodhātupavattikālepi*).

(18) Speech (*vācā*) does not conform to thought (*yathācitta*).[25]

Since someone says, 'I shall proclaim (*bhaṇissāmi*) something (*aññaṃ*)' and proclaims (*bhaṇati*) something else (*aññaṃ*), or someone says, 'I shall recount (*kathessāmi*) something' and recounts (*katheti*) something else, etc., speech is neither in conformity to thought, nor corresponding to thought (*cittānurūpa*), nor dependent on thought (*cittānugatika*), and functions (*pavattati*) without (*vinā*) thought (*citta*).

(19) Bodily action (*kāyakamma*) does not conform to thought (*yathācitta*).[26]

This thesis parallels the preceding one. Since someone says, 'I shall go (*gacchissāmi*) somewhere (*aññatra*)' and goes (*gacchati*) somewhere else (*aññatra*), when someone says, 'I shall throw (*pasāressāmi*) something (*aññaṃ*)' and throws (*pasāreti*) something else (*aññaṃ*), bodily action is neither in conformity to thought, nor corresponding with thought (*cittānurūpa*), nor dependent on thought (*cittānugatika*) and functions (*pavattati*) without (*vinā*) thought (*citta*).

(20) Knowledge (*ñāṇa*) is dissociated from thought (*cittavippayutta*).[27]

Since the arahant should be called (*vattabba*) knower (*ñāṇī*) because he is endowed with visual consciousness, etc. (*cakkhuviññāṇādisamaṅgī*), and because that knowledge, which is however knowledge of the Path (*maggañāṇa*), is not associated (*sampayutta*) with thought (*citta*), knowledge is therefore dissociated from thought.

(21) A person (*puggala*) endowed with [right] view (*diṭṭhisampanna*) can intentionally (*sañcicca*) deprive (*voropeyya*) a living being (*pāṇa*) of life (*jīvitā*).[28]

18. Ibid. VIII, 2.
19. Ibid. VIII, 3.
20. Ibid. VIII, 4.
21. Ibid. VIII, 10.
22. Ibid. VIII, 11.
23. Ibid. IX, 2.
24. Ibid. IX, 9.
25. Ibid. IX, 10.
26. Ibid. IX, 11.
27. Ibid. XI, 3.
28. Ibid. XII, 7.

Since there is murder of a living being (*pāṇātipāta*) because of a thought associated with hatred (*dosasampayuttacitta*) and because that hatred has not been abandoned (*appahīna*) in whoever is endowed with right view, the latter can kill a living being intentionally.

(22) He who is certain (*niyata*) enters (*okkamati*) certainty (*niyāma*).[29]

There are two certainties, that is, two states in which fruition is determined: certainty of wrongness (*micchattaniyāma*) resulting from an irremissible action (*anantariyakamma*) and certainty of rightness (*sammattiyaniyāma*) which is the Noble Path (*ariyamagga*). The Pubbaseliyas allude to another certainty, not recognised by the Theravādins. In fact, the buddhas can know, with the aid of their own (*attano*) power of knowledge (*ñāṇabala*) that such-and-such a being (*satta*) will obtain (*pāpuṇissati*) Awakening (*bodhi*) in the future (*anāgate*), and it is said, 'The bodhisatta is certain (*niyata*) because of the pre-eminence of his merit (*puññussadattā*)'. Indeed, the bodhisatta who has reached his last existence (*pacchimabhava*), who is already certain according to that point of view, is able (*bhabba*) to comprehend clearly (*abhisametuṃ*) [the Dhamma] from the moment of that birth (*jāti*), therefore to enter certainty of rightness.

(23) The thirst for mental phenomena (*dhammataṇhā*) is neutral (*abyākata*).[30]

Buddhaghosa does not mention the demonstration of this thesis. It can be supposed that thirst for mental phenomena, which is the very object of the mental element (*manodhātu*), is neutral, that is, neither good (*kusala*) nor bad (*akusala*), therefore it does not produce a fruit (*phala*), because it is neither bad like the thirst for the five sense-objects, forms, sounds, odours, flavours and tangibles which cause attachment to the world, nor good like the Path of Deliverance.

(24) The thirst for mental phenomena (*dhammataṇhā*) is not the origin of suffering (*dukkhasamudaya*).[31]

This thesis is a corollary of the preceding one. Buddhaghosa does not mention its demonstration.

29. Ibid. XIII, 4.
30. Ibid. XIII, 9.
31. Ibid. XIII, 10.

(25) The six spheres (*saḷāyatana*) are established (*saṇṭhāti*) in the maternal womb (*mātukucchi*) simultaneously (*apubbaṃ acarimaṃ*).[32]

From the instant of relinking (*paṭisandhikkhaṇeyeva*) in the maternal womb, the six spheres exist in the state of a seed (*vījamatta*), like the shoot (*aṅkura*) of a tree (*rukkha*) endowed with its branches and forks (*sampannasākhāvitapa*).

(26) Speculative view (*diṭṭhigata*) is not included (*apariyāpanna*) in the world.[33]

Since the worldling (*putthujjana*) who has attained the absorptive meditations (*jhānalābhī*) can be called (*vattabba*) free from craving (*vītarāga*) and desire (*kāma*) whilst he is still not free from speculative views (*na vigatadiṭṭhi*), speculative views are therefore not included in the world.

(27) Having perfectly understood (*adhiggayha*), one pays attention (*manasi karoti*).[34]

This thesis relies on the word of the Buddha: 'All (*sabbe*) conditioned things (*saṅkhāra*) are impermanent (*anicca*) . . . are suffering (*dukkha*) . . . and impersonal (*anatta*). When one sees (*passati*) by means of wisdom (*paññā*), one is disgusted (*nibbindati*) with suffering. Such is the path (*magga*) of purity (*visuddhi*)'. Attention (*manasikāra*) is, according to Buddhaghosa, the mental practice which consists of imprinting in one's mind the truths concerning the characteristics of the impermanence, etc., of conditioned things. Buddhaghosa glosses *adhiggayha* with *saṅgaṇhitvā*, 'having understood', having grasped through wisdom.

(28) He who has acquired attainment (*samāpanna*) hears (*suṇāti*) sound (*sadda*).[35]

The Buddha said, 'For him who is in the first absorption (*jhāna*), sound is a thorn (*kaṇṭaka*)'. If he who is in attainment cannot hear (*taṃ na suneyya*), how could sound be (*siyā*) a thorn? That is why he who has acquired attainment hears sound.

(29) The fruit of the religious life (*sāmaññaphala*) is unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*).[36]

32. Ibid. XIV, 2.
33. Ibid. XIV, 9.
34. Ibid. XVI, 4.
35. Ibid. XVIII, 8.
36. Ibid. XIX, 3.

(30) Acquisition (*patti*) is unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*).[37]

Acquisition, which does not enter the five aggregates, is not conditioned (*saṅkhata*).

(31) Transcendental (*lokuttara*) knowledge (*ñāṇa*) has twelve objects (*dvādasavatthuka*).[38]

The knowledge taught by the Buddha during the setting in motion of the Wheel of the Dhamma (*dhammacakkhappavattana*), and which is transcendental knowledge, is a knowledge with twelve aspects (*dvādasākārañāṇa*).

(32) All (*sabbe*) things (*dhamma*) last only for a single thought-moment (*ekacittakkhaṇika*).[39]

Since all conditioned things (*saṅkhatadhamma*) are impermanent (*anicca*), they last only a single thought-moment. For because of impermanence (*aniccatā*), what difference (*visesa*) is there between a thing that is destroyed (*bhijjati*) rapidly (*lahuṃ*) and another that lasts for a long time (*cirena*)?

37. Ibid. XIX, 4.
38. Ibid. XX, 6. See LVP, *Kośa* VI, pp. 246 ff.
39. *Kathāvatthu* XXII, 8.

CHAPTER 14

The Aparaśailas

This school is unknown to the Sammatīya tradition cited by Bhavya, and the Sinhalese Chronicles do not include them in the table of the affiliation of the schools but in a group of six schools which were late in appearing. Vasumitra classes them alongside the Caitīyas and Uttaraśailas among the later schools of the Mahāsāṃghikas, at least in the most recent versions, since that by Paramārtha is unaware of them. The Mahāsāṃghika list cited by Bhavya and Vinītadeva classes them among the Mahāsāṃghikas along with the Pūrvaśailas. Buddhaghosa makes them one of the four Andhaka schools.

Paramārtha does not mention the Aparaśailas in his commentary on Vasumitra. The little that Kuiji says teaches us nothing about them.[1] They can in all probability be considered as a Pūrvaśaila school, if indeed they can be distinguished from the latter, since all the theses attributed to them by various sources are common to both schools. They must have appeared at the earliest in the second half of the third century BCE.

Several inscriptions attest their presence in Nāgarjunikoṇḍa under the Ikṣvāku dynasty, therefore in the third century CE.[2] This confirms the information given by the other sources. Buddhaghosa considers them as an Andhaka school, therefore of that region.[3] Xuanzang found the Aparaśilā monastery on a mountain to the west of Dhaṇyakaṭaka, but it had then been deserted for more than a hundred years.[4]

1. Kuiji, I, p. 45b.
2. Sastri, *Ep. Ind.* XX, pp. 17, 20, 22; ibid. XXI, 1931, p. 66.
3. *Kathāvatthu* I, 9.
4. Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels* II, pp. 214–15.

Tāranātha notes that at the time of Dharmapāla and Dharmakīrti, therefore in the seventh century CE, the Aparaśailas had disappeared.[5]

An inscription at Nāgārjunikoṇḍa gives us a brief glimpse of their canonical literature by mentioning, along with their name, the *Dīghanikāya, Majjhimanikāya* and *Saṃyuttanikāya* as well as five *Mātukas.*[6] It will be noted that the divisions of the Sūtra-piṭaka were designated under the name of *nikāya* as with the Theravādins of Ceylon, and not under that of *āgama* as in the northwest. N. Dutt thinks that the five *Mātukas* were summaries of the Vinaya-piṭaka, since the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya is in five parts.[7] It is not very likely that in the third century CE, the Vinaya of that school still only existed in the form of five separate summaries. Conversely, it is more likely that they were summaries of the Abhidharma, a basket which all the schools collected quite late and which, we know, remained for a long time in the form of separate *mātṛkās.*

Vasumitra notes that the majority of the Aparaśailas' theses, like those of the Uttaraśailas and Caitīyas from which they cannot be differentiated, were similar to those of the Mahāsāṃghikas. These are the theses:

(1) The bodhisattvas are not delivered (*vimukta*) from the bad destinies (*durgati*).[8]

(2) Veneration (*pūjā*) of a reliquary (*stūpa*) or sanctuary (*caitya*) does not yield a great fruit (*mahāphala*).[9]

(3) An arahant has an impure seminal discharge (*asucisukkavisaṭṭhi*).[10]

(4) The arhat has nescience (*ajñāṇa*).[11]

(5) The arhat has doubts (*kāṅkṣā*).[12]

(6) The arhat is advised by others (*paravitāraṇa*).[13]

5. Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte,* p. 175.
6. Sastri, *Ep. Ind.* XX, pp. 17 and 20.
7. Dutt, *Early Monastic Buddhism,* II, pp. 55–6.
8. Vasumitra, thesis 1; Vinītadeva, thesis 1; *Kathāvatthu* XXIII, 3, attributed to the Andhakas, therefore to the Aparaśailas. See above, thesis 71 of the Andhakas and thesis 1 of the Pūrvaśailas.
9. Vasumitra, thesis 2; Vinītadeva, thesis 2. See above, thesis 2 of the Pūrvaśailas.
10. *Kathāvatthu* II, 1; Vasumitra, thesis 3. See above, thesis 30 of the Mahāsāṃghikas.
11. Vasumitra, thesis 3. See above, thesis 30 of the Mahāsāṃghikas.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.

(7) There is an uttering of words (*vacībheda*) in him who is possessed of attainment (*samāpanna*).[14]

(8) He who is certain (*niyata*) enters (*okkamati*) certainty (*niyāma*).[15]

(9) The six spheres (*saḷāyatana*) are established (*saṇṭhāti*) in the maternal womb (*mātukucchi*) simultaneously (*apubbaṃ acarimaṃ*).[16]

(10) Transcendental (*lokuttara*) knowledge (*ñāṇa*) has twelve objects (*dvādasavatthuka*).[17]

(11) All (*sabbe*) things (*dhamma*) last only for a single thought-moment (*ekacittakkhaṇika*).[18]

14. Ibid.
15. *Kathāvatthu* XIII, 4. See thesis 22 of the Pūrvaśailas.
16. Ibid. XIV, 2. See thesis 25 of the Pūrvaśailas.
17. Ibid. XX, 6. See thesis 31 of the Pūrvaśailas.
18. Ibid. XXII, 8. See thesis 32 of the Pūrvaśailas.

CHAPTER 15

The Rājagirīyas

These are only known to Buddhaghosa, who makes them one of the four Andhaka schools, and the Mahāsāṃghika list cited by Bhavya, who classes them among the Mahāsāṃghikas. They can be considered as a late school of the Mahāsāṃghika group established around Amarāvatī and Nāgārjunikoṇḍa.[1]

Their name alludes to a 'king's mount' (*rājagiri*) on which was doubtless established the first monastery of this school and which must have been near Amarāvatī.

Since Buddhaghosa knew them, the Rājagirīyas existed before the fifth century CE. As Buddhaghosa attributes to them in their own right several heresies denounced in Part VII of the *Kathāvatthu,* it seems we must date their appearance back quite some time, possibly even the last century BCE.

These are their theses:

(1) There are no things (*dhamma*) that can be included (*saṅgahita*) in other things.[2]

All things are independent of each other. This is the negation of all logical classification of essences and all systematism. Buddhaghosa does not mention the demonstration of this proposition.

(2) There are no things (*dhamma*) that are associated (*sampayutta*) with other things.[3]

This is a reinforcement of the preceding thesis. Things, being absolutely

1. Dutt, *Early Monastic Buddhism* II, p. 52, notes inscriptions recorded by G. Burgess (*The Buddhist Stupas of Amaravati and Jaggayyapeta*, London: Trübner & Co, 1887, pp. 53 and 104) attesting to their presence in this region.
2. *Kathāvatthu* VII, 1.
3. Ibid. VII, 2.

independent, are not associated with combined actions. Buddhaghosa does not mention the demonstration of this thesis.

(3) There are no mental (*cetasika*) phenomena (*dhamma*).[4]

Mental phenomena are immaterial things which are not thoughts (*citta*), that is, the aggregates (*khandha*) of feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*) and mental formations (*saṅkhāra*). Mental phenomena being associated (*sampayutta*) with thought, if, as is maintained by the preceding proposition, there are no things associated with others, there are therefore no mental phenomena. This thesis therefore seems to be a corollary of the preceding one. Buddhaghosa does not mention its demonstration.

(4) Giving (*dāna*) is a mental (*cetasika*) phenomenon (*dhamma*).[5]

This proposition seems to contradict the previous one. Buddhaghosa explains that giving is threefold (*tividha*): giving with generous intention (*cāgacetanā*), giving through abstinence (*virati*), giving through moral obligation (*deyyadhamma*). The Rājagirīyas maintained that giving has a desirable fruit (*iṭṭhaphala*), a likeable fruit (*kantaphala*), a pleasant fruit (*manuññaphala*), a precious fruit (*asecanakaphala*), having fortunate consequences (*sukhudraya*), has a fortunate outcome (*sukhavipāka*). The Bhagavant said, 'Giving is caused by faith (*saddhā*), by conscientiousness (*hiriya*) and it is good. These things (*dhamma*) are followed by good men (*sappurisānuyāta*). Whoever honours (*vadanti*) that divine (*diviya*) path (*magga*) because of that goes (*gacchati*) to the world of the gods (*devaloka*)'. Indeed, giving which is caused by faith and conscientiousness is giving with generous intention. In another sutta, the Buddha taught the five great gifts (*mahādāna*) which are gifts through abstinence by means of which one gives (*deti*) fearlessness (*abhaya*), absence of hostility (*avera*) and absence of ill-will (*abyāpajja*) to innumerable beings. These two kinds of giving are mental phenomena. The Buddha did not teach giving through moral obligation which, alone, is not mental since it consists of food, drink, clothing, etc. Therefore, giving is a mental phenomenon.

(5) One increases (*vaḍḍhati*) merit (*puñña*) through [gifts] consisting of rejoicing (*paribhogamaya*).[6]

The Buddha said, 'For those who give (*dadanti*) a drink (*papa*), a well

4. Ibid. VII, 3.
5. Ibid. VII, 4.
6. Ibid. VII, 5.

(*udapāna*) or shelter (*upassaya*), merit (*puñña*) increases (*pavaḍḍhati*) by day (*divā*), by night (*ratto*), always (*sadā*)'. In another sutta, the Buddha said, 'For anyone thanks to whom a monk (*bhikkhu*) rejoices (*paribhuñjamāna*) in a robe (*cīvara*), alms-food (*piṇḍapāta*), etc., there is a consequence of merit (*puññābhisanda*), a fortunate consequence (*kusalābhisanda*), a nourishing of happiness (*sukhassāhāra*), a good fruition (*sukhavipāka*), heavenly (*sovaggika*), leading to the heavens (*saggasaṃvattanika*) . . .'. These gifts consisting of rejoicing are giving through moral obligation (*deyyadhamma*) of which the preceding thesis denied the existence. It therefore seems there is again a contradiction here.

(6) Because of giving (*dāna*) done here below (*ito*), one is sustained (*yāpenti*) above (*tattha*).[7]

The Rājagirīyas based their argumentation on this sutta: 'The deceased (*peta*) delight (*anumodanti*) in giving gifts (*dāna*) in their own interest (*attano atthāya*), they brighten (*pasādenti*) their thoughts (*citta*), they arouse (*uppādenti*) joy (*pīti*) in themselves, they acquire (*paṭilabhanti*) pleasure (*somanassa*)'. It is also said, 'Just as rain (*vuṭṭha*) water (*udaka*) moves (*pavattati*) from above (*unnate*) to below (*ninnaṃ*), so a gift (*dinna*) made here below (*ito*) profits (*upakappati*) the deceased (*peta*). Just as full (*pūra*) storm clouds (*vārivaha*) fill (*paripurenti*) the ocean (*sāgara*), so a gift made here below profits the deceased. Since there above (*tattha*), there is no ploughing (*kasī*), there (*ittha*) the raising of oxen (*gorakkhā*) is unknown (*na vijjati*), there are no [occupations] such as (*tādisī*) that of merchant (*vaṇijjā*), the buying and selling (*kayākaya*) of gold (*hiraññā*). Through giving here below the dead deceased (*kālakata*) are sustained (*yāpenti*) there above (*tahiṃ*)'. On the other hand, the Buddha advised people who wished (*icchanti*) for a son (*putta*) to make a donation (*dakkhiṇaṃ anuppadassati*) to the deceased.

(7) Whoever should last for a cosmic period (*kappaṭṭha*) can last (*titthеyya*) for a cosmic period (*kappa*).[8]

The Buddha said, 'A schismatic (*saṅghabhedaka*) remains hell-bound (*nerayika*) for a cosmic period (*kappaṭṭha*) and subject to the wretchedness that follows decease (*apāyika*). He who delights in dissension (*vaggarata*), who abides in unlawfulness (*adhammaṭṭha*) is deprived (*padhaṃsati*)

7. Ibid. VII, 6.
8. Ibid. XIII, 1. Thesis proper to the Rājagirīyas.

of utter peace (*yogakkhema*). Having divided (*bhetvāna*) the formerly united (*samagga*) Community (*saṃgha*), he is tortured (*paccati*) for a cosmic period (*kappa*) in the hells (*niraya*)'. He therefore remains in the hells for an entire (*sakala*) cosmic period.

(8) Whoever has reached attainment (*samāpanna*) in the cessation of perception and feeling (*saññāvedayitanirodha*) can die (*kālaṃ kareyya*).[9]

Since such-and-such a one is subject to the law of death (*maraṇadhamma*) and not another such a one, there is no fixity (*niyāma*) in the law of death for beings (*satta*), and whoever has reached attainment in the cessation of perception and feeling can die just as much as anyone else.

(9) There is no untimely death (*akālamacca*) for an arahant.[10]

The arahant, having experienced (*paṭisaṃvedayitvā*) the fruition of all his actions (*sabbakammavipāka*), can enter complete Nibbāna (*parinibbāyitabba*) without the fruit of a former bad action interrupting his life prematurely.

(10) All this (*sabbamidaṃ*) is conditioned by actions (*kammato*).[11]

The Buddha said, 'Through action (*kamma*), the world (*loka*) moves (*vattati*). Through action creatures (*pajā*) move. Beings (*satta*) are attached (*nibandhana*) to action like the linch-pin (*āṇi*) of the wheel of a chariot (*ratha*) in movement (*yāyant*)'. He also said, 'Through action eulogistic (*pasaṃsa*) glory (*kitti*) is obtained (*labhate*). Through action confiscation (*jāni*), execution (*vadha*), incarceration (*bandha*) [are obtained]. Having cognised (*viditvā*) that action in various forms (*nānākaraṇa*), why is it said that the world is not action?'

9. Ibid. XV, 9. Thesis proper to the Rājagirīyas.
10. Ibid. XVII, 2.
11. Ibid. XVII, 3.

CHAPTER 16

The Siddhārthikas

These are known only to Buddhaghosa, who places them among the four Andhaka schools, and the Mahāsāṃghika list cited by Bhavya, who classes them among the Mahāsāṃghikas. They can be considered as a late school of the Mahāsāṃghika group established around Amarāvatī and Nāgārjunikoṇḍa.[1]

Their name is perhaps a patronymic, Siddhārtha designating either the Buddha or the founder of the school, who is unknown to us. It may also be a qualifier, *siddhārthika* meaning 'who has accomplished his task'.

Since Buddhaghosa knew them, the Siddhārthikas therefore existed before the fifth century CE. As Buddhaghosa attributes to them in their own right several heresies denounced in Part VII of the *Kathāvatthu,* it seems that their appearance should be dated back quite a long time, perhaps even to the last century BCE.

All the theses which Buddhaghosa attributes to them are equally attributed to the Rājagirīyas, with whom they seem to have had very close links.

These are their theses:

(1) There are no things (*dhamma*) that are included (*saṅgahita*) in other things.[2]

(2) There are no things (*dhamma*) that are associated (*sampayutta*) with other things.[3]

1. Dutt, *Early Monastic Buddhism* II, p. 52, notes an inscription recorded by Burgess (*The Buddhist Stupas of Amaravati and Jaggayyapeta,* London: Trübner & Co, 1887, p. 110) attesting their presence in that region.

2. *Kathāvatthu* VII, 1. For the commentary, refer to the chapter on the Rājagirīyas.

3. Ibid. VII, 2.

(3) There are no mental (*cetasika*) phenomena (*dhamma*).[4]

(4) Giving (*dāna*) is a mental (*cetasika*) phenomenon (*dhamma*).[5]

(5) One increases (*vaḍḍhati*) merit (*puñña*) consisting of rejoicing (*paribhogamaya*).[6]

(6) Because of giving (*dāna*) made here below (*ito*), one is sustained (*yāpenti*) above (*tattha*).[7]

(7) There is no untimely death (*akālamaccu*) for an arahant.[8]

(8) All this (*sabbamidaṃ*) is conditioned by actions (*kammato*).[9]

4. Ibid. VII, 3.
5. Ibid. VII, 4.
6. Ibid. VII, 5.
7. Ibid. VII, 6.
8. Ibid. XVII, 2.
9. Ibid. XVII, 3.

CHAPTER 17

The Sthaviras

We have very little information on the early Sthaviras, champions of orthodoxy who opposed the first Mahāsāṃghikas. We know they should not be identified with the Sinhalese Theravādins, despite the archaisms in the latter's doctrine.[1]

The Sammatīya tradition cited by Bhavya is alone in claiming to give us some information on the doctrine of these early Sthaviras or Pūrva-Sthaviras, by attributing the following theses to them:

(1) Mahādeva's five propositions concerning the nature of the arhat should be rejected.[2]

Such is indeed, according to all the sources, the position which the Sthaviras adopted during the schism provoked by these very propositions of Mahādeva.

(2) The person (*pudgala*) exists.[3]

This is the fundamental thesis of the Vātsīputrīyas and Sammatīyas. Its attribution to the early Sthaviras is merely a falsification by the Sammatīya informant who thus tries to justify the orthodoxy of his own school.

(3) There is an intermediate existence (*antarābhava*).[4]

This is again a pious fraud on the part of the Sammatīya informant.

(4) Full Nirvāṇa (*parinirvāṇa*) of the arhat exists.[5]

(5) The past (*atīta*) and the future (*anāgata*) also exist.[6]

1. Cf. below, ch. 33.
2. Bhavya, thesis 1.
3. Ibid., thesis 2.
4. Ibid., thesis 3.
5. Ibid., thesis 4. Nothing original in this.
6. Ibid., thesis 5.

This is the fundamental thesis of the Sarvāstivādins of whom, we know from elsewhere, the early Sthaviras were certainly unaware.

(6) The meaning (*artha*) of Nirvāṇa exists.[7]

This collection of data is therefore of no value.[8]

7. Ibid., thesis 6. The meaning of this thesis remains enigmatic.
8. The information concerning the Sthaviras, supplied by Xuanzang, Yijing and later sūtras, will be studied in chapter 33 below.

CHAPTER 18

The Haimavatas

The origins and nature of this school pose a problem.

The *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra,* which is without doubt the oldest of our sources concerning the affiliation of the schools, is unaware of them.[1] The *Dīpavaṃsa,* scarcely more recent, classes them alongside the Andhakas among the schools which were late in appearing and whose origin is not stated, and not in the table of the affiliation of the schools which immediately preceded.[2] A little later, Vasumitra identifies them with the Sthaviras who remained radical after the schism which gave rise to the Sarvāstivādins. Doubtless about the same period, the Sammatīya tradition makes them the first subschool detached from the group of Sthaviras. Both agree that no secondary school derived from them. Later, the Mahāsāṃghika tradition cited by Bhavya, then Vinītadeva and the *Varṣāgraprcchāsūtra,* class the Haimavatas among the Mahāsāṃghikas and, more exactly, among the schools called Andhakas by Buddhaghosa. This is all the more odd in that Vasumitra himself, while noting that their doctrine is very close to that of the Sarvāstivādins, attributes to them the five theses of Mahādeva which are the basis of the Mahāsāṃghika doctrine, thus justifying in advance the classing of the Haimavatas in this last group by later authors.

Their name means 'those who reside in the Himalayas' and therefore attests their geographical origin.

Commenting on Vasumitra, who dates the appearance of the Haimavatas to the beginning of the third century EN, Paramārtha tells how, reacting against the influence of Kātyāyanīputra, who gave too much importance to

1. T 1465, p. 900b–c.
2. *Dīpavaṃsa* V, 54.

the Abhidharma, the conservative Sthaviras, claiming to have returned to the teaching of the Sūtras alone, split away and went to settle in the Himalayas, hence the name of their school which thus perpetuated the orthodox tradition.[3]

Kuiji cites the preceding tradition and tells how the schism from which the Haimavatas emerged must have been due to certain Sthaviras who criticised Mahādeva's five theses, which until then all the Sthaviras as well as the Mahāsāṃghikas had approved.[4] This is formally contradicted by all the traditions concerning the first schism and which precisely define the Sthaviras as adversaries of Mahādeva.

Przyluski attempted to identify the Haimavatas with the Kāśyapīyas[5] but, as N. Dutt rightly remarks, this is contradicted by the fact that all our sources distinguish clearly between these two schools.[6]

It seems that the Haimavatas were not considered as a separate school before the end of the fourth century CE and that at that time it was realised that certain Sthaviras living in the Himalayas had preserved an archaic doctrine, possibly because of their mountainous isolation, hence all the explanations by Vasumitra and the Sammatīyas. Later, it would have been noticed that their doctrine had been strongly influenced by the Mahāsāṃghikas, and they were then classed among the latter. It is even possible that this Mahāsāṃghika influence occurred and developed after their rediscovery. However it may be, the Haimavatas do indeed appear to be one of the schools which, having been subjected to the influence of two large groups of Sthaviras and Mahāsāṃghikas, possessed an eclectic doctrine at a certain period. This was also the case for the Dharmaguptakas, who seemed to have possessed a canon if not identical, at least very close to that of the Haimavatas.

No inscription, no testimony from the Chinese travellers informs us of their domain, but their name is sufficiently clear in attesting that the Haimavatas resided, at least at the outset, in the Himalayas.

The Chinese translation of a *Vinayamātṛkā* which appears to be a Haima-

3. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 22–3 and 53–4.
4. Kuiji, II, pp. 3a–5b.
5. Przyluski, *Concile de Rājagṛha,* pp. 317–8.
6. Dutt, *Early Monastic Buddhism* II, pp. 170–1.

vata work has come down to us.[7] In it there is mention of the Himalayas, of the need for those who live there to dress warmly,[8] and of Kāśyapa, the Himalayan propagandist,[9] which at least attests the geographical origin of this school to whom this work is ascribed.

This gives the description of the canon of the school to which it pertained thus:

I	Vinaya-piṭaka	(1) *Bhikṣuprātimokṣa.* (2) *Bhikṣuṇīprātimokṣa.* (3) *Kaṭhina*, etc. (4) *Mātṛkā.* (5) *Ekottara.*
II	Sūtra-piṭaka	(1) *Dīrghāgama.* (2) *Madhyamāgama.* (3) *Ekottarāgama.* (4) *Saṃyuktāgama.* (5) *Kṣudrakāgama* or *Saṃyuktapiṭaka.*
III	Abhidharma-piṭaka	(1) *Sapraśnakavibhaṅga.* (2) *Apraśnakavibhaṅga.* (3) *Saṃgraha.* (4) *Saṃyukta.* (5) *Prasthāna.*[1]

1. T 1463, p. 818a.

The text does indeed specify the division of the canon into three baskets of five sections each.

In another place, the division of the Sūtra-piṭaka is given differently: *Ekottarāgama, Madhyamāgama, Dīrghāgama, Saṃyuktāgama;* the order is therefore different and the *Kṣudrakāgama* is missing.[10] We should be clear

7. T 1463. Cf. p. 819a–b: 'This is the canon assembled by five monks in the Himalayas'. This sentence concludes the narrative of the Council of Rājagṛha and supposedly attests the Haimavata origin of the work.

8. Ibid., p. 822a.

9. Ibid., p. 822a, etc. Cf. Przyluski, *Concile de Rājagṛha*, pp. 317–8, who gives references concerning Kāśyapa's propagation in the Himalayas.

10. Ibid., p. 820a.

that in the first list given above, the fifth section of the Sūtra-piṭaka, which Przyluski reads as *Kṣudrakāgama* because of the similarity with the Pāli canon, should rather read *Saṃyuktapiṭaka,* 雜藏. It is doubtless because of this that this term is missing in the second list. This reminds us that the Mahāsāṃghikas and Bahuśrutīyas possessed, at a certain time, a Saṃyuktapiṭaka, which constituted the fourth canonical basket.[11]

On the other hand, the layout of the Abhidharma-piṭaka is identical to that of the Dharmaguptaka Abhidharma-piṭaka and that of the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* near enough so that, in the last case at least, the third and fourth sections form a single one, *Saṃgrahasaṃyukta.*[12]

We know very little about the doctrine of the Haimavatas; the few details we possess are rendered flimsy by the fact that Bhavya here contradicts both Vasumitra and Vinītadeva and further attributes to the Haimavatas theses that are manifestly *Pudgalavādin* on the evidence of the Sammatīya tradition.

(1) The bodhisattvas are worldlings (*pṛthagjana*).[13]

(2) Heretics (*tīrthika*) cannot obtain the five superknowledges (*abhijñā*).[14]

Heretics cannot obtain the five superknowledges because their teaching (*śāsana*) is false (*mithyā*) and because they cannot therefore acquire the principles of the superknowledges.[15]

(3) Among the gods (*deva*), there is no pure conduct (*brahmacārya*) or cultivation of the Path (*mārgabhāvanā*).[16]

There is no pure conduct among the gods because the goddesses (*devī*), by means of music, arouse in them thoughts of lewdness and subjugate them completely, which causes them to be reborn among mankind.[17]

(4) The bodhisattvas enter a womb without arousing desire (*kāma*).[18]

(5) There are arhats who are seduced by others (*paropahṛta*), who are subject to nescience (*ajñāna*), who have doubts (*kāṅkṣā*), who are advised

11. See above, chs. 5 and 9.

12. Cf. below, ch. 30.

13. Vasumitra, thesis 1; Bhavya, thesis 1, says the opposite. See thesis 45 of the Sarvāstivādins.

14. Vasumitra, thesis 3; Vinītadeva, thesis 1; Bhavya, thesis 2, says the opposite.

15. Kuiji, III, p. 24b.

16. Vasumitra, thesis 4; Vinītadeva, thesis 2.

17. Kuiji, III, p. 24b.

18. Vasumitra, thesis 2. See thesis 21 of the Mahāsāṃghikas.

by others (*paravitīrṇa*) and there is uttering of words (*vacibheda*) when one enters the Path (*mārga*).[19]

(6) One abandons (*prajahāti*) suffering (*duḥkha*) by means of the Path (*mārga*).[20]

(7) One should say (*vaktavya*) that the person (*pudgala*) is different from the aggregates (*skandha*) since, when it is in Nirvāṇa, where the aggregates have ceased (*niruddha*), the person subsists.[21]

The attribution, by the *Pudgalavādin* Sammatīyas, of this *Pudgalavādin* thesis to the supreme level is extremely suspect.

Vasumitra notes that the other Haimavata theses are, for the most part, similar to those of the Sarvāstivādins.

According to Tāranātha, the Haimavatas had disappeared by the time of Dharmapāla and Dharmakīrti, that is, the seventh century CE.[22]

19. Vasumitra, thesis 5; Bhavya, thesis 4, confirms the fifth proposition: vocal utterance during meditation. See thesis 30 of the Mahāsāṃghikas.
20. Bhavya, thesis 5.
21. Bhavya, thesis 3.
22. Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte*, p. 175.

CHAPTER 19

The Vātsīputrīyas

According to the agreement of all the sources, the Vātsīputrīya school is the first to emerge from the Sthavira trunk, possibly, however, after that of the Haimavatas. The schism which gave birth to it would have occurred just two hundred years after the Nirvāṇa, in about 280 BCE, according to the Sammatīya tradition, which must be based on the Vātsīputrīya tradition itself, or the beginning of the third century EN, that is, shortly after 280 BCE, according to the traditions of the northwest. We would not be too wrong in placing this event in the reign of Bindusāra Maurya (289–64 BCE).

The Vātsīputrīyas derive their name from the founder of their school, Vātsīputra.[1] According to the *Mañjuśrīparipṛcchāsūtra,* the latter was a discipline master (*vinayadhāra*).[2] According to Kuiji, he was of the brahmin caste.[3] Paramārtha makes him a disciple of Śāriputra.[4]

The Sinhalese tradition calls them Vajjiputtakas and not, as might have been expected, Vacchīputtakas. The difference is easily explained by the phonetics, but it must have been noted since the name Vajjiputtaka equally designates the Vṛjjiputrakas, that is, the monks from Vaiśālī of the Vṛjji clan who, through their infractions of the disciplinary rules, provoked the assembling of the Council of Vaiśālī 100 or 110 years after the Nirvāṇa. From this we could conclude that the Vātsīputrīyas are none other than these Vṛjjiputrakas if, on the one hand, the Sinhalese tradition identified

1. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought,* pp. 38–9, notes, suggests another explanation: the Vātsīputrīyas were monks from the land of Vatsa, capital Kauśāmbī.
2. T 468, p. 501b.
3. Kuiji, II, p. 5b.
4. Ibid. II, p. 6a.

them, which is not the case, and if all the other traditions did not clearly distinguish between the two names. There is therefore certainly no link between them.[5]

Lin Li-Kouang, basing himself on the suspect evidence of the Chinese monk Sengyu (beginning of sixth century CE), elaborated an ingenious hypothesis according to which it appears that the Vātsīputrīyas are none other than 'reformed Mahāsāṃghikas'.[6] The fragility of this hypothesis, seductive though it may be, is too great for it to be taken into consideration. We have seen, at the beginning of the chapter on the Mahāsāṃghikas, what should be thought of this 'reform' occurring among them. Very loyally, Lin Li-Kouang makes no secret of the fact that the identification of the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya with that of the Vātsīputrīyas does not exist in the postscript to the former on which he bases himself. It was therefore an invention by Sengyu. On the other hand, and this is decisive, *the agreement of all the Indian sources* or those inspired directly by Indian evidence absolutely distinguishes the Vātsīputriyas from the Mahāsāṃghikas.[7] Sengyu, upon whom the accusation of 'messing about with the texts' clearly weighs, could not have been right against such an agreement.

The Vātsīputrīyas themselves have left no trace of their residence in India or elsewhere. This is certainly because they were soon eclipsed by one or another of their subschools, the Sammatīyas, whose extraordinary development in India in the seventh century CE was noted by Xuanzang.

We know nothing of their literature except that from the evidence of the author of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* and Paramārtha, their Abhidharmapiṭaka was called *Śāriputrābhidharma* or *Dharmalakṣaṇābhidharma* and comprised nine parts.[8] Unfortunately, it has not come down to us.

According to Tāranātha, the Vātsīputrīyas still existed as a distinct school at the time of the Pāla kings (tenth and eleventh centuries CE).[9]

These are the theses attributed to them:

5. Dutt, *Early Monastic Buddhism* II, p. 174, however, accepts the hypothesis of this identification.

6. Lin, *Aide-Mémoire*, pp. 194, 202, n. 2, 297–302.

7. See Bareau, "Une confusion entre Mahāsāṅghika et Vātsīputrīya," pp. 399–406.

8. Lamotte, *Traité* I, p. 112; Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 23 and 57. This is not T 1548 despite the similarity of the titles.

9. Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte*, p. 274.

(1) The person (*pudgala*) is perceived (*upalabhyate*) as an evident reality (*sākṣītkṛtaparamārthena*). The person is neither identical (*sama*) to the aggregates (*skandha*) nor different (*viṣama*) from them. It neither exists in the aggregates nor outside them.[10]

This is the personalist (*pudgalavādin*) thesis which distinguishes them from all other Buddhists and makes them closer to the Brahminists, Hindus and Jains.

Here are some of the many arguments by means of which the Vātsīputrīyas maintained this thesis. It was said by the Bhagavant, 'Having transmigrated (*sandhāvitvāna*) seven times at the most (*sattakkhattuparamaṃ*), the individual (*puggala*) puts an end to suffering (*dukkhassantakaro hoti*) and becomes him who has exhausted all the fetters (*sabbasaññojanakkhaya*)'; therefore, an individual exists who transmigrates (*sandhāvati*) from this world (*asmā lokā*) to another world (*paraṃ lokaṃ*) and from another world to this world. It was said by the Bhagavant, 'O monks, I see (*passamāhaṃ*) by means of the perfectly pure (*visuddha*) and superhuman (*atikkantamānusaka*) divine eye (*dibba cakkhu*) beings (*satta*) who pass (*cavamāna*), who are reborn (*upapajjamāna*), lowly (*hīna*) or exalted (*paṇīta*), good-looking (*suvaṇṇa*) or ugly (*dubbaṇṇa*), having good destinies (*sugata*) or bad destinies (*duggata*), I know (*pajānāmi*) beings who are recompensed according to their actions (*yathākammupaga*)'. It was said by the Bhagavant, 'O monks, I will explain to you the burden (*bhāra*), the bearer of the burden (*bhārahāra*), the taking up of the burden (*bhārādāna*), the laying down of the burden (*bhāranikkhepana*)'. It was said by the Bhagavant, 'An individual, O monks, who is born (*uppajjamāna*) in the world (*loka*) is born (*uppajjati*) for the welfare of many people (*bahujanahitāya*)'. An individual who is a streamwinner (*sotāpanna*), deceased (*cuta*) in the world of mankind (*manussaloka*) and reborn (*uppana*) in the world of the gods (*devaloka*), will remain a streamwinner there. There is someone who sees (*passati*), who hears (*suṇāti*), who smells (*ghāyati*), who tastes (*sāyati*), who touches (*phusati*), who knows (*vijānāti*) something which is seen, heard, etc., something by which one sees, hears, etc. Similarly, there is someone (*koci*) who is endowed with the superknowledges (*abhiññā*), who hears sound (*sadda*) with the divine (*dibba*) ear

10. *Kathāvatthu* I, 1; *Satyasiddhiśāstra*, T 1646, p. 259a; *Vibhāṣā*, T 1545, pp. 55a and 8b; Vasumitra, thesis 1; Bhavya, thesis 5; Vinītadeva, thesis 1. LVP, *Kośa* IX, p. 232.

(*sotadhātu*), who knows (*jānāti*) another's thought (*paracitta*), etc. The existence of knowledge presupposes the existence of a subject of knowledge, which is the individual. Since there are mothers (*mātā*), fathers (*pitā*), nobles (*khattiya*), brahmins, gods (*deva*), humans (*manussa*), etc., it is because there are individuals who bear those names. An analogous argument is based on the acknowledged existence of various types of Buddhist holy ones.

(2) What is graspable (*upādānīya*) and endowed with grasping (*upādāna*) by the cravings and defilements, that is, what is based on the aggregates (*skandha*), spheres (*āyatana*) and elements (*dhātu*), is merely a designation (*prajñapti*).[11]

This thesis is a corollary of the previous one. That with which the ignorant identify the person, that is, a particular aggregate, a particular sphere, a particular element, which is subject to cravings and defilements, is merely fiction, pure designation and cannot therefore be the person itself.[12]

(3) With the exception of the person (*pudgala*) no thing (*dharma*) transmigrates (*saṃkrāmati*) from this world (*asmāllokāt*) to another world (*paraṃ lokaṃ*).[13]

If no thing transmigrates, it could be said that when the life faculty (*jīvitendriya*) has ceased (*niruddha*), all things have equally ceased. However, the person (*pudgala*) has not ceased, it can transmigrate from one world to another and, since things are not different from a person, one could say that there is transmigration (*saṃkrānti*).[14]

(4) All conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*) last only for a single instant (*ekakṣaṇika*).[15]

According to Bhavya, the Vātsīputrīyas maintained that conditioned things are instantaneous or not. Without a commentary, it is difficult to understand this last proposition.

(5) The five kinds of sense consciousness (*vijñāna*) are not endowed with craving (*sarāga*) or devoid of craving (*virāga*).[16]

The five kinds of consciousness are neither endowed with craving nor

11. Vasumitra, thesis 1; Bhavya, thesis 1.
12. Kuiji, III, p. 26b.
13. Vasumitra, thesis 3; Bhavya, theses 2 and 3.
14. Kuiji, III, p. 27a.
15. Vasumitra, thesis 2; Bhavya, thesis 3.
16. Vasumitra, thesis 5; Bhavya, thesis 8; Vinītadeva, thesis 3.

devoid of craving since they are undefined (*avyākṛta*), that is, neither good (*kuśala*) nor bad (*akuśala*).

(6) There are also heretics (*tīrthika*) who possess the five superknowledges (*abhijñā*).[17]

Heretics can acquire the superknowledges by means of vision (*darśana*) and cultivation (*bhāvanā*).

(7) The abandonment (*prahāna*) of the fetters (*saṃyojana*) of the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) which should be abandoned through cultivation (*bhāvanayā prahātavya*) is what is called detachment (*virāga*). This is not abandonment of the fetters which should be abandoned through vision (*darśanena prahātavya*).[18]

The fetters of the realm of desire which should be abandoned through cultivation are delusion (*moha*), hatred (*dveṣa*) and craving (*rāga*). Delusion is merely illusion (*māyā*). It places no obstacle (*āvaraṇa*) in the way of principles [of awakening, such as the empty (*śūnya*), impersonality (*anātmya*), etc.]. The six meditational practices concerning the impurities (*āsrava*) cannot produce these principles through realisation (*sākṣītkaroti*), they can only control delusion. Delusion is therefore not something that one should abandon through vision. Once one has seen these principles, one can definitively abandon the fetters. Worldlings (*pṛthagjana*) and noble ones (*ārya*), by means of the six practices, abandon the fetters of the *kāmadhātu*, etc.[19]

(8) Patience (*kṣānti*), names (*nāman*), aspects (*ākāra*) and the supreme worldly dharmas (*laukikāgradharma*) are called 'those which can cause entry into rightness (*samyaktva*) and the quitting of rebirth (*upapatti*)'.[20]

The stage of patience is that in which, at the start of clear comprehension (*abhisamaya*) of the Four Truths (*satya*), these are only examined together. The stage of name is that in which one can examine elements (*dharma*) of the teaching (*śāsana*). The stage of aspects is that in which, following clear comprehension of the Truths, one examines the essence of their principles. In the stage of the supreme worldly dharmas, which immediately

17. Vasumitra, thesis 4.
18. Ibid., thesis 6.
19. Kuiji, III, p. 28a. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* V, pp. 13–14.
20. Vasumitra, thesis 7.

succeeds the stage of aspects, one attains the path of vision (*darśanamārga*). The Vātsīputrīyas maintain that these four things alone are called good roots (*kuśalamūla*).[21]

(9) In the path of vision (*darśanamārga*), there are twelve thought-moments (*cittakṣaṇa*) in which one is called 'orientated' (*pratipanna*). At the thirteenth thought-moment one is called 'fruit of abiding' (*sthitiphala*).[22]

Three thoughts are devoted to each Truth (*satya*). [Hence, with regard to the Truth of Suffering (*duḥkhasatya*)]: (1) Knowledge of painful things (*duḥkhadharmajñāna*), by means of which one examines the suffering of the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*). (2) Patience with regard to painful things (*duḥkhadharmakṣānti*): after having examined the Truth of Suffering of the *kāmadhātu*, one abandons (*prajahāti*) delusion (*moha*) which has not yet been abandoned (*aprahīna*) [in the *kāmadhātu*] (since there is still delusion in the higher realms (*dhātu*)), by means of repeated examination. (3) Knowledge of types of suffering (*duḥkhānvayajñāna*): by examining together the suffering of the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) and the formless realm (*arūpadhātu*), one exhausts the Truth of Suffering in the three realms. The thirteenth thought is either a thought contiguous (*santati*) with knowledge of the type of the Path (*mārgānvayajñāna*) or a thought of clear comprehension of the Four Truths together. After having successfully passed beyond [the first twelve thoughts], one obtains the fruit (*phala*), then, likewise, the second and third fruits successively.[23]

(10) The knowable (*jñeya*) is expressible (*abhilāpya*) and inexpressible (*anabhilāpya*).[24]

(11) It should not be said that Nirvāṇa is truly identical to all things (*dharma*), or that it is truly different.[25]

This is a corollary of thesis 1 above. If the person (*pudgala*) is neither identical to nor different from things, its Nirvāṇa is necessarily neither identical to nor different from them.

21. Kuiji, III, p. 48b, and Koyama, III, p. 48b. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* VI, pp. 165–9.
22. Vasumitra, thesis 7; Vinītadeva, thesis 4.
23. Kuiji, III, p. 49a–b. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* VI, pp. 179–85.
24. Vinītadeva, thesis 5. Due to a lack of commentary, the meaning of this proposition remains enigmatic.
25. Bhavya, thesis 6.

(12) It should not be said that Nirvāṇa truly exists or truly does not exist.[26]

This is a corollary of the previous thesis.

(13) The arahant regresses (*parihāyati*) from holiness (*arahatta*).[27]

It has been said by the Blessed One, 'O monks, five things (*dhamma*) lead (*saṃvattanti*) to the regression (*parihāna*) of the occasionally delivered (*samayavimutta*) monk. What are those five? The fact of delighting in action (*kammārāmatā*), the fact of delighting in discussion (*bhassārāmatā*), the fact of delighting in sleep (*niddārāmatā*), the fact of delighting in company (*saṃgaṇikārāmatā*), the fact that he does not observe (*paccavekkhati*) that his mind (*citta*) is delivered (*vimutta*) [SBW: cf. A III, 173]. In truth, O monks, these five things lead to the regression of the occasionally delivered monk'.

(14) The supreme worldly dharmas (*laukikāgradharma*) are the five faculties of faith (*śraddhendriya*), vigour (*vīryendriya*), mindfulness (*smṛtīndriya*), concentration (*samādhīndriya*) and wisdom (*prajñendriya*), because of their own-nature (*svabhāva*).[28]

Only these five faculties are good (*kuśala*) through their own-nature. It is because they are associated with these that the others can also be called good. It is because they base themselves on these five faculties that the noble ones (*ārya*) are distinguished from other men, and not because they base themselves on the other faculties. As the Sūtra says: 'There are five faculties that increase resolve. Because one cultivates and practises them equally and generally, one fully realises deliverance (*vimukti*)'.[29]

(15) The person (*pudgala*) knows (*jānāti*) things (*dharma*).[30]

(16) Knowledge (*jñāna*) is only a part of the Path (*mārgāṅga*), and consciousness (*vijñāna*) is only a part of existence (*bhavāṅga*).[31]

The Sūtra in fact says that right view (*samyagdṛṣṭi*) is part of the Path, while the object of consciousness is conditioned things (*saṃskāra*).

(17) An eye alone (*cakṣus*) sees (*paśyati*) forms (*rūpa*).[32]

26. Ibid., thesis 7.
27. *Kathāvatthu* I, 2.
28. *Vibhāṣā*, T 1545, p. 8b.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p. 42c. No argumentation is mentioned.
31. Ibid., p. 44b.
32. Ibid., p. 62a. No argumentation is mentioned.

(18) It is only with regard to the person (*pudgala*) that the latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) have the meaning (*artha*) of growth (*anuśayana*).[33]

It is the person, and not thought (*citta*), etc., that is endowed with or devoid of the tendencies, since it is it that is fettered or unfettered.[34]

(19) Nirvāṇa is both trainee (*śaikṣa*), trained (*aśaikṣa*) and neither trainee nor trained (*nevaśaikṣanāśaikṣa*).[35]

(20) The ten latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) which should be abandoned by means of vision (*darśanena prahātavya*) in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) constitute the nature (*bhāva*) of a worldling (*pṛthagjana*).[36]

The nature of a worldling is included in the realm of desire. This defiled nature (*kliṣṭabhāva*) should be abandoned by means of vision. It is included (*saṃgrahita*) in the aggregate of mental formations (*saṃskāraskandha*) associated (*saṃprayukta*) with thought (*citta*).[37]

(21) The fetters (*saṃyojana*), what can be fettered (*saṃyojanīya*) and the person (*pudgala*) are real.[38]

(22) Sound (*śabda*) is a fruit of the maturing [of karman] (*vipākaphala*).[39]

It is said in the sūtras that the bodhisattva, having abandoned false and harsh speech during his former existences, acquires a celestial voice (*brahmasvara*) because of the accomplishment of that action. That is why it is said that sound is a fruit of the maturing [of karman, SBW].

(23) All beings (*sattva*) have two kinds of loss (*āpatti?*): loss of mind (*manas*) and loss of object (*vastu*).[40]

(24) Birth (*jāti*) and death (*maraṇa*) have two kinds of sovereign causes (*adhipatihetu*): defilements (*kleśa*) and actions (*karman*).[41]

(25) Two kinds of things (*dharma*) are sovereign causes (*adhipatihetu*) of deliverance (*vimukti*): insight (*vipaśyanā*) and tranquillity (*śamatha*).[42]

33. Ibid., p. 110b.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., pp. 169a and 8b. No argumentation is mentioned.
36. Ibid., pp. 231b and 8b; on p. 8b it is said that the tendencies are dissociated (*viprayukta*).
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., pp. 228b and 8b. No argumentation is mentioned.
39. Ibid., p. 612c.
40. Vasumitra, complementary series of Paramārtha's version, thesis 1. Due to a lack of commentary, this thesis remains enigmatic.
41. Ibid., thesis 2. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* II, pp. 307–8.
42. Vasumitra, thesis 3. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* VI, p. 280, and VII, p. 21.

(26) If he does not place reliance (*āśraya*) on own-nature (*svabhāva*) and does not take modesty (*hrī*) as a sovereign condition (*adhipatipratyaya*), the Good Dharma (*saddharma*) does not accompany a man.[43]

(27) The roots (*mūla*) of the defilements (*kleśa*) are of two kinds: they function perpetually according to all beings and in ignorance (*avidyā*) there is craving (*tṛṣṇā*).[44]

(28) There are seven kinds of places of purity (*viśuddhisthāna*).[45]

(29) The objects (*visaya*) of the knowledge of the buddhas (*buddhajñāna*) are dissociated (*viprayukta*) from morality (*śīla*), etc.[46]

(30) By placing reliance (*āśraya*) on right understanding whose object (*ālambana*) is everything (*sarva*), the buddhas can penetrate all things (*dharma*).[47]

(31) There are six kinds of common things which are included in cessation (*nirodha*).[48]

(32) In the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) and the formless realm (*arūpadhātu*), there is no entry into rightness (*samyaktva*).[49]

(33) The bodhisattvas, when they are reborn in an intermediate existence (*antarābhava*), if they had formerly aroused the knowledge of destruction (*kṣayajñāna*) and the knowledge of non-arising (*anutpādajñāna*), can acquire the title of buddha.[50]

The Vātsīputrīyas, like the Sammatīyas, therefore admitted the intermediate existence. They also admitted that a bodhisattva could become a buddha in the intermediate existence.

(34) The sūtras uttered by the Tathāgata have three meanings (*artha*): (1) the revealing of faults (*āpatti*) [which lead to] birth (*jāti*) and death (*maraṇa*); (2) the revealing of merit (*puṇya*) [which leads to] deliverance (*vimukti*); (3) the unrevealable.[51]

43. Vasumitra, thesis 4. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* II, p. 172.
44. Vasumitra, thesis 5. See Bhavya, thesis of the Dharmottarīyas.
45. Vasumitra, thesis 6.
46. Ibid., thesis 7.
47. Ibid., thesis 8.
48. Ibid., thesis 9. The translation is uncertain.
49. Ibid., thesis 10.
50. Ibid., thesis 11.
51. Ibid., thesis 12.

The teaching of the Buddha therefore has a partially esoteric meaning.

(35) The supreme worldly dharmas (*laukikāgradharma*) are included (*paryāpanna*) in the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) and the formless realm (*arūpadhātu*).[52]

Indeed, if at one level (*bhūmi*) there is the Noble Path (*āryamārga*), at that level there are supreme worldly dharmas.

(36) There are six destinies (*gati*), including that of the Asuras.[53]

(37) The latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) are formations dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*).[54]

(38) There is only one unconditioned thing (*asaṃskṛta*), namely Nirvāṇa.[55]

(39) The nature of a worldling (*pṛthagjanabhāva*), wrong (*akuśala*) bodily action (*kāyakarman*) and vocal action (*vākkarman*) should be abandoned by means of vision (*darśanena prahātavya*).[56]

The nature of a worldling is an undefiled (*akliṣṭa*) and neutral (*avyākṛta*) thing (*dharma*). Wrong bodily or vocal action, the fruition of which is a bad destiny (*durgati*), is matter (*rūpa*). In fact, the quality of worldling and action which causes a bad destiny are at variance with the path of vision (*darśanamārga*). They should therefore be abandoned by means of vision.

(40) Bodily intimation (*kāyavijñapti*) is displacement (*gati*), since it occurs when there is movement, not when there is no movement.[57]

52. *Vibhāṣā*, T 1545, p. 14a; T 1546, p. 9b.
53. Ibid., T 1545, p. 8b; T 1546, p. 6a.
54. Ibid., T 1545, p. 8b.
55. LVP, *Kośa* I, p. 7, n. 2.
56. Ibid. I, p. 79.
57. Ibid. IV, p. 4.

CHAPTER 20

The Sammatīyas

All the early sources agree in considering the Sammatīyas as one of the four schools that emerged from the Vātsīputrīyas, either the third (sources from the northwest) or the fourth (Sinhalese sources). According to the former, their appearance would date from the middle of the third century EN, that is, mid-second century BCE. In reality, we find no definite trace of their existence before the second century CE. If, as Paramārtha claims, the schism which gave rise to them was provoked by a debate concerning the Abhidharma-piṭaka of the Vātsīputrīyas, their appearance should be dated to the first century BCE/CE.

Depending on the spelling and on the translations, their name can mean those who live in concord, or those who should be respected (*saṃmatīya*), those who are assembled, or equal (Pāli *samitīya*), those who have the right measure, or those who are equal (*saṃmitīya*). According to Bhavya (first list), their name would come from their teacher Saṃmata. Kuiji explains that since the meaning (*artha*) of the most profound (*sugambhīra*) teaching (*dharma*) which they maintain is correct, free of error, well estimated, rightly measured, they were given that name.[1]

Only two inscriptions attest their presence, one in Mathurā in the second century CE,[2] the other in Sārnāth in the fourth century, where they replaced the Sarvāstivādins, who had themselves earlier supplanted the Sthaviras.[3] From the beginning of the seventh century, their importance had grown to such a considerable degree that Xuanzang, Yijing and Vinītadeva considered them as the foremost Vātsīputrīya school, grouping under their name

1. Kuiji, II, p. 6b.
2. Sastri, *Ep. Ind.* XIX, p. 67.
3. Hultzsch, *Ep. Ind.* VIII, p. 172.

all the subschools of that branch. In the second quarter of the seventh century, Xuanzang met small and large groups of them throughout the valley of the Middle Ganges, where they totalled some 12,000 monks living in approximately 80 monasteries, more than 5,000 in some fifteen monasteries on the Lower Ganges, 20,000 in some 100 monasteries in Mālava, 6,000 in 100 monasteries in Valabhī, 20,000 in some 100 monasteries in the Indus Delta.[4] According to Xuanzang, this was the most numerous group, with more than 60,000 monks of a total of 220,000. In the final years of this same seventh century, Yijing records them all over western India, in Lāṭa and Sindhu, where they were by far the most flourishing school, in Magadha in eastern India, and a small number in southern India, but neither in Ceylon nor north India. Still according to Yijing, some were to be found in the Sunda Islands [Indonesia] and a large group in Champa, where they predominated.[5] According to Bhavya (first list) and Vinītadeva, they were at that time divided into two schools,[6] the Avantakas and Kurukulas. These two names can be explained geographically: the Avantakas were perhaps the Sammatīyas of Avanta or Avanti, that is, the region situated to the north of the Narbada and east of the Lower Indus; the Kurukulas, 'those of the Kuru family', could be Sammatīyas residing on the land of the old Kurukṣetra, that is, the Upper Ganges, around Sthāneśvara. The sister of the renowned king Harṣa Śīlāditya, who was precisely from the lineage of the princes of Sthāneśvara, purportedly revered the Sammatīyas particularly,[7] and on the other hand Xuanzang found at that same time numerous monks of that school in the region.

According to Yijing, their Tripiṭaka contained only 200,000 *ślokas*, 30,000 of which for a single Vinaya-piṭaka.[8] The bottom of their monastic robe was cut in an irregular shape, they slept in kinds of enclosures demarcated by ropes and used communal dormitories.[9] They draped their outer

4. For details, see above, part one, ch. 3.
5. Takakusu, *Record of the Buddhist Religion*, pp. xxiv, 8 ff.
6. The names of these two schools are uncertain since they correspond badly with the translations, whether Tibetan or Chinese, given by the *Mahāvyutpatti*.
7. Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels* I, p. 346. Xuanzang, on the other hand, says that she was on the contrary an adherent of the Mahāyāna: Grousset, *Sur les traces du Bouddha*, p. 196.
8. Takakusu, *Record of the Buddhist Religion*, pp. xxiv and 8.
9. Ibid., p. 7.

robes in the manner of Indian women, taking the right border to the left side and leaving the flaps floating free.[10]

According to certain late Tibetan works, their patron was the śūdra Upāli, the renowned scholar who recited the Vinaya-piṭaka at the Council of Rājagṛha. Their language was Paiśācī or rather Apabhraṃśa. Their robe consisted of twenty-one to twenty-five bands of cloth or from five to twenty bands. Their emblem was an areca flower. Their names ended by preference in *-dāsa* and *-sena*, but sometimes in *-śīla, -hari, -candra* and *–guhya*.[11]

Of all their literature, all that remains for us is the Chinese translation of the *Sammatīyanikāyaśāstra*, a fairly short and clearly postcanonical treatise which gives us some valuable information on the Sammatīya doctrine,[12] and a short Vinaya treatise.[13]

According to Paramārtha, the Sammatīyas formed one of the four schools which emerged from the Vātsīputrīyas and who, discontented with Śāriputra's Abhidharma, the Abhidharma-piṭaka of the latter, composed treatises (*śāstra*) in order to complete the meaning of the Sūtras. They [tr.] 'explained the Śāriputra' Abhidharma, by completing its meaning, wherever it was lacking, with the aid of the meaning of the Sūtras'.[14]

Vasumitra says that the schism must have been due to different explanations given by the four schools of the following stanza (*gāthā*):

> *Being already delivered, one falls again.*
> *The fall comes from craving; one returns again.*
> *Having attained the place of calm joy, there is happiness.*
> *If one follows the practices of happiness, there is perfect happiness.*

Commenting on this passage by Vasumitra, Kuiji explains that according to the Sammatīyas, to the four fruits (*phala*) correspond six kinds of individuals: (1) the delivered (*vimukta*), that is, the streamwinner (*srotāpanna*) who has attained deliverance (*vimukti*); (2) he who goes from family to family (*kulaṃkula*), that is, he who is aiming at the second fruit; (3) he who has

10. Ibid., pp. 66–7.
11. Lin, *Aide-Mémoire*, pp. 176–81 and 205–8.
12. T 1649, translated between 350 and 431.
13. T 1461.
14. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," p. 58.

obtained the fruit of once-returner (*sakṛdāgāmin*); (4) he who has no more than a single interval (*ekavīcika*); (5) the nonreturner (*anāgāmin*); (6) the arhat. The first line (*pāda*) designates the one who is delivered, who can regress through error. The second line designates he who goes from family to family, the fourth individual, who may regress because of desire (*kāma*), and the third individual, who will return to this world. The third line designates the fifth individual [who will not return to this world], and the fourth line designates the arhat.[15]

The Sammatīya tradition cited by Bhavya attributes only one thesis to them, given as fundamental:

That which should exist (*bhavanīya*) and that which exists (*bhava*), that which should cease (*niroddhavya*) and that which ceases (*niruddha*), that which should be born (*janitavya*) and that which is born (*jāta*), that which should die (*maraṇīya*) and that which dies (*mṛta*), that which should be done (*kṛtya*) and that which is done (*kṛta*), that which should be liberated (*moktavya*) and that which is liberated (*mokta*), that which should go (*gantavya*) and that which goes (*gāmin*), that which should be cognised (*vijñeya*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*) exist.

Due to a lack of commentary, the exact meaning of this thesis eludes us. It does, however, seem to deal with the ontological problem.

Only Vinītadeva and in particular the *Kathāvatthu* inform us in some detail of their doctrines. Here, then, are their theses:

(1) The person (*puggala*) is perceived (*upalabbhati*) as an evident reality (*sacchikaṭṭhaparamaṭṭhena*). The person (*pudgala*) is not truly identical to the aggregates (*skandha*). It is not in the aggregates. Neither does it exist outside the aggregates.[16]

(2) The arahant regresses (*parihāyati*) from holiness (*arahattā*).[17]

(3) There is no pure conduct (*brahmacariyavāsa*) among the gods (*deva*).[18]

There are among the gods no wandering (*pabbajja*), shaven-headed (*muṇḍiya*) monks equipped with the monastic robe (*kāsāvadhāra*) and alms-bowl (*pattadhāra*). The Sammāsaṃbuddhas, Paccekabuddhas, the pairs of disciples (*sāvakayuga*), are not born (*uppajjanti*) among the gods. In consequence, there can be among the gods no cultivation of the Path (*maggabhāvanā*) or pure conduct.

15. Kuiji, III, p. 30a–b. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* VI, pp. 195–230.
16. *Kathāvatthu* I, 1; Vinītadeva, thesis 1. T 1649, pp. 462a–469b. See thesis 1 of the Vātsīputrīyas.
17. *Kathāvatthu* I, 2. See thesis 13 of the Vātsīputrīyas.
18. Ibid. I, 3.

(4) One abandons (*jahati*) the defilements (*kilesa*) one after another (*odhisodhiso*).[19]

The streamwinners (*sotāpanna*) and other noble ones desire (*icchanti*) the abandonment of the defilements (*kilesappahāna*), one part after the other (*ekadesena ekadesena*), one after the other (*odhiso odhiso*) by means of the vision of suffering (*dukkhadassana*) and the other Truths, by means of different clear comprehensions (*nānābhisamayavasena*). Moreover, the Buddha said, 'Progressively (*anupubbena*), little by little (*thokaṃ thokaṃ*), from one instant to another (*khaṇe khaṇe*), the intelligent (*medhavī*) man washes away (*niddhame*) his own stain (*malamattano*) as a silversmith (*kammāra*) does that of silver (*rajata*)'.

(5) The worldling (*puthujjana*) abandons (*jahati*) sensuous craving (*kāmarāga*) and ill-will (*byāpāda*).[20]

It has been said by the Blessed One, 'There were (*ahesuṃ*) in the past (*atītaṃsa*) six famous (*yassassī*) masters (*satthā*), giving off a perfume of virtue (*nirāmagandha*), filled with compassion (*karuṇā*), delivered (*vimutta*) from the fetter of desire (*kāmasaññojana*). Having discarded (*virājetvā*) sensuous craving (*kāmarāga*), they attained the Brahma world (*brahmalokūpaga*). They had several (*aneka*) hundred (*sata*) listeners (*sāvaka*) giving off a perfume of virtue, filled with compassion, delivered from the fetter of desire. Having discarded the fetter of sensuous craving, the latter attained the Brahma world'. The worldling who has acquired knowledge (*ñāṇalābhī*), who is endowed with clear comprehension of the Truths (*saha saccābhisamaya*), who is a nonreturner (*anāgāmī*), has abandoned (*pahīna*) sensuous craving and ill-will.

(6) Clear comprehension (*abhisamaya*) is progressive (*anupubba*).[21]

(7) For the eighth-level (*aṭṭhamaka*) individual (*puggala*), the obsession with false views (*diṭṭhipariyuṭṭhāna*) and the obsession with doubt (*vicikicchāpariyuṭṭhāna*) are abandoned (*pahīna*).[22]

19. Ibid. I, 4.
20. Ibid. I, 5.
21. Ibid. II, 9 [cor.]. See thesis 4 of the Andhakas.
22. Ibid. III, 5.

In the candidate to the fruit of streamwinning (*sotāpattiphala*), two obsessions (*pariyuṭṭhāna*), those of false views (*diṭṭhi*) and of doubt (*vicikicchā*), are abandoned by reason of the nonexistence of their practice (*samudācārābhāvato*).

(8) The divine eye (*dibbacakkhu*) is the fleshly eye (*maṃsacakkhu*) based on things (*dhammūpatthaddha*).[23]

The divine eye is only the fleshly eye based on things in the fourth absorption (*catutthajjhāna*). No demonstration of this thesis is mentioned.

(9) Merit (*puñña*) consisting in delight (*paribhogamaya*) increases (*vaḍḍhati*).[24]

The Buddha said, 'For those who give (*dadanti*) a drink (*papa*), a well (*udapāna*) or shelter (*upassaya*), merit increases (*pavaḍḍhati*) by day (*divā*), by night (*ratto*), always (*sadā*)'. In another sutta, the Buddha said, 'For whomever thanks to whom a monk (*bhikkhu*) rejoices (*paribhuñjamāna*) in a robe (*cīvara*), alms-food (*piṇḍapāta*), etc., there is a consequence of merit (*puññābhisanda*), a fortunate consequence (*kusalābhisanda*), a nourishing of happiness (*sukhassāhāra*), a good fruition (*sukhavipāka*), heavenly (*sovaggika*), leading to the heavens (*saggasaṃvattanika*) . . .'. These gifts consisting of rejoicing are giving through moral obligation (*deyyadhamma*).

(10) There is an intermediate existence (*antarābhava*).[25]

(11) There is an individual (*attabhāva*) endowed with six sense-spheres (*saḷāyatanika*) in the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*).[26]

(12) Bodily action (*kāyakamma*) having as its origin (*samuṭṭhita*) a good (*kusala*) thought (*citta*) is good form (*rūpa*). Form is action.[27]

Bodily action and vocal action (*vacīkamma*) are precisely form (*rūpa*) considered as intimation (*viññatti*) by the body (*kāya*) or by the voice (*vacī*). If its origin is good (*kusalasamuṭṭhāna*), it is good, and if its origin is bad (*akusalasamuṭṭhāna*) it is bad (*akusala*).

(13) There is no material (*rūpa*) life faculty (*jīvitindriya*).[28]

23. Ibid. III, 7.
24. Ibid. VII, 5.
25. Ibid. VIII, 2. See thesis 11 of the Pūrvaśailas. T 1649, pp. 469b–471c.
26. *Kathāvatthu* VIII, 7. See thesis 36 of the Andhakas.
27. Ibid. VIII, 9.
28. Ibid. VIII, 10.

(14) The arahant regresses (*parihāyati*) from holiness (*arahattā*) because of his actions (*kammahetu*).[29]

(15) The form (*rūpa*) of him who is endowed with the Path (*maggasamaṅgī*) is the Path (*magga*).[30]

Right speech (*sammāvācā*), right action (*sammākammanta*) and right livelihood (*sammājīva*) are material and yet are part of the Path.

(16) Intimation (*viññatti*) is morality (*sīla*).[31]

Intimation by the body (*kāyaviññatti*) is bodily action (*kāyakamma*) and intimation by the voice (*vacīviññatti*) is vocal action (*vacīkamma*). In fact, morality is bodily action and vocal action. Therefore, intimation by the body and intimation by the voice are morality. Furthermore, it cannot truly be said (*na hevaṃ vattabbe*) that intimation is immoral (*dussīlya*).

(17) The latent tendencies (*anusaya*) are undefined (*abyākata*), uncaused (*ahetuka*) and dissociated from the mind (*cittavippayutta*).[32]

The worldling (*puthujjana*) should be said (*vattabba*) to be endowed with latent tendencies (*sānusaya*) when his mind (*citta*) remains (*vattamāna*) good (*kusala*) or undefined (*abyākata*). However, one cannot truly say (*na hevaṃ vattabbe*) that for him good or bad (*kusalākusala*) things (*dhamma*) come (*āgacchanti*) into confrontation (*sammukhībhāva*). Equally, since one cannot say that they are caused (*sahetuka*) by a cause (*hetu*), the tendencies are uncaused. Finally, since one cannot say that they are associated (*saṃpayutta*) with the mind (*citta*), the tendencies are dissociated from the mind.

(18) Craving for form (*rūparāga*) which dwells (*anuseti*) on the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) is included in the realm of form (*rūpadhātupariyāpanna*). Craving for the formless (*arūparāga*) which dwells on the formless realm (*arūpadhātu*) is included in the formless realm (*arūpadhātupariyāpanna*).[33]

Since craving for sense-desire (*kāmarāga*) which dwells on the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) is included in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātupariyāpanna*), craving for form which dwells on the realm of form is included in the realm of form, and craving for the formless which dwells on the formless realm is included in the formless realm.

29. Ibid. VIII, 11. See thesis 15 of the Pūrvaśailas.
30. Ibid. X, 2 [cor.].
31. Ibid. X, 10 [cor.].
32. Ibid. XI, 1.
33. Ibid. XIV, 7.

(19) Action (*kamma*) is different (*aññа*) from the accumulation of action (*kammūpacaya*).[34]

What is called accumulation of action is different from action dissociated from thought (*cittavippayutta*), undefined (*abyākata*) and devoid of an object (*anārammaṇa*).

(20) Form (*rūpa*) is good (*kusala*) or bad (*akusala*).[35]

Since bodily action (*kāyakamma*) and vocal action (*vacīkamma*) are good or bad, the material of intimation by the body (*kāyaviññatti*) and intimation by the voice (*vacīviññatti*), which is included in bodily and vocal actions, is good or bad.

(21) Form (*rūpa*) is fruition (*vipāka*).[36]

Just as thought and mental (*cittacetasika*) things (*dhamma*) engendered (*uppanna*) consequent to the accomplishment (*katatta*) of action (*kamma*) are fruition, form engendered consequent to the accomplishment of action is fruition.

(22) There are intermediate (*antarika*) stages between the absorptions (*jhāna*).[37]

In the fivefold method (*pañcakanaya*) there are five distinct (*vibhatta*) absorptions, and three concentrations (*samādhi*) only (*kevalaṃ*) are manifested (*uddiṭṭha*). The appearance (*okāsa*) of concentration without reasoning but endowed with deliberation (*avitakkavicāramatta*), which is located between (*antare*) the first and second absorptions, is called intermediate stage of absorption.

(23) The aggregates (*skandha*) remain firm even in another time.[38]

(24) Through the door (*dvāra*) of the five kinds of consciousness (*vijñāna*), cravings (*rāga*) do not arise (*utpadyante*), neither are they [the five kinds of consciousness] separated from cravings.[39]

(25) The path of vision (*darśanamārga*) contains twelve thought-moments (*cittakṣaṇa*). Beyond that, one remains fixed on the fruit (*phalasthita*).[40]

34. Ibid. XV, 11.
35. Ibid. XVI, 7.
36. Ibid. XVI, 8.
37. Ibid. XVIII, 7.
38. Vinītadeva, thesis 2. Through lack of a commentary, this thesis remains enigmatic. It seems to contradict thesis 4 of the Vātsīputrīyas.
39. Ibid., thesis 3.
40. Ibid., thesis 4.

(26) The knowable (*jñeya*) is both expressible (*abhilāpya*) and inexpressible (*anabhilāpya*).[41]

(27) The condition of object (*ālambanapratyaya*) of a consciousness (*vijñāna*) is what engenders (*janayati*) it.[42]

(28) Intimation by the body (*kāyavijñapti*) is movement (*gati*).[43]

(29) The characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) should be attributed to a certain prolonged state.[44]

(30) There is an indestructible (*avipraṇāśa*) thing that is dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayukta*).[45]

This indestructible thing is undoubtedly identical to what Candrakīrti defines thus: 'When action arises there arises in the series a thing dissociated from thought, undefined (*avyākṛta*), destroyed by cultivation (*bhāvanā*), which is called indestructible, which produces the fruit of action'.[46]

The majority of theses defended by the Vātsīputrīyas should also be attributed to the Sammatīyas.

According to Tāranātha, the Avantaka school had disappeared by the seventh century.[47] Only the Kaurakulaka school survived until the time of the Pāla kings (ninth and tenth centuries).[48] The whole system of this last school was influenced by the Mahāyāna from the seventh century on, when Tāranātha records their teacher at that time to be Vimuktasena, born near Jvālaguhā, between Madhyadeśa and the south.[49]

41. Ibid., thesis 5. Through lack of a commentary, this thesis remains enigmatic.
42. LVP, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, 2 vols., Paris 1928–29, p. 43.
43. Ibid., p. 48.
44. Ibid., p. 67.
45. Ibid., p. 71.
46. LVP, *Kośa* IX, p. 295, n. 4.
47. Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte*, p. 175.
48. Ibid., p. 274.
49. Ibid., p. 138.

CHAPTER 21

The Dharmottarīyas

All the traditions agree in considering these as the first of the schools to emerge from the Vātsīputrīyas. According to the sources from the northwest, they would have appeared in the middle of the third century EN.

Their name means 'those who are superior (*uttara*) with regard to the Teaching (*dharma*)'. According to Kuiji, they took their name from their teacher Dharmottara, who was purportedly a Vinaya-master, or else, having a transcendental (*lokottara*) teaching (*dharma*), they were superior (*uttara*) to beings (*sattva*), hence their name: superior with regard to the Teaching.[1] The *Mañjuśrīparipṛcchāsūtra*[2] and Bhavya (first list) also assert that their name came from their founder Dharmottara, Vinaya-master.

According to Paramārtha, the Dharmottarīyas were one of four subschools which completed the Abhidharma-piṭaka of the Vātsīputrīyas, also called *Śāriputrābhidharma* or *Dharmalakṣaṇābhidharma* in nine parts, with treatises (*śāstra*), by relying on the meaning of the Sūtras.[3]

The Sammatīya tradition cited by Bhavya classes them alongside the Bhadrayānīyas, in the subgroup of Mahāgiriyas, those who reside in the great mountains (*mahāgiri*).

Inscriptions from the second century CE attest their presence in Karle, Soparaka and Junnar,[4] in the mountains of the Bombay region, which should doubtless be identified with the Mahāgiris just mentioned.

1. Kuiji, II, p. 6b.
2. T 468, p. 501b.
3. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 23 and 58.
4. Hultzsch, *Ep. Ind.* VII, pp. 54–5; Lüders, *Ep. Ind.* X, Appendix, Nos. 1094, 1095, 1152; Burgess, *ASWI* IV, pp. 91–3.

We know little of their doctrine. According to Bhavya, they upheld the same thesis as the Bhadrayānīyas, that is:

In birth (*jāti*) there is ignorance (*avidyā*) and birth; in cessation (*nirodha*) there is ignorance and cessation.

Due to lack of a commentary, it is difficult to interpret this proposition, which seems very banal for Buddhism.

According to Vasumitra, they taught a special interpretation of the following stanza:

Being already delivered, one falls again.
The fall comes from craving; one returns again.
Having attained the place of calm joy, there is happiness.
If one follows the practices of happiness, there is perfect happiness.

Kuiji, in his commentary, specifies their opinion on this point: the arhat has dharmas of regression (*parihāni*), of stability (*sthiti*) and of progress; the first two lines concern regression, the third stability and the last progress.[5]

5. Kuiji, III, pp. 29b–30a. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* VI, pp. 253 ff.

CHAPTER 22

The Bhadrayānīyas

All the sources agree in considering the Bhadrayānīyas as one of the schools which emerged from the Vātsīputrīyas, and always name them in second place, immediately after the Dharmottarīyas. According to the sources from the northwest, they would have appeared in the middle of the third century EN.

Their name means 'those whose way (*yāna*) is happy (*bhadra*)'.[1] According to Kuiji, Bhadra was the name of the school's teacher, and *yāna* meant descent, posterity. He interprets the translation used by Xuanzang in this way: *xian zhou* 賢胄. According to him, we should therefore understand [the name as]: [spiritual] descent of the Arhat Bhadra.[2]

Paramārtha tells how the Bhadrayānīyas were one of the four subschools that completed the Abhidharma-piṭaka of the Vātsīputrīyas, also called *Śāriputrābhidharma* or *Dharmalakṣaṇābhidharma* in nine parts, with treatises (*śāstra*), by relying on the meaning of the Sūtras.[3]

The Sammatīya tradition cited by Bhavya classes them, alongside the Dharmottarīyas, in the subgroup of the Mahāgiriyas, that is, those who reside on the great mountains (*mahāgiri*).

Inscriptions from the second century CE testify to their presence in Nāsik and Kanheri, in the mountains located in the Bombay region,[4] which are doubtless the Mahāgiris just mentioned.

1. Bhavya, first list.
2. Kuiji, II, p. 6b.
3. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 23 and 58.
4. Hultzsch, *Ep. Ind.* VIII, pp. 61–2, 67; Lüders, *Ep. Ind.* X, 1912, Appendix, Nos. 987, 1018; Burgess, *ASWI* IV, pp. 110–11.

We know very little about their doctrine. According to Bhavya, they upheld the same thesis as the Dharmottarīyas, that is:

In birth (*jāti*) there is ignorance (*avidyā*) and birth; in cessation (*nirodha*) there is ignorance and cessation.

According to Vasumitra, they had a special interpretation of the following stanza:

> *Being already delivered, one falls again.*
> *The fall comes from craving; one returns again.*
> *Having attained the place of calm joy, there is happiness.*
> *If one follows the practices of happiness, there is perfect happiness.*

Kuiji, in his commentary, specifies the opinion of the Bhadrayānīyas on this point: the first two lines apply to the arhats, who can therefore regress; the third line concerns the Pratyekabuddhas, and the last line the buddhas themselves.[5]

Finally, the *Kathāvatthu* attributes one thesis to them:

Clear comprehension (*abhisamaya*) of the Four Truths (*sacca*) and fruits (*phala*) is progressive (*anupubbena*).[6]

5. Kuiji, III, p. 30a. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* VI, p. 267 and n. 2.
6. *Kathāvatthu* II, 9. See thesis 4 of the Andhakas.

CHAPTER 23

The Ṣaṇṇagarikas or Ṣaṇḍagiriyas

All the traditions are in agreement in considering these as the last school to emerge from the Vātsīputrīyas. According to the sources from the northwest, they appeared towards the middle of the third century EN

Their name means 'those of the six (*ṣaṣ*) towns (*nagara*)'. This is often interpreted, particularly in Chinese, as *ṣaṇḍagiriya*, 'those who reside on the mountain (*giri*) of bushes (*ṣaṇḍa*). The *Mañjuśrīparipṛcchāsūtra*, which refers to the latter form, interprets it as due to the name of their residence.[1] Kuiji interprets the form translated by Xuanzang, school of the mountain of the dense forest, by saying that the Ṣaṇḍagiriyas took their name from their teacher's place of residence, a thick forest with luxuriant vegetation, located near a mountain.[2]

According to Paramārtha, the Ṣaṇṇagarikas were one of the four subschools which completed the Abidharma-piṭaka of the Vātsīputrīyas, also called *Śāriputrābhidharma* or *Dharmalakṣaṇābhidharma* in nine parts, with treatises (*śāstra*), by relying on the meaning of the Sūtras.[3]

The Sammatīya tradition cited by Bhavya states that opinion was divided on the question of knowing whether the Ṣaṇṇagarikas pertained to the Sammatīyas or the Mahāgiriyas (Dharmottarīyas and Bhadrayānīyas).

We know nothing of their geographical sphere. Doubtless they resided in western India with the other schools of the same group.

Only Vasumitra and Kuiji supply us with a little information on their doctrine. They had a special interpretation of the following stanza:

1. T 468, p. 501b.
2. Kuiji, II, p. 7a.
3. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 23 and 58.

Being already delivered, one falls again.
The fall comes from craving; one returns again.
Having attained the place of calm joy, there is happiness.
If one follows the practices of happiness, there is perfect happiness.

According to Kuiji, they interpreted it as follows: there are six kinds of those beyond training (*aśaikṣa*), that is, arhats, who are respectively characterised by regression (*parihāṇi*), thinking (*cetanā*), protection (*anurakṣaṇā*), stability (*sthitā*), analysis (*prativedhanā*) and imperturbability (*akopya*)[4]; he who is already delivered is the second; he who can regress is the first; he who falls back into craving because of his regression is the third; he who returns is the fourth; the third line concerns the fifth, and the last line the sixth.[5]

4. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* VI, pp. 251 ff.
5. Kuiji, III, p. 30b.

CHAPTER 24

The Sarvāstivādin Vaibhāṣikas

The Sarvāstivādins are, together with the Theravādins, the two schools about which we know the most. The Sarvāstivādins have transmitted to us, particularly through their Chinese and Tibetan translations, all their Tripiṭaka as well as their main postcanonical works, the whole constituting a mine of information of inestimable value.

They broke away from the Sthavira trunk after the Haimavatas and Vātsīputrīyas. Although the data on the problem of their origin are extremely confused, a certain number of indications tend to place the schism which gave rise to them in the reign of Aśoka, in 244 or 243 BCE, following the council held in Pāṭaliputra presided over by a certain Maudgalayāyana or Moggaliputta and which rejected the theory of *sarvāstivāda* in the name of orthodoxy.

Their name means 'those who teach that everything (i.e., particularly the past, future and present) exists (*sarvam asti*)' and so proves that they derive their origin from the specific defence of this thesis.

According to Paramārtha, on the death of Kātyāyanīputra, the Sthaviras split into two schools: the Sthaviras and the Sarvāstivādins. 'The reason for this schism was that the Sthāvirīya school propagated the Sūtras only; it took the Sūtras as the right norm' while 'the Sarvāstivādin school, in contrast, professed that there was nothing superior to the Abhidharma, and propagated that Basket to the detriment of the other two' [tr].[1] Kuiji cites another explanation: the schism was due to the fact that certain Sthaviras had by then rejected the five theses of Mahādeva.[2] However, the two explanations are of little worth since they rely on the Sarvāstivādin tradition represented by Vasumitra and which classes all the Sthaviras, the Haimavatas only excepted, among the Sarvāstivādins. We have seen that this is a grossly inaccurate claim.[3]

1. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 53–4.
2. Kuiji, II, p. 4a.

Their history is not well known to us, despite their abundant literature. It is only with the greatest difficulty that we can extract from the vast collection of legends which have been bequeathed to us a few elements which might be of certain historical value.

Profiting from the expansion of the Aśokan empire, and doubtless also because of the Sarvāstivādins' defeat at the Council of Pāṭaliputra,[4] one of them, Madhyāntika, went to convert Kashmir,[5] which became their main centre for a thousand years. This Madhyāntika was a disciple of Ānanda and at first belonged to the community in Mathurā.[6] The region of Mathurā and even the upper basin of the Ganges and Yamunā between that town and Sthāneśvara always remained a residence of the Sarvāstivādins, but they were not alone. In the middle of the second century CE, they widely benefited from the generosity of the famous King Kaniṣka. Inscriptions dating from the latter's reign confirm this fact.[7] At that time, the Sarvāstivādins were present in the region of Peshawar, western Kashmir, Mathurā and Śrāvastī, one of the holy towns of Buddhism. It was then, as these inscriptions inform us, that the Sarvāstivādin Tripiṭaka was completed. Legend places under Kaniṣka a council, no doubt peculiar to the Sarvāstivādins, at which was fixed either their Abhidharma-piṭaka or the enormous commentary on the latter, the *Vibhāṣā*.[8] The latter text tells us itself that it was compiled quite a long time after Kaniṣka's reign. La Vallée Poussin in fact remarks that the earliest account that we have of this council does not name the king in whose reign it took place and from this deduces that it is [tr.] 'probable that the king did not convene a council and that there was no council'. It is possible that this council was a gathering peculiar to the Sarvāstivādins held in Kashmir in the first or the beginning of the

3. See above, part one, ch. 1.
4. As is suggested by the account in the *Vibhāṣā*, T 1545, pp. 511c–512a.
5. Przyluski, *Concile de Rājagṛha*, pp. 2–3, 46–61, 339–42; *Mahāvaṃsa* XII, beginning.
6. Ibid., pp. 50–3, 56–60.
7. Konow, *Kharoṣṭhī Inscriptions*, pp. 48–9, 137, 145, 155; Hultzsch, *Ep. Ind.* III, pp. 181, 176, 177, 179.
8. Cf. LVP, *L'Inde aux temps des Maurya*, pp. 326–8, which gives the references; Przyluski, *Concile de Rājagṛha*, p. 206.

second century CE[9] and in which was fixed the canon of that school. This gathering would be the counterpart, among the Sarvāstivādins of Kashmir, of the assembly held under King Vaṭṭagāmani of Ceylon and during which (about the year 15 BCE) the Tripiṭaka of the Sinhalese Theravādins was fixed. According to Paramārtha, it was Kātyāyanīputra who presided over the Council of Kashmir. The later Kashmirian tradition ascribes to Vasumitra the control of compiling the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. We have no means of verifying these two assertions. One fact is certain: since a small, clearly postcanonical Abhidharma treatise had been translated by An Shigao in the mid-second century CE,[10] at that time the compilation of treatises of this kind had already been going on for some time. We would not be too wrong in moving to the first century CE the fixing of the Sarvāstivādin Tripiṭaka. The *Vibhāṣā* attributed to Kātyāyanīputra[11] may date from about the year 100, and the *Mahāvibhāṣā* attributed to Vasumitra, the layout of which is completely different and represents an enormous volume, might date from around the year 200.[12]

The *Mahāvibhāṣā* often cites the names and doctrines of several Sarvāstivādin masters, thus supplying with regard to them a *terminus ad quem*. They are especially Pārśva, Vasumitra, Ghoṣaka, Buddhadeva, Dharmatrāta and another scholar who is designated only by his title of Bhadanta.[13] Others are cited more rarely: Kuśavarman, Ghoṣavarman, Drava, Dharadatta, Dharmanandin, Dhārmika Subhūti, Pūrṇāṣa, Bakkula, Vāmaka, Śamadatta, Saṃghavasu, Buddharakṣita. Among them, there are many who were influenced to a greater or lesser degree by the Sautrāntikas.[14] The *Mahāvibhāṣā* also tells us that in the second century there were several different, more or less dissident, schools among the Sarvāstivādins: the orthodox Yuktavādins; the Abhidharmācāryas, that is, those who understand faultlessly the meaning of the Abhidharma-piṭaka and are opposed to the heretical Sautrāntikas;

9. Since the inscriptions at Sārnāth and Śrāvastī mention, in the third year of Kaniṣka's reign, the Tripiṭaka of the Sarvāstivādins. Cf. Hultzsch, note above.

10. T 1557. The state of the language used by the translator leaves no doubt as to the period in which he lived.

11. T 1547. Translated into Chinese in 383 by Saṃghabhūti.

12. T 1546, partly translated into Chinese by Buddhavarman and Daotai in 439; T 1545, translated in full by Xuanzang in 658–59.

13. Cf. LVP, *Kośa*, Introduction, pp. xliii–li, and index.

14. Cf. ch. 26 below.

the Kaśmīrācāryas, masters of the Kashmir school; the Gandhārācāryas, masters of the Gandhāra school, who should perhaps be identified with the Pāścātīyas, those of the West, and with the Bahirdeśakas, the foreigners. For the Sarvāstivādins also, in consequence, geographical dispersion was one of the main causes of the division.

At an unknown date between the beginning of the Common Era and the year 400[15] lived successively three masters who worked on a treatise entitled *Abhidharmasāra* or *Abhidharmahṛdaya:* Dharmaśrī, Upaśānta and Dharmatrāta. If the last should indeed be identified with the Dharmatrāta so often cited in the *Mahāvibhāṣā,* as was thought, not without excellent reason, by La Vallée Poussin, these three scholars must have therefore lived between the years 0 and 200 CE, which is not at all impossible.

We know nothing precise about the history of these masters. Confused and even contradictory legends and traditions that mention them do not enable us to grasp the least historical indication about them. It can be supposed that, in certain cases, there were several eminent personages bearing the same names: several Vasumitras, several Dharmatrātas, several Vasubandhus, etc.

If we are, it seems, a little better informed about the personality of Vasubandhu, who was born in Puruṣapura, now Peshawar, at the heart of the main centre of the Sarvāstivādins, and lived for a long time in Ayodhyā, on the borders of Madhyadeśa and Magadha, also Sarvāstivādin centres but less exclusive than the first, the period in which he lived is still problematical. Two dates are proposed: 300–350 or 420–500, and it must be admitted that arguments for and against one or the other are equally possible.[16] Vasubandhu, who had undergone certain Sautrāntika influences, is the author of the famous treatise entitled *Abhidharmakośaśāstra.* This extremely important work at first aroused strong criticism from the orthodox Saṃghabhadra, who wrote two voluminous treatises in order to refute it, the *Nyāyānusāraśāstra* and the *Abhidharmakośaśāstrakārikāvibhāṣya,* and who was supposedly a con-

15. Cf. LVP, *Kośa*, Introduction, pp. lxiii–lxvii. Dharmatrāta's work, the most recent of the three, was translated into Chinese in 433.

16. Cf. ibid., pp. xxiv–xxviii, which summarises the discussion and gives references. Also see Frauwallner, *On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu*, which distinguishes between two Vasubandhus, the second, born about 400 in a place unknown, being the Sarvāstivādin master.

temporary of Vasubandhu. Later, the *Abhidharmakośaśāstra* was commented upon by Guṇamati, Yaśomitra, Pūrṇavardhana, Śamathadeva and Sthiramati. At the beginning of the fourth century in Nālanda, Guṇamati wrote the *Lakṣaṇānusāraśāstra,* which is inspired by the *Abhidharmakośaśāstra.* Towards the end of his life Guṇamati settled in Valabhī, in Gujerat, where he had Sthiramati as a pupil. The latter was the master of Pūrṇavardhana, who taught the Sarvāstivādin doctrine to Jinamitra and Śīlendrabodhi. In the fifth century also lived Vasuvarman, author of the *Cahuḥsatyaśāstra,* who followed Vasubandhu's doctrinal line strictly.

When Xuanzang visited India in the second quarter of the seventh century, he noted the presence of Sarvāstivādins in many places: 300 monks in Tamavāsana (Sialkot region), 500 in Matipur (southeast of Sthāneśvara), 500 in Navadevakula (near Kanauj), 200 in Ayamukha (between Ayodhyā and Prayāga), 2,000 in Vārāṇasī, 200 near Nālandā, 1,000 in Iraṇaparvata (east of Nālandā), 100 in Bhilmal (north of Gujerat) for India proper; 2,000 in Kashmir, 5,000 in Kucha, 1,000 in Bāluka, 300 in Gaz Darah (between Balkh and Bāmiyān), 500 in Khabandha and 1,000 in Wusa (Pamir), 1,000 in Kashgar and a few in Niya. This barely represents 16,000 monks living in some 300 monasteries, of which only 5,000 monks and 50 monasteries are for India proper. However, we should add that Xuanzang does not always specify, far from it, the schools to which the monks he met on his way belonged. It is almost certain that the 5,000 living in 100 monasteries, the existence of which he notes in Kashmir, were Sarvāstivādins. There must also have been a good share of Sarvāstivādins among the 2,000 undefined monks in Jālandhāra, the 700 in Sthāneśvara, the 1,000 in Śrughna, the 2,000 in Mathurā, the 10,000 in Kanauj, the 3,000 in Ayodhyā, the thousands in Nālandā, the 1,000 in the land of the Vṛjjis, the 2,000 in Nepal, the 3,000 in Puṇyavardhana. Yijing's evidence, half a century later, enables us to confirm this. In such a short time, the situation could not have changed much and, if Xuanzang notes the presence of 17,000 Sammatīya monks in the Ganges Basin, whereas Yijing considers the Sarvāstivādins to be the most numerous in that region, we would certainly not be far wrong in assigning the number of approximately 20,000 to the Sarvāstivādins living in that part of India in the middle of the seventh century. It is not without sadness that Xuanzang notes the devastation of two of the main Sarvāstivādin strongholds, Gandhāra and Uḍḍiyāṇa: nearly all the inhabitants are non-Buddhists, there are there the ruins of some 2,500 deserted monasteries in

which perhaps 30,000 monks had formerly lived.[17] The decadence, due to causes hard to discern, was rapid since Songyun, who crossed the region 110 years before, saw it then in all the splendour of triumphant Buddhism.[18]

At the end of the seventh century, Yijing established the geographical breakdown of the Sarvāstivādins as follows: the north, that is, Kashmir and neighbouring regions, is their virtually exclusive stronghold; they are the most numerous in Magadha, i.e., in the higher and middle Ganges Basin; they are found alongside other schools in the east, i.e., Bengal; they have a few representatives in the west, i.e., Gujerat and Mālva; and in the south, in Deccan. They are in a clear majority in the Sunda Islands [Indonesia] and the whole of southern China, and a few are to be encountered in Champa.

We have very little information on the ultimate fate of the Sarvāstivādins in India. According to Tāranātha, they were still represented at the time of the Pāla kings (ninth and tenth centuries) by the Mūlasarvāstivādin school.

In China, the translation of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośaśāstra* by Xuanzang in 651–54 provoked the appearance of a new school which took that text as its basis and therefore merited being considered as a Chinese branch of the Sarvāstivādins. It flourished until the end of the ninth century, then declined and disappeared rapidly because its doctrine was too scholastic and dry for Chinese taste.[19] Its only noteworthy representative was Puguang, a disciple of Xuanzang, who compiled a commentary on the *Abhidharmakośaśāstra* between 650 and 655 in Changan. This school was introduced into Japan in 658 by the Chinese monks Jizu and Jitazu but it has also disappeared from that country long since.[20]

According to certain later texts, the Sarvāstivādins had as teacher Rāhula or Rāhulabhadra, their language was Sanskrit, their emblems an *utpala* lotus flower, a *padma* lotus flower, a jewel and a tree-leaf. They wore a cloak made up of twenty-five to twenty-nine or nine to twenty-five bands of fabric. Their names ended in preference with *-mati, -śrī, -prabhā, -kīrti* and *-bhadra.*[21]

According to other, older works, the Sarvāstivādins were distinguished

17. Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels* I, pp. 199–230.
18. Chavannes, "Voyages de Song-Yun dans l'Udyāna et le Gandhāra," pp. 1–63, here pp. 30–43.
19. Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism* III, pp. 314–15; Eliot, *Japanese Buddhism,* p. 173.
20. Eliot, *Japanese Buddhism,* p. 212.
21. Lin, *Aide-Mémoire,* pp. 176–8, 181 and 197–201.

for their erudition and perspicacity, and they propagated the Buddhist teaching widely. Their robes were black or dark red.[22]

Yijing informs us about some particular usages of the Sarvāstivādins. They cut the bottom of their cloak in a straight line. Each monk benefited from an individual cell. They received alms-food directly into their hands (that is, into the alms-bowl they held in their hands). They wore their outer robe by drawing the flaps from both sides together. It was made of a piece of fabric five cubits in length by two in width, in silk or linen.[23] Describing in particular the usages of the Sarvāstivādins of whom he was part, Yijing gives still much more information concerning them.

The literature of the Sarvāstivādins is well known to us, since Chinese and Tibetan translations have preserved their most important works for us.

Their Tripiṭaka is composed as follows [see figure on p. 175].

The most important works corresponding to those which form the Pāli *Khuddhakanikāya* also existed, but they were not classed in the canon. There also exist collections of *Jātakas* and *Avadānas*, a *Dharmapada* and an *Udānavarga*, without counting other works lost today. We would merely point out the *Avadānaśataka, Divyāvadāna, Aśokāvadāna*, which are most especially linked with the Mūlasarvāstivādin school whose enormous Vinaya-piṭaka includes many narratives of that order.

The literature of the large canonical commentaries is also well represented. If it is reduced to a single quite short work with regard to the Vinaya,[24] we possess two different *Vibhāṣās* commenting on the Abhidharma-piṭaka.[25] The most important of the two, an enormous collective work, full of valuable information concerning the doctrines of the various Sarvāstivādin and other schools, is precisely a commentary on the *Jñānaprasthānaśāstra*. Its doctrinal importance was such that it represented the surest criterion of orthodoxy and gave its name to the most orthodox of the Sarvāstivādins, the Vaibhāṣikas.

Alongside these works, canonical in nature, we have a whole series of various treatises the doctrinal nuances of which are of real interest in the history of ideas. They can be classed by group.

22. T 1465, p. 900c; T 1470m p. 925c; Lin, *Aide-Mémoire*, pp. 80–1.
23. Takakusu, *Record of the Buddhist Religion*, pp. 7, 66, 75.
24. T 1440.
25. T 1547, and T 1545 and 1546.

I	Vinaya-piṭaka[1] (10 recitations)	(1–3) *Prātimokṣa* (4) *Saptadharma* (5) *Aṣṭadharma* (6) *Kṣudrakaparivarta* (7) *Bhikṣuṇīvinaya* (8) *Ekottaradharma* (9) *Upāliparipṛcchā* (10) *Kuśalaparivarta*
II	Sūtra-piṭaka[2] (4 *āgamas*)	(1) *Dīrghāgama* (2) *Madhyamāgama* (3) *Saṃyuktāgama* (4) *Ekottarāgama*
II	Abhidharma-piṭaka[3] (6 *pādas*)	(1) *Jñānaprasthāna* (2) *Saṅgītiparyāyapāda* (3) *Dharmaskandhapāda* (4) *Prajñaptipāda*[4] (5) *Vijñānakāyapāda* (6) *Dhātukāyapāda* (7) *Prakaraṇapāda*

1. T 1435 to 1439 and 1441.
2. There are four complete *Āgamas* and more than two hundred diverse sūtras in Chinese. The *Dīrghāgama* and the *Ekottarāgama* are not of Sarvāstivādin origin. As for the other two, it is impossible to say to which school they could have belonged.
3. T 1536 to 1544.
4. Tanjur-Mdo, vol. LXII, 2 and 3.

The oldest of these is undoubtedly the one which is represented by three short treatises entitled *Pañcavastu* or *Pañcadharma*, one of which is attributed to Dharmatrāta while the other two are anonymous.[26] One of the latter dates at the latest from the second century CE.[27] All three deal with the classification of phenomena (*dharma*) in five classes peculiar to the Sarvāstivādins: thought (*citta*), mental factors (*caitta*), dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayukta*), form (*rūpa*) and the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*).

A second group consists of the *Abhidharmasāras* or *Abhidharmahṛdayas*

26. T 1555, 1556, 1557.
27. T 1557.

by Dharmaśrī, Upaśanta and Dharmatrāta.[28] These are medium-length treatises all compiled on the same level and containing ten chapters: elements (*dhātu*), conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*), actions (*karman*), latent tendencies (*anuśaya*), career of the noble ones (*ārya*), knowledges (*jñāna*), concentrations (*samādhi*), sūtras, mixtures (*saṃyukta*) and treatises (*śāstra*).

Along with these two groups, we note three isolated treatises. One bears the name of Vasumitra, is of medium length and, in fourteen chapters, deals with different Abhidharma questions.[29] The *Abhidharmāmṛtarasa* by Ghoṣa, quite short despite its sixteen chapters, is of the same type as the preceding one.[30] The *Abhidharmāvatāraprakaraṇā* by Skandhila, Saṃghabhadra's teacher, is shorter and deals in a very concise way with greatly varying Abhidharma problems.[31]

A separate place must be reserved for the *Lokaprajñapti,* an undoubtedly very old work which is a Buddhist description of the world, with its kingdoms, parks, towns, hells, cataclysms, etc.[32]

In the fourth or fifth century is placed the *Abhidharmakośa* by Vasubandhu in its two forms, *kārikās* or verse summary, and *śāstra* or *bhāṣya,* prose development.[33] This work in nine chapters is, thanks to La Vallée Poussin who translated it, too well known for us to stop over it for long. We should cite the abundant literature it inspired and which has been preserved for the most part: commentaries by Guṇamati, Sthiramati, Puṇyavardhana, Yaśomitra,[34] without forgetting the vast *Nyāyānusāra* by Saṃghabhadra who criticises it fiercely.[35]

It only remains to mention the *Catuḥsatyaśāstra* by Vasuvarman, a medium-length treatise dealing with the Four Truths, as its title indicates,[36] and the *Lakṣaṇānusāra* by Guṇamati, much shorter, at least what remains of it, and which discusses the sixteen aspects (*ākāra*) of the Truths[37]

28. T 1550, 1551 and 1552.
29. T 1549.
30. T 1553.
31. T 1554. Tengyur, mdo LXX, 5, and 4 (anonymous commentary).
32. T 1644. Tengyur, mdo LXII, 1.
33. T 1558, 1559, 1560, Tengyur, mdo LXIII and LXIV, 1.
34. T 1561. [Tengyur,] mdo LXV to LXX.
35. T 1562 and 1563. [Tengyur,] mdo LXIV, 2.
36. T 1647.
37. T 1641.

These are the Sarvāstivādin theses:

(1) Everything (*sarva*) exists (*asti*). The past (*atīta*) and future (*anāgata*) really and substantially exist.[38]

This is their fundamental thesis.

The Blessed One said in a sūtra, 'O monks, if past matter (*rūpa*) were not to exist, the trained holy listener would not be "not taking into consideration" past matter. . . . If future matter were not to exist, the trained holy listener would not be "not taking pleasure" in future matter. It is because future matter exists that the trained holy listener . . .'. And again: 'Consciousness (*vijñāna*) arises because of two things. What are those two? The faculty of sight (*cakṣurindriya*) and the visible (*rūpa*), the mind (*manas*) and things (*dharma*)'. It is in fact impossible that, in one and the same person (*pudgala*), two thoughts (*citta*) exist at the same time, in particular that of the object (*ālambana*) to be cognised and that of the agent of consciousness. Consequently, one would be past when the other appears and the latter will still be future at the moment the first arises. If, therefore, past and future things were not to exist, there could be no encounter between the agent of consciousness and its object, and all consciousness would be impossible. There is consciousness of past and future things, particularly in the act of memorisation and in the act of anticipation, which are current experience. If past and future things were not to exist, that consciousness would be impossible since it would have no object, all consciousness having to have a real existing object. On the other hand, one and the same person cannot simultaneously perform an action (*karman*) and receive the fruit of its fruition (*vipākaphala*). When an action is performed, its fruit of fruition is a future thing and, when the agent receives that fruit, the action which engendered it is a past thing. If past and future things were not to exist, past actions, being nonexistent, could not yield any fruit.

(2) Everything is included (*saṃgṛhīta*) in the name (*nāman*) and form (*rūpa*).[39]

The characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of form is its coarseness (*sthūlatā*). It is easy to know that a substance of that kind should be designated as form. The

38. Vasumitra, thesis 1; Bhavya, thesis 3. LVP, *Kośa* V, pp. 49–65. T 1539, pp. 531a–537a; T 1545, pp. 393a–396b. *Kathāvatthu* I, 6.
39. Vasumitra, thesis 1; Bhavya, thesis 2; Vinītadeva, thesis 1. LVP, *Kośa* III, pp. 94–5; T 1545, pp. 71c–75b.

substance of the other four aggregates (*skandha*) and unconditioned things (*asaṃskṛta*) is subtle (*sūkṣma*), hidden, difficult to know. Because it presents the appearance of a name, it is designated as name.[40]

(3) All the spheres of mental phenomena (*dharmāyatana*) are entirely knowable (*jñeya*), perceptible by consciousness (*vijñeya*) and comprehensible (*abhijñeya*).[41]

Since thought (*citta*) or the mind (*manas*) and mental factors (*caitta*) which form the sphere of mental phenomena, the specific object of the mind, have the same substance (*dravya*) and the same characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*), mental phenomena are entirely knowable, perceptible to consciousness and comprehensible.

(4) The characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of birth (*jāti*), decline (*vyaya*), duration (*sthiti*) and impermanence (*anityatā*), as well as that which is dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayukta*), are included (*saṃgṛhīta*) in the aggregate of mental formations (*saṃskāraskandha*).[42]

The characteristics of conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*), existing really and being conditioned themselves, should therefore be included in the aggregates, as well as things dissociated from thought. Since neither of them can be classed in any of the other four aggregates, they are therefore included in the aggregate of mental formations.

(5) Conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*) are of three kinds: past (*atīta*), future (*anāgata*) and present (*pratyutpanna*).[43]

The three times are conditioned because they arise by reason of causes (*hetu*) and conditions (*pratyaya*) and because they perform an activity.

(6) Unconditioned things (*asaṃskṛta*) are of three kinds: cessation by means of acquired knowledge (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*), cessation without acquired knowledge (*apratisaṃkhyānirodha*), space (*ākāśa*).[44]

40. Kuiji, III, p. 11b.

41. Vasumitra, thesis 3. T 1537, p. 500c; T 1541, p. 646b–c; T 1542, p. 713c; T 1545, p. 976c.

42. Vasumitra, thesis 3. LVP, *Kośa* I, pp. 29, 40. T 1545, p. 198b.

43. Vasumitra, thesis 4. LVP, *Kośa* I, pp. 11–12; T 1545, pp. 74b, 85b, 190a, 393a, 479a, 919a.

44. Vasumitra, thesis 4; Vinītadeva, thesis 3. LVP, *Kośa* I, pp. 7–11; T 1537, p. 505a; T 1541, p. 627a; T 1542, p. 694a–b; T 1545, p. 65a.

(7) The characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*) are distinct and exist really and substantially.[45]

There are four (and not three, as Vasumitra and Bhavya claim) characteristics of conditioned things: arising (*utpāda*), duration (*sthiti*), decline (*vyaya*) or changing (*anyathatva*), and impermanence (*anityatā*) or cessation (*nirodha*). Each of them really exists, is itself conditioned and endowed with a distinct own-nature.

(8) The Truth (*satya*) of Cessation (*nirodha*) is unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), but the other three Truths are conditioned (*saṃskṛta*).[46]

The Truth of Cessation, being identical to Nirvāṇa, that is, to *pratisaṃkhyānirodha,* is unconditioned. The other three Truths are not so.

(9) Clear comprehension (*abhisamaya*) of the Four Noble Truths (*āryasatya*) is progressive (*anupūrva*).[47]

The Blessed One said in a sūtra, 'There is, O householder, progressive clear comprehension of the Four Noble Truths, but not a single clear comprehension (*ekābhisamaya*). He, O householder, who would speak thus: "Without having clearly comprehended (*anabhisametya*) the Noble Truth of Suffering, I shall clearly comprehend (*abhisameṣyāmi*) the Noble Truth of the Origin. . . . I shall clearly comprehend the Noble Truth of the Path which leads to the cessation of suffering" should not speak in that way. For what reason? It is as inadequate (*asthāna*) and impertinent (*anavakāśa*) to say: "Without having comprehended . . ." as to say, O householder: "Without having established (*apratiṣṭhāpya*) the foundations (*mūlapada*) of the top storey (*kūṭāgāra*) or of a room located on the top storey (*kūṭāgāraśālā*), I shall establish (*pratiṣṭhāpayiṣyāmi*) the walls (*bhitti*). Without having established its walls, I shall establish its ceiling (*talaka*). Without having established the ceiling, I shall establish its roof (*chadana*)". That should not be said'. And again: 'He who would speak thus: "Not having climbed (*anabhiruhya*) the first flight (*prathamasopānakaḍevara*) of a stairway (*sopāna*) with four flights (*catuḥkaḍevara*), I shall climb (*abhirokṣyāmi*) the second (*dvitīya*). Not having climbed the second . . ." should not speak in that way. For what

45. Vasumitra, thesis 4; Bhavya, thesis 5. LVP, *Kośa* II, pp. 226 ff; T 1545, p. 198a–c.

46. Vasumitra, thesis 4. T 1536, p. 392a; T 1545, pp. 34c, 985b.

47. Vasumitra, thesis 5; Bhavya, thesis 6. LVP, *Kośa* VI, pp. 185–8, and VII, p. 31. T 1545, pp. 533a–b and 405a–406a. *Kathāvatthu* II, 9. See thesis 4 of the Andhakas.

reason? It is as inadequate and impertinent to say . . .'. And again: 'Hence, even here, there is no reason (*sthāna*) for one, not having seen (*adṛṣṭvā*) the Truth of Suffering, to see (*drakṣyati*) the Truth of the Origin. . . . Noble Ānanda spoke thus: "What then, O Venerable One, is progressive clear comprehension of the Truths? Just as, O Ānanda, he who would say: "Not having climbed the first (*prathama*) step of stairs (*niḥśreṇīpāda*) of a stairway (*niḥśreṇī*) with four steps (*catuṣpadikā*), I shall climb onto the terrace (*prāsāda*) . . .", because of the variety of aspects (*ākāra*) of the Four Truths, it is impossible to maintain that clear comprehension has occurred at a single time since "one does not see the origin, etc., under the aspects of suffering". Furthermore, clear comprehension does not consist only in seeing the common natures of the Truths as their aspect of impersonality (*anātmākāra*), but in seeing the own-natures of each one, and that at all stages of the Path "since one cultivates the Truths in the same way that one has seen them"'.

(10) By relying on the concentrations (*samādhi*) on the empty (*śūnya*) and the wishless (*apraṇihita*) together, one can enter the certainty of rightness (*samyaktvaniyāma*).[48]

Both concentrations concern the aspects (*ākāra*) of the Truth of Suffering (*duḥkhasatya*). The concentration on the empty has as its object the two empty and impersonal (*anātman*) aspects and the concentration on the wishless the two impermanent (*anitya*) and painful (*duḥkha*) aspects. Consequently, when one relies on these two concentrations, one concentrates on the four aspects of the Truth of Suffering and one thus enters the Path of Deliverance.

(11) By meditating on desire (*kāma*), one can enter into the certainty of rightness (*samyaktvaniyāma*).[49]

(12) When one has entered the certainty of rightness (*samyaktvaniyāma*), at the moment of the first fifteen arousals of thought (*cittotpāda*), one is called 'orientated' (*pratipanna*), at the sixteenth thought one is called 'fruit of abiding' (*sthitiphala*).[50]

With regard to the Truth of Suffering, one successively arouses: (1) acquiescence in the knowledge of the Teaching (*dharmajñānakṣānti*), concerning the suffering of the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*), and which is the entry into the certainty of rightness; (2) knowledge of the Teaching (*dharmajñāna*), having the same object; (3) acquiescence in the subsequent knowledge (*anvayajñānakṣānti*), concerning the suffering of the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) and the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*); (4) subsequent knowledge (*anvayajñāna*), having the same object. It is the same for the other three Truths, therefore sixteen thoughts in all. However, the sixteenth thought is not part of the path of vision (*darśanamārga*) since there is nothing more to be seen that has not already been seen. It concentrates on the Truth which it has seen, and therefore is part of the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*).

48. Vasumitra, thesis 6; Bhavya, thesis 7. LVP, *Kośa* VIII, pp. 184–95; T 1545, pp. 538a ff.

49. Vasumitra, thesis 7. LVP, *Kośa* VI, pp. 195 and 232.

50. Vasumitra, thesis 6; Bhavya, thesis 8. LVP, *Kośa* VI, pp. 179 ff. and 191 ff.

(13) The supreme worldly dharmas (*laukikāgradharma*) are a single thought-moment (*ekakṣaṇikacitta*). The supreme worldly dharmas are fixed (*niyata*) and are free of regression (*parihāṇī*), while the three preparatory things (*prayoga*) are subject to regression.[51]

(14) The streamwinner (*srotāpanna*) is not subject to regression (*parihāṇī*), but the arhat is subject to regression.[52]

(15) Not all the arhats obtain the knowledge of non-arising (*anutpādajñāna*).[53]

Only the imperturbable (*akopya*) arhat, he who is not subject to regression (*parihāṇī*), obtains the knowledge of non-arising. The other five arhats, being susceptible to regression, cannot obtain it.

(16) The worldling (*pṛthagjana*) can abandon desire (*kāma*) and ill-will (*vyāpāda*).[54]

By means of the worldly path (*laukikamārga*) one can also abandon certain latent tendencies (*anuśaya*). It is said in a sūtra that Udraka Rāmaputra, one of the worldly teachers whom the Buddha frequented before the Awakening, had abandoned the defilements (*kleśa*) of the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*), of the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) and of the first three stages of the

51. Vasumitra, thesis 7. LVP, *Kośa* VI, pp. 163–79. T 1545, pp. 20b–22c. Too long a discussion and impossible to summarise here.

52. Vasumitra, thesis 8; Bhavya, theses 4 and 10. LVP, *Kośa* VI, pp. 251–7. T 1545, pp. 931b, 933 ff. *Kathāvatthu* I, 2. See thesis 13 of the Vātsīputrīyas.

53. Vasumitra, thesis 9. LVP, *Kośa* VI, p. 240.

54. Vasumitra, thesis 10; Bhavya, thesis 11. T 1545, pp. 264b, 741c.

formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*) and that he was reborn in the sphere of neither perception nor nonperception (*naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana*).

(17) Heretics (*tīrthika*) can obtain the five superknowledges (*abhijñā*).[55]

(18) There is pure conduct (*brahmacaryā*) among the gods (*deva*).[56]

(19) In seven attainments (*samāpatti*) the limbs of Awakening (*bodhyaṅga*) can be obtained, not in the others.[57]

These seven attainments are the four absorptions (*dhyāna*) and the three lower formless (*ārūpya*) attainments. In the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) and in the higher formless attainment, there are no limbs of Awakening or limbs of the Path (*mārgāṅga*) because, in those two places, the pure (*anāsrava*) Path does not exist. The higher formless attainment is never pure, because of the weakness of extremely subtle perception (*saṃjñā*) which exists there alone and which prevents meditating on the Path.

(20) All the absorptions (*dhyāna*) are fully included (*saṃgṛhīta*) in the applications of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*).[58]

The components of the penetration (*nirvedhabhāgīya*) of preparation (*prayoga*) for the Path (*mārga*) are the applications of mindfulness. The path of vision (*darśanamārga*) is, by its nature, the application of mindfulness concerning things (*dharmasmṛtyupasthāna*). The applications of mindfulness are wisdom (*prajñā*) by nature, contribute thereby to Awakening (*bodhi*) and are part of the essential limbs (*aṅga*) of the absorptions.

(21) Without relying on the absorptions (*dhyāna*) one can enter the certainty of rightness (*samyaktvaniyāma*) and also obtain the fruit of holiness (*arhattvaphala*).[59]

The bodhisattvas and Pratyekabuddhas enter the certainty of rightness by relying directly on the fourth absorption and all or part of the four components of penetration (*nirvedhabhāgīya*). The bodhisattvas do not enter the attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*) before attaining Awakening (*bodhi*).

(22) If one relies on the body (*kāya*) of the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) and

55. Vasumitra, thesis 11; Bhavya, thesis 12. LVP, *Kośa* VII, pp. 97–100.

56. Vasumitra, thesis 12; Bhavya, thesis 13.

57. Vasumitra, thesis 13. LVP, *Kośa* VI, pp. 290 ff; VIII, pp. 144–5 and 181–2. T 1545, pp. 497b and 321b ff.

58. Vasumitra, thesis 13. LVP, *Kośa* VI, pp. 153–61 and 283–9. T 1545, pp. 945 ff.

59. Vasumitra, thesis 13. LVP, *Kośa* II, pp. 205 ff; IV, pp. 220–31; VI, pp. 175–7; VIII, pp. 192–5. T 1545, pp. 33a–b and 417c.

the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*), although one can experience (*sākṣītkuryāt*) the fruit of holiness (*arhattvaphala*), one cannot enter the certainty of rightness (*samyaktvaniyāma*). If one relies on the body of the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*), not only can one enter the certainty of rightness, but one can also experience the fruit of holiness.[60]

In the realm of form and the formless realm, one can arouse knowledge (*jñāna*) but not acquiescence (*kṣānti*), one can arouse subsequent knowledge (*anvayajñāna*) but not the knowledge of things (*dharmajñāna*) and, furthermore, one does not feel suffering (*duḥkha*) there. For all these reasons, when one dwells in those higher realms, one cannot enter the Path of Deliverance. Conversely, if one has already entered them in a former existence, one can continue to progress there until the acquisition of the fruit of holiness. It is only in the realm of desire that the conditions necessary to entry on the Path are realised.

(23) The inhabitants of Uttarakuru do not possess detachment (*virāga*) and the noble ones (*ārya*) are not born there. Neither are they born among the nonperceptive gods (*asaṃjñideva*).[61]

Uttarakuru is the northern continent in Buddhist cosmology. Its inhabitants live in perfect happiness, without undergoing any suffering for which to feel disgust, which would incite them to become detached from the passions. The nonperceptive gods are the gods of the fourth level of the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) corresponding to the fourth absorption (*dhyāna*). During their extraordinarily long and nonperceptive lives, they cannot exhaust the fruition of their former good actions without becoming detached from the world and progressing on the Path.

(24) The four fruits of the religious life (*śrāmaṇyaphala*) are not necessarily obtained gradually. If one has already entered the certainty of rightness (*samyaktvaniyāma*), by relying on the worldly path (*laukikamārga*) one experiences (*sākṣītkaroti*) the fruits of once-returning (*sakṛdāgāmiphala*) and nonreturning (*anāgāmiphala*).[62]

He who has entered the certainty of rightness is immediately destined to any one of the first three fruits according to the number of fetters (*saṃyojana*)

60. Vasumitra, thesis 14; Bhavya, thesis 15. T 1545, p. 33c.

61. Vasumitra, thesis 15. T 1545, p. 33b–c. LVP, *Kośa* VI, p. 174; IV, pp. 104, 182–3, 205. Kuiji, III, p. 17a.

62. Vasumitra, thesis 16. LVP, *Kośa* VI, p. 243. T 1545, p. 278b.

that he has already severed formerly by means of the worldly, that is, non-Buddhist, path. If he has not severed any fetter or has severed one to five of them, he is destined to the fruit of streamwinning (*srotāpanna*). If he has severed six to eight fetters before entering the certainty of rightness, he is immediately destined to the fruit of once-returning. If he has previously abandoned the defilements of the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) or the other realms including the sphere of nothingness (*ākiñcanyāyatana*), he is immediately destined to the fruit of nonreturning. Hence the new convert does not lose the benefit of efforts accomplished before his conversion.

(25) The four applications of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*) can include all things (*dharma*).[63]

It is said in a sūtra, 'All things, that is precisely the four applications of mindfulness'. The four applications of mindfulness are, in fact, the body (*kāya*), feeling (*vedanā*), thought (*citta*) and things (*dharma*), that is, everything that can serve as an object for the mind (*manas*).

(26) All the latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) are wholly mental factors (*caitta*) associated with thought (*cittasaṃprayukta*), and endowed with an object (*sālambana*).[64]

(27) All the latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) are included in full in the obsessions (*paryavasthāna*), but the obsessions are not all included in the latent tendencies.[65]

(28) The nature (*bhāva*) of the links (*aṅga*) of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) is necessarily conditioned (*saṃskṛta*).[66]

Since dependent origination is included in the triple realm of which it is the fundamental law, it can only be conditioned like it. Furthermore, if it is in basing oneself on the certainty of its nature that one can prove the unconditioned character of dependent origination, one should therefore also acknowledge as unconditioned form (*rūpa*), the four great elements (*mahābhūta*), the aggregates (*skandha*), etc., since each of them always keeps its own-nature. In fact they are notoriously conditioned. Therefore, dependent origination is conditioned.

63. Vasumitra, thesis 17. LVP, *Kośa* VI, pp. 158–62. T 1545, pp. 936c–937a.
64. Vasumitra, thesis 18. LVP, *Kośa* V, pp. 4 ff. T 1545, pp. 257b. 110a–b.
65. Vasumitra, thesis 19. LVP, *Kośa* V, pp. 73, 81, 89–91.
66. Vasumitra, thesis 20. LVP, *Kośa* III, pp. 77–8. T 1545 p. 116c.

(29) The links (*aṅga*) of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) also function in an arhat.[67]

It is easy to show that certain links of dependent origination, such as consciousness (*vijñāna*), feeling (*vedanā*), name and form (*nāmarūpa*), the six sense spheres (*saḍāyatana*), contact (*sparśa*), play a role in the life of an arhat.

(30) For an arhat there is an increase (*vardhana*) of meritorious actions (*puṇyakarman*).[68]

When an arhat has performed an action engendering merit, he does so in such a way that, through the power of meditation and mental concentration, that action yields a fruition (*vipāka*), not of enjoyment (*bhoga*) in another existence, since he should not be reborn, but in life (*āyus*), that is, by increasing the present life[-span].

(31) It is only in the realms of desire (*kāmadhātu*) and of form (*rūpadhātu*) that there is an intermediate existence (*antarābhava*).[69]

The intermediate being which effects the passage from one existence to another is formed, like every living being, of the five aggregates (*skandha*). Its existence is demonstrated by the fact that there can be no discontinuity in time and space between the place and moment of death and those of rebirth, and therefore the two existences belonging to the same series must be linked in time and space by an intermediate stage. The intermediate being is the Gandharva whose presence is necessary at conception, as are the fertility and union of the parents. Furthermore, the Antarāparinirvāyin is an Anāgāmin who reaches Parinirvāṇa during the intermediate existence. As for a great criminal, guilty of one of the offences of immediate fruition (*ānantarya*), he all the same passes through an intermediate existence in the terms of which he will necessarily be reborn in the hells.

(32) The five kinds of sense-consciousness (*vijñāna*) are endowed with craving (*sarāga*) and devoid of detachment (*avirāga*).[70]

(33) The five kinds of sense-consciousness (*vijñāna*) only assume their self-nature (*svalakṣaṇa*) and have no discrimination (*vikalpa*).[71]

67. Vasumitra, thesis 21. Kuiji, III, pp. 17b–19a.
68. Vasumitra, thesis 22. LVP, *Kośa* II, pp. 120–1. T 1545, p. 656b.
69. Vasumitra, thesis 23. LVP, *Kośa* III, pp. 30–50. T 1545, pp. 352a ff. and 356c ff.
70. Vasumitra, thesis 24; Bhavya, thesis 17, maintains the opposite. LVP, *Kośa* I, p. 58.
71. Vasumitra, thesis 24. LVP, *Kośa* IV, p. 39, and I, pp. 19–20 and 60–61. T 1545, pp. 64–66, 219b and 610a. Kuiji, III, p. 19b.

The five kinds of sense-consciousness are specialised with regard to their respective spheres (*āyatana*) and not with regard to the various substances (*dravya*) which those spheres can contain, for example, blue, yellow, red, etc. They do not assume common characteristics, like mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) which plays a centralising role. They are free from discrimination through determining (*nirūpaṇāvikalpa*), that is, nonrecollected wisdom (*prajñā*), of the sphere of mental consciousness, and discrimination consisting of memory (*anusmaraṇavikalpa*), that is, memory associated with mental consciousness. However, they are endowed with their own discrimination (*svabhāvavikalpa*), that is, reasoning (*vitarka*) and deliberation (*vicāra*).

(34) Things (*dharma*) that are thoughts consisting of (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) really exist. They are endowed with an object (*sālambana*). Own-nature (*svabhāva*) is dissociated from self-nature (*svabhāvaviprayukta*). Thought is dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayukta*).[72]

The first part of the thesis is a corollary of *sarvāstivāda* (thesis 1). Thought and mental factors having objects, their activity is efficient. Thought is dissociated from thought because in one and the same body two thoughts cannot occur together.

(35) There is a worldly (*laukika*) right view (*samyagdṛṣṭi*).[73]

Worldly right view is wisdom (*prajñā*) associated (*saṃprayukta*) with good (*kuśala*) but impure (*sāsrava*) mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*).

(36) The five faculties (*indriya*) of faith (*śraddhā*), etc., are as much worldly (*laukika*) as transcendental (*lokottara*).[74]

(37) There are undefined (*avyākṛta*) things (*dharma*).[75]

Like the majority of the schools of the Small Vehicle, the Sarvāstivādins admit the existence of undefined things, that is, neither good (*kuśala*) nor bad (*akuśala*) and not bearing any fruit.

(38) The arhats also have things (*dharma*) which do not belong to either trainees or the trained (*naivaśaikṣanāśaikṣa*).[76]

72. Vasumitra, thesis 25. LVP, *Kośa* II, p. 177. T 1545, pp. 270–1.

73. Vasumitra, thesis 26; Bhavya, thesis 16. LVP, *Kośa* I, pp. 80–1.

74. Vasumitra, thesis 26. LVP, *Kośa* II, pp. 118–20. T 1545, p. 7c. See thesis 189 of the Theravādins.

75. Vasumitra, thesis 27. LVP, *Kośa* I, pp. 53 ff.; IV, pp. 31, 35, 105–6, etc. T 1541 and 1542, passim.

76. Vasumitra, thesis 28. LVP, *Kośa* I, pp. 6–7 and 58; VII, pp. 24–5.

Those things are impure (*sāsrava*) things.

(39) The arhats acquire the absorptions (*dhyāna*) but do not manage to manifest them clearly.[77]

It is by means of the four basic attainments (*maulasamāpatti*) that the arhats dispel the defilements. As soon as they are on the Path of Deliverance (*vimuktimārga*), they acquire the basic absorptions. However, they cannot manifest them in a distinct way, or examine them in depth and know to which precise class they pertain.

(40) The arhats receive the fruition (*vipāka*) of their former actions (*pūrvakarman*).[78]

The arhats and even the buddhas continue to experience the effects of their former actions.

(41) There are worldlings (*pṛthagjana*) who die with a good (*kuśala*) thought (*citta*).[79]

(42) When one is dwelling in concentration (*samādhi*) one does not die.[80]

(43) The deliverances (*vimukti*) of the buddhas and their disciples are identical, but the three vehicles (*yāna*) each have their own distinctive characteristics.[81] The good-will (*maitrī*) and compassion (*karuṇā*), etc., of the buddhas do not take beings (*sattva*) as an object (*ālambana*).[82]

Since beings do not exist as persons (*pudgala*) but as unstable groups of aggregates (*skandha*), the good-will, compassion, etc., of the buddhas cannot be directed at the beings themselves but at the series of impermanent aggregates which are wrongly designated as beings.

(44) As long as they are attached to existence (*bhava*), beings (*sattva*) cannot obtain final deliverance (*vimukti*).[83]

This, it seems, is a corollary of the rejection of personalism (*pudgalavāda*).

(45) The bodhisattvas are necessarily worldlings (*pṛthagjana*), since their fetters (*saṃyojana*) are not yet abandoned (*prahīṇa*). As long as they have not

77. Vasumitra, thesis 28. LVP, *Kośa* VIII, pp. 166 ff. T 1545, p. 822c. Kuiji, III, p. 20a.

78. Vasumitra, thesis 28. T 1545, p. 655a–b. Kuiji, III, p. 20a–b.

79. Vasumitra, thesis 29. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* II, pp. 133–6; III, p. 133. No demonstration is given.

80. Vasumitra, thesis 30. LVP, *Kośa* III, p. 132.

81. Vasumitra, thesis 31. T 1545, pp. 162a–c and 735b–c.

82. Vasumitra, thesis 31. T 1539, pp. 543c–545b.

83. Vasumitra, thesis 31.

entered the certainty of rightness (*samyaktvaniyāma*), they have not gone beyond (*samatikrāmanti*) the land of worldlings (*pṛthagjanabhūmi*).[84]

(46) Beings (*sattva*) are only a designation (*prajñapti*) of the series (*saṃtati*) of successive existences (*bhava*).[85]

(47) All conditioned things (*saṃskāra*) cease at every instant (*kṣaṇika-niruddha*).[86]

(48) Nothing transmigrates (*saṃkramati*) from this world (*asmāllokāt*) to another world (*paraṃ lokaṃ*). To say that a person (*pudgala*) transmigrates is just a way of speaking. As long as life lasts, conditioned things (*saṃskāra*) are reunited. When there is cessation without remainder (*aśeṣanirodha*), the aggregates (*skandha*) cease to transform themselves (*pariṇamanti*).[87]

(49) There are transcendental (*lokottara*) absorptions (*dhyāna*).[88]

The four pure (*anāsrava*) basic absorptions (*mauladhyāna*) are called transcendental.

(50) Reasoning (*vitarka*) can be pure (*anāsrava*).[89]

In the first pure absorption, reasoning exists.

(51) The good (*kuśala*) is a cause of existence (*bhavahetu*).[90]

It is because of the fruition of good actions that one is reborn among the various gods.

(52) In the state of concentration (*samādhi*), there is no vocal utterance (*vacibheda*).[91]

(53) The Eightfold (*aṣṭāngika*) Noble Path (*āryamārga*) is the Wheel of the Teaching (*dharmacakra*). When they speak, the Tathāgatas do not always set the Wheel of the Teaching turning.[92]

(54) The Buddha cannot teach all things (*dharma*) with a single sound (*svara*).[93]

84. Vasumitra, thesis 32. LVP, *Kośa* II, p. 206; III, pp. 129–30. T 1545, p. 780a–c.
85. Vasumitra, thesis 33. LVP, *Kośa*, ch. IX. T 1539, pp. 537a–547c. Bhavya, thesis 1.
86. Vasumitra, thesis 34. LVP, *Kośa* IV, p. 4.
87. Vasumitra, thesis 35. LVP, *Kośa*, ch. IX. T 1539, pp. 537a–547c.
88. Vasumitra, thesis 36, LVP, *Kośa* VIII, pp. 146 ff. and 170–3. T 1545, pp. 820–821. Kuiji, III, p. 22a.
89. Vasumitra, thesis 37. LVP, *Kośa* VIII, p. 147. T 1545, p. 219.
90. Vasumitra, thesis 37. Kuiji, III, p. 22a. T 1545, p. 820c.
91. Vasumitra, thesis 38. T 1545, p. 929c. Kuiji, III, p. 22a–b. No demonstration is mentioned.
92. Vasumitra, thesis 39. T 1545, pp. 911b–913a. LVP, *Kośa* VI, pp. 245–9.
93. Vasumitra, thesis 40.

(55) Not all the words (*vāc*) of the buddhas conform to the meaning (*yathārtha*).[94]

(56) All the sūtras that the Buddha has expounded do not have an entirely explicit meaning (*nītārtha*). The Buddha himself said that there are sūtras whose meaning is not explicit.[95]

(57) The streamwinner (*srotāpanna*) and the once-returner (*sakṛdāgāmin*) do not obtain the absorptions (*dhyāna*).[96]

In fact, they have not yet abandoned desire (*kāma*).

(58) Concentration (*samādhi*) is the continuity of thought (*cittasantati*).[97]

Concentration that can last for a very long time without interruption is defined as the continuity of thought during all that time.

(59) The five faculties (*indriya*) of faith (*śraddhā*), etc., are as much impure (*sāsrava*) as pure (*anāsrava*).[98]

The supreme worldly dharmas (*laukikāgradharma*) have the own-nature (*svabhāva*) of the five faculties. In fact, these supreme worldly dharmas are found in all beings (*sattva*). Consequently, the five faculties are also found in impure beings.

(60) The nature (*bhāva*) of the five faculties (*indriya*) of faith (*śraddhā*), etc., is not exclusively good (*kuśala*).[99]

The five faculties are comingled with other things and have the same support (*āśraya*), same action, same object (*ālambana*), same arising (*utpāda*), same duration (*sthiti*), same cessation (*nirodha*), same fruit (*phala*), same result (*niṣyanda*), same fruition (*vipāka*). In fact, those things are not always good. Therefore, the five faculties are not always good.

(61) The supreme worldly dharmas (*laukikāgradharma*) are included (*paryāpanna*) only in the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*).[100]

They cannot be included in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) since, in the latter, one cannot definitively abandon the impediments (*āvaraṇa*) and fetters (*saṃyojana*). They are not included in the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*),

94. Ibid.
95. Ibid. LVP, *Kośa* III, p. 75; IX, p. 246. Bhavya, thesis 14, says the opposite.
96. T 1545, pp. 693b–c, 719c. Bhavya, thesis 9, says the opposite.
97. *Kathāvatthu* XI, 6.
98. T 1545, p. 7c.
99. Ibid., p. 8b.
100. Ibid., p. 14a ff.

since one should arouse them before entering the absorptive meditations of that realm.

(62) The supreme worldly dharmas (*laukikāgradharma*) last only a single instant (*ekakṣaṇika*).[101]

(63) The belief in a personality (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*) has a real object (*ālambana*), namely the five grasping aggregates (*upādānaskandha*), which it takes for the self (*ātman*) and what pertains to the self (*ātmanya*), and which are real.[102]

(64) A single knowledge (*jñāna*) cannot know all things (*sarvadharma*).[103]

It cannot know its own-nature (*svabhāva*) since it cannot be both its own cause (*hetu*) and its own fruit (*phala*), its own agent (*kartṛ*) and its own effect (*kṛta*), perceiver and perceived, etc. It cannot know things (*dharma*) which are associated (*saṃprayukta*) with it, since they have the same object (*ālambana*) and function at the same time. It cannot know things which are coexistent (*sahabhū*) with it, since their characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) are too close.

(65) It is knowledge (*jñāna*) that knows, and not the person (*pudgala*).[104]

Since a person is pure designation and not a reality, it cannot know anything.

(66) Knowledge (*jñāna*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*) are both constituents of existence (*bhavāṅga*) and constituents of the Path (*margāṅga*).[105]

(67) In one and the same person (*pudgala*), two thoughts (*citta*) cannot occur at the same time.[106]

On the one hand, no person really exists and, on the other, two things cannot be mutual causes of each other.

(68) Knowledge (*jñāna*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*) occur at the same time.[107]

(69) Both eyes (*cakṣus*) together see forms (*rūpa*).[108]

Neither visual consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*) nor wisdom (*prajñā*) can see forms since they do not have the natures of vision (*darśana*). Neither is

101. Ibid., p. 20b ff.
102. Ibid., p. 36a.
103. Ibid., p. 42c ff.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid., p. 44b.
106. Ibid., p. 47b.
107. Ibid., p. 44b.
108. Ibid., p. 61c.

it the combination (eye and visual consciousness) which sees forms, since then one would always see, which is not the case, as experience proves. If a single eye were to see and not both together, there would be no simultaneous sensations.

(70) Names (*nāma*), phrases, letters, etc., really exist and are included (*saṃgṛhīta*) in the aggregate of mental formations (*saṃskāraskandha*) dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayukta*).[109]

(71) Causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*) really exist.[110]

(72) Thought (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) occur simultaneously.[111]

Both rely on the same faculty (*indriya*) and objectify the same objective domain (*viṣaya*). Therefore, they occur simultaneously.

(73) Ignorance (*avidyā*) and speculative views (*dṛṣṭi*) are and are not universal (*sarvatraga*), depending on the case.[112]

(74) Thirst (*tṛṣṇā*), pride (*māna*) and thought (*citta*) are never universal (*sarvatraga*).[113]

(75) The five aggregates (*skandha*) can just as much be causes of fruition (*vipākahetu*) as fruits of fruition (*vipākaphala*).[114]

(76) Matter (*rūpa*), thought (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) and conditioned things dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*) can just as much be causes of fruition (*vipākahetu*) as fruits of fruition (*vipākaphala*).[115]

(77) The cause of fruition (*vipākahetu*) of which the fruit (*phala*) has already ripened really exists.[116]

(78) Things (*dharma*) do not arise or cease without causes (*hetu*).[117]

(79) The thirst for nonexistence (*vibhavatṛṣṇā*) should only be abandoned (*prahātavya*) through cultivation (*bhāvanā*).[118]

(80) The nature (*bhāva*) of thought (*citta*) is not fundamentally clear

109. Ibid., p. 70a.
110. Ibid., pp. 79a, 680c.
111. Ibid., p. 79c.
112. Ibid., p. 90c.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid., pp. 96a, 263c.
115. Ibid., p. 96a.
116. Ibid., pp. 96b, 263c.
117. Ibid., p. 103c.
118. Ibid., p. 138b. Very long discussion based on the interpretation of a sūtra.

(*prabhāsvara*). It is thought freed from craving (*kāma*), hatred (*dveṣa*) and delusion (*moha*) which is delivered.[119]

The defilements (*kleśa*), the nature of which is fundamentally defiled (*kliṣṭa*), and which are associated (*saṃprayukta*) with thought, are not clear [SBW: French, *impures*]. It is not the defilements that defile thought, since they have the same natures as the latter and, since they are not clear, the latter is equally not clear. Furthermore, it should be admitted that thought was clear before being defiled. In that case, how can it be maintained that future thought is fundamentally clear? On the other hand, while craving, hatred and delusion have not been abandoned, thought cannot be delivered.

(81) The three kinds of cessation (*nirodha*) really exist.[120]

(82) Cessation due to impermanence (*anityatānirodha*) is conditioned (*saṃskṛta*).[121]

It is a characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of conditioned things and it is consequently conditioned like them.

(83) Nirvāṇa is defined as not concerning either trainees or the trained (*naivaśaikṣanāśaikṣa*).[122]

Nirvāṇa is not a fruit (*phala*) that can be cultivated, like the Path (*mārga*) or the conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) fruits of trainees (*śaikṣa*) and the trained (*aśaikṣa*).

(84) A dream really exists.[123]

(85) The defilements (*kleśa*) are sometimes bad (*akuśala*), sometimes undefined (*avyākṛta*).[124]

Because they yield undesirable fruits (*phala*), they are called bad. Thirst (*tṛṣṇā*) and ignorance (*avidyā*) can be undefined.

(86) The characteristics of conditioned things (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*) really exist.[125]

(87) The characteristics of conditioned things (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*) are exclusively conditioned (*saṃskṛta*).[126]

119. Ibid., p. 140b–c ff.
120. Ibid., p. 161a. See thesis 86.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid., p. 169a.
123. Ibid., p. 193b. This thesis relies on a collection of sūtras.
124. Ibid., pp. 196a, 259c.
125. Ibid., p. 198a.
126. Ibid., p. 198a.

(88) A single instant (*kṣaṇa*) possesses the three characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of arising (*utpāda*), declining (*vyaya*) and cessation (*nirodha*).[127]

The moments of action are different: at the moment when a thing arises, arising enters into action; at the moment a thing ceases, decline and cessation enter into action. Although the substance only exists for a single moment, activity has one before and one after.

(89) Will (*cetanā*) and mental discussion (*manojalpa*) are mental (*caitta*) things (*dharma*) having-distinct own-natures (*svabhāva*).[128]

Will is action (*karman*): it is mental action (*manokarman*). Mental discussion is wisdom (*prajñā*).

(90) Reasoning (*vitarka*) and deliberation (*vicāra*) are mental (*caitta*) things (*dharma*).[129]

(91) All the knowledges (*jñāna*) objectify an objective domain (*viṣaya*).[130]

(92) The birth-body (*janmakāya*) of the Buddha is impure (*sāsrava*).[131]

If the birth-body of the Buddha were pure (*anāsrava*), it could not cause desire to arise in a woman, hatred in Aṅgulīmāla, pride in Mānaśrabdha, delusion in Uruvilvā Kāśyapa.

(93) The nature (*bhāva*) of worldlings (*pṛthagjana*) is included (*paryāpanna*) in the three realms (*dhātu*). It should be abandoned (*prahātavya*) by cultivation (*bhāvanā*). It is not defiled (*kliṣṭa*). It is included (*saṃgṛhīta*) in the aggregate of mental formations (*saṃskāraskandha*) dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayukta*).[132]

(94) The own-nature (*svabhāva*) of worldlings (*pṛthagjana*) really exists.[133]

(95) Reasoning (*vitarka*) and deliberation (*vicāra*) are found in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) and the first absorption (*dhyāna*). Deliberation alone, without reasoning, is found in the intermediate absorption (*dhyānāntara*). There is no reasoning or deliberation in the three higher absorptions and four formless states (*ārūpya*).[134]

127. Ibid., p. 200a.
128. Ibid., p. 216b ff.
129. Ibid., p. 218c.
130. Ibid., p. 228b.
131. Ibid., pp. 229a, 392a.
132. Ibid., p. 231b.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid., pp. 269c, 462c.

(96) Things (*dharma*) arise together and not necessarily one after the other.[135]

Each one arises because of its own characteristic of arising (*svotpādalakṣaṇa*).

(97) The two fetters (*saṃyojana*) of jealousy (*īrṣyā*) and selfishnesss (*matsara*) exist only in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*).[136]

(98) The nature of conditions (*pratyayatā*) really exists.[137]

If the nature of conditions were not to exist, no thing (*dharma*) would really exist, since the four kinds of conditions (*pratyaya*) include all things.

(99) The fetters (*saṃyojana*) and what can be fettered (*saṃyojanīya*) really exist, but the person (*pudgala*) does not exist.[138]

(100) All things (*sarvadharma*) are included (*saṃgṛhīta*) in their own-nature (*svabhāva*): that is inclusion in the absolute sense (*paramārtha*).[139]

If inclusion in another's nature (*parabhāva*) were in the absolute sense, the own-nature of a single thing would be that of all things. In that case, were a thing to arise, all things would arise, and were a thing to cease, all things would cease, which is not the case.

(101) It is only a defiled (*kliṣṭa*) thought (*citta*) that can ensure the continuity of existence (*bhavasantati*).[140]

When a male being enters the maternal womb, he arouses a thought of love for his mother and a thought of hatred for his father. When a female being enters the maternal womb, she arouses a thought of love for her father and a thought of hatred for her mother. When a bodhisattva enters the maternal womb, he arouses a thought of love indiscriminately for his father and his mother. However, since it is a thought of love [therefore a thought imbued with passion], his thought is defiled. Consequently, in every case, it is the defiled thought that ensures the continuity of existence.

(102) All the defilements (*kleśa*) ensure the continuity of existence (*bhavasantati*).[141]

It is not only love and hatred, but all the defilements which ensure the continuity of existence.

135. Ibid., pp. 270a, 463a, 493c.
136. Ibid., p. 271b.
137. Ibid., p. 283a–b.
138. Ibid., p. 288b.
139. Ibid., pp. 306c, 550a.
140. Ibid., p. 309a.
141. Ibid., p. 309a.

(103) The four fruits of the religious life (*śrāmaṇyaphala*) are as much conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) as unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*).[142]

(104) He who dispels the defilements (*kleśa*) is not reborn in the higher realms.[143]

In order to abandon the lower realms and be reborn in the higher realms, the defilements must be exhausted.

(105) There is matter (*rūpa*) included (*saṃgṛhīta*) in the sphere of mental phenomena (*dharmāyatana*), namely, non-intimation (*avijñapti*).[144]

(106) Vocal sounds (*śabda*) really exist. Images reflected by water or by a mirror really exist.[145]

Both have multiple causes which produce them. Sounds are produced by reason of the lips, teeth, tongue, palate, wind-pipe, etc., which are struck and from which sounds emerge. Images are produced by reason of sunlight or moonlight and from jewels, receptacles, water, etc., on which they are reflected. Being produced by causes, sounds and images really exist.

(107) There is no distinction between the nature of time (*kāla*) and that of conditioned things (*saṃskāra*).[146]

Time is conditioned things, and conditioned things are time. Time is that whose increase reveals conditioned things.

(108) There is no matter (*rūpa*) in the immaterial realm (*ārūpyadhātu*).[147]

(109) Mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) has objects (*ālambana*) similar to or different from those of the five sense-consciousnesses. It also has as objects the internal (*adhyātmika*) faculties (*indriya*) and the other consciousnesses (*vijñāna*).[148]

(110) Thought (*citta*) and the mental factors (*caitta*) evolve together and can mutually act as immediate and equal conditions (*samantarapratyaya*).[149]

Only thought and the mental factors are immediate and equal conditions, since other things do not produce effects that are equal to their causes.

142. Ibid., p. 337a ff.
143. Ibid., p. 355a.
144. Ibid., p. 383b.
145. Ibid., p. 390c.
146. Ibid., pp. 393a, 700a.
147. Ibid., p. 431b ff. LVP, *Kośa* VIII, pp. 135–41.
148. T 1545, p. 449a.
149. Ibid., p. 461b. LVP, *Kośa* II, p. 300.

(111) Acquisitions (*prāpti*) and non-acquisitions (*aprāpti*) really exist.[150]

(112) The Path (*mārga*) is conditioned (*saṃskṛta*).[151]

The Path is cultivated, but the unconditioned cannot be cultivated. Therefore the Path is conditioned.

(113) Pure (*anāsrava*) patience (*kṣānti*) is vision (*darśana*) and not knowledge (*jñāna*).[152]

It is not knowledge since when it is aroused, uncertainty (*vicikitsā*) is not abandoned, while knowledge is only aroused when uncertainty has been abandoned. By nature it is determining, therefore vision.

(114) Impure (*sāsrava*) good (*kuśala*) wisdom (*prajñā*) associated (*saṃprayukta*) with mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) is vision (*darśana*).[153]

It is part of conventional (*saṃvṛti*) right view (*samyagdṛṣṭi*).

(115) The perverse views (*viparyāsa*) are only of four kinds and can only be abandoned (*prahātavya*) by vision (*darśana*).[154]

(116) In one and the same thought (*ekacitta*) there is both knowledge (*jñāna*) and nescience (*ajñāna*), or absence of knowledge (*na jñāna*) and absence of nescience (*nājñāna*), or doubt (*vicikitsā*) and certainty (*niyāma*), or absence of doubt (*na vicikitsā*) and absence of certainty (*na niyāma*), or coarseness (*sthūlatā*) and subtlety (*sūkṣmatā*), or absence of coarseness (*na sthūlatā*) and absence of subtlety (*na sūkṣmatā*).[155]

(117) Beyond will (*cetanā*), the own-natures (*svabhāva*) of bodily actions (*kāyakarman*) and vocal action (*vākkarman*) exist distinctly.[156]

(118) Covetousness (*abhidhyā*), ill-will (*vyāpāda*) and false view (*mithyādṛṣṭi*) do not have the own-nature (*svabhāva*) of action (*karman*).[157]

(119) Not all actions (*karman*) can be reversed.[158]

There are actions which cannot be redeemed by good actions, such as the offences of immediate fruition (*ānantaryakarman*).

150. T 1545, pp. 479b, 550c–562a.
151. Ibid., p. 479c.
152. Ibid., p. 489b. LVP, *Kośa* VII, p. 2.
153. T 1545, p. 502a–b. LVP, *Kośa* VII, p. 3.
154. T 1545, p. 536c. LVP, *Kośa* V, pp. 23 ff.
155. T 1545, p. 547b.
156. Ibid., p. 587a. LVP, *Kośa* IV, p. 136.
157. Ibid., p. 587a. LVP, *Kośa* IV, p. 136.
158. T 1545, pp. 593b, 359b.

(120) Right livelihood (*samyagājīva*) and wrong livelihood (*mithyājīva*) have vocal action (*vākkarman*) and bodily action (*kāyakarman*) as their nature.[159]

Bodily and vocal actions, depending on whether they are good or bad, aroused or not by the passions, constitute wrong livelihood or right livelihood.

(121) Sound (*śabda*) is not a fruit of fruition (*vipākaphala*).[160]

Sound is not a fruit of fruition, 'since speech proceeds from a desire for action'.

(122) When an action (*karman*) is not yet freed from defilements (*kleśa*), neither is its fruition free from defilements.[161]

In that case, their fruition can only be abandoned (*prahātavya*) by cultivation (*bhāvanā*).

(123) Objects created by transformation (*nirmāṇavastu*) really exist.[162]

Here we are concerned more precisely with the transformation bodies that a meditator can produce in cosmic levels other than where he resides.

(124) Contact (*sparśa*) really exists.[163]

If contact did not exist, a link would be missing in the chain of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), and feeling (*vedanā*) would not arise.

(125) Life (*āyus*) does not follow upon thought (*cittānuparivartin*).[164]

Things (*dharma*) which follow upon thought have necessarily the same arising (*ekotpāda*), same duration (*ekasthiti*) and same cessation (*ekanirodha*) with thought. It is, in fact, not so with life.

(126) There is untimely death (*akālamaraṇa*).[165]

There can be untimely death for the beings of the *kāmadhātu* who are not found in the two higher attainments. For them, life (*āyus*) is dependent on the life series (*saṃtānavartin*) and, consequently, when the body is harmed, life is harmed. In contrast, for beings in the *rūpadhātu* and *ārūpyadhātu* and for those in the *kāmadhātu* who are found in the two higher attainments,

159. Ibid., p. 604c. LVP, *Kośa* IV, p. 189.
160. T 1545, p. 612c. LVP, *Kośa* I, pp. 68–70.
161. T 1545, p. 629a.
162. Ibid., p. 696b–c.
163. Ibid., p. 760b.
164. Ibid., p. 770c.
165. Ibid., p. 771a. LVP, *Kośa* II, p. 218.

life is such that once one is born, it lasts. In that case, since the body cannot be harmed, neither can life be harmed. Moreover, one cannot die when one is meditating.

(127) There is no thought (*citta*) in the nonperceptive attainment (*asaṃjñāsamāpatti*).[166]

(128) In the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling (*saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*), all thoughts (*citta*) have ceased (*niruddha*).[167]

(129) All the absorptions (*dhyāna*) have constituents (*aṅga*).[168]

(130) One enters the certainty of rightness (*samyaktvaniyāma*) by meditating on the three kinds of suffering (*duḥkha*): the suffering of suffering (*duḥkhaduḥkhatā*), the suffering of conditioned things (*saṃskāraduḥkhatā*) and the suffering of transformations (*pariṇāmaduḥkhatā*).[169]

(131) The category (*rāśi*) of beings (*sattva*) certain of wrongness (*mithyatvaniyata*) only appear in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*). The category of beings certain of rightness (*samyaktvaniyata*) and that of those who are not certain (*aniyata*) appear in the three realms.[170]

(132) All the fetters (*saṃyojana*) are bad (*akuśala*) in the three realms (*dhātu*).[171]

The Sarvāstivādins abide by the formal teaching of the Buddha.

(133) There is no 'even-headed' (*samaśirsin*) arhat.[172]

(134) There are ten kinds of emptiness (*śūnyatā*): internal (*adhyātma*), external (*bahirdhā*), internal-external (*adhyātmabahirdhā*), conditioned (*saṃskṛta*), unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), without beginning or end (*anavarāgra*), natural (*prakṛti*), undispersed (*anavakāra*), of absolute meaning (*paramārtha*) and of emptiness (*śūnyatā*).[173]

(135) Atoms (*paramāṇu*) are merely dots without mass which do not touch each other.[174]

166. T 1545, pp. 772c, 774a. LVP, *Kośa* II, p. 200.
167. T 1545, p. 775a. LVP, *Kośa* II, p. 203.
168. T 1545, p. 814a. LVP, *Kośa* VIII, pp. 132–3 and 147–61.
169. T 1545, p. 928a. LVP, *Kośa* VI, p. 125.
170. T 1545, p. 930b. LVP, *Kośa* III, pp. 137–8.
171. T 1545, p. 260a–c.
172. Ibid., p. 929b–c.
173. Ibid., pp. 37a and 540a. T 1646, pp. 27a and 347c.
174. LVP, *Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 39; *Kośa* I, pp. 89–92.

(136) Atoms, taken individually (*pratyekaṃ*) but when they are agglomerated (*saṃghaṭita*), are condition as an object (*ālambanapratyaya*) of consciousness (*vijñāna*).[175]

(137) In name and form (*nāmarūpa*), there is a consciousness (*vijñāna*) which is fruition (*vipāka*), consequently undefined (*avyākṛta*) and which is produced by the mental formations (*saṃskāra*), since the latter exist even though they have passed.[176]

(138) Harmlessness (*avihiṃsa*) is not the absence of hatred (*adveṣa*), but it has a separate nature, namely, kindness.[177]

(139) Four characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) are attributed to a moment (*kṣaṇa*).[178]

(140) The matter of bodily intimation (*kāyavijñaptirūpa*) is shape (*saṃsthāna*).[179]

175. LVP, *Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 44.
176. Ibid., p. 218.
177. Ibid., pp. 335–6.
178. Ibid., p. 67.
179. Ibid., p. 48.

CHAPTER 25

The Mūlasarvāstivādins

Their name is unknown to all the old lists (Sinhalese lists, *Śāriputra-paripṛcchāsūtra,* Vasumitra, *Mañjuśrīparipṛcchāsūtra,* the three traditions cited by Bhavya), that is, all the lists consisting of two main trunks and the single list consisting of three trunks. All these lists are prior to the seventh century CE. In the first half of that same seventh century, Xuanzang nowhere mentions the Mūlasarvāstivādins. It is Yijing who, less than half a century later, is the first to speak of them, making them one of the four fundamental schools, having as subdivisions the Mūlasarvāstivādins, Dharmaguptakas, Mahīśāsakas and Kaśyapīyas.[1] However, he also mentions the Sarvāstivādins in such a way that he does not seem to note any difference between them and the Mūlasarvāstivādins.[2] If Vinītadeva, shortly after Yijing, and, later, the authors of the *Bhikṣuvarṣāgraprcchāsūtra,* who adopted the same classification in four trunks, call one of these that of the Sarvāstivādins and not Mūlasarvāstivādins, the latter, to the exclusion of the former, figure among the schools that emerged from that trunk.

Only the Vinaya-piṭaka of this school has come down to us. It is clearly different from that of the Sarvāstivādins, which has also been preserved for us. It is to Yijing that is due the Chinese translation of this immense work,[3] made from copies brought back by him from India. The only Vinaya-piṭaka that the Tibetans possess is also that of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, which was translated into their language by Jinamitra in the reign of Ralpachan, at the beginning of the ninth century CE.[4]

1. Takakusu, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, pp. xxiv, 7, 8, 20, etc.
2. Ibid., pp. 9, 76, 140.
3. T 1442 to 1459. 200 *juan* in all.
4. Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism* III, pp. 379 and 351. Seven works in thirteen volumes in all.

The latter proves that at that time and doubtless in the preceding century, in the part of India that bordered Tibet and with which the latter was in direct contact, that is, Kashmir and the Ganges Basin, the Mūlasarvāstivādin school was clearly predominant. Yijing had already recorded this fact in the last quarter of the seventh century. According to him, the Mūlasarvāstivādins were the most numerous in Magadha, that is, in the Middle Ganges Basin, some were to be found in the west, in Lāṭa and Sindhu, and in the south, they were well represented in the east (Bengal), but they were the only Buddhists in the north (north of Punjab and Kashmir), which had long been the main stronghold of the Sarvāstivādins.[5] They constituted nearly all the Buddhists in the Sunda Islands [Indonesia], and a few were to be found in Champa.[6]

The literary language used by the Mūlasarvāstivādins was Sanskrit, a purer Sanskrit than that employed by the Sarvāstivādins, and this would indicate that the Mūlasarvāstivādin works belonged to a later period than those of the Sarvāstivādins.[7]

However, according to thorough but very partial comparative studies, the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya-piṭaka clearly seems much older than that of the Sarvāstivādins, and even the majority of other Vinaya-piṭakas.[8] Huber and S. Lévi, followed by Przyluski, have on the other hand recognised in our Vinaya-piṭaka the source from which are taken the majority of accounts in the *Divyāvadāna.*[9] To appreciate these facts in full, it should be remembered that if the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya-piṭaka was translated into Chinese in the early years of the eighth century by Yijing, that of the Sarvāstivādins had been done by Kumārajīva at the very beginning of the fifth century, that is, three hundred years earlier. Therefore, in the fourth century at the latest, and doubtless even earlier, the two Vinaya-piṭakas must already have existed together. It is, however, highly improbable, even impossible, that one and the same school would have two different Vinaya-piṭakas. As there is no trace whatsoever of the name of Mūlasarvāstivādins before the end

5. Takakusu, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, pp. xxiv, 8, 9.
6. Ibid., pp. 10 and 12.
7. Lin, *Aide-Mémoire*, pp. 198–201 and 221–2.
8. Przyluski, *Légende d'Açoka*, pp. 23, 68–9, etc.; Hofinger, *Étude sur le concile de Vaiśālī*, pp. 235–41, etc.
9. Przyluski, *Légende d'Açoka*, pp. v–vi, ix, 14, etc.

of the seventh century, it follows that from the fourth century there were two different schools claiming the name of Sarvāstivādins and possessing, if not perhaps two absolutely separate canons, at least two different Vinaya-piṭakas. Moreover, what we know of the history of the Sarvāstivādins and their tendency to split into separate, more or less rivalling, schools,[10] leads us to suppose it was indeed so.

Only Vinītadeva, who does not consider the Sarvāstivādins as a separate school but as a group of schools, informs us about the doctrine of the Mūlasarvāstivādins. This does not essentially differ from that of the Sarvāstivādins. Here are the theses:

(1) All conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*) are included (*saṃgṛhīta*) in the three times, name (*nāman*) and form (*rūpa*).[11]

(2) Those that do not pertain to the sixth [the sphere of mental phenomena (*dharmāyatana*)], and unconditioned things (*asaṃskṛta*) are knowable (*jñeya*) and perceptible by consciousness (*vijñeya*).[12]

(3) There are three kinds of unconditioned things (*asaṃskṛta*).[13]

(4) The defilements (*kleśa*) are endowed with sameness.[14]

(5) The munis are of two kinds. For them, the sacred texts (*pravacana*) and the faculties (*indriya*) are barely material (*rūpin*).[15]

(6) Paying homage (*pūjā*) to a sanctuary (*caitya*) yields a great fruit (*mahāphala*).[16]

(7) With regard to the abandonment (*prahāna*) of the bad destinies (*durgati*) by the Bodhisattvas, it is said that there is a wish (*icchā*) of two kinds.[17]

(8) Merit (*puṇya*) accomplishes the accumulation (*saṃbhāra*) of the Path (*mārga*).[18]

10. Cf. the preceding chapter.
11. Vinītadeva, thesis 1. See thesis 2 of the Sarvāstivādins.
12. Ibid., thesis 2. See thesis 3 of the Sarvāstivādins, which seems contradicted here, but the negation seems to be faulty.
13. Ibid., thesis 3. See thesis 6 of the Sarvāstivādins.
14. Ibid., thesis 4. The meaning of this thesis remains enigmatic.
15. Ibid., thesis 5.
16. Ibid., thesis 6.
17. Ibid., thesis 7.
18. Ibid., thesis 8.

CHAPTER 26

The Sautrāntikas or Saṅkrāntivādins

All the sources agree in considering these as a school that emerged belatedly from the Sarvāstivādins. The sources from the northwest make them the last of the classic schools to appear and place their origin in the fourth century EN.

The *Śāriputraparipṛcchāsūtra* distinguishes the Sautrāntikas from the Saṅkrāntivādins just as it distinguishes the Kāśyapīyas from the Suvarṣakas, but all the other sources have them as identical.

According to Paramārtha, they taught that the five aggregates (*skandha*) pass on (*saṅkrānti*) from one existence to another, hence their name of Saṅkrāntikas, and only cease if the Path is cultivated. Since they only recognised the authority of the Sūtra-piṭaka, they were also called Sautrāntikas.[1]

The various versions used by the translators of Vasumitra's treatise give some further information. According to the version by Xuanzang, they revered Ānanda as their master. According to the Qin version, their founder was called Uttara. According to the Tibetan version, they were called Uttarīyas because they were superior (*uttara*) with regard to the Teaching (*dharma*).

Bhavya (first and third lists) confirms that the Saṅkrāntivādins were also called Uttarīyas, from the name of their founder Uttara, a dissident Sarvāstivādin teacher.

Tāranātha states that the Saṅkrāntivādins, Uttarīyas and Tāmraśatīyas are one and the same school.[2]

1. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 23 and 63.
2. Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte*, p. 273.

La Vallée Poussin has shown that the Dārṣṭāntikas, often denounced as heretics in the *Vibhāṣā,* are probably Sautrāntikas.[3]

Kuiji repeats the traditions cited by Paramārtha and adds some information on the origin of the school. A master known as Pūrṇa especially elaborated the Abhidharma and Vinaya. A reaction followed among certain monks who broke away, taking as their head Ānanda, the great sūtra-master.[4]

We know nothing of their domain, apart from the fact that Xuanzang found in Śrughna, near Sthāneśvara, a master who taught him the Sautrāntika doctrine.[5]

Neither do we know anything about their literature.

Vasumitra says that the Sautrāntikas' doctrine was very close to that of the Sarvāstivādins.

These are the theses attributed to them:

(1) The five aggregates (*skandha*) pass on (*saṃkrānti*) from one existence to another.[6]

(2) Beyond the Path (*mārga*), there is no definitive cessation (*nirodha*) of the aggregates (*skandha*).[7]

This is a corollary of the first thesis.

(3) The person (*pudgala*) does not exist in the absolute sense (*paramārtha*).[8]

Although Vasumitra states the contrary, here it is Bhavya who must be right. In fact, the *pudgalavādin* doctrine is well known, but it is always attributed to the Vātsīputrīyas and Sammatīyas, and never to the Sautrāntikas. Yet the last are well known to the Sarvāstivādins. If they did indeed maintain this opinion, as is claimed by Vasumitra, Vasubandhu and Saṃghabhadra on the one hand, the *Vibhāṣā* on the other would not have failed to inform us of it in long passages in their works in which they denounce the *pudgalavāda* while attributing it officially to the Vātsīputrīyas, as does the *Kathāvatthu*

3. LVP, *Kośa*, introduction, pp. lii–lv.
4. Kuiji, II, pp. 9b–10a.
5. Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels* I, p. 321.
6. Vasumitra, thesis 1; Bhavya, thesis 1; Vinītadeva, thesis 1.
7. Vasumitra, thesis 2; Bhavya, thesis 2; Vinītadeva, thesis 3.
8. Bhavya, thesis 4; Vasumitra, thesis 5, says the opposite, as does Vinītadeva, thesis 1 of the Vibhajyavādins, who immediately follow the Saṅkrantivādins.

and *Satyasiddhiśāstra.*[9] Furthermore, this thesis would uselessly reinforce the first one, which is sufficient to explain the mechanism of the fruition of actions. Kuiji comments on this passage by Vasumitra by distinguishing this thesis from that of the Sammatīyas, etc., who maintained that the *pudgala* is neither identical to nor different from the *skandhas.*[10]

(4) The aggregates (*skandha*) have a root and an end (*mūlānta*). The aggregates have only one taste (*ekarasa*).[11]

According to Kuiji, a persisting subtle (*sūkṣma*) mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) would ensure the continuity of the aggregates, constitute their root and end and would communicate to them that single taste.[12]

(5) In the state of worldling (*pṛthagjana*) there are also noble things (*āryadharma*).[13]

(6) The four aggregates (*skandha*) are fixed in their own-nature (*svabhāva*).[14]

Through lack of a commentary, the meaning of this proposition remains unknown. It should perhaps be compared with number 4 above, the first four aggregates being determined by the fifth, the aggregate of consciousness (*vijñānaskandha*) which, identical to mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*), would constitute their own-nature.

(7) The aggregates (*skandha*) are endowed with basic faults (*mūlāpatti*).[15]

Without a commentary, it is not possible to discover the true meaning of this thesis. According to the *Abhidharmakośaśāstra,* the basic faults (*maulī āpatti*) are those able to cause a lapsing (*patanīya*) of dignity in a monk, that is, lack of chastity, major theft, manslaughter and mendacity with regard to the supernormal powers.[16] Are we to understand that, as long as the aggregates have not been definitively destroyed, one is subject to committing these faults?

9. LVP, *Kośa*, ch. IX. Saṃghabhadra: T 1562 and 1563, ch. IX; *Vibhāṣa,* T 1545, pp. 288b, 42a–b, 110b: *Kathāvatthu* I, 1; *Satyasiddhiśāstra,* T 1646, p. 259a. *Vibhāṣā*, p. 288b, attributes to the Dārṣṭāntikas the thesis in the terms of which the *pudgala* is fictitious.
10. Kuiji, III, p. 48a–b.
11. Vasumitra, thesis 3.
12. Kuiji, III, p. 47a–b. Cf. also LVP, *Kośa*, Introduction, pp. lii, liv.
13. Vasumitra, thesis 4.
14. Vinītadeva, thesis 2.
15. Bhavya, thesis 3.
16. LVP, *Kośa* IV, p. 92 and n. 2.

(8) All (*sarva*) is impermanent (*anitya*).[17]

This confirms thesis 3 above.

(9) Unconditioned things (*asaṃskṛta*) do not really exist.[18]

Unconditioned things are not real and distinct entities, but pure absences. Space is the absence of the tangible (*spraṣṭavya*). *Pratisaṃkhyānirodha* or Nirvāṇa is the absence of latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) and existence (*bhava*) acquired with the aid of wisdom (*prajñā*). *Apratisaṃkhyānirodha* is the absence of the arising of future things obtained through the absence of causes and independently of the power of wisdom.

(10) Past (*atīta*) and future (*anāgata*) things (*dharma*) do not really exist.[19]

If they were really to exist, conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*) would always exist and would therefore be eternal, which is not so.

(11) Acquisitions (*prāpti*) do not really exist.[20]

They are in fact not perceived either directly or through their effects. The two theories by means of which the Sarvāstivādins explained the mechanism of the fruition of action are therefore refuted.

(12) The mechanism of the fruition of action is explained by the theory of the seeds (*bīja*).[21]

The seed (*bīja*) is the collection of the five aggregates (*skandha*) able to yield a fruit either immediately or after a certain time, thanks to the series: 'The series (*saṃtati*) consists of the *saṃskāras* of the past, present and future, in relation to causality, which constitute an uninterrupted series. *Pariṇāma,* or the evolution of the series, consists of modification (*anyathātva*) of the series, the fact that the series arises differently by itself at each moment. *Viśeṣa,* or the culminating point of this evolution, consists of the moment of the series which possesses the ability to yield the fruit immediately'.

(13) There are only four characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*), enduring being one with modification (*sthityanayathātva*).[22]

17. Bhavya, thesis 5.
18. LVP, *Kośa* II, pp. 278–87.
19. Ibid. V, pp. 49–50.
20. Ibid. II, pp. 181 ff.
21. Ibid. II, pp. 183–5.
22. Ibid. II, pp. 223–4.

The sūtra to which they refer mentions only three characteristics,[23] as Vasubandhu acknowledges.

(14) Non-intimation (*avijñapti*) does not really exist.[24]

In fact, *avijñapti* 'consists only of no longer performing an action after having been engaged in doing it; . . . is a thing that exists because of past great elements . . . past dharmas in fact no longer exist; . . . *avijñapti* does not have the nature of *rūpa* . . .' since it is 'unresisting' (*apratigha*).

(15) The life faculty (*jīvitendriya*) does not really exist.[25]

'It is a certain power that the act of a former existence places in the being at the moment of conception, a power by means of which, at a determined time, the *skandhas* will renew themselves in that long homogenous series that constitutes an existence (*nikāyasabhāga*)'.

(16) Bodily action (*kāyakarman*) does not really exist.[26]

'Bodily action is action whose object is the body . . . : that is, will (*cetanā*) which sets the body in motion . . . in various ways: it proceeds by relying on that gateway which is the body, and it is therefore called bodily action'.

(17) The eye (*cakṣus*) does not see forms (*rūpa*).[27]

'There is neither an organ that sees nor a visible that is seen; there is no seeing action there, no agent who sees; it is just a play of causes and effects'.

(18) Thought (*citta*) and the body (*kāya*) endowed with its organs (*indriya*) are mutually seeds (*bīja*).[28]

'When a person is born in the Ārūpyadhātu, *rūpa,* or matter, is cut off for a long period: if that person is later reborn in the Kāmadhātu or the Rūpadhātu, his new *rūpa* does not proceed from the series of *rūpa* interrupted long before, but indeed from the thought prior to the attainment: it is born from "a body endowed with organs" (*sendriyakāya*)'.

(19) There is no coexistent cause (*sahabhūhetu*).[29]

23. T 99, p. 83c. *Aṅguttaranikāya* III, 47; PTS I, p. 152 [Ed. A. K. Warder, 2nd ed. *Aṅguttara-Nikāya,* London: Pali Text Society, 1961]; *Kathāvatthu* I, 1.
24. LVP, *Kośa* IV, p. 14.
25. Ibid. II, pp. 215–7.
26. Ibid. IV, p. 12.
27. Ibid. I, p. 86.
28. Ibid. II, p. 212. LVP, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi,* pp. 183 and 207: the aggregates (*skandha*) are pervadable (*vāsya*) and bear seeds (*bīja*).
29. LVP, *Kośa* II, p. 253.

The relationship between cause and effect is only noted when the cause is prior to the effect, never when it is coexistent with the effect.

(20) Unconditioned things (*asaṃskṛta*) are not causes (*hetu*).[30]

The sūtras in fact teach that causes (*hetu*) and conditions (*pratyaya*) are impermanent (*anitya*) and, consequently, conditioned (*saṃskṛta*).

(21) The omniscience (*sarvajñāna*) of the Buddha is employed by direct realisation (*sākṣātkāra*) of all things, including those of the past and the future, and not by deduction or divination.[31]

(22) For immaterial (*arūpin*) beings, the mental series of thought (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) has no point of support outside itself.[32]

Thought and mental factors support each other. The mental series of a new existence is 'projected' by a cause and, if the latter is devoid of attachment to form, the mental series is reborn and will exist without a relationship with form.

(23) A figure (*saṃsthāna*) is not a distinct thing in itself (*anyad dravyaṃ*), but only a designation (*prajñapti*).[33]

If a figure were a thing in itself, it would be perceived by two organs. In fact, a figure is part of form (*rūpa*) which is defined as the particular object of the eye. Since numerous figures are seen in a complex figure, there would therefore be several forms (*rūpa*) in one and the same place, which is impossible. There are no atoms of figure.

(24) Will (*cetanā*) is not a mental action (*manaskarman*).[34]

There is no mental action outside covetousness (*abhidhyā*), ill-will (*vyāpāda*) and false views (*mithyādṛṣṭi*).

(25) An atom has mass, it consists of spatial division (*digbhāgabheda, digvibhāga*). Atoms touch each other and collide because of their mass (*digdeśabheda-pratighāta*).[35]

(26) Condition as a quality of object (*ālambanapratyaya*) consists of agglomerated (*saṃghaṭita*) atoms (*paramāṇu*).[36]

30. Ibid. II, pp. 277–87.
31. Ibid. II, pp. 304–5.
32. Ibid. III, p. 6.
33. Ibid. IV, pp. 8–11.
34. Ibid. IV, pp. 169–70 and 136.
35. LVP, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 39.
36. Ibid., p. 43.

When visual consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*) cognises colour (*varṇa*), it is not assailed by the atoms, but only by their agglomeration, since it takes on the aspect of that agglomeration (*tadākāratvāt*): one sees a mass of blue, not blue atoms.

(27) The four characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) are attributed to the moment (*kṣaṇa*) and to a certain prolonged state.[37]

(28) The six evolving consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*) are seeds (*bīja*).[38]

(29) Mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*), in the subtle (*sūksma*) state, subsists in the attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*).[39]

(30) The five sense-consciousnesses (*vijñāna*) have no simultaneous (*sahabhū*) support (*āśraya*). It is a previous moment of the sense organ (*indriya*) that engenders subsequent consciousness. It is the same for mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*).[40]

(31) There is, among the nonperceptive gods (*asaṃjñideva*), no evolving belief in a self (*ātmagrāha*), but the seeds (*bīja*) of belief in a self dwell in the state of nonperception. Therefore, that state contains a belief in the self.[41]

(32) Concentration (*samādhi*) is not a separate thing but thoughts that have a single object (*cittāny evaikālambanāni*), since the Sūtra says that of the three trainings (*śikṣā*), the training on higher thought (*adhicittaṃ śikṣā*) is concentration of thought [one-pointedness of mind] (*cittaikāgratā*).[42]

37. Ibid., p. 67.
38. Ibid., p. 117.
39. Ibid., pp. 142, 202–3 and 211; p. 207 says the opposite, very probably wrongly (cf. theses 18 and 22 above).
40. Ibid., p. 282.
41. Ibid., p. 284.
42. Ibid., p. 313; *Kośa* VIII, p. 129.

CHAPTER 27

The Dārṣṭāntikas

Although, as La Vallée Poussin remarks,[1] the Dārṣṭāntikas seem to be identical to the Sautrāntikas, which is asserted by Tāranātha,[2] it is perhaps more prudent to treat them separately. Indeed, Vasubandhu and the *Vibhāṣā* know the Dārṣṭāntikas and Sautrāntikas apart. It is therefore possible that the Dārṣṭāntikas were one of the schools, and even the main one, of the Sautrāntikas, but that there was a difference between them, however slight.

The Darṣṭāntikas owe their name to their frequent usage of comparisons (*dṛṣṭānta*), as is demonstrated by the few fragments of their literature that has come down to us.

These are the theses attributed to them:

(1) Matter (*rūpa*) is not a similar cause (*sabhāgahetu*) of matter.[3]

(2) The matter (*rūpa*) of the arhats and external (*bāhya*) form, that is, the five sense-objects, are pure (*anāsrava*) because they are not the support (*āśraya*) of impurities (*āsrava*).[4]

(3) There are four kinds of action (*karman*) in relation to certainty (*niyāma*): (a) action certain as to the period of fruition, but uncertain as to fruition; (b) action certain as to fruition, but uncertain as to the period of fruition; (c) action certain as to both points of view; (d) action uncertain as to both points of view.[5]

(4) Covetousness (*abhidhyā*), ill-will (*vyāpāda*) and false views (*mithyādṛṣṭi*) are mental actions (*manaskarman*), since the *Saṃcetanīyasūtra* considers them as actions.[6]

1. LVP, *Kośa*, Introduction, pp. lii–lv; LVP, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, pp. 221–4.
2. Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte*, p. 274.
3. LVP, *Kośa* II, p. 256. Cf. thesis 19 of the Sautrāntikas.
4. Ibid. IV, p. 19.
5. Ibid. IV, pp. 116–17.

(5) In the first three absorptions (*dhyāna*), the faculty of happiness (*sukhendriya*) is bodily (*kāyika*) only and not mental (*caitasika*).[7]

(6) The individualistic view (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*) has no real object.[8]

The individualistic view consists of believing that the principle of self (*ātman*) and what concerns the self (*ātmanya*) really exist. Since in the absolute sense (*paramārthena*), neither *ātman* nor *ātmanya* exists, the individualistic view therefore has no object. It is the same for a man who, seeing a rope, thinks: 'That is a snake', or who, seeing a tree trunk, thinks: 'That is a man'.

(7) Knowledge (*jñāna*) is not simultaneous with consciousness (*vijñāna*).[9]

(8) It is the whole of the aggregates (*skandha*) that see forms (*rūpa*).[10]

(9) Causes (*hetu*) and conditions (*pratyaya*) are not realities.[11]

In fact, the formula of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) teaches that ignorance (*avidyā*) conditions the mental formations (*saṃskāra*). The latter are characterised as multiple and diverse, whilst ignorance is characterised as single. What is single cannot be a condition of what is multiple. Therefore condition and causality are not realities.

(10) There are two universal (*sarvatraga*) latent tendencies (*anuśaya*): ignorance (*avidyā*) and the thirst for existence (*bhavatṛṣṇā*).[12]

In fact, the roots (*mūla*) of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) are what are known as universal (*sarvatraga*). Ignorance (*avidyā*) is a root of dependent origination which constitutes its fore-limit, and the thirst for existence (*bhavatṛṣṇā*) is the root which constitutes its hind-limit.

(11) Outside of will (*cetanā*), there is no cause of fruition (*vipākahetu*). Outside of feeling (*vedanā*), there is no fruit of fruition (*vipākaphala*).[13]

6. Ibid. IV, p. 136. Cf. thesis 24 of the Sautrāntikas.
7. Ibid. VIII, p. 154.
8. T 1545, p. 36a.
9. Ibid., p. 44b. No explanation is given.
10. Ibid., p. 61c. Cf. above, thesis 17 of the Sautrāntikas.
11. Ibid., pp. 79a, 680b–c and 833a.
12. Ibid., p.90c.
13. Ibid., pp.96a, 741b.

(12) Although all things arise by reason of causes (*hetu*), they cease without a cause.[14]

Examples: when an archer shoots an arrow, it soon falls to the ground; likewise, the potter's wheel which stops after a certain time. In both cases, the falling or the stopping, that is, the cessation of movement, occur by themselves, without any cause.

(13) The latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) do not regenerate (*anuśayana*) either in their objects (*ālambana*) or in things associated with thought (*cittasaṃprayukta*).[15]

If the latent tendencies were to regenerate in their objects, they would also have to regenerate in another realm (*dhātu*) and in pure things (*anāsravadharma*) when the latter are their objects. If they were to regenerate in things associated with thought, they would never be abandoned, or else, even if they were abandoned, they would still regenerate, since a thought cannot definitively be dissociated from that with which it is associated.

(14) It is thought (*citta*) endowed with all the impediments (*āvaraṇa*) which obtains deliverance (*vimukti*).[16]

(15) The three kinds of cessation (*nirodha*) are devoid of reality.[17]

This concerns cessation by means of acquired knowledge (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*), cessation without acquired knowledge (*apratisaṃkhyānirodha*) and cessation due to impermanence (*anityatānirodha*). No demonstration of this thesis is given.[18]

(16) A dream (*svapna*) has no reality.[19]

Common experience proves this. Hence, in a dream, one sees food and drink in profusion and one makes use of it until one is completely sated and satisfied. However, as soon as one wakes, one is hungry, thirsty, one's body has no strength and is weak.

(17) The characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*) are not real substances (*dravya*).[20]

14. Ibid., pp.103c and 105a.
15. Ibid., p.110a.
16. Ibid., p. 141b.
17. Ibid., p. 161a.
18. See thesis 9 of the Sautrāntikas.
19. T 1545, p. 193b.
20. Ibid., pp. 198a and 977b.

In fact, those characteristics are included in formations dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*), which are not real substances.

(18) An instant (*kṣaṇa*) is devoid of the three characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of arising (*utpāda*), declining (*vyaya*) and cessation (*nirodha*).[21]

If an instant were to possess those three characteristics, it would have to arise, decline and cease at one and the same time, which is impossible.

(19) Will (*cetanā*) and mental discussion (*manojalpa*) are only thought (*citta*).[22]

(20) The worldling nature (*pṛthagjanatva*) does not exist as a reality.[23]

(21) All the defilements (*kleśa*) are entirely bad (*akuśala*).[24]

(22) A worldling (*pṛthagjana*) cannot abandon the defilements (*kleśa*).[25]

(23) There is reasoning (*vitarka*) and deliberation (*vicāra*) from the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) up to the realm of the Akaniṣṭha gods.[26]

The Dārṣṭāntikas rely on a sūtra which defines reasoning as the coarse (*sthūla*) nature of thought (*citta*) and deliberation as the subtle (*sūkṣma*) nature of thought. This dual nature of thought is manifested in the three realms (*dhātu*); therefore reasoning and deliberation are found in the three realms.

(24) Things (*dharma*) arise gradually (*anupūrvena*) and not all at once.[27]

(25) The fetters (*saṃyojana*) really exist, but their objects (*vastu*) and the person (*pudgala*) are unreal.[28]

The objects of the fetters are unreal because objects (*viṣaya*) endowed with or devoid of impurities are not fixed (*niyata*). Thus, an honest woman, bedecked with all kinds of jewels and adornments, goes to a worldly gathering. The sight of her evokes in others very diverse feelings: admiration, covetousness, hatred, envy, disgust, sorrow, indifference, depending on each one's personal tendencies.

(26) Craving (*rāga*) and aversion (*pratigha*) are the only factors of continuity (*saṃtati*) in the life series, from one existence to another.[29]

21. Ibid., p. 200a.
22. Ibid., p. 216b.
23. Ibid., p. 231b.
24. Ibid., p. 259c.
25. Ibid., p. 264b.
26. Ibid., pp. 269b and 462c.
27. Ibid., pp. 270a and 463a.
28. Ibid., p. 288b.
29. Ibid., p. 309a. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* III, pp. 50–1.

At the moment of conception, the Gandharva, whose presence is necessary, always experiences a twofold thought: it loves one of its parents and hates the other. That is why craving and aversion are the only factors of rebecoming that ensure the continuity of the life series.

(27) Only he who has overcome the defilements (*kleśa*) obtains a higher rebirth.[30]

(28) All actions (*karman*) can be reversed.[31]

Even actions of immediate fruition (*ānantaryakarman*) can be reversed, without which the supremacy of the Akaniṣṭha gods would no longer be a supremacy. Consequently, all actions can be redeemed by good actions.

(29) Non-intimation (*avijñapti*) does not exist.[32]

In other words, there is no form (*rūpa*) in the sphere of the mental object (*dharmāyatana*).

(30) Time (*kāla*) is distinct from the formations (*saṃskāra*).[33]

In fact, time is permanent (*nitya*), whilst the formations are impermanent (*anitya*). The formations are in time like a fruit in a pot. Just as a fruit can leave that pot and enter this other one, or as many men leave a house and enter another one, the formations leave the future (*anāgata*) and enter the present (*pratyutpanna*), then leave the present and enter the past (*atīta*).

(31) The Truths (*satya*) are defined in this way. The Truth of Suffering (*duḥkha*) is name (*nāman*) and form (*rūpa*). The Truth of its Origin (*samudaya*) is actions (*karman*) and defilements (*kleśa*). The Truth of Cessation (*nirodha*) is the exhaustion (*kṣaya*) of actions and defilements. The Truth of the Path (*mārga*) is tranquillity (*śamatha*) and insight (*vipaśyanā*).[34]

(32) Since the six kinds of consciousness (*vijñāna*) each have distinct objects, mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) does not have as its object those of the five sense consciousnesses.[35]

(33) Since the six kinds of consciousness (*vijñāna*) have only external

30. T 1545, p. 355a.
31. Ibid., pp. 359b and 593b.
32. Ibid., pp. 383b and 634b. Cf. above, thesis 14 of the Sautrāntikas.
33. T 1545, pp. 393a, 700a. See *Kathāvatthu* XV, 3, anonymous thesis: the three moments (*addhā*) of time, i.e., the past, present and future, are perfected (*parinipphanna*).
34. T 1545, p. 397b.
35. Ibid., p. 449a.

objects, they do not have as objects the internal faculties (*indriya*) or the consciousnesses themselves.[36]

(34) The acquisitions (*prāpti*) and non-acquisitions (*aprāpti*) do not really exist.[37]

The acquisitions are pure designations (*prajñapti*). When beings (*sattva*) do not abandon things, it is said there is acquisition. When they abandon things, it is said there is non-acquisition (*aprāpti*). It is the same for the whole of the five fingers, which is called the hand.

(35) Acquiescence (*kṣānti*) which forms part of clear comprehension (*abhisamayāntika*) has the nature of knowledge (*jñānatva*).[38]

When pure (*anāsrava*) knowledge has, at the outset, falling back as its object (*viṣaya*), it is called acquiescence. When, later, it has stability (*sthiti*) as its object, it is called *jñāna.*

(36) If a thought (*citta*) is endowed with knowledge (*jñāna*), it is devoid of nescience (*ajñāna*). If a thought is endowed with doubt (*vicikitsā*), it is devoid of certainty (*niyāma*). If a thought is endowed with coarseness (*sthūlatā*) it is devoid of subtlety (*sūkṣmatā*).[39]

(37) Right livelihood (*samyagājīva*) and wrong livelihood (*mithyājīva*) are substances distinct from words (*vāc*) and actions (*karman*).[40]

In fact, the Buddha said in a sūtra that each of the eight constituents of the Path has its own distinct substance.

(38) A supernormal creation (*nirmāṇa*) is unreal.[41]

(39) Contact (*sparśa*) is unreal.[42]

In fact, the Sūtra says: 'The eye (*cakṣus*) and form (*rūpa*) engender visual consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*). The three together form contact (*sparśa*)'. Outside the eye, form and visual consciousness, there is no external reality that can be called contact.

(40) A subtle (*sūkṣma*) thought (*citta*) subsists in the attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*).[43]

36. Ibid., p. 449a.
37. Ibid., pp. 479a and 550c.
38. Ibid., p. 489b.
39. Ibid., p. 547b.
40. Ibid., p. 604c.
41. Ibid., p. 700a. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* III, pp. 9–11.
42. T 1545, p. 760a.
43. Ibid., pp. 774a and 775a.

If no thought were to subsist in the attainment of cessation, the life faculty (*jīvitendriya*) would then be interrupted; in other words there would be death (*maraṇa*) for the meditator.

(41) There is regression (*parihāṇi*) for him who is in the attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*).[44]

This is a corollary of the thesis above[45] according to which all actions are reversible. In this case, regression is always possible.

(42) There is a blend of absorptions (*dhyāna*).[46]

The absorptions pervade each other mutually.

(43) One enters certainty (*niyāma*) by meditating only on the suffering of conditioned things (*saṃskāraduḥkhatā*).[47]

(44) The three categories (*rāśi*) of beings are encountered from the Avici hell to the heaven of the Akaniṣṭhas.[48]

There are the three categories of beings: those predestined to deliverance, those predestined to ruin, those who are not predestined.

(45) Names (*nāman*), phrases (*pada*) and phonemes (*vyañjana*) do not really exist and have sound (*śabda*) as their own-nature (*svabhāva*).[49]

(46) Thought (*citta*) and mental (*caitta*) things (*dharma*) do not arise at the same time.[50]

Just as a group of merchants, crossing a pass in precipitous mountains, walk one behind the other and not two by two, so thought and mental factors arise one after the other.

(47) Reasoning (*vitarka*) and deliberation (*vicāra*) are thought (*citta*).[51]

(48) There are knowledges (*jñāna*) the objects (*ālambana*) of which do not exist.[52]

When the object of a knowledge is illusory (*māyā*) in nature, whether it is a Gandharva city, a ring of fire [produced by a rapidly revolving point of

44. Ibid., pp. 773c–774a.
45. Thesis 28.
46. T 1545, p. 879c.
47. Ibid., p. 928a. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* VI, p. 125.
48. T 1545, p. 930c. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* III, p. 137.
49. T 1545, p. 70a.
50. Ibid., p. 79c.
51. Ibid., p. 218c.
52. Ibid., p. 228b.

light], a mirage (*mṛgatṛṣṇā*), etc., the resulting knowledge has no objective domain (*viṣaya*).

(49) There is neither a precise moment of arising nor a precise moment of cessation.[53]

Conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*) only exist in two times: when they have not yet arisen and when they have already arisen, or when they have not yet ceased and when they have already ceased.

(50) Images reflected on the surface of water or in a mirror have no real existence.[54]

Since a face does not enter a mirror, and a mirror is not found in a face, then how could a mirror produce real images of a face?

(51) Sounds (*śabda*) have no real existence.[55]

All sounds, being instantaneous (*kṣaṇika*) by nature (*bhāva*), arise and cease in the same place and at the same instant. How then could they reach a valley, etc., and produce an echo there?

(52) Thoughts (*citta*) are similar and immediate conditions (*samantarapratyaya*) in relation to thought and not in relation to mental factors (*caitta*). Mental factors are similar and immediate conditions in relation to mental factors and not in relation to thoughts.[56]

(53) Good (*kuśala*) but impure (*sāsrava*) wisdom (*prajñā*) associated (*saṃprayukta*) with mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) is never vision (*darśana*).[57]

(54) Bodily actions (*kāyakarman*), vocal actions (*vākkarman*) and mental actions (*manokarman*) are will (*cetanā*) alone (*eka*).[58]

(55) On stages (*bhūmi*) which have contiguous parts (*antikāṅga*), there are only good (*kuśala*) things (*dharma*).[59]

(56) Supernormally created objects (*nirmāṇavastu*) have no real existence.[60]

53. Ibid., pp. 141b and 919b.
54. Ibid., p. 390c.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., p. 461b.
57. Ibid., p. 502a.
58. Ibid., p. 587a.
59. Ibid., p. 693c.
60. Ibid., pp. 696c and 700a.

If they were really to exist, why would it be said that they were created supernormally?

(57) There is no untimely death (*akālamaraṇa*).[61]

This thesis relies on the Sūtra which says, 'Death can be cured'.

(58) In the attainment of nonperception (*asaṃjñāsamāpatti*), subtle (*sūkṣma*) thought (*citta*) has not ceased (*niruddha*).[62]

If there were no thought in the attainment of nonperception, the life faculty (*jīvitendriya*) would be destroyed and that state would have to be called death and not attainment.

(59) Regression (*parihāṇi*) has no own-nature (*svabhāva*), it is only a designation (*prajñapti*).[63]

In the body, there was formerly good (*kuśala*) merit (*puṇya*). Now, through a sequence of fortunate circumstances, it is lost. What is the own-nature of these things? Just as if a man whose riches have been stolen by a thief is asked, 'What is the nature of the riches which you have lost?', the owner were to reply, 'Formerly, I possessed those riches. At present a thief has stolen them from me, and I have no more riches. How can I know what nature they have?'

(60) The abandonment (*prahāna*) of good roots (*kuśalamūla*) has no own-nature (*svabhāva*).[64]

The abandonment of good roots is only cessation (*nirodha*), the absence of the former.

(61) There exists a certain form (*rūpa*) that is neither colour (*varṇa*) nor shape (*saṃsthāna*), which is engendered by thought (*citta*). It sets in motion the hand and other limbs. It is called act of intimation by the body (*kāyavijñaptikarman*).[65]

(62) It is the earlier moment that pervades (*vāsayati*) the subsequent moment.[66]

61. Ibid., p. 771a.
62. Ibid., p. 772c.
63. Ibid., p. 313a.
64. Ibid., p. 182c.
65. LVP, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 48.
66. Ibid., pp. 183 and 186.

CHAPTER 28

The Vibhajyavādins

The question of the Vibhajyavādins is one of the most difficult of the general problem of the schools. This is how it is posed: Do the Vibhajyavādins constitute a separate and clearly defined school or does their name designate only a more or less heterogenous group of schools? In the first case, we still need to define precisely what they are, as well as the characteristic traits of their history and doctrine. In the second case, we need to determine the common trait or traits of the various schools designated by their name and define, as much as possible, what those schools are.

For a long time, modern scholars have preoccupied themselves with resolving the question, without being able to agree. Some of them, generally those most informed on the ins and outs of the problem after a profound study, even refuse to take part.[1]

It must be admitted that the question is greatly confused mainly because of the later commentators whose information was not sure, even if the data they supply are not simple personal hypotheses. We should first remember the meaning of the word Vibhajyavādin: 'he who speaks, who upholds the theory of distinctions (*vibhajya*)', or 'he who upholds a distinct, separate, theory, hence a heretic'. The meaning of the word has certainly varied with the authors who used it.[2]

1. See LVP, *Kośa*, Introduction, pp. lv–lviii, essential because he quotes the majority of the documents; Dutt, *Early Monastic Buddhism* II, pp. 195–200 and 265–70; Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," p. 49, note which summarises the works by C. Akanuma and T. Kimura.
2. Cf. T 1545, p. 738a.

A. Early Documents

(1) The Sarvāstivādin *Vibhāṣā,* which dates from approximately the year 200 CE, is both the oldest and most important of the documents concerning the Vibhajyavādins, to whom it attributes a very large number of theses which we will examine further on and which form a very eclectic doctrine. The Vibhajyavādins were often, and alone, in opposition to the Yuktavādins, that is, those who teach the correct principles, in this case the Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādins.[3] In these passages, especially the first ones cited in the note, the Vibhajyavādins appear as typical heretics, 'those who make objections, who maintain wrong doctrines and who attack the good doctrine'. It seems, therefore, that the *Vibhāṣā* designates by the name of Vibhajyavādins heretics in general, those who do not adhere to the doctrine defended by it, since its authors cannot or will not define their adversaries with more precision. The word Vibhajyavādin is therefore a general term to designate those who are not Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādins and perhaps more particularly a group of schools which we will attempt to define below.

In the *Abhidharmakośaśāstra,* Vasubandhu defines them thus: 'Those who admit the existence of the present and part of the past [i.e., of an action which has not borne fruit] and the nonexistence of the future and part of the past [i.e., of the action which has borne fruit] are considered as Vibhajyavādins, they do not belong to the Sarvāstivādin school'.[4] The Kāśyapīyas, whose known fundamental thesis is recognised here with certainty, are therefore Vibhajyavādins. But are they the only Vibhajyavādins? Vasubandhu does not answer that question.

Saṃghabhadra, who distinguishes them clearly from the *pudgalavādin* 'argumentationists', instantaneists, nihilists and Prajñaptivādins, ascribes the following opinion to them: 'Only the present and the past action which has not yielded its fruit exist'.[5] He is therefore in agreement with Vasubandhu.

Vasuvarman, who also distinguishes them from the Prajñaptivādins, attributes this thesis to them: 'All conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*) are wholly

3. Ibid., pp. 43a, 571c and 138c, 169 ff., 69 ff., etc.
4. LVP, *Kośa* V, p. 52, and Introduction, p. lvi.
5. T 1563, p. 901b–c; T 1562, p. 630c.

suffering (*duḥkha*) because they are impermanent (*anitya*)',[6] which is a Prajñaptivādin thesis.

Finally, Bhavya's first list, which originates from the northwest of India, a Sarvāstivādin stronghold, identifies the Vibhajyavādins with the Sarvāstivādins, which is in formal contradiction to the *Vibhāṣā:* 'Among them [the Sarvāstivādins] even, there are several who say: "Past actions whose fruit has not fallen exist. Some do not exist: those whose fruit has been tasted, and the future". Because, taking these distinctions (*vibhajya*) into account, they speak of them, the latter are precisely called Vibhajyavādins'. This thesis is that of the Kāśyapīyas, and on this point the author is in agreement with Vasubandhu and Saṃghabhadra.

(2) The Sinhalese Theravādins of the Mahāvihāra designate themselves several times by the name of Vibhajjavādī.[7]

During the Council of Pāṭaliputta, to King Aśoka who asked him what was the teaching of the Buddha, the president Tissa Moggaliputta answered that it was Vibhajjavādī: '*Kiṃ vādī bhante Sammāsambuddhoti?—Vibhajavādī Mahārājāti. Evaṃ vutte rājā theraṃ pucchi: Vibhajavādī Sammāsambuddhoti*'. According to the text, Tissa Moggaliputta means by this that the Buddha was neither an eternalist (*sassatavādī*), nor an annihilist (*ucchedavādī*), nor a partisan of the survival of consciousness (*saññīvādī*) nor an adherent of the nonsurvival of consciousness (*asaññīvādī*), etc., but, faced with each of these large problems, he adopted a prudent attitude, distinguishing (*vibhajja*) between the pros and cons of each teaching.[8] However, this late explanation (fifth century CE) is far from satisfying, since all Buddhists were Vibhajjavādīs in this way. In fact, this position is defined in the famous *Brahmajālasūtra* adopted by all the schools. It could not, therefore, serve to distinguish one Buddhist school from the others, as the Mahāvihāra Theravādin tradition seems to do. On the other hand, neither could it serve as a criterion of orthodoxy during a Buddhist council, since it was adopted by all the parties present. It is therefore probable that in the fifth century CE, the Theravādins, and most especially those of the Mahāvihāra, contin-

6. T 1647, p. 380a.
7. *Dīpavaṃsa* XVIII, 41, 44; *Mahāvaṃsa* V, 271; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā,* beginning; *Cullavagga,* pp. 72, 312; *Tikapaṭṭhāna-Aṭṭhakathā,* pp. 366–7.
8. *Mahāvaṃsa* V, 271; *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā,* end of the *Nidāna.*

ued to consider themselves as Vibhajjavādīs, a name that they had claimed as expressing their orthodox position during the council held in Pāṭaliputra in the reign of Aśoka in the third century BCE, that is, 700 years earlier, but the particular meaning of that name was lost.

(3) The Sammatīya tradition cited by Bhavya (third list) makes the Vibhajyavādins a dissident Sarvāstivādin school, a school which later split into Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas, Tāmraśātīyas and Kāśyapīyas. We note in this group the presence of the Kāśyapīyas, whose fundamental thesis Vasubandhu, Saṃghabhadra and the author of Bhavya's first list define as particularly Vibhajyavādin. We also note that the Sinhalese Theravādins, who designated themselves by the name of Vibhajjavādīs, certainly belonged to the group as defined here, since their close relationship with the Mahīśāsakas is undeniable.[9]

(4) The Mahāsāṃghika tradition cited by Bhavya (second list) makes the Vibhajyavādins one of three fundamental groups, alongside the Sthaviras and Mahāsāṃghikas. According to it, the Vibhajyavādin group has four divisions: Mahīśāsakas, Kāśyapīyas, Dharmaguptakas and Tāmraśātīyas. Agreement with the Sammatīya tradition, although independent, is complete. The same remarks as above should therefore be made.

Consequently, a systematic comparative study of the Indian data prior to the fifth century CE shows that the four distinct traditions (Sarvāstivādin, Theravādin, Sammatīya and Tāmraśātīya) agree or at least do not disagree over the following points:

(1) The Vibhajyavādins are not Sarvāstivādins.

(2) The Kāśyapīyas form part of the Vibhajyavādins.

(3) The Theravādins, and consequently the Mahīśāsakas who were the most closely linked with them, are also part of the Vibhajyavādins.

(4) The Dharmaguptakas, a school which emerged directly from the Mahīśāsakas, are also part of the Vibhajyavādins.

(5) The Tāmraśātīyas, whom we know little about, are also part of that group.

(6) The Vibhajyavādins represent the group of non-Vātsīputriya Sthaviras who rejected the *sarvāstivāda*. After the Council of Pāṭaliputra held under Aśoka, the non-Vātsīputrīya Sthaviras split into two groups: the Sarvāstivādins, supporters of the *sarvāstivāda*, and the Vibhajyavādins, who rejected it. The leader of the Vibhajyavādins was Tissa Moggaliputta, who should be identified, as has been shown by La Vallée Poussin,[10] with the Maudgalyāyana who criticised the *sarvāstivāda* in the *Vijñānakāya* of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma-piṭaka.[11] He even gives his name to the part of the work in which he is involved and which opens the treatise. Later, the Vibhajyavādins divided into several subschools. First, doubtless near the end of the third century CE, there was a split into two schools: the Mahīśāsakas, supporters of a total rejection of the *sarvāstivāda*, and the Kāśyapīyas, who adopted a position of compromise. Later again, various causes provoked the appearance of divergences from which resulted new schools: the Theravādins of Ceylon, the Mahīśāsakas of the north and south, the Dharmaguptakas and the Tāmraśātīyas.

9. See below, ch. 33.

B. Recent Documents

(1) In his Chinese translation of the treatise by Vasumitra, Paramārtha (first half of the sixth century) renders the word Prajñaptivādin by *fenbie shuobu*, an expression that more correctly translates the term Vibhajyavādin. In his commentary on the same work, he explains this word by saying that the founder of the Prajñaptivādin school, Mahākātyāyana, established distinctions (*vibhajya*) in the teaching of the Bahuśrutīya mother school, hence the name of that new school, Vibhajyavādin, or more exactly Bahuśrutīya-Vibhajyavādin.[12]

In his commentary on the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, Kuiji (mid-seventh century) says, 'Those who were formerly called Vibhajyavādins are now known as Prajñaptivādins'.[13] This information is clearly taken from the works of Paramārtha and, as we can see, misunderstood or tendentious. In no way should it be concluded that all the Vibhajyavādins, in particular those of the *Vibhāṣā*, Vasubandhu and Saṃghabhadra, as well as the Theravādins, were Prajñaptivādins.

10. LVP, *L'Inde aux temps des Maurya*, pp. 133–9.
11. T 1539, pp. 531a–537a.
12. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 22 and 49–50.
13. LVP, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 179, n. 2; LVP, *Kośa*, Introduction, pp. lv–lvi.

(2) Furthermore, in another passage from the same work, Kuiji says, 'The Vibhajyavādins are Mahāsāṃghikas, Ekavyāvahārikas, Lokottaravādins and Kaukkuṭikas'.[14] In fact, these four schools are very different from the Prajñaptivādins, a later school derived from the last of them. There is nothing implausible about this opinion, since these four schools totally rejected the *sarvāstivāda*[15] and also merited being designated by the name of Vibhajyavādins by the Sarvāstivādins. It might even be wondered if the Mahāsāṃghika schools did not attend the Council of Pāṭaliputra held in the reign of Aśoka and from which resulted the schism between the Sarvāstivādins and Vibhajyavādins. This would explain why the Sarvāstivādins place the schism under Aśoka: they would have confused the two schisms and two councils, both held in Pāṭaliputra, and at which they were twice vanquished by the Mahāsāṃghikas; but the second time the latter were not the only ones and the majority of the Sthaviras took their side in condemning the *sarvāstivāda*.[16] This is only a hypothesis. However it may be, it is presumably possible that the Mahāsāṃghikas, who rejected the *sarvāstivāda* as did most of the Sthaviras, were considered because of this fact as Vibhajyavādins by the authors of the *Vibhāṣā*. This could well explain the presence of Mahāsāṃghika theses among those which the *Vibhāṣā* attributes to the Vibhajyavādins.

(3) A contemporary of Kuiji, and like him a pupil of Xuanzang, Puguang, defined the Vibhajyavādins thus in his commentary on the *Abhidharmakośa*: 'They say that there is no opinion that is completely right; that, in part existence, in part nonexistence [or, in part true, in part false]; one must distinguish. Therefore they are called Vibhajyavādins'.[17] This explanation is clearly a reconstruction based on etymology and tells us nothing.

(4) Huizhao, who belonged to the next generation and was a pupil of Xuanzang and Kuiji, says in his commentary on the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*: 'The Vibhajyavādins are either divergent teachers from the Great Vehicle, or all the schools of the Small Vehicle are called Vibhajyavādins: those who are not from a specific school. Consequently, in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*,

14. LVP, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 109; LVP, *Kośa*, Introduction, p. lv.
15. See above, ch. 5, thesis 47 of the Mahāsāṃghikas.
16. See above, part one, ch. 2.
17. Cited by LVP, *Kośa*, Introduction, p. lvi.

the Vibhajyavādins are described as Mahīśāsakas; in the *Vibhāṣā*, as Sāṃmatīyas'.[18] La Vallée Poussin notes regarding this [tr.]: 'This is obscure: The Saṃgraha cites the Āgama of the Mahīśāsakas and ignores the Vibhajyavādins; the Vibhāṣā seemingly ignores the Sāṃmatīyas'. It is not extraordinary that the *Vibhāṣā*, which dates from the second century, should ignore the Sammatīyas. At that time, the latter had not yet acquired the importance they were to have in the seventh century, and the *Vibhāṣā* certainly classes them among the Vātsīputrīyas just as, in the seventh century, the situation was reversed. Xuanzang and Yijing place the Vātsīputrīyas among the Sammatīyas. An examination of the theses attributed to the Vibhajyavādins by the *Vibhāṣā* shows that the latter had little to do with the Sammatīyas. However, what is important about Huizhao's note is that it clearly proves that its author was badly misinformed and greatly confused by the question. First, he hesitates between two hypotheses, both equally absurd, since the Vibhajyavādins were not part of the Mahāyāna and they would not be considered as 'all the schools of the Hīnayāna' since the *Vibhāṣā*, Vasubandhu, Saṃghabhadra, etc., prove for us irrefutably that the Sarvāstivādins were not Vibhajyavādins. Then Huizhao gives two identifications, the second of which is patently false. This amalgam of evident errors makes us think that in the preceding generation, Kuiji and Puguang could not have been much better informed. This clarifies their contradictions and far from satisfying explanations.

(5) In the eighth century, Vinītadeva makes the Vibhajyavādins the seventh and last school of the Sarvāstivādin group, but distinguishes them clearly from the Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas, Kāśyapīyas and Tāmraśātīyas classed in the same group on the one hand, and in the Sinhalese Sthavira group on the other. He attributes to them as their own five or six theses which we will examine further on, the highly eclectic nature of which arouses strong scepticism. In fact, found among them are the fundamental theses of both the Vātsīputrīyas and Kāśyapīyas, one Dārṣṭantika thesis and another the poor state of the text (or a translator's error) of which makes it impossible to interpret. Nevertheless, he too clearly distinguishes the Vibhajyavādins, classed among the Sarvāstivādins, from the Prajñaptivādins, classed at the heart of the Mahāsāṃghikas.

18. Cited in ibid.

(6) Finally, the *Bhikṣuvarṣāgraprcchāsūtra,* manifestly later, classes the Vibhajyavādins among the Mahāsāṃghikas, alongside the Prajñaptivādins. It places the Kāśyapīyas, Mahīśāsakas and Dharmaguptakas in the Sarvāstivādin group and the Tāmraśātīyas amongst the Sammatīyas, along with the Bahuśrutīyas. Faced with such obvious errors, we can place little reliance on the evidence of this work.

There is little, then, that can be derived from these later sources, which bristle with errors and can only lead to confusion. We should rely therefore, at least provisionally, on the conclusions taken from the study of the early sources.

Here are the theses which the *Vibhāṣā* attributes to the Vibhajyavādins:

(1) Sound (*śabda*) is a fruit of fruition (*vipākaphala*).[19]

It is said in a sūtra that the bodhisattva, having abandoned harsh and wrong speech during his previous existences, because of the accomplishment of that action, obtains a heavenly voice (*brahmasvara*). That is why it is said that sound is a fruit of fruition.

2) The birth-body (*janmakāya*) of the Buddha is a pure (*anāsrava*) thing (*dharma*).[20]

It is said in the Sūtra: 'The Tathāgatas are born in the world, dwell in the world, appear in the world, but they are not defiled by worldly (*laukika*) things'. That is why it is said that the birth-body of the Buddha is a pure thing.

(3) The five faculties (*indriya*) of faith (*śraddhā*), etc., are exclusively pure (*anāsrava*).[21]

This thesis is based on a sūtra according to which, depending on the degree of cultivation of these five faculties, one obtains one of the four fruits of holiness, whilst he who is completely devoid of them is a worldling.

(4) Life (*āyus*) is a consequence of thought (*cittānuparivartin*).[22]

It is said in a sūtra: 'Life, heat and consciousness (*vijñāna*) are always united and never separated'. Hence, those three things can never be designated as separate, disconnected, different. That is why we obviously know that life is a consequence of thought.

19. T 1545, p. 612c. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* I, p. 69; LVP, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 190.
20. T 1545, p. 871c. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* I, p. 58, n. 4; LVP, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, pp. 769–70.
21. T 1545, p. 7c. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* II, p. 118; T 1548, p. 567c.
22. T 1545, p. 770c. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* II, p. 215.

(5) In the attainment of nonperception (*asaṃjñisamāpatti*), subtle (*sūkṣma*) thought (*citta*) has not ceased (*niruddha*).[23]

If, in the attainment of nonperception, there were no thought, the life faculty (*jīvitendriya*) would then be cut off and [that state] would have to be called death and not dwelling in the attainment.

(6) In the attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*), subtle (*sūkṣma*) thought (*citta*) has not ceased (*niruddha*).[24]

There is no being (*sattva*) without form (*rūpa*), nor attainment (*samāpatti*) without thought (*citta*). If there were not thought in that attainment, the life faculty (*jīvitendriya*) would be cut off and [that state] would have to be called death and not dwelling in the attainment.

(7) In the three realms (*dhātu*), when one is reborn, there is no intermediate state (*antarābhava*).[25]

Immediate fruition, without the intermediary (*ānantarya*) of the five great offences, does indeed prove there is no intermediate existence. It is said in a sūtra: 'O twice-born, you are old and sick, you will be reborn in the domain of Yama. There is no intermediate (*antarā*) stay for you, nor travelling supplies'. Moreover, there is no more intermediate state between life and death than between light and darkness. As for the Antarāparinirvāyin, he attains Parinirvāṇa either in mid-life or in the interval of his stay among the gods.

(8) Dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) is unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*).[26]

(9) The Path (*mārga*) is unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*).[27]

In fact, supreme, perfect and full Awakening (*anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi*) is unique, constant, indestructible, and it is because of it that the buddhas appear in the world. Moreover, in a sūtra the Buddha declared that the Path is old. Consequently, it is unconditioned.

(10) Avarice (*abhidhyā*), ill-will (*vyāpāda*) and false views (*mithyādṛṣṭi*) are, by their own-nature (*svabhāva*), action (*karman*).[28]

23. T 1545, p. 772c. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* VIII, p. 207, and II, p. 211.
24. T 1545, p. 774a. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* II, p. 212.
25. T 1545, pp. 356c, 700a, 878b–c. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* III, p. 32. From which the difficult explanation of the *antarāparinirvāyin*: T 1545, p. 357b; LVP, *Kośa* III, p. 39.
26. T 1545, p. 116c. Cf.LVP. *Kośa* III, p. 77. See thesis 9 of the Pūrvaśailas.
27. T 1545, p. 479c.
28. Ibid., p. 587a. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* IV, p. 136, which attributes this to the Dārṣṭāntikas.

It is said in the Sūtra: 'The three kinds of bodily action (*kāyakarman*) which create will (*cetanā*), when they have been accomplished, when they are produced, are wrong (*pāpa*) and bad (*akuśala*). They can give rise to sufferings (*duḥkha*) and provoke a painful fruition (*vipāka*). The four kinds of vocal action (*vākkarman*) which create will and the three kinds of mental action (*manaskarman*), when they have been accomplished, when they are produced, are wrong and bad. They can give rise to a painful fruition'. In fact, the three mental actions are avarice, ill-will and false views. On the basis of this sūtra, it is said that avarice, etc., have all three the own-nature of action.

(11) What is good (*kuśala*) in its own-nature (*svabhāva*) is knowledge (*jñāna*). What is good by association (*saṃprayoga*) is consciousness (*vijñāna*) which is associated with it. What is good in origination (*samutthāna*) are bodily actions (*kāyakarman*) and vocal actions (*vākkarman*) engendered by it. What is absolutely (*paramārthatas*) good is Nirvāṇa. What is bad (*akuśala*) in its own-nature is delusion (*moha*). What is bad by association is consciousness which is associated with the latter. What is bad in origin is bodily and vocal actions engendered by it. What is absolutely bad is the round of rebirth (*saṃsāra*).[29]

(12) The thought (*citta*) of the Bhagavat is always [abiding] in attainment (*samāpatti*).[30]

In fact, his mindfulness (*smṛti*) and right knowledge are good, calm and stable.

(13) The Buddha never sleeps.[31]

In fact, he is free from all impediments (*āvaraṇa*).

(14) The thirst for nonexistence (*vibhavatṛṣṇā*) should be abandoned (*prahātavya*) by means of vision (*darśana*).[32]

The impermanence (*anityatā*) of the three realms (*dhātu*) is called nonexistence (*vibhava*). Desire (*kāma*) which can have it as an object (*ālambana*) is called the thirst for nonexistence. Since impermanence is abandoned by means of vision and cultivation (*bhāvanā*), the thirst (*tṛṣṇā*) which has it as an object is therefore abandoned by means of those two.

29. T 1545, p. 741a. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* IV, p. 33.
30. T 1545, p. 410b. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* IV, p. 40.
31. As n. 30.
32. T 1545, p. 138b–c. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* V, p. 29.

(15) There are twelve perversions (*viparyāsa*): eight should only be abandoned (*prahātavya*) by means of vision (*darśana*), and four should be abandoned by means of cultivation (*bhāvanā*).[33]

Impermanence (*anityatā*) gives rise to the perversions of perception (*saṃjñā*), thought (*citta*) and views (*dṛṣṭi*) relating to permanence (*nityatā*). Suffering (*duḥkha*) gives rise to happiness (*sukha*). Impersonality (*anātmaka*) gives rise to the personal principle (*ātman*). Impurity (*aśuddhi*) gives rise to the perversions of thought and views relating to purity (*viśuddhi*). That is why we know that all the perversions are of twelve kinds. Among them, eight should be abandoned only by means of vision: in impermanence and the personal principle, each grasps three kinds of happiness, and in purity, each grasps only the perversions of views. Four should be abandoned by cultivation: in happiness and purity, each grasps two perversions of perception and of thought.

(16) What constitutes the eight characteristics of suffering (*duḥkha*) is both suffering and the Truth (*satya*) of Suffering. The other impure (*sāsrava*) things (*dharma*) are suffering but are not the Truth of Suffering. The thirst (*tṛṣṇā*) that provokes subsequent existence (*bhava*) is origin (*samudaya*) and the Truth of the Origin. The other thirsts and other causes (*hetu*) of impure things are origin but not the Truth of the Origin. The destruction (*kṣaya*) of the thirst that provokes subsequent existence is cessation (*nirodha*) and the Truth of Cessation. The destruction of the other thirsts and other causes is cessation but not the Truth of Cessation. The Eightfold Noble Path (*āryamārga*) of trainees (*śaikṣa*) is Path (*mārga*) and the Truth of the Path. The other things concerning trainees and everything concerning the trained (*aśaikṣa*) are Path but are not the Truth of the Path.[34]

(17) Clear comprehension (*abhisamaya*) of the Four Truths (*satya*) takes place a single time.[35]

It is said in a sūtra that if one feels no doubt regarding the Truth of Suffering, neither will one feel doubt regarding the other three Truths.

(18) There is no regression (*parihāṇi*) of the arhat in the sense (*artha*) of arousing passions (*kleśa*).[36]

33. T 1545, p. 536c. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* V, pp. 23–4.
34. T 1545, p. 397b. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* VI, p. 123.
35. T 1545, p. 533a–b. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* VI, p. 185.
36. T 1545, p. 312b. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* VI, pp. 255 and 264.

Just as, when a pitcher is broken, a tree burnt, there remains no more pitcher or tree but only shards and ashes, when the defilements (*kleśa*) are destroyed, broken, they cannot re-arise and the arhat cannot regress.

(19) There are forty-one qualities contributing to Awakening (*bodhipākṣika*): the Four Truths (*satya*) and thirty-seven limbs of Awakening (*bodhyaṅga*).[37]

(20) There is form (*rūpa*) in the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*).[38]

According to a sūtra, name and form (*nāmarūpa*) have consciousness as condition (*vijñānapratyaya*). Since consciousness exists in the formless realm, name and form must therefore exist there also. It is said in another sūtra: 'Life (*āyus*), heat (*uṣma*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*) are all three always united and never separated'. Since there is life and consciousness among beings of the formless realm, there must therefore also be heat, that is, something formed. It is said in another sūtra: 'Outside form, feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saṃjñā*) and mental formations (*saṃskāra*), it cannot be said that consciousness has a base, death, or birth'. Since consciousness exists in the realm of formless things, its four bases must also exist, particularly form.

(21) Only the first absorption (*dhyāna*) possesses constituents (*aṅga*).[39]

It is said in a sūtra: 'How many constituents are there in the first absorption?' 'O, venerable one, there are five constituents, namely, reasoning (*vitarka*), deliberation (*vicāra*), joy (*prīti*), happiness (*sukha*) and mental concentration [one-pointedness of mind] (*ekāgracittatā*)'. Since the devout layman (*upāsaka*) did not ask her, 'What are the constituents of the higher absorptions?', the nun (*bhikṣuṇī*) did not teach it to him. That is why we know there are no constituents in the higher absorptions.

(22) Since there is an 'even-headed' (*samaśīrṣin*) arhat, when that disciple of the Buddha is reborn in the sphere of neither perception nor nonperception (*nevasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana*) at the end of his life, his defilements (*kleśa*), actions (*karman*) and life (*jīvita*) are all three exhausted together, and it is therefore not by means of the Noble Path (*āryamārga*) that he obtains the fruit (*phala*) of arhatship.[40]

37. T 1545, p. 499a. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* VI, p. 281.
38. T 1545, pp. 431b–432a. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* VIII, pp. 135–41.
39. T 1545, pp. 813c–814a. Cf. LVP, *Kosa* VIII, pp. 132–3 and 147–61.
40. T 1545, pp. 929b–310c.

(23) The basic nature (*mūlabhāva*) of thought (*citta*) is clear (*prabhāsvara*). It is adventitious defilements (*āgantukleśa*) that defile it.[41]

It is thought associated (*saṃprayukta*) with desire (*kāma*), hatred (*dveṣa*) and delusion (*moha*) that wins deliverance (*vimukti*). There is no difference between the substance (*dravya*) of a defiled thought and that of an undefiled thought. If, having become associated with the defilements (*kleśa*), it has not yet abandoned them, it is called defiled thought. If, after having been associated with the defilements, it has already abandoned them, it is called undefiled thought. It is the same for a copper pot or other receptacle. When it has not yet been cleaned of stains (*mala*), it is called a stained (*samala*) pot. If it is cleaned of its stains, it is called an unstained (*vimala*) pot. It is the same with thought.

(24) Five things (*dharma*) are universal (*sarvatraga*): ignorance (*avidyā*), thirst (*tṛṣṇā*), speculative views (*dṛṣṭi*), pride (*māna*) and thought (*citta*).[42]

A stanza (*gāthā*) says: 'There are five universal things which can spread the sufferings (*duḥkha*) of beings (*sattva*) everywhere, they are ignorance, thirst, speculative views, pride and thought; such are the five'.

(25) Bodily strength (*kāyabala*) and bodily weakness do not have two distinct own-natures (*svabhāva*).[43]

When a thought (*citta*) is strong (*balavant*), bodily strength is spoken of. When thought lacks strength (*abala*), bodily weakness is spoken of. That is why the strength and weakness of the body do not have two distinct own-natures.

(26) The three kinds of cessation (*nirodha*), that is, cessation by means of acquired knowledge (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*), cessation without acquired knowledge (*apratisaṃkhyānirodha*) and cessation due to impermanence (*anityatānirodha*), are all unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*).[44]

(27) There are three kinds of Nirvāṇa: the first is constantly trainee (*śaikṣa*), the second is constantly trained (*aśaikṣa*), the third is constantly neither trainee nor trained (*nevaśaikṣanāśaikṣa*).[45]

(28) Nirvāṇa which was formerly neither trainee nor trained then

41. Ibid., p. 140b. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* VI, p. 299.
42. T 1545, p. 90c. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* II, pp. 153 ff.
43. T 1545, p. 154b.
44. Ibid., p. 161a.
45. Ibid., p. 169a. A long discussion impossible to summarise here.

becomes trainee. That which was formerly trainee then becomes trained. That which was formerly trained then becomes trainee.[46]

(29) The characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*) are all unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*).[47]

If the substance (*dravya*) of the characteristics of conditioned things were conditioned, it would be weak by nature (*bhāva*) and would then not be able to cause things to arise, endure, change and cease. It is because the substance of the characteristics of conditioned things is unconditioned that, being very powerful by nature, it can then cause things to arise, endure, change and cease.

(30) Adherence to observances and rituals (*śīlavrataparāmarśa*) and doubt (*vicikitsā*) are bad (*akuśala*) in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) and undefined (*avyākṛta*) in the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) and the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*).[48]

If a thing (*dharma*) is devoid of self-respect (*hrī*) and modesty (*apatrāpya*) and if its own-nature (*svabhāva*) is associated (*saṃprayukta*) with the absence of self-respect and modesty, that absence of self-respect and modesty which incurs the fruit of streamwinner (*srotāpannaphala*) is bad. Since, in the realm of form and the formless realm, the defilements (*kleśa*) are not like that, they are therefore undefined.

(31) Things (*dharma*) are included (*saṃgṛhita*) in the nature of other things (*parabhāva*) but are not included in their own-nature (*svabhāva*).[49]

It is said in a sūtra: 'Among the five faculties (*indriya*), the faculty of wisdom (*prajñendriya*) is the best'. The faculty of wisdom can understand the other four faculties, but it is different from them. Several other similar sūtras are cited in support of this thesis.

(32) The four fruits of the religious life (*śrāmaṇyaphala*) are unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) only.[50]

It is said in a sūtra that the four fruits are the definitive abandonment of various fetters (*saṃyojana*). Consequently, the four fruits are unconditioned.

46. Ibid., p. 169a. A long discussion impossible to summarise here.
47. Ibid., pp. 198a, 977b–c.
48. Ibid., p. 260b.
49. Ibid., pp. 306b, 841b. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* I, pp. 33–4.
50. T 1545, pp. 312c, 336a–337a.

(33) The substance (*dravya*) of time (*kāla*) is different to that of conditioned things (*saṃskāra*).[51]

The substance of conditioned things is impermanent (*anitya*). The substance of time is permanent (*nitya*). Impermanent conditioned things function in permanent time.

(34) The supreme worldly dharmas (*laukikāgradharma*) are manifested in continuity (*saṃtati*) and are not instantaneous (*ekacittakṣaṇika*).[52]

In all there are three kinds of continuity: the continuity of time (*kālasaṃtati*), the continuity of arising (*utpādasaṃtati*) and the continuity of sameness (*samasaṃtati*). The supreme worldly dharmas, although they do not concern the first two, concern the last.

(35) The two fetters (*saṃyojana*) of envy (*īrṣyā*) and selfishness (*matsara*) also exist in the Brahma world (*brahmaloka*).[53]

This thesis relies on a sūtra in which the Devarāja Mahābrahma says to the Brahmas, 'We have no need to go to where the monk Gautama is residing to pay homage to him and listen to the Dharma, but we will stay here and it will come about that you will be delivered from birth, old age and death and that you will realise eternal cessation and peace'. By saying this, King Brahma had his thoughts bound by the fetters of envy and selfishness.

(36) An undefiled (*akliṣṭa*) mind (*citta*) also ensures the continuity (*saṃtati*) of existences (*bhava*).[54]

In fact, the bodhisattva enters his mother's womb with right knowledge (*samyagjñāna*), he dwells there and emerges with right knowledge. Consequently, he is conceived with an undefiled mind, and that undefiled mind ensures the continuity of his existences.

(37) The *srotāpannas* and the *sakṛdāgāmins* also acquire the basic attainments (*maulasamāpatti*).[55]

It is said in a sūtra: 'There is no wisdom (*prajñā*) without absorptive meditation (*dhyāna*) and there is no absorptive meditation without wisdom. Those who possess both go to Nirvāṇa and do not stray from it'. The

51. Ibid., pp. 393a and 700a.
52. Ibid., p. 20b.
53. Ibid., p. 271b.
54. Ibid., pp. 308c, 309a.
55. Ibid., p. 693bc.

srotāpannas and *sakṛdāgāmins,* not being devoid of wisdom, therefore possess the basic attainments.

(38) The latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) are seeds (*bīja*) of the obsessions (*paryavasthāna*). The obsessions arise from the latent tendencies.[56]

(39) The own-nature (*svabhāva*) of the latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) is dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayukta*).[57]

(40) The own-nature (*svabhāva*) of the obsessions (*paryavasthāna*) is associated with thought (*cittasaṃprayukta*).[58]

(41) There is a consciousness constituent of existence (*bhavaṅgavijñāna*), a cause (*hetu*) of existence.[59]

This consciousness constituent of existence is identical to that which is accepted by the Theravādins and it would constitute a forerunner of the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) of the Mahāyāna.

A study of the agreements and disagreements of the Vibhajyavādins of the *Vibhāṣā* with the other schools gives the following result:[60]

Schools	Agree	Disagree	Schools	Agree	Disagree
Mahāsāṃghikas	16	0	Andhakas	8	3
Mahīśāsakas	10	0	Pūrvaśailas	2	2
Dārṣṭāntikas	6	0	Vātsīputrīyas	3	3
Śāriputrābhidharma	11	5	Sammatīyas	1	5
Theravādins	5	15	Sarvāstivādins	0	40

What should especially be considered, in view of our ignorance regarding the teaching of the majority of the schools, is less the figures themselves than the relationship between the agreements and disagreements. The

56. Ibid., p. 313a.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. LVP, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 179.
60. The ignorance in which we find ourselves regarding the majority of the theses of many schools obviously falsifies the figures which should be considered, in both columns, as minima.

agreement with the Mahāsāṃghikas[61] and Mahīśāsakas is quite remarkable. Neither should we neglect the partial agreements with the *Śāriputrābhidharma,* the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Andhakas.

Let us examine the hypothesis suggested at one and the same time by Vasubandhu, Saṃghabhadra and Vinītadeva: Are the Vibhajyavādins Kāśyapīyas? The investigation we have just done showed that the Vibhajyavādins were closely connected, from the doctrinal point of view, with the Mahāsāṃghikas on the one hand, and with the Mahīśāsakas and Dharmaguptakas on the other. In fact, the combined evidence of Vasumitra, Bhavya and the *Śāriputrābhidharma* tends to prove that the Kāśyapīyas' teaching, which was very close to that of the Dharmaguptakas, must have been related like the latter to that of the Mahāsāṃghikas. This therefore confirms the evidence of Vasubandhu, Saṃghabhadra and Vinītadeva: the Kāśyapīyas were Vibhajyavādins.

However, were the Kāśyapīyas the only Vibhajyavādins? In contrast to the three above-named authors, the first two at least of which were very well informed, those of the *Vibhāṣā* do not attribute to the Vibhajyavādins any thesis which could be given in other respects as pertaining to the Kāśyapīyas. Better still, they attribute by name, and several times, to the Kāśyapīyas only their basic thesis on ontology.[62] Consequently, the authors of the *Vibhāṣā* clearly distinguish the Kāśyapīyas from the Vibhajyavādins and if, for them, the Kāśyapīyas are Vibhajyavādins, they are certainly not the only Vibhajyavādins.

The *Vibhāṣā* equally distinguishes the latter from the Mahāsāṃghikas, Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas, Dārṣṭāntikas and Vātsīputrīyas, all of whom are named several times. Furthermore, the same theses are sometimes attributed jointly to the Vibhajyavādins *and* Dārṣṭāntikas (four times), or Mahāsāṃghikas (once), or Vātsīputrīyas (once), which does indeed seem to prove that, in the minds of the authors of the *Vibhāṣā,* the Vibhajyavādins were distinct and outside those three schools. In two other cases, the *Vibhāṣā* ascribes different theses to the Dharmaguptakas and Vibhajyavādins, which also seems to prove that the Vibhajyavādins were distinct from the Dharmaguptakas, unless we should understand here

61. Cf. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," p. 49, note.
62. T 1545, pp. 96b, 263c, 741b; T 1546, p. 204c.

that the Dharmaguptakas held, in these two cases, opinions different from those of *other* Vibhajyavādins. This last hypothesis is all the more plausible in that, in both cases, the opinions credited to the Dharmaguptakas and Vibhajyavādins testify to close links between the two schools.

Is it possible to conclude that heretics designated by the name of Vibhajyavādins in the *Vibhāṣā* are indeed the Kāśyapīyas, Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas and related schools together? There is in fact nothing against this, but a scruple still holds us back. Indeed, the *Vibhāṣā* denounces some dozen times, without ever naming those who upheld it, the ontological thesis of the early Mahīśāsakas, Theravādins, Mahāsāṃghikas and Sautrāntikas: 'The past (*atīta*) and the future (*anāgata*) have no real existence',[63] but this thesis is always linked to the following one, with which it forms an obvious, indissoluble whole: 'The present (*pratyutpanna*) is unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*)'.[64] In fact, the second part of this thesis is totally unknown elsewhere. Indeed, here is what is, according to the four translations of Vasumitra, the second part of the Mahīśāsakas' ontological thesis: 'The present *and* the unconditioned exist', and, according to Bhavya, 'the state of present conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) exists'. Neither in the numerous passages from both Chinese translations of the *Vibhāṣā,* nor in the Chinese and Tibetan translations of the treatises by Vasumitra and Bhavya, do we find the slightest indication that might cause us to suspect an error in one or the other.[65] Moreover, the commentaries given by both sides leave no doubt, if such could have existed, on the exact meaning of the two theses. Could it be two expressions of the same theory? We do not know. If there is no disagreement between these two theses, neither is there the necessary agreement. It is therefore not possible to know for sure if both were upheld by the same scholars. Nonetheless, we note that the form given in the *Vibhāṣā,* 'the present is unconditioned', is directly linked with thesis 33 of the Vibhajyavādins: 'time, which is permanent, is different from conditioned things, which are impermanent'. In fact, the unconditioned is always considered as permanent and absolute. The thesis of unknown origin can therefore be stated thus: 'the present is permanent',

63. T 1545, pp. 65b, 74b, 85b, 190a, 393a, 919a–c, etc.; T 1546, pp. 75c, 142c, 293c, etc.

64. Ibid.

65. Moreover, Xuanzang translated both the *Vibhāṣā* and Vasubandhu's treatise.

which is identical to thesis 33 of the Vibhajyavādins. This thesis of time, or of the present, eternal and absolute, in which conditioned things move and are transformed, is inconsistent with the thesis of *sarvāstivāda,* as has been clearly seen by the *Vibhāṣā,* which refutes it. Consequently, the thesis of unknown origin and thesis 33 of the Vibhajyavādins both derive from one and the same concept of absolute and inert time, in contrast to the tripartite and essentially functional time of the Sarvāstivādins. Besides, if the Darṣṭāntikas are indeed Sautrāntikas, as everything leads us to believe, they must have maintained like the latter that the past and future do not exist (thesis 10) and, since they were in agreement with the Vibhajyavādins in asserting that time is permanent, therefore absolute, and distinct from the aggregates, this constitutes further proof of the close relationship existing between the two theses in question. The thesis of unknown origin is therefore indeed a Vibhajyavādin thesis and is closely linked, through its first part, to the ontological thesis of the Mahīśāsakas.[66]

However, it ensues that the Vibhajyavādins of the *Vibhāṣā* are in very clear disagreement with the Kāśyapīyas, therefore with the Vibhajyavādins of Vasubandhu, Saṃghabhadra and Vinītadeva, from whom they must con-

66. If this theory is not that of all the Mahīśāsakas, it was nonetheless maintained by one school of the latter or by an associated subschool. However, this last cannot be either that of the Kāśyapīyas or the Theravādins, whose positions regarding the problem of ontology are well known and clearly different. Neither does it seem as if this theory was that of the Dharmaguptakas, since the *Śāriputrābhidharma* is silent on the question of ontology. Therefore, there remain the Tāmraśātīyas, about whom we know nothing, and the Mahīśāsakas, or rather a somewhat dissident school of the latter which remains unknown to us. Or again, this theory is that of the Mahīśāsakas of a certain period, that in which the *Vibhāṣā* was compiled, about 200 CE, since it is clearly in the evolutionary line of the ontological thesis of the early Mahīśāsakas just as Vasumitra and Bhavya have transmitted it to us. We should further note that according to these two authors, the Mahāsāṃghikas, like the Mahīśāsakas, denied the existence of the past and future. Consequently, the Vibhajyavādins, Mahīśāsakas, Theravādins, Mahāsāṃghikas, Sautrāntikas and Dārṣṭāntikas taught the same ontological doctrine: the past and future do not exist.

However, a mystery remains: Why does this thesis, denounced a dozen times in the *Vibhāṣā*, remain anonymous there while, as we know, it was maintained by the Mahīśāsakas, Mahāsāṃghikas, Sautrāntikas and Vibhajyavādins, who are often named in other places? Were the authors of the *Vibhāṣā* unaware that all these schools taught this ontological theory? It is most unlikely that their vast erudition failed on this major point. One can only get lost in conjecture on the cause of this undoubtedly strange silence.

sequently be considered as distinct. Since it is impossible that either the authors of the *Vibhāṣā* or Vasubandhu and his more orthodox adversary Saṃghabhadra, all major scholars whose great erudition is reflected in their works, should each be mistaken, it is therefore certain that none of them designated by the name of Vibhajyavādin a precise school but merely a group of schools. Besides, how could the *Vibhāṣā* attribute forty theses to those, moreover nearly unknown, Vibhajyavādins, while it denounces only six Mahāsāṃghika theses, one Mahīśāsaka, four Dharmaguptaka and eleven Vātsīputrīya, all schools whose great importance is undeniable. It could be objected that it attributes twice as many of them to the Dārṣṭāntikas but, in this last case, it was a matter of 'family quarrels', the Dārṣṭāntikas seeming to have emerged directly from the Sarvāstivādins and only recently.

It could further be objected that the *Vibhāṣā* attributes three clearly Lokottaravādin theses to the Vibhajyavādins (theses 2, 12 and 13). This could indeed be an obstacle if thesis 2, by far the most characteristic of the three, were not attributed to the Vibhajyavādins *and* Mahāsāṃghikas. That little conjunction here is of great importance. It proves on the one hand that the *Vibhāṣā* clearly distinguished the Vibhajyavādins from the Mahāsāṃghikas, and on the other that the influence of the latter on the former was extremely strong.[67] Hence there is no longer any opposition to attributing to the Vibhajyavādins the two Lokottaravādin theses and, with all the more reason, the other thirteen Mahāsāṃghika theses, which were, moreover, also maintained by the Mahīśāsakas or Dharmaguptakas.

The Sarvāstivādins (authors of the *Vibhāṣā,* Vasubandhu, Saṃghabhadra) are therefore in agreement with the Theravādins in designating by the name of Vibhajyavādins the group of non-Vātsīputrīya Sthaviras who opposed the *sarvāstivāda,* that is, the Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas, Kāśyapīyas and Tāmrasātīyas, not forgetting the Theravādins themselves. This does not mean that all the schools thus defined accepted wholesale all the theses attributed to the Vibhajyavādins. In contrast to Buddhaghosa, the authors are unfortunately never specific: *certain* Vibhajyavādins or *certain* Mahāsāṃghikas. This omission is too systematic for us to consider this correction as possible throughout.

67. This had already been noted by T. Kimura. See Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," p. 49, note.

Purely for documentary purposes these are the theses ascribed by Vinītadeva to the Vibhajyavādins:

(1) The person (*pudgala*) exists in the absolute sense (*paramārtha*).

This is the basic and characteristic thesis of the Vātsīputrīya group.

(2) What is past (*atīta*) and does not pertain to things whose fruit (*phala*) has not yet ripened does not exist. The future (*anāgata*) other than the fruit [which has not yet ripened] does not exist.

This is the basic and characteristic thesis of the Kāśyapīyas.

(3) The present (*pratyutpanna*) which does not have an equal class does not exist.

The meaning of this thesis is obscure.

(4) Things (*dharma*) do not become immediate causes (*samanantarahetu*).[68]

(5) Neither is there a discernable cause (*sabhāgahetu*) of form (*rūpa*).

This is apparently thesis 1 of the Dārṣṭāntikas.

Finally, we should add that, according to Tāranātha, the Vibhajyavādins and Kāśyapīyas had disappeared by the seventh century.[69]

68. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* II, pp. 300–6.

69. Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte,* p. 175.

CHAPTER 29

The Mahīśāsakas

All our sources agree in considering the Mahīśāsakas as the main school which emerged from the Sthavira trunk after the successive schisms of the Haimavatas, Vātsīputrīyas and Sarvāstivādins. If, in keeping with the Sammatīya and Mahāsāṃghika traditions cited by Bhavya and, it also seems, with the Sinhalese tradition, the Sthaviras who refused to accept the Sarvāstivādin doctrine are designated by the name of Vibhajyavādins, the Mahīśāsakas constitute the most important school of that group.

Depending on the spellings and translations, their name can be interpreted differently: those who govern, instruct or correct the land (*mahīśāsaka*), those who instruct a great deal (*mahāsāsaka*), those whose food is buffalo (Pāli, *mahisāsaka*), the great ones who cannot be forsaken (*mahāśeṣya*), great archers (*maheṣvāsaka*). Bhavya (first list) explains their name thus: 'Governing (*śāsant*) according to the teaching (*anuśāsana*) [come] from the sound of the word "auspiciousness of the land" (*mahībhadra*), and teaching (*anuśāsant*) the non-arising (*anutpāda*) of existence (*bhava*) to the great multitude of beings (*sattva*), they are called Mahīśāsakas'. Kuiji gives another explanation: 'The founding master of this school was the king of a country who governed (*aśāt*) the territory (*mahī*) of a kingdom. As he governed the people of that territory, he was called governor of the land (*mahīśāsaka*). He deserted his kingdom and left home in order to disseminate the Teaching (*dharma*) of the Buddha everywhere. Hence the name of the school of Mahīśāsakas. Paramārtha calls it the school of the correctors of the land (*mahīśāsaka*), the origin of which was a master who was a king and corrected and directed a territory. He deserted the latter and disseminated the Dharma; that is why he was called corrector of the land'.[1] Paramārtha also

1. Kuiji, II, p. 7b.

says that the founder of the Mahīśāsaka school was a converted brahmin who decorated the Buddhist texts with the aid of Vedic style and Sanskrit grammar.[2] Przyluski attempted to explain their name by comparing it with that of the Mahiṣamaṇḍala, 'the land of buffaloes', a region in Mahiṣmatī, present-day Maheshwar, on the Narbadā.[3] If his identification of the Mahīśāsakas with the Mahāvantakas rests on an error in the Chinese *Mahāvyutpatti*, as we have seen,[4] his hypothesis has some established facts in its favour: the presence of the Mahīśāsakas in the Deccan, Nāgārjunikoṇḍa and Vanavāsī is attested by an inscription,[5] and their presence in Ceylon by the fact that it was in that island that Faxian found their Vinaya-piṭaka.[6] It is highly probable that the Mahīśāsakas resided in the Narbadā basin shortly after the Sarvāstivādin schism which gave rise to them, that is, in the reign of Aśoka, and together with the Theravādins from whom they were not yet distinguished. It is possible, as Przyluski indicates, that their name was derived from a geographical term, Mahiṣamaṇḍala, which designated that region, and the word Mahīśāsaka was a noble name created on a misinterpretation of the Prākrit term for the first Mahīśāsakas.

We have very little evidence on the lands where they resided. An inscription in Nāgārjunikoṇḍa, dated the 11th year of King Vāseṭhiputa Siri Ehuvala, of the Ikṣvāku dynasty (third century CE), notes a donation made by the queen of Vanavāsī to masters of the Mahīśāsaka school.[7] In about 412, Faxian found their Vinaya-piṭaka in Ceylon. An inscription from Kura, south of Takṣaśilā, dating from the reign of Mahārāja Tōramāṇa Shāhi Jaūvla (about 490) mentions a gift to the Mahīśāsakas.[8] In 630, Xuanzang met in Uḍḍiyāna some Mahāyāna monks who still taught their Vinaya-piṭaka together with those of the Dharmaguptakas, Kāśyapīyas, Sarvāstivādins and Mahāsāṃghikas,[9] but nowhere does he note their presence in India. In the last quarter of the seventh century, Yijing states that then no

2. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," p. 23.
3. Przyluski, *Concile de Rājagṛha*, pp. 322–5.
4. See above, part one, ch. 1.
5. Sastri, *Ep. Ind.* XX, Delhi 1929–30, p. 25.
6. Legge, *Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms*, p. 111.
7. Sastri, *Ep. Ind.* XX, p. 25.
8. *Ep. Ind.* I, p. 238.
9. Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels* I, p. 226.

more Mahīśāsakas were to be found in India proper, or in Ceylon, but a few groups of them could still be encountered in Uḍḍiyāna (certainly those recorded by Xuanzang), Karashahr, Khotan and the Sunda Islands [Indonesia] and south China.[10]

Two later sūtras attest the existence, in the northwest of India, doubtless more precisely in Uḍḍiyāna, of a community in which five schools lived in perfect harmony: the Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas, Kāśyapīyas, Sarvāstivādins and Mahāsāṃghikas. According to these works, the Mahīśāsakas were distinguished by their blue robes and their talent for penetrating the subtlety of absorptive meditation (*dhyāna*) by pursuing what was abstract and obscure.[11] In the words of another later sūtra, the Mahīśāsakas did not conceive notions (*saṃjñā*) of earth (*pṛthivī*), water (*apas*), fire (*tejas*), wind (*vāyu*), space (*ākāśa*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*).[12]

Of their literature, only their Vinaya-piṭaka has come down to us, translated into Chinese.[13] This work is very close to the Pāli Vinaya-piṭaka of the Theravādins, which is evidence of the close link existing between the two schools.[14] Their Vinaya-piṭaka mentions a Sūtra-piṭaka formed of five *Āgamas: Dīrgha, Madhyama, Saṃyukta, Ekottara* and *Kṣudraka,* but it does not anywhere record the existence of an Abhidharma-piṭaka, as an attentive study reveals.[15] The only two passages in which the word Abhidharma occurs concern the discipline of that name and not the canonical work devoted to it. In contrast, it mentions several times together the Vinaya and the Dharma, that is, the Sūtras.[16] It is therefore certain that the Mahīśāsakas' Vinaya-piṭaka was definitively fixed before their Abhidharma-piṭaka was completed and incorporated into the canon, if indeed it existed at all. This absence of an Abhidharma-piṭaka in which the doctrine of the schools should have been fixed could well explain the great divergences that Vasumitra notes between the doctrines of the successive Mahīśāsaka

10. Takakusu, *Record of the Buddhist Religion*, pp. xxiv, 7 ff.
11. T 1465, p. 900c; T 1470, p. 926a. Lin, *Aide-Mémoire*, pp. 80–1.
12. T 387, p. 26b. Lin, *Aide-Mémoire*, p. 300.
13. T 1421 and 1422, translated by Buddhajīva in 424.
14. Przyluski, *Concile de Rājagṛha*, pp. 315, 316, 322, 330, 340, 363; Hofinger, *Étude sur le concile de Vaiśālī*, pp. 167, 190, 192, 193, 194, 237, 238, 240, 250.
15. Przyluski, *Concile de Rājagṛha*, pp. 147, 148; T 1421, p. 191a.
16. Ibid., pp. 139 and 159.

schools, as well as the differences which seemed to have existed between the southern school, known to Buddhaghosa, and the northern school, known to Vasumitra.

If, since it is most likely, the Mahīśāsakas and Theravādins at first only constituted a single school, that of the Vibhajyavādins, it must be admitted that what we know of the doctrine of the former is fairly different from that of the latter. This last seems more archaic, which might be explained by the insular isolation in relation to the Theravādins in about the second century BCE. It seems that the Theravādins were a small group of the Vibhajyavādins who lived in Ceylon from the end of the third century or the beginning of the second century BCE, and the Mahīśāsakas the one which dwelled on the Indian subcontinent and whose doctrine evolved more rapidly.

These are the theses of the Mahīśāsakas:

(1) The past (*atīta*) and future (*anāgata*) do not exist. The present (*pratyutpanna*) and unconditioned things (*asaṃskṛta*) exist.[17]

(2) There is clear comprehension (*abhisamaya*) of the Four Noble Truths (*āryasatya*) a single time. When one sees the Truth of Suffering (*duḥkhasatya*), one can see all the Truths.[18]

When, by means of the path of vision (*darśanamārga*), one clearly comprehends the common aspects (*ākāra*) of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and impersonality (*anātmya*), one penetrates the Four Truths with that clear comprehension. If one has clearly and distinctly comprehended the own-aspects of the Four Truths, when, in the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*), one sees the Truth of Suffering, one can clearly comprehend the other three Truths. Just as mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) can take as object the five aggregates (*skandha*) and ten material (*rūpin*) spheres (*āyatana*), and at one and the same time it can cognise them distinctly, one can, by means of the path that is no longer that of vision, see the principles of the Truths which one has already clearly comprehended together.

(3) The latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) are neither thoughts (*citta*) nor men-

17. Vasumitra, thesis 1; Bhavya, thesis 1; Vinītadeva, thesis 1: neither the past, future nor present do not exist (this is certainly a mistake). See above, thesis 7 of the Theravādins.
18. Vasumitra, thesis 2; Bhavya, thesis 2; Vinītadeva, thesis 2.

tal factors (*caitta*), nor endowed with objects (*ālambana*). Their own-nature is dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayukta*).[19]

(4) The latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) are different from the obsessions (*paryavasthāna*). The own-nature of the obsessions is associated with thought (*cittasaṃprayukta*).[20]

(5) Worldlings (*pṛthagjana*) cannot abandon either craving for sense-pleasures (*kāmarāga*) or ill-will (*vyāpāda*).[21]

(6) There is no heretic (*tīrthika*) who can acquire the five superknowledges (*abhijñā*).[22]

Because of their false (*mithyā*) teaching (*deśanā*), heretics cannot acquire the five superknowledges. If some of them can fly in the sky and perform other wonders, it is only by using the power of magical formulas, drugs or spirits.

(7) There is no pure conduct (*brahmacaryā*) among the gods (*deva*).[23]

The reason for this is because the gods enjoy many pleasures, particularly sense-pleasures.

(8) There is no intermediate existence (*antarābhava*).[24]

(9) Among the arhats, too, there is an accumulation of merit (*puṇyopacaya*).[25]

(10) The five kinds of sense consciousness (*vijñāna*) are both endowed with craving (*sarāga*) and devoid of craving (*virāga*).[26]

That the five kinds of consciousness are endowed with craving goes without saying, since it is through their intermediary that cravings ensnare a being. But the sense-consciousnesses also enable one to see the Buddha, hear his Dharma, etc., which enables a being to enter the holy Path and cultivate it. Consequently, the five kinds of sense-consciousness are also devoid of craving.

19. Vasumitra, thesis 3; Vinītadeva, thesis 7.
20. Vasumitra, thesis 3; Bhavya, thesis 3.
21. Vasumitra, thesis 4; Vinītadeva, thesis 3; Bhavya, thesis 10, says the opposite, certainly wrongly.
22. Vasumitra, thesis 5.
23. Ibid., thesis 6; Vinītadeva, thesis 4; Bhavya, thesis 5, says the opposite.
24. Vasumitra, thesis 7; Bhavya, thesis 4; Vinītadeva, thesis 5.
25. Bhavya, thesis 6; Vinītadeva, thesis 6; Vasumitra, thesis 8, says the opposite.
26. Vasumitra, thesis 9; Bhavya, thesis 7.

(11) The six kinds of consciousness (*vijñāna*) are associated (*samprayukta*) with reasoning (*vitarka*) and deliberation (*vicāra*).[27]

(12) There is also a person (*pudgala*) who is 'even-headed' (*samaśīrṣin*).[28]

The person who is 'even-headed' is a nonreturner (*anāgāmin*). He is reborn in the highest stage (*bhūmi*) [the sphere of neither perception nor nonperception (*nevasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana*)] and cannot arouse the pure (*anāsrava*) Noble Path (*āryamārga*) [of the stages] below it. Here he takes the fruit of the trained (*aśaikṣaphala*) [that is, of the arhat] and when he comes to the desired end of his life, all the fetters (*saṃyojana*) are exhausted by themselves, he becomes an arhat and attains Parinirvāṇa. He is called 'even-headed' because of the head [culminating point, final end] of his births and deaths [because he reaches death and final deliverance at the same time]. Being on the last stage, he wins to the supreme sphere (*āyatana*), then to the sphere of the non-arisen (*anutpanna*), although he does not arouse the Noble Path, and he obtains the fruit of the trained.[29]

(13) There is no worldly (*laukika*) faculty of faith (*śraddhendriya*).[30]

There is no faculty of faith that could be worldly since worldly faith is not firm, it is changeable and does not increase. It cannot therefore be called a sovereign faculty (*indriya*).

(14) There is no transcendental (*lokottara*) absorption (*dhyāna*).[31]

The absorptions are coarse (*sthūla*). Heretics (*tīrthika*) and worldlings (*pṛthagjana*) can obtain them in entirety. A distinction should be made between the absorptions, which are impure (*sāsrava*), from the attainments (*samāpatti*), which are pure (*anāsrava*) and by means of which one enters the path of vision (*darśanamārga*).

(15) There is no pure (*anāsrava*) reasoning (*vitarka*) or deliberation (*vicāra*).[32]

27. Vasumitra, thesis 10. Kuiji does not comment on this thesis. See *Vibhaṅga*, Ch. III, 3, for the Theravādins, and LVP, *Kośa* I, pp. 59–60 and 173–6, for the Sarvāstivādins.
28. Vasumitra, thesis 11; Bhavya, thesis 8.
29. Kuiji, III, p. 33b.
30. Vasumitra, thesis 12. *Kathāvatthu* XIX, 8. The Tibetan and the Chinese version by Xuanzang add: there is a worldly right view (*samyagdṛṣṭi*). The other two Chinese versions say the opposite.
31. Vasumitra, thesis 13.
32. Ibid.

Reasoning, being coarse (*sthūla*), is only impure (*sāsrava*). Deliberation is subtle (*sūkṣma*) and penetrates the eight constituents (*aṅga*) of the pure Path (*mārga*). However, right deliberation is only an impure auxiliary of the constituents of the Path. It is called a constituent of the Path but in reality it is not so.[33]

(16) The good (*kuśala*) is not a cause of existence (*bhavahetu*).[34]

The good is not an efficient and correct cause of births and deaths. If it helps bad (*akuśala*) actions (*karman*) to lead men and gods to take on rebirths, it is an established principle that a correct cause cannot fructify in the three kinds of existence (*bhava*). If one is reborn in the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) and the formless realm (*arūpadhātu*), it is because the influence of subtle and bad actions has been helped by the good, since bad actions penetrate the realms of form and the formless.[35]

(17) The streamwinner (*srotāpanna*) is subject to regression (*parihāṇi*). The arhat is certainly not subject to regression.[36]

The streamwinner may fall back since he has just acquired the Path and he still possesses delusion (*moha*). The arhat cannot fall back since, for him, the Path is complete.

(18) The constituents of the Path (*mārgāṅga*) are all included (*saṃgṛhīta*) in the applications of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*).[37]

The applications of mindfulness, being associated with wisdom (*prajñā-saṃprayukta*), are mental factors (*caitta*) like the constituents of the Path.

(19) Unconditioned things (*asaṃskṛta*) are of nine kinds: (1) cessation through acquired knowledge (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*); (2) cessation without acquired knowledge (*apratisaṃkhyānirodha*); (3) space (*ākāśa*); (4) immobility (*āneñjya*); (5) the suchness of good things (*kuśaladharmatathatā*); (6) the suchness of bad things (*akuśaladharmatathatā*); (7) the suchness of undefined things (*avyākṛtatathatā*); (8) the suchness of the Path (*mārgatathatā*); (9) the suchness of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpādatathatā*).[38]

33. Kuiji, III, p. 35a.
34. Vasumitra, thesis 14.
35. Kuiji, III, p. 35a–b.
36. Vasumitra, thesis 15.
37. Ibid., thesis 16.
38. Ibid., thesis 17; Vinītadeva, thesis 8. *Kathāvatthu* II, 11; VI, 2 and 6.

(20) From conception until death, the great elements (*mahābhūta*) of the faculties (*indriya*), thought (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) evolve.[39]

In the interval of time between conception and death, thought and mental factors, the faculties and great elements are transformed just as milk (*kṣīra*) is transformed into curds (*dadhi*). Since their nature (*bhāva*) is not born and does not die instantaneously (*kṣaṇa*), there is transformation. All conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*) are therefore not instantaneously destroyed.[40]

Because, in the community (*saṃgha*) there is the Buddha, a gift (*dāna*) made to the community yields a great fruit (*mahāphala*), but not a gift made especially to the Buddha.[41]

The Buddha is in the Saṃgha, since he counts among the religious (*śramaṇa*). Having long since entered Nirvāṇa, he cannot in any way enjoy a gift made to him, and that is why that gift does not yield a great fruit. In contrast, a gift to the Saṃgha profits the latter, since it consists of living beings who enjoy it, and consequently that gift is very meritorious and yields a great fruit.

(22) The Buddhas and Śrāvakas have the same Path (*mārga*) and same deliverance (*vimukti*).[42]

Although there are differences between the knowledges (*jñāna*) of the Buddha and those of the Listeners, the substance of the Path does not change whether it is followed by the former or the latter; its nature remains the same and it functions equally well on various levels. The deliverance of the Buddha and that of the Listeners are identical to cessation through acquired knowledge (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*).

(23) All conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*) are entirely destroyed at every instant (*kṣaṇikaniruddha*) and are of no duration (*sthiti*).[43]

(24) Neither thought (*citta*), nor mental factors (*caitta*) nor any thing (*dharma*) whatsoever pass (*saṃkrānti*) from this world (*asmallokāt*) to another world (*paraṃ lokaṃ*).[44]

39. Vasumitra, thesis 18.
40. Kuiji, III, p. 37a. However, see below, thesis 23.
41. Vasumitra, thesis 19; Bhavya, thesis 11; Vinītadeva, thesis 9. T 1646, p. 258c.
42. Vasumitra, thesis 20; Bhavya, thesis 12; Vinītadeva, thesis 10.
43. Vasumitra, thesis 21; Bhavya, theses 15 and 17.
44. Vasumitra, thesis 22; Bhavya, thesis 14.

Since all things are instantaneously destroyed (*kṣaṇikaniruddha*), they cannot pass on.

(25) Thought (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) can know each other.[45]

There are two kinds of wisdom (*prajñā*) that arise at the same time: one is associated [with thought (*citta*]*saṃprayukta*), the other is dissociated [from thought (*citta*]*viprayukta*). The former knows the latter, and reciprocally.

(26) The form (*rūpa*) of him who is equipped with the Path (*maggasamaṅgī*) is the Path (*magga*).[46]

Since right speech (*sammāvācā*), right conduct (*sammākammanta*) and right livelihood (*sammājīva*), which are form, are part of the Path, the form of him who is equipped with the Path is therefore the Path.

(27) Form (*rūpa*) is good (*kusala*) or bad (*akusala*).[47]

Bodily action (*kāyakamma*) and vocal action (*vacīkamma*) are good or bad. Consequently, the form of bodily intimation (*kāyaviññatti*) and vocal intimation (*vacīviññatti*), which is considered as being part of bodily and vocal actions, is good or bad.

(28) Form (*rūpa*) is action (*kamma*). Bodily action (*kāyakamma*) having as its origin (*samuṭṭhita*) a good (*kusala*) thought (*citta*) is good form.[48]

Bodily action and vocal action (*vacīkamma*) are precisely considered as intimation (*viññatti*) by the body (*kāya*) or by the voice (*vacī*). If its origin is good (*kusalasamuṭṭhāna*), it is good, and if its origin is bad (*akusalasamuṭṭhāna*) it is bad (*akusala*). This thesis is linked to the previous one.

(29) One passes (*saṅkamati*) directly from one absorption (*jhāna*) to another absorption.[49]

The Buddha said, 'The monk (*bhikkhu*), as soon as he is freed (*vivicceva*) from desires (*kāma*) . . . having attained (*upasampajja*) the first absorption, he dwells [there] (*viharati*); through the stilling (*vūpasama*) of reasoning (*vitakka*) and deliberation (*vicāra*), having attained the second absorption . . . the third absorption . . . the fourth absorption, he dwells [there]'. Consequently, one passes directly from one absorption to another without

45. *Vibhāṣā*, T 1545, p. 42c.
46. *Kathāvatthu* X, 2 [cor.].
47. Ibid. XVI, 7.
48. Ibid. VIII, 9. Also see below, thesis 5 of the second series.
49. Ibid. XVIII, 6.

(*vinā*) there being an appearance of stages of access (*upacārappavatti*) from one to another.

(30) The Path (*magga*) is fivefold (*pañcaṅgika*).[50]

Right speech (*sammāvācā*), right conduct (*sammākammanta*) and right livelihood (*sammājīva*) form a separate whole, which should not be included in the Path since it is dissociated from thought (*cittavippayutta*). The Path is therefore fivefold rather than eightfold.

(31) The streamwinner (*srotāpanna*) acquires absorptive meditation (*dhyāna*).[51]

(32) The person (*pudgala*) does not see (*na paśyati*).[52]

(33) The action (*karman*) which can increase conditioned things (*saṃskāra*) is birth (*jāti*).[53]

(34) There is no thing (*dharma*) that can be destroyed (*vinaṣṭa*).[54]

(35) Having seen (*dṛṣṭvā*) conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*), one enters the absence of delusions.[55]

Although this thesis is not accompanied by a commentary, it is easy to understand it. It is a corollary of thesis 2 above. An investigation of conditioned things reveals that they are suffering (*duḥkha*), empty (*śūnya*), impersonal (*anātmaka*) and impermanent (*anitya*). This investigation therefore is equivalent to that of the Truth of Suffering (*duḥkhasatya*) by means of which one enters the Path (*mārga*) of Deliverance (*vimukti*).

(36) The supreme worldly dharmas (*laukikāgradharma*) are included (*paryāpanna*) in the three realms (*dhātu*).[56]

In fact, when in a land (*bhūmi*) there is knowledge of exhaustion (*kṣayajñāna*), a good root (*kuśalamūla*), cultivable (*bhāvayitavya*), on that land there are supreme worldly dharmas.

50. Ibid. XX, 5.
51. Bhavya, thesis 9.
52. Ibid., thesis 13.
53. Ibid., thesis 16. Due to the lack of a commentary, the meaning of this thesis remains enigmatic.
54. Ibid., thesis 19. This thesis seems to be a corollary of thesis 23 averring the instantaneity of all conditioned things.
55. Ibid., thesis 22.
56. *Vibhāṣā*, T 1545, p. 14a; T 1546, p. 9b: this thesis is missing.

(37) There is an aggregate which endures until the end of the round of rebirth (*saṃsārakoṭiniṣṭhaskandha*).[57]

This is a forerunner of the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) of the Mahāyāna. According to the Mahīśāsakas, there are three kinds of aggregates: (1) aggregates which only last an instant (*kṣaṇaskandha*); (2) aggregates which endure for a whole existence (*ekajanmāvadhiskandha*), such as the sense organs (*indriya*) etc.; (3) the aggregate that endures until the end of the round of rebirth.

(38) There are beings who begin (*ādyutpanna*), who are not born from actions (*karman*) and defilements (*kleśa*). Once the first existence is past, they are born from actions and defilements. Since they are born in great numbers, the Buddha is not exhausted.[58]

These are the theses which Vasumitra attributes to the secondary or later school of the Mahīśāsakas:

(1) The past (*atīta*) and future (*anāgata*) truly exist.[59]

This thesis contradicts thesis 1 above. It is the fundamental thesis of the Sarvāstivādins. It is possible that certain Mahīśāsakas were incorporated into the Sarvāstivādins, at a time it is impossible for us to specify, but which must have been around the beginning of the Common Era.

(2) There is an intermediate existence (*antarābhava*).[60]

This thesis contradicts thesis 8 above. It is again a Sarvāstivādin thesis.

(3) The sphere of mental phenomena (*dharmāyatana*) is entirely knowable (*jñeya*) and perceptible by consciousness (*vijñeya*).[61]

Again, a Sarvāstivādin thesis.

(4) Action (*karman*) is in reality will (*cetanā*). There is no bodily action (*kāyakarman*) or vocal action (*vākkarman*).[62]

(5) Action (*karman*) is in conformity with thought (*yathācitta*).[63]

This is a corollary of the preceding thesis.

57. LVP, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, p. 180.
58. Ibid., p. 809.
59. Vasumitra, thesis 1 of the second series.
60. Ibid., thesis 2 of the second series.
61. Ibid., thesis 3 of the second series.
62. Ibid., thesis 4 of the second series; Bhavya, thesis 18. See LVP, *Kośa* IV, p. 2 ff.
63. Bhavya, thesis 18.

(6) Reasoning (*vitarka*) and deliberation (*vicāra*) are associated (*saṃprayukta*) [with thought (*citta*)].[64]

This is again a Sarvāstivādin thesis.

(7) The great element (*mahādhātu*) earth (*pṛthivī*) lasts (*tiṣṭhati*) for a cosmic period (*kalpa*).[65]

The great element earth lasts for a *kalpa*, since it is not instantaneously destroyed (*kṣaṇikaniruddha*).[66] This thesis therefore contradicts thesis 23 above.

(8) Paying homage (*pūjā*) to a reliquary (*stūpa*) does not yield fruit (*phala*), or [just] a small fruit.[67]

(9) The own-nature (*svabhāva*) of the latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) remains perpetually (*sadā*) present (*pratyutpanna*).[68]

The own-nature of the tendencies always remains in the present because it gives rise (*utpadyati*) to all things (*dharma*). Although it has passed, it does not abandon the present.[69]

(10) The aggregates (*skandha*), spheres (*āyatana*) and elements (*dhātu*) are also perpetually (*sadā*) present (*pratyutpanna*).[70]

Only seeds (*bīja*) that are perpetually present can give rise (*utpadyanti*) to things (*dharma*). That is why the aggregates, spheres and elements are perpetually present.[71] This thesis is closely linked to the preceding one. It seems related to the thesis of *sarvāstivāda* (1 above) adopted by the later Mahīśāsakas.

(11) The secondary Mahīśāsaka school was divided when debating the interpretation of the following stanza (*gāthā*):

> *Five things* (dharma) *can assuredly cause attachment.*
> *Suffering* (duḥkha) *arises from them:*
> *Ignorance* (avidyā), *desire* (kāma), *thirst* (tṛṣṇā),
> *The five speculative views* (dṛṣṭi) *and actions* (karman).[72]

64. Vasumitra, thesis 5 of the second series. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* I, pp. 59–60 and 173–6.
65. Vasumitra, thesis 6 of the second series.
66. Kuiji, III, p. 39b.
67. Vasumitra, thesis 7 of the second series; Bhavya, thesis 20.
68. Vasumitra, thesis 8 of the second series; Bhavya, thesis 21.
69. Kuiji, III, p. 40a.
70. Vasumitra, thesis 9 of the second series.
71. Kuiji, III, p. 40a.
72. Vasumitra, thesis 10 of the second series.

Five things bind beings (*sattva*) and prevent then from leaving the cycle of births and deaths. All sufferings arise from and are produced by these five things: (1) ignorance (*avidyā*), that is, ignorance of the three realms (*dhātu*); (2) desire (*kāma*); (3) the thirst (*tṛṣṇā*) for the [realms] of form (*rūpa*) and the formless (*arūpa*); (4) the five speculative views (*dṛṣṭi*), that is, the view of individuality (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*), etc., [extremist views (*antagrāhadṛṣṭi*), false views (*mithyādṛṣṭi*), adherence to false views (*dṛṣṭiparāmarśa*), adherence to observances and rituals (*śīlavrataparāmarśa*)];[73] (5) actions (*karman*), that is, the three actions [of body (*kāya*), speech (*vāc*) and mind (*manas*)].—Why are only those five things named, and how many actions are there?—Because it was said above (thesis 16) that the good (*kuśala*) is not a cause of existence (*bhavahetu*) and that the absence of merit (*puṇya*) does not set action in motion. By means of the path of vision (*darśanamārga*), one triumphs over the five speculative views the principal obstructors of which were manifested in the head. By means of the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*), one triumphs over desire and thirst the objects of which were manifested in the head. The principles which dwell inside the objects of the five speculative views are the three realms (*dhātu*) inasmuch as they are identical through their characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*). It is only to summarise that the five speculative views are spoken of. The objects of desire and thirst also have the characteristics of conditioned things, but each of them is distinct from the others. The objects of the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) are the external (*bāhya*) sense-doors (*dvāra*) [that is, the five objective domains (*viṣaya*) of the senses]. The objects of the two higher realms are the internal (*ādhyātmika*) sense-doors [that is, the body (*kāya*)]. That is why desire is distinguished from thirst. Hence, those two kinds [of path (*mārga*)], vision (*darśana*) and cultivation (*bhāvanā*), have different uses. However, although those two paths are fully used in order to triumph over the root (*mūla*), that is, ignorance (*avidyā*), since [their field of action] is limited, the other delusions (*moha*) are not included among the latter. Furthermore, ignorance is the link (*aṅga*) of ignorance [in the *pratītyasamutpāda*], desire and thirst are the link of thirst, the five speculative views are the link of clinging (*upādāna*). Because of the increase of the latter, action gives rise to mental formations (*saṃskāra*) and existence

73. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* V, pp. 15–18.

(*bhava*). Because those five things can always cause clinging, one acquires consciousness (*vijñāna*), etc., up to birth (*jāti*). Moreover, it is only because of bad (*akuśala*) actions that one is born in the two higher realms, since those bad actions are subtle (*sūkṣma*). Good (*kuśala*) things help them to ripen in higher births. Since there is no ripening due to good actions in the two higher realms, the expression 'actions' designates [bad actions] of body, speech and mind.[74]

74. Kuiji, III, pp. 40b–41b.

CHAPTER 30

The Dharmaguptakas

All our sources make the Dharmaguptakas a school which separated from the Mahīśāsakas, in the course of the third century EN according to those from the north. From an investigation of their doctrine, it seems that the origin of the schism concerned the relationship between the Buddha and the Saṃgha and the merit of respective gifts to one or the other.

The name Dharmaguptaka means 'he who protects, or preserves, the Teaching'.[1] It is often found written Dharmagupta, which means in contrast 'he who is protected by the Teaching'. The latter name was borne by several more or less famous personages in the history of Buddhism, particularly by two translators, one at the beginning of the fifth century CE, the other, better known, at the end of the sixth century and beginning of the seventh,[2] and by a Sinhalese master whom Faxian met in Ceylon at the beginning of the fifth century.[3] In this case, the school took its name from that of its teacher, another Dharmagupta.[4]

Paramārtha says that the Dharmaguptas, derived from the Mahīśāsaka school, had a canon in four or five baskets, adding to the classical Tripiṭaka a bodhisattva-piṭaka, containing an account of the previous careers of the bodhisattvas, and even, it seems, a Dhāraṇī-piṭaka or Mantra-piṭaka enclosing magical formulae. They took their name from their founder, Dharmagupta, but intentionally claimed as their master Maudgalyāyana, the great wonder-worker disciple of the Buddha, of whom their founder Dharma-

1. Lévi and Chavannes, "Les seize Arhats protecteurs de la Loi," pp. 5–50, 189–304.
2. Bagchi, *Le Canon bouddhique*, pp. 174–5 and 464–7.
3. Legge, *Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms*, p. 107.
4. This is the opinion of the Sthaviras cited by Bhavya (1st list) and also Paramārtha and Kuiji.

gupta had been a fervent disciple.[5] Some indications seem to prove that the Dharmaguptakas had indeed an especial veneration for Maudgalyāyana,[6] which fits in with the insertion, at least at a particular time, of a Dhāraṇī-piṭaka into the canon.

No inscription or evidence from the Chinese pilgrims inform us about their domain in India. In the seventh century, Xuanzang and Yijing found traces of them in Uḍḍiyāṇa. The former records that in that region five Vinayas, including that of the Dharmaguptakas, were still being taught by monks belonging to the Mahāyāna, particularly expert in *dhāraṇīs* and *mantras*, and who recited their books without penetrating the profound meaning.[7] Yijing did not encounter them in India itself but, in small groups, in Uḍḍiyāṇa and Central Asia, especially in southern and eastern China.[8]

Basing himself on the fact that the different parts of the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya were imported into China by Sogdian, Parthian and Kashmiri monks, Przyluski claims that their domain lay in western India.[9]

Even though our knowledge of the Indian domain of the Dharmaguptakas is reduced to hypotheses, we are fortunate in possessing a major part of their canonical literature.

Their Vinaya-piṭaka gives us the structure of their canon. It is a normal Tripiṭaka and not, as Paramārtha and Kuiji claim, a canon of five baskets, or rather, if the latter existed, it was only compiled later and adopted only by the Mahāyānist school of Dharmaguptakas. In the early period, their canon consisted of the following[10] [see top figure on p. 256].

The preface to the Chinese translation of the *Dīrghāgama* briefly describes thus the canon which we have good reason to believe to be of Dharmaguptaka origin[11] [see bottom figure on p. 256].

5. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 23, 61 and 62.
6. Ibid., p. 61, note.
7. Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels* I, p. 226.
8. Takakusu, *Record of the Buddhist Religion*, pp. xxiv, 7 ff.
9. Przyluski, *Concile de Rājagṛha*, p. 326. He cites other indications: possible identity between Dharmagupta and Dharmarakṣita who won over Aparāntaka and Sindh, etc.
10. T 1428, p. 968b; Przyluski, *Concile de Rājagṛha*, pp. 194–5 and 354.
11. T 1, p. 1a; Przyluski, *Concile de Rājagṛha*, p. 355. This canon contains a Vinaya in four parts, which is characteristic of that of the Dharmaguptakas, which also has ten recitations. Furthermore, the translator of this Vinaya, Buddhayaśas, is also that of the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya.

I	Vinaya-piṭaka	(1) *Bhikṣupratimokṣa* (2) *Bhikṣuṇīpratimokṣa* (3) *Khandhaka* (4) *Ekottara*
II	Sūtra-piṭaka	(1) *Dīrghāgama* (2) *Madhyamāgama* (3) *Ekottarāgama* (4) *Saṃyuktāgama* (5) *Kṣudrakāgama*
III	Abhidharma-piṭaka	(1) *Sapraśnaka* ('with difficulties') (2) *Apraśnaka* ('without difficulties') (3) *Saṃgrahasaṃyukta* (4) *Prasthāna*

I	Vinaya-piṭaka	4 sections and 10 recitations
II	Dharmalakṣaṇābhidharma-piṭaka	4 sections and 5 recitations
III	Sūtra-piṭaka	(1) *Ekottarāgama*: 4 sections and 8 recitations. (2) *Madhyamāgama*: 4 sections and 5 recitations. (3) *Saṃyuktāgama*: 4 sections and 10 recitations. (4) *Dīrghāgama*: 4 sections and 4 recitations, 30 sūtras.

What characterises the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya-piṭaka is its division into four parts. As we can see, it seems that the Dharmaguptakas had a tendency to split up their canon according to a division into four sections. This is what mainly distinguishes this canon from that of the Haimavatas.[12]

We certainly possess the Vinaya-piṭaka of this canon, translated into Chinese by Buddhayaśas in Changan in the early years of the fifth century CE. We probably also possess its *Dīrghāgama*, translated by the same Buddhayaśas, and Abhidharma-piṭaka, also translated at the same time in Changan by Dharmayaśas and Dharmagupta, and which has been preserved for us under the name of *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra*.[13]

If the general layout of this canon is notably different, at first sight, from

12. See above, ch. 18.
13. See Bareau, "Les origines du Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra," pp. 69–95.

that of the Sarvāstivādin and Theravādin canons, a careful investigation shows that the same parts and same sūtras as in the other two are found in it, but arranged differently. As might be expected, the greatest divergences are seen in a comparison of the three Abhidharma-piṭakas. The doctrine of that of the Dharmaguptakas differs quite clearly from that of the other two, as we shall see.

Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva state their particular opinions on certain great problems in Buddhism:

(1) The Buddha is not included (*paryāpanna*) in the Saṃgha. That is why a gift (*dāna*) to the Buddha yields a great fruit (*mahāphala*), but not a gift to the Saṃgha.[14]

The intrinsic value of the Buddha is greatly superior to that of the Saṃgha. In fact, the latter is provided with a superior (*sottara*), whereas the Buddha is supreme, without a superior (*anuttara*). A gift to the Buddha yields a great fruit, not that to the Saṃgha, because of the rule according to which the merit of a gift is in proportion to the value of the recipient. On the other hand, the intention of making a gift to the Buddha contains in itself undeniable spiritual advantages by concentrating all thoughts on homage to the Buddha alone.

(2) Although the deliverance (*vimukti*) of the Buddha is identical to that of the listeners (*śrāvaka*), their paths (*mārga*) are different.[15]

(3) Heretics (*tīrthika*) cannot acquire the five superknowledges (*abhijñā*).[16]

(4) The body (*kāya*) of an arhat is totally pure (*anāsrava*).[17]

The body of an arhat is pure in two senses: (1) its support (*āśraya*) is devoid of impurities (*āsrava*) because the aggregates (*skandha*) of the trained (*aśaikṣa*) do not give rise to impurities; (2) its objective domains (*viṣaya*) are devoid of impurities because they do not give rise to or increase other impurities.

(5) Even among the gods (*deva*) there is pure conduct (*brahmacārya*).[18]

14. Vasumitra, thesis 1, says the opposite, except in the Qin translation. However, Bhavya, thesis 1, and Vinītadeva, thesis 1, confirm it.
15. Vasumitra, thesis 2; Vinītadeva, thesis 2.
16. Vasumitra, thesis 3; Vinītadeva, thesis 3. See thesis 6 of the Mahīśāsakas.
17. Vasumitra, thesis 4; Vinītadeva, thesis 4.
18. Bhavya, thesis 2.

(6) Homage (*pūjā*) paid to a reliquary (*stūpa*) yields a very great fruit (*bṛhatphala*).[19]

The relics (*śarīra*) of the Buddha contained in the monument represent the Buddha symbolically. Moreover, the latter declared that there is no difference between the relics and the Buddha himself. He himself stated that he would accept gifts which were offered to the relics. The latter can therefore but yield a very great fruit.

(7) There are worldly (*laukika*) things (*dharma*).[20]

This last thesis does not seem to be original, since all the schools know two categories of *laukika* dharmas. Some are dharmas subjected to the vicissitudes of the world (*loka*), in contrast to the *lokottara* or transcendental dharmas, which are the Path (*mārga*) and unconditioned things (*asaṃskṛta*). Others are the eight dharmas pertaining to the world of rebirth: prosperity and ruin, blame and praise, denigration and celebrity, sadness and happiness. Possibly the Dharmaguptakas possessed a third category of worldly dharmas, which were peculiar to them and of which we are unaware.

(8) The supreme worldly dharmas (*laukikāgradharma*) are included (*paryāpanna*) in the three realms (*dhātu*) and not included (*aparyāpanna*) in the three realms.[21]

Since these things are called worldly (*laukika*), they are therefore included in the three realms. Since, on the other hand, they are called supreme (*agra*), they are not included in the three realms.

(9) Thought (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) can know things associated with thought (*cittasaṃprayukta*).[22]

Wisdom (*prajñā*) can know things associated with thought.

(10) The own-nature (*svabhāva*) of bodily strength (*kāyabala*) is vigour (*vīrya*). The own-nature of bodily weakness is indolence (*kausīdya*).[23]

(11) Three characteristics of conditioned things (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*) are conditioned (*saṃskṛta*). Only the characteristic of cessation (*nirodhalakṣaṇa*) is unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*).[24]

19. Vasumitra, thesis 1 (translations by Xuanzang and Paramārtha).
20. Bhavya, thesis 3.
21. T 1545, p. 14a; T 1546, p. 9b.
22. Ibid., p. 42c.
23. Ibid., p. 154b–c.
24. Ibid., p. 198a.

The nature (*bhāva*) of the characteristics is impermanent (*anitya*), because the nature of conditioned things is weak. That is why it cannot cause things (*dharma*) to cease (*nirundhati*). Because the nature of the latter is unconditioned, it is strong and consequently able to cause things to cease.

(12) It is only by means of signless concentration (*animittasamādhi*) that one can enter the certainty of rightness (*samyaktvaniyāma*).[25]

(13) Dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) is unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*).[26]

Finally, Vasumitra notes that their doctrine was very close to that of the Mahāsāṃghikas, which is surprising at first, since the Dharmaguptakas emerged from the Sthavira group.

A study of the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* is particularly interesting because its doctrine is very different from those of the Abhidharma-piṭakas of the Sarvāstivādins and Theravādins, and, in contrast, very close to those of the Mahāsāṃghikas, Mahīśāsakas and Vibhajyavādins. These are the most interesting theses found there:

(1) The person (*pudgala*) is merely a designation (*prajñapti*).[27] The person consists of eyes (*cakṣus*), ears (*srotra*), a nose (*ghrāna*), a tongue (*jihva*), a body (*kāya*) and a mind (*manas*) which are [together] designated as a person.

The eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body and mind are not the person. Outside the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body and mind there is no person either. It is the same as a house which consists of beams, rafters, partitions and walls, which are [together] designated as a house. The beams, rafters, partitions and walls are not the house. Outside the beams, rafters, partitions and walls, there is no house either.

(2) Knowledge (*jñāna*) and concentration (*samādhi*) which have as their objective domain (*viṣaya*) the past (*atīta*) and the future (*anāgata*) are called devoid of objective domain (*aviṣaya*).[28]

25. Ibid., p. 927c.
26. T 1566, p. 62a; T 1567, p. 136a.
27. T 1548, p. 626c. The same demonstration is repeated several times, with different comparisons. In the same passage, *ātman*, translated by *wo*, is distinguished from *pudgala*, translated by *ren*.
28. Ibid., pp. 593c and 717a–b. See *Kathāvatthu* IX, 6 and 7, thesis 14 of the Uttarāpathakas.

This is a direct corollary of the implicit thesis according to which the past and the future have no real existence.

(3) The career of the Buddha and that of the *śrāvakas* are clearly distinct.[29]

The *śrāvakas* listen to others, receive instruction from others, enquire from others, listen to the teaching of others; they do not meditate or reflect or reason themselves; they enter the certainty of rightness (*samyaktvaniyāma*); they obtain the fruits (*phala*) of *srotāpanna, sakṛdāgāmin, anāgāmin* and *arhat*. The Pratyekabuddhas do not have the thirty-two marks (*lakṣaṇa*) of a Great Man; they do not listen to others, do not receive instruction from others, do not enquire from others, do not listen to the teaching of others; they meditate, reflect and reason themselves; they enter the certainty of rightness; they obtain the fruits of *srotāpanna, sakṛdāgāmin, anāgāmin* and *arhat*; they do not see and know all things unhindered, they do not acquire sovereignty through their power, nor eminence, nor supremacy;[30] they do not acquire full, perfect and supreme Awakening (*anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi*); they do not practise perfectly either the ten powers (*bala*) of the Tathāgata, or the four kinds of fearlessness (*abhaya*), or great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*), and they do not set turning the Wheel of the Dharma (*dharmacakraṃ pravartayanti*). The bodhisattvas possess the thirty-two marks; they do not listen to others, do not receive instruction from others, do not enquire from others, do not listen to the teaching of others; they meditate, reflect and reason themselves; they know and see all things unhindered; they are destined to become Samyaksaṃbuddhas, that is, by their own power to obtain sovereignty, eminence, supremacy, to attain full, perfect and supreme Awakening, to practise perfectly the ten powers of the Tathāgata, the four kinds of fearlessness, great compassion and to set turning the Wheel of the Dharma.

(4) The intermediate existence (*antarābhava*) does not exist.[31]

The *antaraparinirvāyin* is defined thus: '. . . because of his former actions, he must necessarily be reborn by receiving a divine body . . . in that divine body, he is an *antaraparinirvāyin*. . . . When his life is finished in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*), he is reborn above, among the gods of the realm of

29. T 1548, p. 585a–b.

30. The old Japanese version, in contrast, grants them omniscience, sovereignty, eminence and supremacy.

31. T 1548, p. 587b.

form (*rūpadhātu*). In that divine life (*āyus*), in the abandonment of things, he is a *parinirvāyin*'.

(5) The defilements (*kleśa*), therefore the latent tendencies (*anuśaya*), are dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayukta*); they do not arise with thought (*na cittasahajāta*), they do not endure with thought (*na cittasahasthita*), they do not cease with thought (*na cittasahaniruddha*).[32]

(6) The nature (*bhāva*) of thought (*citta*) is clear (*prabhāsvara*). It is adventitious defilements (*āgantukleśa*) that sully it.[33]

(7) The five faculties (*indriya*) of faith (*śraddhā*), vigour (*vīrya*), mindfulness (*smṛti*), concentration (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*prajñā*) are exclusively not included (*aparyāpanna*) in the three realms and, consequently, exclusively transcendental (*lokottara*) and never worldly (*laukika*).[34]

(8) Right view (*samyagdṛṣṭi*) is, like all the constituents of the Path (*mārgāṅga*), exclusively not included (*aparyāpanna*) in the three realms and, consequently, exclusively transcendental (*lokottara*) and never worldly (*laukika*).[35]

(9) The form (*rūpa*) of the Holy One is the Path (*mārga*).[36]

The Truth of the Path (*mārgasatya*) that is form (*rūpin*) is: right speech (*samyagvāc*), right conduct (*samyakkarmānta*), right livelihood (*samyagājīva*), right bodily effort (*samyakkāyavyāyāma*).[37]

(10) There are nine unconditioned things (*asaṃskṛta*): cessation through acquired knowledge (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*), cessation without acquired knowledge (*apratisaṃkhyānirodha*), certainty (*niyāma*), the stability of things (*dharmasthitatā*), dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), the sphere of the infinity of space (*ākāśānantyāyatana*), the sphere of the infinity of consciousness (*vijñānānantyāyatana*), the sphere of nothingness (*akiñcanyāyatana*), the sphere of neither perception nor nonperception (*naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana*).[38]

(11) The four fruits of the religious life (*śrāmaṇyaphala*) are identified

32. Ibid., p. 690b.
33. Ibid., p. 697b.
34. Ibid., p. 567c.
35. Ibid., p. 559b.
36. Ibid., pp. 554c and 552a.
37. Ibid., pp. 531b–c and 540a–b.
38. Ibid., pp. 526c, 529c, 535a, 538b, 663b–c, 613a.

with Nirvāṇa and, which comes to the same thing, with cessation through acquired knowledge (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*). Consequently, they are unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) only.[39]

(12) Cessation through acquired knowledge (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*), that is, Nirvāṇa, is good (*kuśala*) and either in training (*śaikṣa*) or trained (*aśaikṣa*).[40]

(13) There is form (*rūpa*) in the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*): the morality (*śīla*) of body (*kāya*) and speech (*vāc*), non-intimation (*avijñapti*), bodily effort (*kāyavyāyāma*), bodily lightness (*kāyalaghutva*), all of them impure (*sāsrava*).[41]

(14) Form (*rūpa*) is, like all the aggregates (*skandha*), good (*kuśala*), bad (*akuśala*) or undefined (*avyākṛta*).[42]

Good form is that which should be cultivated, which is engendered by good thoughts (*citta*), bodily intimation (*kāyavijñapti*), vocal intimation (*vāgvijñapti*), bodily morality (*kāyaśīla*), vocal morality (*vākśīla*), non-intimation (*avijñapti*), bodily effort (*kāyavyāyāma*), bodily lightness (*kāyalaghutva*), right speech (*samyagvāc*), right conduct (*samyakkarmānta*), right livelihood (*samyagājīva*), right bodily lightness (*samyakkāyalaghutva*). Bad form is that which should be abandoned, which is engendered by bad thoughts, bodily intimation, vocal intimation, bodily and vocal immorality (*duḥśīla*), non-intimation, impure (*sāsrava*) bodily effort. Undefined form is that which is neither fruition nor a thing of the formula of fruition (*naivavipākanavipākadharma*), the spheres (*āyatana*) of the eye (*cakṣus*), ear (*śrotra*), nose (*ghrāna*), tongue (*jihva*), body (*kāya*), odours (*gandha*), flavours (*rasa*) and tangibles (*spraṣṭavya*), lovely (*śubha*) or unlovely (*aśubha*) forms (*rūpa*), etc., lovely or unlovely sounds (*śabda*), etc., form engendered by undefined thoughts, bodily intimation, vocal intimation.

(15) In the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*) there are the spheres (*āyatana*) and elements (*dhātu*) of the eye (*cakṣus*), ear (*śrotra*), body (*kāya*), forms (*rūpa*), sounds (*śabda*), tangibles (*spraṣṭavya*), and the elements of eye-consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*), ear-consciousness (*śrotravijñāna*) and bodily consciousness (*kāyavijñāna*), as well as the spheres and elements of the mind (*manas*)

39. Ibid., pp. 526c, 553c, 613a.
40. Ibid., p. 557c.
41. Ibid., p. 552a.
42. Ibid., p. 549a–b.

and mental phenomena (*dharma*), and the element of mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*).[43]

(16) In the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*) there exist only the spheres (*āyatana*) and elements (*dhātu*) of the mind (*manas*) and mental phenomena (*dharma*), and the element of mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*).[44]

(17) The five kinds of sense-consciousness (*vijñāna*) are exclusively endowed with craving (*sarāga*).[45]

(18) There are only five destinies (*gati*).[46]

(19) There is pure conduct (*brahmacarya*) among the gods (*deva*).[47]

Only the gods who have a long life (*dīrghāyus*), that is, the Asaṃjñins, cannot practise pure conduct.

(20) Form (*rūpa*) is fruition (*vipāka*).[48]

Form that is fruition consists of the spheres (*āyatana*) of the eye (*cakṣus*), ear (*śrotra*), nose (*ghrāna*), tongue (*jihva*), body (*kāya*), lovely (*śubha*) or unlovely (*aśubha*) bodily forms (*rūpa*), etc., lovely or unlovely bodily sounds (*śabda*), etc., lovely or unlovely bodily odours (*gandha*), etc., bodily qualities, bodily or vocal intimations (*vijñapti*), bodily and vocal morality (*śīla*), non-intimation (*avijñapti*), bodily effort (*kāyavyāyāma*), bodily lightness (*kāyalaghutva*), right speech (*samyagvāc*), right conduct (*samyakkarmānta*), right livelihood (*samyagājīva*), right bodily effort, right bodily lightness.

(21) The life-faculty (*jīvitendriya*) is formless (*arūpin*).[49]

(22) Morality (*śīla*) is neither mental (*caitta*) nor consequent to thought (*cittānuparivartin*).[50]

Morality is exclusively formed (*rūpin*).

(23) Sound (*śabda*) is fruition (*vipāka*).[51]

Sound that is fruition is that which actions (*karman*) and defilements (*kleśa*) have engendered and which form an integral part of the personality

43. Ibid., pp. 533b and 542a.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., pp. 535c–536a.
46. Ibid., p. 690b.
47. Ibid., p. 654c.
48. Ibid., p. 550b.
49. Ibid., p. 561a.
50. Ibid., pp. 575a and 574c.
51. Ibid., pp. 531c, 540a–b.

(*ātmabhāva*), lovely or unlovely bodily sounds, those which are engendered by vocal intimation.

(24) The six sense spheres (*āyatana*) are fruition (*vipāka*).[52]

The five spheres of the eye (*cakṣus*), ear (*śrotra*), nose (*ghrāna*), tongue (*jihva*) and body (*kāya*) are exclusively fruition. The mental sphere is of three kinds.

(25) Form (*rūpa*) is seen (*paśyate*) by means of the eye (*cakṣus*).[53]

(26) A thought (*citta*) can last for a long time.[54]

In the diamond-like concentration (*vajropamasamādhi*), thought can last (*tiṣṭhati*) for an immeasurable (*apramāṇa*) time (*kāla*).

(27) The arhat has abandoned all the defilements (*kleśa*).[55]

(28) The earth element (*pṛthivīdhātu*) is fruition (*vipāka*) like the other great elements (*mahābhūta*).[56]

The great elements that are fruition are those which have been engendered by actions (*karman*) and defilements (*kleśa*) and which are an integral part of the personality (*ātmabhāva*).

(29) Form (*rūpa*) is cause (*hetu*) and caused (*sahetuka*).[57]

Form that is cause is that which is good or bad (see thesis 14).

(30) Noble (*ārya*) form (*rūpa*) is that which is derived from the great elements (*mahābhūta*).[58]

It is, in fact, form which is included in the Path (*mārga*) (see thesis 9).

(31) The sphere of mental phenomena (*dharmāyatana*) is entirely knowable (*jñeya*), comprehensible (*prajñeya*) and perceptible by consciousness (*vijñeya*).[59]

(32) The Truth of Cessation (*nirodhasatya*) alone is unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), the other three Truths are conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) only.[60]

(33) There are undefined (*avyākṛta*) things (*dharma*).[61]

52. Ibid., pp. 531b–c, 532a–b, 539a and 540b.
53. Ibid., pp. 525c, 534b, 560a, 588b.
54. Ibid., pp. 591b, 698a, 715a–b.
55. Ibid., p. 586a.
56. Ibid., p. 573b.
57. Ibid., p. 548b.
58. Ibid., pp. 545c–546a.
59. Ibid., p. 529c.
60. Ibid., p. 557a.
61. Ibid., p. 576c and passim.

(34) There is a non-intimation (*avijñapti*), which is mental action (*manokarman*) and forms part of the sphere of mental phenomena (*dharmāyatana*) included in the aggregate of form (*rūpaskandha*).[62]

(35) Noble (*ārya*) things (*dharma*) come to fruition (*vipāka*).[63]

Hence, the Truth of the Path (*mārgasatya*), the eight noble faculties (*indriya*) and the seven factors of awakening (*bodhyaṅga*) come to fruition.

(36) The candidate to the fruit (*phala*) of *srotāpanna* possesses the faculty of faith (*śraddhendriya*).[64]

(37) The four great elements (*mahābhūta*) are invisible (*anidarśana*).[65]

(38) All the faculties (*indriya*) are invisible (*anidarśana*).[66]

(39) There are things (*dharma*) included (*saṃgṛhita*) in others.[67]

(40) There are things (*dharma*) associated (*saṃprayukta*) with others.[68]

(41) The aggregates (*skandha*) are destroyed at death and consequently do not re-arise.[69]

(42) There are bodily actions (*kāyakarman*) and vocal actions (*vākkarman*) distinct from will (*cetanā*).[70]

(43) The three bad roots (*akuśalamūla*) are not actions (*karman*).[71]

(44) Form (*rūpa*) has no object (*anālambana*).[72]

(45) There are eight worldly (*laukika*) things (*dharma*): prosperity and ruin, blame and praise, denigration and celebrity, sadness and happiness.[73]

(46) There are six kinds of emptiness (*śūnyatā*).[74]

Internal emptiness (*adhyātmaśūnyatā*) concerns all internal things. External emptiness (*bahirdhāśūnyatā*) concerns all external things. Internal-external emptiness (*adhyātmabahirdhāśūnyatā*) concerns internal and external

62. Ibid., pp. 581a, 526c, 535a, 543a–b.
63. Ibid., pp. 555a, 562a–c, 568c.
64. Ibid., pp. 585c and 588b.
65. Ibid., p. 573a.
66. Ibid., p. 561b.
67. Ibid., pp. 661a–671b.
68. Ibid., pp. 671c–679a and passim.
69. Ibid., p. 552c.
70. Ibid., p. 581a.
71. Ibid., p. 570c.
72. Ibid., p. 547b.
73. Ibid., p. 654a–b.
74. Ibid., p. 633a–b.

things. The emptiness of emptiness (*śūnyatāśūnyatā*) concerns the object of the concentration (*samādhi*) on emptiness. Great emptiness (*mahāśūnyatā*) concerns all things. Emptiness in the absolute sense (*paramārthaśūnyatā*) concerns Nirvāṇa. It is a matter of the emptiness of the personal principle (*ātman*) and what pertains to it (*ātmaka*). That emptiness is permanent (*nitya*) and untransformable (*avipariṇāma*).

(47) The thirst for nonexistence (*vibhavatṛṣṇā*) is abandoned (*prahīṇa*) only by cultivation (*bhāvanā*), since it is not abandoned by vision (*darśana*).[75]

(48) Reasoning (*vitarka*) and deliberation (*vicāra*) are associated with thought (*cittasaṃprayukta*).[76]

(49) Will (*cetanā*) is not the only cause of fruition (*vipākahetu*), and feeling (*vedanā*) is not the only fruit of fruition (*vipākaphala*).[77]

All the aggregates (*skandha*) are both causes and fruits of fruition.

(50) Will (*cetanā*) is not thought (*citta*) but a mental factor (*caitta*).[78]

(51) Thought (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) are provided with an object (*sālambana*).[79]

(52) Consciousness (*vijñāna*), that is, thought (*citta*), cannot be said (*na vaktavya*) to be either associated with thought (*cittasaṃprayukta*) or dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayukta*).[80]

(53) Bodily action (*kāyakarman*) is invisible (*anidarśana*).[81]

(54) There are mental (*caitta*) things (*dharma*).[82]

(55) Old age and death (*jarāmaraṇa*) are neither fruition (*vipāka*) nor things of the formula of fruition (*vipākadharma*).[83]

(56) The divine eye (*divyacakṣus*) is clearly distinct from the fleshly eye (*maṃsacakṣus*).[84]

The fleshly eye is distinguished from the divine eye by the fact that it is made of matter derived from the four great elements (*mahābhūta*).

75. Ibid., p. 585c.
76. Ibid., pp. 545b and 547b.
77. Ibid., pp. 548b and 550b.
78. Ibid., p. 547b.
79. Ibid., p. 547b–c.
80. Ibid., p. 547b.
81. Ibid., pp. 545c and 547c.
82. Ibid., p. 576a and passim.
83. Ibid., pp. 545b and 550c.
84. Ibid., p. 593a.

(57) There is an 'even-headed' (*samaśīrṣin*) arhat.[85]

This is he who at the same time abandons the impurities (*āsrava*) and life (*āyus*).

(58) There are paths (*mārga*) with one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten or eleven constituents (*aṅga*).[86]

The singlefold path consists of a single application of mindfulness concerning the body (*kāyasmṛtyupasthāna*) due to which the fruits of the religious life (*śrāmaṇyaphala*) can be obtained. The twofold path consists of concentration (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*prajñā*). The threefold path consists of three contemplations of the first two attainments (*savitarkavicāra, avitarkavicāramātra, avitarkāvicāra*) or three transcendental (*lokottara*) contemplations (*śūnyatā, animitta, apraṇīdhāna*). The fourfold path consists of the four *smṛtyupasthānas,* four *samyakpradhānas,* four *ṛddhipādas,* etc. The fivefold path consists of the five *indriyas,* five *balas,* etc. The sixfold path consists of the six *smṛtis,* six *vidyāṅgas,* etc. The rest is similar.

(59) The Path (*mārga*) is either mental (*caitta*) or nonmental.[87]

The mental Path is formed of right view (*samyagdṛṣṭi*), right intention (*samyaksaṃkalpa*), right mental effort (*samyagmanovyāyāma*), right mindfulness (*samyaksmṛti*) and right concentration (*samyaksamādhi*).

(60) The Path (*mārga*) can be cultivated (*bhāvayitavya*).[88]

(61) Conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*) have as their characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) arising (*utpāda*), enduring (*sthiti*) and cessation (*nirodha*).[89]

(62) Unconditioned things (*asaṃskṛta*) are not causes (*hetu*).[90]

(63) The aggregate of mental formations (*saṃskāraskandha*) is either associated with thought (*cittasaṃprayukta*) or dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayukta*).[91]

(64) Life (*jīvita*) is neither a consequence of thought (*cittānuparivartin*) nor coexistent with thought (*cittasahabhū*).[92]

85. Ibid., p. 589b.
86. Ibid., p. 625a.
87. Ibid., pp. 555c, 556a.
88. Ibid., p. 557b.
89. Ibid., p. 633b.
90. Ibid., pp. 529c and 538a.
91. Ibid., p. 547b.
92. Ibid., p. 563b–c.

(65) The five kinds of sense-consciousness (*vijñāna*) are exclusively undefined (*avyākṛta*).[93]

(66) There are actions (*karman*) devoid of fruition (*avipāka*).[94]

(67) There are absorptions (*dhyāna*) not included (*aparyāpanna*) in the three realms, therefore transcendental (*lokottara*).[95]

(68) Reasoning (*vitarka*) and deliberation (*vicāra*) are either pure (*anāsrava*) or impure (*sāsrava*).[96]

(69) The five faculties (*indriya*) of faith (*śraddhā*), etc., are exclusively pure (*anāsrava*) and good (*kuśala*).[97]

(70) There is reasoning (*vitarka*) and deliberation (*vicāra*) only in the first absorption (*dhyāna*).[98]

(71) In thought (*citta*) there is no form (*rūpa*).[99]

(72) The kinds of morality (*śīla*) pertaining exclusively to the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*) are never transcendental (*lokottara*) and the Holy One can possess two kinds of morality, one worldly (*laukika*), the other transcendental (*lokottara*).[100]

(73) Restraint (*saṃvara*) is action (*karman*).[101]

(74) Aging and death (*jarāmaraṇa*) are never transcendental (*lokottara*), but are exclusively worldly (*laukika*).[102]

(75) Since the five kinds of sense-consciousness (*vijñāna*) do not pertain either to those in training (*śaikṣa*) or the trained (*aśaikṣa*), one does not cultivate the Path (*mārga*) while equipped with the five kinds of sense-consciousness (*pañcavijñānasamāṅgin*).[103]

(76) There is knowledge (*jñāna*) of the past (*atīta*), future (*anāgata*) and present (*pratyutpanna*).[104]

93. Ibid., p. 539a.
94. Ibid., p. 580b.
95. Ibid., pp. 718a and 552b.
96. Ibid., pp. 546a–b and 552b.
97. Ibid., pp. 561b–c and 564c.
98. Ibid., pp. 621b–624c.
99. Ibid., p. 545c.
100. Ibid., p. 575a.
101. Ibid., pp. 581a–b, 529a, 537c.
102. Ibid., pp. 552b and 559b.
103. Ibid., p. 539b.
104. Ibid., p. 594c.

(77) All the absorptions (*dhyāna*) have constituents (*aṅga*).[105]

(78) The candidate to the fruit (*phala*) of *srotāpanna* has not yet abandoned the obsessions (*paryavasthāna*) of speculative views (*dṛṣṭi*) and doubt (*vicikitsā*).[106]

(79) One does not enter Parinirvāna as soon as one is reborn (*upapadyate*).[107]

The *upapadyaparinirvāyin* is defined thus: 'because of his former actions, he necessarily receives a divine body . . . in that divine body, he is an *upapadyaparinirvāyin* . . . at the end of his life in the *kāmadhātu,* he is reborn above among the gods of the *rūpadhātu;* in that divine life (*āyus*), he experiences happiness (*sukha*) and much detachment (*virāga*), he is an *upapadyaparinirvāyin*'.

105. Ibid., pp. 621b to 624c.
106. Ibid., p. 585c.
107. Ibid., p. 586b–c.

CHAPTER 31

The Kāśyapīyas or Suvarṣakas

All the sources agree in having the Kāśyapīyas emerge among the Sthaviras, some time after the Sarvāstivādin schism. The sources from the northwest place their appearance at the end of the third century EN.

Vasumitra identifies the Kāśyapīyas with the Suvarṣakas. Paramārtha says that the latter took their name from their master Suvarṣa ['good year', or 'good rainy season retreat'] who supposedly made 'a collection of the words of the Buddha in two sections, in which successively and in parallel, on the one hand he refutes the heretics and on the other he combats the cravings of all beings'.[1]

Kuiji explains that the two names of the school derive from two proper names, one, Suvarṣa, of a brahmin, the other, Kāśyapa, of a sage (*ṛṣi*). He then gives several legendary explanations of these two names.[2]

Bhavya (first list) and Tāranātha[3] also explain the name of Kāśyapīya by the name of the school's master, Kāśyapa.

Some inscriptions note the presence of the Kāśyapīyas towards the middle of the third century CE in Takṣaśilā[4] and Bedadi, 200 km northeast of that town[5] and, towards the mid-fifth century, in Pālāṭu Ḍherī Jars, near Peshawar.[6] However, in the seventh century, Xuanzang, then Yijing, found their descendants, degenerated and gone over to the Mahāyāna, only in

1. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 62 and 23.
2. Kuiji, II, p. 9a.
3. Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte*, p. 273.
4. Konow, *Kharoṣṭhī Inscriptions*, p. 88.
5. Ibid., p. 89.
6. Ibid., pp. 120–2.

Uḍḍiyāṇa[7] and, outside India, in Karashahr and Khotan.[8] They therefore do not seem to have resided outside the extreme northwest of India.

According to certain works, the Kāśyapīyas wore robes the colour of *magnolia obovata*, that is, dark red, and they were distinguished for their courage and the diligence with which they protected and saved beings.[9]

We know little of their literature except for a small treatise on discipline (T 1460). According to certain indications, they seemed to have possessed a specific Vinaya-piṭaka.[10] Since Vasumitra and the Sammatīyas cited by Bhavya attest that their doctrine was very close to that of the Dharmaguptakas, we can suppose that they possessed a canon very similar to that of the latter. In particular, the *Vinayamātṛkā*,[11] which is attributed to the Haimavatas because it often mentions the Himalayas, and whose authors possessed a canon very close to that of the Dharmaguptakas, is perhaps a Kāśyapīya work. Their Sūtra-piṭaka must have been very similar, if not identical, to that of the Dharmaguptakas. As for an Abhidharma-piṭaka, it is possible that the Kāśyapīyas borrowed that of the Dharmaguptakas, that is, very probably the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra*, the few theses over which the two schools disagreed being consigned to postcanonical works, as is often the case.

These are their particular theses:

(1) Past (*atīta*) action (*karman*) whose fruit (*phala*) has not yet ripened (*avipāka*) exists. The rest of the past does not exist.[12]

This is their fundamental thesis, that which doubtless caused them to set themselves up as an autonomous school. It represents a compromise between the opinions of the Sarvāstivādins and those of the Mahīśāsakas and other Vibhajyavādins.

7. Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels* I, p. 226.
8. Takakusu, *Record of the Buddhist Religion*, pp. xxiv and 20. Tāranātha (Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte*, p. 175) confirms that in the seventh century, the Kāśyapīyas had disappeared.
9. T 1465, p. 900c; T 1470, p. 926a.
10. Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels* I, p. 226; Lin, *Aide-Mémoire*, pp. 189–92.
11. T 1463. Cf. above, ch. 18.
12. Vasumitra, thesis 2; Bhavya, thesis 1. *Kathāvatthu* I, 8; *Satyasiddhiśāstra*, T 1646, p. 258c; *Vibhāṣā*, T 1545, pp. 96b, 263c, 741b; T 1546, p. 204c. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* V, p. 52 (attributed to the Vibhajyavādins by Vasubandhu); Vinītadeva, theses 2 and 3 of the Vibhajyavādins.

It is the same, they said, as with plants: as long as a shoot has not sprouted, the seed exists, but, as soon as the shoot has appeared, the seed no longer exists.

(2) What consists of abandonment (*prahāṇa*) is perfectly known (*parijñā*). What does not consist of abandonment is not perfectly known.[13]

The three Tibetan translations of Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva, as well as the Qin Chinese translation of Vasumitra, agree in establishing the text as given. The Chinese versions of Vasumitra by Paramārtha and Xuanzang have a completely different, and most probably faulty, text: 'If a thing (*dharma*) is already abandoned (*prahīṇa*) and already completely known (*parijñā*), it does not exist. That which is not yet abandoned and not yet completely known exists'. This last proposition is then presented as a corollary to the first Kāśyapīya thesis and can be interpreted in this way: the defilements (*kleśa*) and impurities (*āsrava*) do not exist except when one is not delivered and they can then yield inauspicious fruit.

As for the thesis given by the other translators, and which is certainly more correct, it means that the abandonments (*prahāṇa*) are identical to the perfect knowledges (*parijñā*), that is, the perfect knowledges consisting of abandonment (*prahāṇaparijñā*) only exist, and that perfect knowledges consisting of knowledges (*jñānaparijñā*) do not exist, as is claimed, in contrast, by the Sarvāstivādins.[14] It therefore follows that, for the Kāśyapīyas, the fact of knowing perfectly a defilement or a craving is a necessary and sufficient condition for being delivered.

(3) Everything that is not conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) has the past (*atīta*) as its cause (*hetu*). Nothing that is conditioned has the future (*anāgata*) as its cause.[15]

This rejection of all finalism is directed at the theses of the Sautrāntikas and Sarvāstivādins in the terms of which future things can be causes of fruition (*vipākahetu*), similar causes (*sabhāgahetu*)[16] and efficient causes (*karaṇahetu*).[17] According to Kuiji, who comments on this opinion, the Kāśyapīyas even denied that the present (*pratyutpanna*) could be an efficient cause in relation to the future, as the Sarvāstivādins maintained.[18]

13. Vasumitra, thesis 1; Bhavya, thesis 2; Vinītadeva, thesis 1 of the Kāśyapīyas (after thesis 8 of the Mūlasarvāstivādins).
14. See LVP, *Kośa* V, pp. 110–18.
15. Vasumitra, thesis 3; Vinītadeva, thesis 2 of the Kāśyapīyas.
16. LVP, *Kośa* II, pp. 257–62.
17. Ibid., p. 247.

(4) The things (*dharma*) of those in training (*śaikṣa*) have fruits of fruition (*vipākaphala*).[19]

This proposition was directed at that according to which, for some schools, *śaikṣa* dharmas did not yield fruits, which could seem as such, that is, the *aśaikṣa* dharmas, being caused by former practices.[20]

(5) All conditioned things (*saṃskṛta*) are instantaneously destroyed (*kṣaṇikaniruddha*).[21]

Vasumitra and Bhavya attest that their other theses were, for the most part, similar to those of the Dharmaguptakas.

18. Kuiji, III, p. 45a–b.
19. Vasumitra, thesis 5; Vinītadeva, thesis 3 of the Kāśyapīyas.
20. Kuiji, III, pp. 45b–46a.
21. Vasumitra, thesis 4.

CHAPTER 32

The Tāmraśātīyas

These are only known to the generally later sources: the Sammatīyas and Mahāsāṃghikas cited by Bhavya, then Vinītadeva and the *Bhikṣu-varṣāgraprcchāsūtra.*

The first two sources, which are the oldest, place the Tāmraśātīyas alongside the Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas and Kāśyapīyas in the Vibhajyavādin group or subgroup, and clearly distinguish them from the Sautrāntikas or Saṅkrāntivādins who are, in contrast, closely linked with the Sarvāstivādins. Vinītadeva places them in the Sarvāstivādin group with the Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas, etc., while specifying that the Tāmraśātīyas are identical to the Saṅkrāntivādins. Finally, the last source places them, certainly wrongly, among the Sammatīya group.

Tāranātha indicates that the Tāmraśātīyas were identical to the Saṃkrāntivādins, Uttarīyas, Sautrāntikas and Darṣṭāntikas, which formed one and the same school. He adds that they still existed at the time of the Pāla kings (tenth century).[1]

Only Bhavya has transmitted one of their theses to us: 'The person (*pudgala*) does not exist'. This is as unoriginal as possible in Buddhism and teaches us nothing about this school.

Although Tāranātha claims that the school derived its name from that of its master and founder, the etymology seems rather to reveal that it owed it to its copper-coloured (*tāmra*) clothing (*śatī*). However, this last piece of information is of no use to us.

1. Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte*, pp. 273 and 274.

CHAPTER 33

The Theravādins of the Mahāvihāra

This school is by far the best known, for the important reason that it is still flourishing today in Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos and because it was thus able to preserve a very rich literature, the main works of which are well known in the West. By particularly fortunate chance, included in them are chronicles which recount the history of the school in Ceylon from the time of Aśoka onwards. Although not all the data of these chronicles should be blindly accepted, we can, with the aid of a healthy critique, retrace with some certainty the broad outline of that history which is not encumbered by legends—unfortunately too often the case in India.

Despite all the information we have on it, the origin of this school remains somewhat obscure. In fact, the Pāli word Theravādin corresponds to the Sanskrit Sthaviravādin, and the first European scholars who studied it identified the Theravādins with the Sthaviras, that is, with the most orthodox school, that which, it is said, remained strictly faithful to the teaching of the Buddha. It must be admitted that the archaic nature of certain parts of the doctrine and usages of the Theravādins seemed to confirm this identification. In reality, the problem is not so simple, since the canonical works of the school prove superabundantly that it had taken part in a great many controversies unknown to early Buddhism and that it was therefore clearly distinguished from the latter. If the Theravādins are not early Sthaviras, who are they? In the first place, it is a confusing question. In fact, not one of the lists of schools prior to the end of the seventh century CE, including that drawn up by the Theravādins themselves, mentions the latter among the twenty-odd schools of the Hīnayāna. It is only at the end of the seventh century that, in the lists of four groups, we see them appear, forming a separate group along with the Mahāsāṃghikas, Sarvāstivādins

and Sammatīyas. This school is recognisable from the three schools which compose it and which are precisely those of the Sinhalese Theravādins: Mahāvihāravāsins, Abhayagirivāsins and Jetavanīyas. This does not resolve the question since none of these schools are cited in the earlier lists either. If we did not have the Sinhalese Chronicles and their lists of schools, we would be tempted to consider this group of three schools as a later group, appearing in the seventh century CE or slightly earlier. We do, in fact, know from the chronicles and other evidence, that such is not the case. The Theravādins should therefore be identified with another school the name of which appears on the lists.

An examination of the theses peculiar to the Theravādins, as we know them from the *Kathāvatthu*, enables us to solve the question as posed. The Theravādins rejected the theses characteristic of the Mahāsāṃghikas, Vātsīputrīyas, Sarvāstivādins and Kāśyapīyas. They were part of the group of schools which emerged from the Sthavira trunk and which did not belong to either the subgroup of Vātsīputrīyas or that of the Sarvāstivādins. Their firm opposition to the latter is clearly asserted by the fact that they rejected the Kāśyapīyas' uncompromised thesis. They are therefore linked with the Mahīśāsakas and Dharmaguptakas. Even a superficial investigation of the doctrines shows that they should not be identified with either one or the other, certain of whose theses they rejected, but they are linked with the former.

This fact is confirmed by an examination of certain philological data. Messrs. Przyluski and Hofinger, in their studies on the first two councils, have shown how many of the accounts of these in the Theravādin Vinaya-piṭaka and that of the Mahīśāsakas are close.[1] Minayeff and de La Vallée Poussin note a Sinhalese tradition according to which the Theravādin canon was borrowed from the Mahīśāsakas.[2] Although this datum is clearly wrong, it is not without significance. Finally, the list of the schools supplied by the Sinhalese tradition differs from all the other lists in that it presents the Mahīśāsakas as one of the two mother schools, along with the Vātsīputrīyas, which emerged from the Sthavira trunk. In fact, it has the Sabbatthivādins,

1. Przyluski, *Concile de Rājagṛha*, pp. 307–332; Hofinger, *Étude sur le concile de Vaiśālī*, pp. 161–168.
2. LVP, *Bouddhisme, Études et matériaux*, p. 54.

Dhammaguttikas, Kassapikas, Saṅkantikas and Suttavādas derive from the Mahīśāsakas. This anomaly has as an exact match which is included in the list of the Sarvāstivādins of the northwest, which has all the Sthavira schools emerge from the Sarvāstivādins, the only exception being the Haimavatas. Finally, we should not forget that it was in Ceylon that Faxian found the Vinaya-piṭaka of the Mahīśāsakas in 412 CE.[3] All this shows that the Sinhalese tradition was strongly influenced by the Mahīśāsakas and that the latter resided in Ceylon and southern India. And yet, we repeat, the Theravādins are not Mahīśāsakas.

In the account of the Council of Pāṭaliputra according to the Sinhalese tradition, orthodoxy is represented by the Vibhajyavādins. In fact, the traditions of the Sammatīyas and Mahāsāṃghikas group under the name of Vibhajyavādin precisely the Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas, Kāśyapīyas and Tāmraśātīyas, that is, the non-Vātsīputrīya Sthaviras who rejected the fundamental thesis of the Sarvāstivādins. The *Vibhāṣā*, the latter's chief work, violently criticises the Vibhajyavādins, attributing to them forty very eclectic theses. From all this, we can conclude that the Theravādins are Vibhajyavādins in the sense understood by the traditions of the Sammatīyas and Mahāsāṃghikas and doubtless also the Sarvāstivādins, that is, non-Vātsīputrīya Sthaviras opposed to the Sarvāstivādins. La Vallée Poussin, moreover, recognised in the Maudgalyāyana who the Sarvāstivādin *Vijñānakāya* denounces as the main adversary of *sarvāstivāda* the Tissa Moggaliputta, who, according to the Sinhalese Chronicles, presided over the Council of Pāṭaliputta and defined orthodoxy as Vibhajjavādin.[4] The Theravādins therefore constituted a school of this subgroup of Vibhajyavādins. They obviously represented an anarchist tendency of this subgroup alongside the Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas and Kāśyapīyas, whose doctrines evolved more lengthily. Undoubtedly their insularity had some effect in slowing their doctrinal evolution. It is possible that in the early days they were considered and perhaps considered themselves as a Mahīśāsaka school. However it may be, in the seventh century Xuanzang and Yijing clearly distinguished them from the latter who they classed, rightly or wrongly, among the schools of the Sarvāstivādin group.

3. Legge, *Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms*, p. 111.
4. LVP, *L'Inde aux temps des Maurya*, pp. 133–9.

According to the Sinhalese tradition, Buddhism was introduced into Ceylon by Mahinda and Saṅghamittā, the son and daughter of Aśoka, in the first year of the reign of Devanāmpiya Tissa, the sixth king of Ceylon. This pious king immediately had built in his capital Anurādhapura the Great Monastery, Mahāvihāra, in order to shelter the holy Bodhi tree which had been brought by the two missionaries. The foundation of the monastery, which was to remain a great Theravādin centre, therefore goes back to approximately 240 BCE. As we have seen, the monks who settled in the Mahāvihāra were Vibhajyavādins associated with the Mahīṣāsakas.

Throughout most of the second century BCE, Ceylon was dominated by non-Buddhist Tamil conquerors, but who did not persecute the monks. Be that as it may, the chronicles describe this period as being particularly troubled, since the Sinhalese resisted the invaders ferociously. These wars certainly had the effect of isolating Ceylon from subcontinental India and of considerably reducing relations between the Sinhalese Vibhajyavādins and other Buddhists. So when, in about 109 CE, the autochthonous king Duṭṭhagāmani cleared the island of invaders, the Theravādins must have constituted, owing to the force of circumstances, a distinct group.

Duṭṭhagāmani renewed the pious and sumptuous traditions of Devanāmpiya Tissa. Like the latter, he constructed numerous religious monuments, monasteries, reliquaries, etc. During the foundation of the Thūpārāma, Ceylon received, it seems, a visit of delegations of monks from all over India, not only from Bodh-Gayā, Rājagaha, Vesāli, Varanāsī, Kosambī, Pāṭaliputta, the holy towns of the Middle Ganges Basin, but also from Kasmīra, the land of the Pallavas (i.e., doubtless eastern Iran), Alasanda (Alexandria of the Caucasus, in Kapiśa), Ujjenī, the Vindhya mountains.[5] If this information is surely legendary, as is shown by the number of monks in each delegation, in all about a million and a half men, it is nonetheless very probable that Duṭṭhagāmani's power favoured the frequency of relations between the Sinhalese Buddhism and that of India.

Vaṭṭagāmani's reign, at the end of the first century BCE, was marked by two important events. First of all, this king founded a new monastery, the Abhayagirivihāra, which almost immediately became a hotbed of heresy and remained so for more than a thousand years. The discord led the king

5. *Mahāvaṃsa*, pp. 193–4.

to assemble a local council during which the Tipiṭaka and commentaries or *atthakathās*, preserved orally until then, were fixed in writing.[6]

In the third century CE, an inscription at Nāgārjunikoṇḍa, in Andhra country, mentions a donation to the community of Taṃbapaṃṇa, that is, Ceylon, 'which converted the Kaśmīras, Gandhāras, Chīnas [Chinese], Chilātas [Kirāṭas, a wild mountain people], Tosalīs [Orissa], Avaraṃtas [Aparānta, Bombay region], Vaṅga [Bengal], Vanavāsi, Yavana [Greco-Bactrian kingdoms] . . .'.[7] It is obvious that these claims are exaggerated, but we can see in them a trace of the missions sent, before the end of the third century CE and perhaps even before the beginning of it, by the community in Ceylon to these various regions. It is clear that the zeal displayed by these missionaries, if they actually existed, was ill-rewarded in the majority of those countries.

In the mid-third century, during the reign of Mahāsena, the Mahāvihāravāsin school was cruelly persecuted. A Chola monk, Saṅghamitta, totally devoted to the Abhayagirivāsins, obtained permission from the king to eject the monks from the Mahāvihāra and destroy their monastery. However, the adherents of the latter succeeded, under threat of revolt, in persuading the king to oust the heretic and rebuild the Mahāvihāra. In that same reign the Jetavanavihāra was founded and soon became the general headquarters of a new schismatic school.[8]

The fifth century is the era of the great commentators of the Theravādins of the Mahāvihāra: Buddhadatta, Buddhaghosa and Dhammapāla. Buddhadatta was born and lived in Uragapura (modern-day Urayur) on the banks of the Kaverī, in Chola country. Buddhaghosa was a brahmin born near Bodh-Gayā who converted to Buddhism. Tradition claims that he resided in Ceylon, but Finot contests this fact.[9] His mission to Burma is pure legend. However, his vast output attests the breadth of his erudition and makes

6. Ibid., pp. 235–7.
7. Sastri, *Ep. Ind.* XX, p. 23.
8. *Mahāvaṃsa*, pp. 265–70.
9. L. Finot, *BEFEO*, 1925, p. 487. [Ed.: Louis Finot, Review of Nalinaksha Dutt, *Early history of the spread of Buddhism and the Buddhist schools*; Bimala Charan Law, *The Life and Work of Buddhaghosa*; idem., *The Buddhist Conception of spirits*; idem., *Heaven and Hell in Buddhist perspective*; idem., *Some Kṣatriya Tribes of Ancient India*, *Bulletin de l'Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient* 25 (1925): 485–88.]

him the greatest thinker and writer of the Theravādins. His *Visuddhimagga* is justifiably famous. Dhammapāla was a Tamil who lived in the region of Kāñcī. It is remarkable that of these three great commentators, none was a native of Ceylon. This proves how much the illustriousness and influence of the Sinhalese community had power in southern India and even distant Magadha. The main task of Buddhaghosa and his two renowned contemporaries consisted of inserting the contents of the old Sinhalese commentaries into works compiled in Pāli.

In the final years of the fifth century, King Dhātusena assembled a council during which the Tipiṭaka was revised.[10] It is possible that during this council, the canon was modified to a certain degree in order better to conform with the teaching of the Mahāvihāravāsins.

In the first half of the seventh century, Xuanzang notes the presence of Sthaviras, that is, Theravādins, not only in Ceylon, of which he speaks only by hearsay, but in Draviḍa country, around Kāñcīpura, where there were more than 10,000 monks living in more than 100 monasteries, and in Samataṭa, in the Ganges Delta, where more than 2,000 monks resided in more than 30 monasteries. As this region is near the port of Tāmralipti, the great landing stage and port where numerous Sinhalese would disembark when going on pilgrimage to Magadha, the presence in the area of an important centre of Sthaviras is easily explained.

Xuanzang met some Mahāyāna-Sthaviras, that is, probably non-Mahāvihāravāsin Theravādins, and most likely Abhayagirivāsins, in Bodh-Gayā, the birthplace of Buddhaghosa, and in Kaliṅga, Bhārukaccha and particularly in Surāṣṭra, where they numbered nearly 3,000. However, Xuanzang's indications vary with his works, and the monks of Kaliṅga (500 in all) and those of Surāṣṭra are also given as Sthaviras, by implication non-Mahāyānists. What should be especially retained of this information is the distribution of the Theravādins, to whatever school they belonged, at the beginning of the seventh century: first in Ceylon, the great religious centre, and nearby Draviḍa country; then the regions neighbouring the two great subcontinental ports where Sinhalese monks disembarked when going on pilgrimage to Magadha, Tāmralipti to the east and Bhārukaccha to the west.

10. Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism* III, p. 32.

Fifty years later, Yijing gives a basically identical distribution of the domain of the Theravādins. All, he says, belong to the Theravādin school in Ceylon, and nearly all in southern India. A few of their disciples are encountered in Lāṭa and Sindhu, to the west. They live side by side with other schools in eastern India and Magadha. Finally, they have recently been introduced into the Sunda Islands [Indonesia], where they remain a minority. However, they are not encountered in either northern India or Indochina, or China.

In about 1160, the great Sinhalese king Parakkama Bāhu I assembled a council in Anurādhapura, presided over by Kassapa, and obliged the two dissident schools to amalgamate at the heart of the Mahāvihāra which henceforth subsisted alone.[11]

Then came a long period of decadence, further accentuated by the arrival of the Portuguese [in 1505] whose religious fanaticism persecuted Buddhism. At the end of the seventeenth century, King Vimala Dharma II was obliged to bring from Arakan, Burma, some regular monks to restore the Sinhalese community. Half a century later, in 1752 and 1755, King Kittisiri Rājasiha renewed this attempt and asked the king of Ayutthaya, in Siam, to send him some monks. However, the community thus re-established retained an aristocratic recruitment. In 1802, some Burmese monks founded in Ceylon the school known as that of Amarapura, whose recruitment was more popular.[12] A more recent school, the Ramanyas, from the region included between Siam and Arakan, insists on the vow of poverty.[13]

Although, according to the Sinhalese traditions, Burma was converted before the Common Era, no trace of this fact remains. Until the eleventh century, the only vestiges found attest to the presence in Burma of a Mahāyānist and even Tantric Buddhism. According to the Burmese chronicles, it was King Anavrata who, in the eleventh century, sword in hand, favoured the conversion of Upper Burma to the school of Sinhalese Theravādins. From then on, religious relations between Burma and Ceylon were frequent and, for two centuries, Pagan remained a great centre of Pāli Buddhist culture.[14] Lower Burma was converted to the Theravāda in the

11. Ibid., III, pp. 33–4; Kern, *Histoire du Bouddhisme* II, pp. 421–2.
12. Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism* III, p. 36.
13. Ibid., p. 38.
14. Ibid., pp. 55–7.

mid-thirteenth century and also became, in the fifteenth century, a particularly illustrious centre. However, the reactions of the locals against the primacy of the Sinhalese had concluded at the end of the twelfth century in the foundation of the Chapaṭa school, soon divided into three branches. In the mid-twelfth century, three new schools, two of Martaban and that of Camboja, appeared. Their rivalry was such that the king of Pegu, Dhammaceti, at the end of the fifteenth century obliged them to amalgamate into one, in conformity with the prescriptions of the Mahāvihāra of Ceylon.[15] In the mid-eighteenth century, King Alompra favoured this Buddhism which shone with such brilliance in Burma. Nonetheless, throughout the eighteenth century, the community was divided over the manner of wearing the robe between the two rival factions of the Ekaṃsikas and Parūpannas.[16] From 1868 to 1871, the pious king Mindon-min assembled a council which revised the Tipiṭaka. His renown was so great that his chaplain was called to arbitrate by Sinhalese monks during a local debate.[17] There are two schools in Burma, the Mahāgandhis and Sūlagandhis, the latter being the more austere.[18]

The date of the introduction of Theravāda Buddhism into Siam is not clear. It occurred around the thirteenth century, the influence coming from Burma. However it may be, an inscription from 1361 informs us that King Sūryavaṃsa Rāma sent to Ceylon for a monk versed in the Tipiṭaka, who was received with great honours.[19] However, for a long time Siamese Buddhism retained Mahāyānist characteristics. In 1782, King Chao Phaya Chakkri mounted the throne and convoked a council entrusted with revising the Tipiṭaka.[20] The kings Mongkut (1851–1868) and Chulalongkorn (1868–1911) greatly favoured Buddhism, obliging it to observe greater morality and publishing an edition of the canon.[21] King Mongkut established the school of the Dhammayuts, more austere than the earlier school, and which still subsists today.

15. Ibid., p. 59.
16. Ibid., pp. 62–4.
17. Ibid., p. 65.
18. Ibid., p. 73.
19. Ibid., pp. 83–4.
20. Ibid., p. 86.
21. Ibid., pp. 87–8.

Cambodia, like Burma, was long the domain of the Mahāyāna. It was in the thirteenth century that it gradually converted to the Hīnayāna of the Theravādins.[22] The only feature marking the history of the Theravādins of Cambodia is the introduction of the Siamese Dhammayut school at the end of the nineteenth century.[23]

The usages of the Theravādins vary according to the country and the schools.[24] Their only common and truly characteristic feature seems to be the yellowish-orange of their monastic robe. Their holy language is Pāli.

It may be of interest to quote the Chinese and Tibetan information concerning the Theravādins of the seventh century.

According to Yijing, the Theravādins wore their outer monastic robe in the manner of Indian women, taking the right border over the left shoulder and letting the ends float free.[25]

According to certain later Tibetan works, their patron was the *vaiśya* Kātyāyana. Their robe consisted of twenty-one to twenty-five bands of cloth. Their emblem was the wheel (*cakra*) or arec flower. Their names ended in *-deva, -ākara, -varman, -sena, -jīva* or *-bala*. They spoke a common, infernal (*paiśācī*) or middling dialect.[26]

The literature of the Theravādins, which has been preserved for us since the school still exists, is both too vast and too well known for a detailed description to be needed here.

This is the composition of the Theravāda Tipiṭaka [see figure on p. 284].

The noncanonical literature opens with works earlier than the fifth century CE and known to the great commentators. These are the *Nettipakaraṇa* and the *Peṭakopadesa*, treatises of textual and exegetical methodology, and the first commentaries, written in Pāli or Sinhalese and for the most part lost today. Room must be made for the Pāli recension of the *Milindapañha*, a famous work which still continues to pose problems.

The fifth century is the era of the great commentators, Buddhadatta, Buddhaghosa and Dhammapāla, whose fundamental work consisted in writing Pāli commentaries on the whole canon, mainly by using the ear-

22. Ibid., pp. 112, 124–6.
23. Ibid., p. 131.
24. Ibid., pp. 36–132, extremely detailed.
25. Takakusu, *Record of the Buddhist Religion*, pp. 66–7.
26. Lin, *Aide-Mémoire*, pp. 176–81 and 208–16.

I	Vinaya-piṭaka	(1) *Suttavibhaṅga*	
		(2) *Khandaka*:	(a) *Mahāvagga*
			(b) *Cullavagga*
		(3) *Parivāra*	
		(4) *Pātimokkha*	
II	Sutta-piṭaka	(1) *Dīgha-Nikāya*	
		(2) *Majjhima-Nikāya*	
		(3) *Saṃyutta-Nikāya*	
		(4) *Aṅguttara-Nikāya*	
		(5) *Khuddhaka-Nikāya*:	(a) *Khuddhakapāṭha*
			(b) *Dhammapada*
			(c) *Udāna*
			(d) *Itivuttaka*
			(e) *Suttanipāta*
			(f) *Vimānavatthu*
			(g) *Petavatthu*
			(h) *Theragāthā*
			(i) *Therīgāthā*
			(j) *Jātaka*
			(k) *Mahāniddesa*
			(l) *Cullaniddesa*
			(m) *Paṭisambhidāmagga*
			(n) *Buddhavaṃsa*
			(o) *Cariyāpiṭaka*
			(p) *Apadāna*
III	Abhidharma-piṭaka	(1) *Dhammasaṅgānī*	
		(2) *Vibhaṅga*	
		(3) *Kathāvatthu*	
		(4) *Puggalapaññatti*	
		(5) *Dhātukathā*	
		(6) *Yamaka*	
		(7) *Paṭṭhāna*	

lier Sinhalese commentaries. Buddhadatta condenses his work into four manuals: The *Abhidhammāvatāra* and *Rūpārūpavibhāga,* which deal with the Abhidhamma, and the *Vinayavinicchaya* and *Uttaravinicchaya,* which comment on the Vinaya-piṭaka. Buddhaghosa's output includes firstly the *Visuddhimagga,* a general commentary on the canon, or rather the doctrine enclosed in the canon, which gives it the aspect of a postcanonical Abhidhamma work, and then a great number of commentaries each concerned with some part of the Tipiṭaka. Dhammapāla completes Buddhaghosa's output on that score.

The Sinhalese Chronicles, *Dīpavaṃsa, Mahāvaṃsa, Cūlavaṃsa, Dāṭhāvaṃsa,* etc., are basically religious chronicles tracing the history of the Sinhalese community or great religious events in Ceylon.

Later, there is evidence of a great flourish of Abhidhamma manuals, the most famous of which is the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* by Anuruddha.

Finally, we note a certain number of religious poems: the *Anāgatavaṃsa, Jinacarita, Telakaṭāhagāthā,* etc.

These are the theses of the Theravādins of the Mahāvihāra:

(1) The person (*puggala*) is not perceived (*upalabbhati*) as an evident reality (*sacchikaṭṭaparamatthena*).[27]

Here are some of the many arguments which serve to demonstrate this thesis. It is impossible to define clearly the relations which existed between the person and the aggregates, elements, spheres and faculties into which Buddhism resolves the individual: are they identical to or different from it? Do they dwell in it or contain it?—so many untenable solutions. It is even impossible to classify this person entity among the different pairs of contradictory categories: Is it caused (*sappaccaya*) or uncaused (*appaccaya*), conditioned (*saṅkhata*) or unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*), eternal (*sassata*) or transitory (*asassata*)? If the person passes from one existence to another, is it the same one which lives here and there? If it is the same one, then a man is identical to a god or an animal depending on whether he will be reborn in one or other of those forms. If it is not the same one, why is it said that it is reborn?

(2) The arahant does not regress (*parihāyati*) from arahantship (*arahattā*).[28]

As the three lower holy ones do not regress, the arahant cannot regress since it is he who has abandoned the most (*bahutara*) defilements (*kilesa*), who has best (*adhimatta*) cultivated the Path (*maggabhāvanā*) and who has best seen (*diṭṭha*) the Truths (*sacca*). Not only has the arahant abandoned all the defilements, he has destroyed their roots (*ucchinnamūla*), made them uprooted palm trees (*tālāvatthukata*), demolished them (*anabhāvaṃkata*), made them things that cannot arise again (*āyatiṃanuppādadhamma*).

27. *Kathāvatthu* I, 1.
28. Ibid. I, 2.

(3) The streamwinner (*sotāpanna*) does not regress (*parihāyati*) from the fruit of streamwinning (*sotāpattiphala*).[29]

If the streamwinner were to regress, he would return (*saṇṭhāti*) to the stage of the worldly (*puthujjanabhūmi*), which is impossible.

(4) There is dwelling in pure conduct (*brahmacariyavāsa*) among the gods (*deva*).[30]

The gods are not stupid (*jaḷa*), or deaf-mutes (*eḷamuga*), or ignorant (*aviññu*), but they find pleasure (*pasanna*) in the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Community by whom they are instructed, and they commit neither offences nor misdemeanours. Even if there is no pure conduct among all the gods, nothing prevents some of them adopting that good practice.

(5) One does not abandon (*jahati*) the defilements (*kilesa*) bit by bit (*odhisodhiso*).[31]

If one were to abandon the defilements progressively, one after the other, one would be partially (*ekadesaṃ*) endowed with one or another of the fruits of the religious life (*sāmaññaphala*), which is contrary to the teachings of the Buddha.

(6) A worldling (*puthujjana*) does not abandon (*jahati*) either craving for the sense-pleasures (*kāmarāga*) or ill-will (*byāpāda*).[32]

When worldlings abandon craving and ill-will, it is not definitively (*accantaṃ*) or completely (*anavasesaṃ*). It is because they differ from the holy ones and, in particular, the nonreturners (*anāgāmī*). Furthermore, worldlings do not abandon those defilements by means of the path (*magga*) of the sphere of form (*rūpāvacara*). Since that path is releasing (*niyyānika*), leading to exhaustion (*khayagāmī*), leading to Awakening (*bodhagāmī*), pure (*anāsava*), undefiled (*asaṅkilesika*), etc. They cannot obtain clear comprehension of the Dhamma (*dhammābhisamaya*), since, not having abandoned the majority of the fetters, they have not yet acquired the three lower fruits (*phala*). Besides, the Buddha declared that worldly teachers are not set free (*aparimutta*) since they do not perceive (*ananubodha*), do not understand (*appaṭivedha*) noble (*ariya*) morality (*sīla*), concentration (*samādhi*), wisdom (*paññā*) and deliverance (*vimutti*).

29. Ibid.
30. Ibid. I, 3.
31. Ibid. I, 4.
32. Ibid. I, 5.

(7) The past (*atīta*) does not exist (*natthi*). The future (*anāgata*) does not exist.[33]

By the terms of their definitions themselves, past and future things cannot exist: what has ceased (*niruddha*) has gone (*vigata*), been transformed (*vipariṇata*), disappeared (*atthaṅgata*), been exterminated (*abbhatthaṅgata*), can no more exist than something that is not yet born (*ajāta*), or become (*abhūta*), or created (*asaṅjata*) or reborn (*anibbatta*), or fully reborn (*anabhinibbatta*), or appeared (*apātubhūta*). The present, past and future should not be confused with things that they affect, as the Sarvāstivādins seem to do. In fact, when present form, for example, ceases (*nirujjhamāna*), it abandons (*jahati*) its present nature (*paccuppanabhāva*), but it does not abandon its nature of form (*rūpabhāva*). Therefore, it cannot be said of present form that in it form and the present are identical (*ekaṭṭha*), the same (*sama*), equal (*samabhāga*), alike (*tajja*). This does not mean that present form never abandons its nature of form since, if it were so, it would, like Nibbāna, be permanent (*nicca*), firm (*dhuva*), eternal (*sassata*) and not subject to the law of transformation (*avipariṇāmadhamma*). If the present and the future should abandon their nature of present and future, it is not the same as for the past, since that which is past remains forever past and therefore does not abandon its nature of past, all the while not being, like Nibbāna, permanent, firm, eternal, etc. Perception or knowledge of an object is not possible if the various factors of that perception or that knowledge, and in particular the organ and the object, are present and consequently simultaneous. If past things were to exist, past cravings (*rāga*), hatreds (*dosa*), delusions (*moha*) would exist in an arahant and the latter would be afflicted as before, which would not be compatible with his arahant nature. Equally, one would be able to use one's past hands, feet, water, fire, etc., which contradicts experience. Furthermore, one would have three series of aggregates (*khandha*), spheres (*āyatana*), elements (*dhātu*), etc., a present, another past and the last future, which is untenable. Finally, like their adversaries, the Theravādins cite in support of their thesis a certain number of suttas. In the most decisive of these, the Buddha declares that, of what is past, one should say, 'That was (*ahosi*)' and not, 'That is (*atthi*)' or, 'That will be (*bhavissati*)', of what is future, one should say, 'That will be' and not, 'That was' or 'That is' and,

33. Ibid. I, 6 and 7.

of what is present, one should say, 'That is' and not, 'That was' or 'That will be'.

(8) It should not be said (*na vattabbaṃ*) that a certain (*ekacca*) past (*atīta*) exists (*atthi*), namely, past things (*dhamma*) whose fruition has not ripened (*avipakkavipāka*), and that a certain past does not exist (*natthi*), namely, past things whose fruition has ripened (*vipakkavipāka*). Neither should it be said that a certain future (*anāgata*) exists, namely, things destined to be aroused (*uppādin*) which are not yet born (*ajāta*), and that a certain future does not exist, namely, things not destined to be aroused (*anuppādin*) and which are not born.[34]

This is a corollary of the preceding thesis.

(9) Not all (*sabbe*) things (*dhamma*) are applications of mindfulness (*satipaṭṭhāna*).[35]

Not all things, far from it, have the characteristics of the applications of mindfulness, that is, mindfulness (*sati*), the faculty of mindfulness (*satindriya*) . . . pure (*anāsava*), unfettered (*asaññojaniya*), untied (*aganthaniya*), etc. Reasoning used to support the opposite thesis would serve all too well to demonstrate that not all things are applications of contact (*phassapaṭṭhāna*), or applications of thought (*cittapaṭṭhāna*).

(10) It should not be said (*na vattabbaṃ*) that the past (*atīta*), the future (*anāgata*), the present (*paccupanna*), form (*rūpa*) and the other aggregates (*khandha*) truly (*heva*) exist (*santi*) and truly do not exist.[36]

Existence (*atthibhāva*) and nonexistence (*natthibhāva*) are not identical (*ekaṭṭha*), the same (*sama*), equal (*samabhāga*) and alike (*tajja*). Consequently one and the same thing cannot both exist and not exist.

(11) The arahant is not seduced by another (*parūpahāra*).[37]

The emission of impure semen (*asucisukkavisaṭṭhi*) differs from the emission of other impure bodily liquids such as saliva, tears, urine, etc., in that it is necessarily linked with an intense craving (*rāga*), namely, desire (*kāma*), which is in contradiction with the moral nature of the arahant and not only with his material nature. In fact the craving of desire is an obsession (*paryutthāna*), a fetter (*saññojana*), a torrent (*ogha*), a yoke (*yoga*), a hindrance (*nīvaraṇa*), all things that a true arahant should have definitively abandoned.

34. Ibid. I, 8.
35. Ibid. I, 9.
36. Ibid. I, 10.
37. Ibid. II, 1.

(12) The arahant has no nescience (*aññāna*).[38]

If an arahant had nescience, he would have ignorance (*avijjā*). In fact, ignorance, the first link in the chain of dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*), is a flood (*ogha*), a yoke (*yoga*), a latent tendency (*anusaya*), an obsession (*paryutthāna*), etc., all things that a true arahant should have definitively abandoned. No matter how, an arahant can in no way not know the four fruits of holiness.

(13) The arahant has no doubt (*kaṅkhā*).[39]

If an arahant were to have doubts, there would therefore be uncertainty (*vicikicchā*). In fact, uncertainty is an obsession, a fetter, a hindrance, all things that a true arahant should have definitively abandoned. However it may be, an arahant could not feel any doubt regarding the four fruits of holiness.

(14) The arahant does not obtain information from others (*paravitāraṇa*).[40]

If an arahant were informed by others, he would be guided by others (*paraneyya*), have trust in others (*parapattiya*), be conditioned by others (*parapaccaya*), be dependent on others (*paṭibandhabhū*), he would not know (*na jānāti*), would not see (*na passati*), be bewildered (*sammūḷha*) and devoid of awareness (*asampajāna*), which is contrary to the nature of an arahant. In any case, an arahant is not informed by others with regard to the four fruits of holiness.

(15) There is no vocal utterance (*vacībheda*) for him who has attained (*samāpanna*) the Path (*magga*).[41]

This exclamation does not occur everywhere (*sabbattha*), or always (*sabbadā*), or for everyone (*sabbesaṃ*), or in the attainments (*samāpatti*). If he who knows (*jānanta*) suffering (*dukkha*) cries, 'O suffering!', he who knows its origin (*samudaya*) should cry, 'O origin!', he who knows its cessation (*nirodha*) should cry, 'O cessation!', and he who knows the Path should cry, 'O Path!'. However, it is not so. Furthermore, knowledge (*ñāṇa*) has the truth as its domain (*saccagocara*), whilst the ear (*sota*) has sound as its

38. Ibid. II, 2.
39. Ibid. II, 3.
40. Ibid. II, 4.
41. Ibid. II, 5.

domain (*saddagocara*), which is very different. Moreover, the Buddha said that for him who has attained the first absorption (*jhāna*), speech (*vācā*) has ceased (*niruddha*), all the more reason for it to be the same in the higher absorptions.

(16) The suffering-nutriment (*dukkhāhāra*) is not a constituent of the Path (*maggaṅga*) included in the Path (*maggapariyāpanna*).[42]

If the suffering-nutriment were a constituent of the Path, all (*sabbe*) those who exclaim (*vācaṃ bhāsanti*), 'O suffering!' (*dukkhanti*) would cultivate (*bhāventi*) the Path (*magga*). In that case, by exclaiming, 'O suffering!', foolish worldlings (*bālaputhujjana*), matricides (*mātughātaka*), parricides (*pitughātaka*), arahant slayers (*arahantaghātaka*), those who shed the blood (*ruhiruppādaka*) of the Buddha, schismatics (*saṅghabhedaka*) would cultivate the Path.

(17) A single (*eka*) thought (*citta*) cannot last (*tiṭṭhati*) for a day (*divasa*).[43]

If a single thought were to last for a day, its moment of arousal (*uppādakkhaṇa*) would last for half a day (*upaḍḍhadivasa*) and its moment of decline (*vayakkhaṇa*) for half a day also, which is impossible. Furthermore, during a day (*ekāha*), other (*aññā*) things (*dhamma*), having often (*bahumpi*) arisen (*uppajjitvā*), would cease (*nirujjhanti*) and would therefore be more mobile (*lahuparivatta*) than the thought, which is contrary to the teachings of the Buddha. The latter declared in fact that he did not know (*nāhaṃ samanupassāmi*) any other thing (*aññā eka dhamma*) which was comparable (*upama*) to thought in relation to mobility. He compared thought to a monkey (*makkaṭa*) walking (*caramāna*) in the forest (*arañña*) which grasps (*gaṇhāti*) a branch (*sākha*) then, having let it go (*muñcitvā*), grasps another one, etc. And then, the thought that sees (*passati*) form (*rūpa*) through the intermediary of the eye (*cakkhu*) cannot be the one which hears (*suṇāti*) sound (*sadda*) through the intermediary of the ear (*sota*), which smells (*ghāyati*) odour (*gandha*) through the intermediary of the nose (*ghāna*), etc. The thought that makes one advance (*abhikkamati*) is not the one that makes one return (*paṭikkamati*), and vice versa, etc. If, among the gods (*deva*) of the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*), a thought lasts as long as a life (*yāvatāyuka*), it is not the same for the other gods and even less so for mankind.

42. Ibid. II, 6.
43. Ibid. II, 7.

(18) It should not be said that all (*sabba*) conditioned things (*saṃkhāra*) without distinction (*anodhiṃkatvā*) are only ashes (*kukkuḷa*).[44]

Since there are many kinds of happiness (*sukha*), it cannot be said that all conditioned things are only suffering (*dukkha*). The Buddha himself vouched in several suttas for the existence of happiness and things able to arouse it, desirable (*iṭṭha*), pleasing (*manāpa*), lovely (*kanta*), enticing (*pīyarūpa*), accompanied by desire (*kāmūpasañhita*), seductive (*rajaniya*). Giving (*dāna*), pure conduct (*brahmacariya*), and other acts of piety engender happiness and not suffering.

(19) Clear comprehension (*abhisamaya*) of the four paths (*magga*) and Four Truths (*sacca*) is not progressive (*anupubba*).[45]

The Blessed One said, 'O monks, at the moment there arises (*udapādi*) for the noble listener (*ariyasāvaka*) the Dhamma eye (*dhammacakkhu*) free of dust (*viraja*) and free of stain (*vītamala*), all that is (*yaṃ kiñci*) the teaching of the origin (*samudayadhamma*) is the teaching of cessation (*nirodhadhamma*) in its entirety (*sabbantaṃ*). O monks, with the appearance of vision (*dassanuppāda*), three fetters (*saññojana*) of the noble listener are abandoned (*pahīyanti*): the view of individuality (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*), uncertainty (*vicikicchā*) and adherence to observances and rituals (*sīlabbataparāmāsa*)'. And again, 'One is not able (*abhabba*) to commit (*kātuṃ*) the six major offences (*chacābhiṭṭhāna*) when one has accomplished vision (*dassanasampadāya*)'. Furthermore, if clear comprehension were progressive, one would gradually cultivate (*bhāveti*) each of the paths leading to the fruits and, in that case, progressively experience (*sacchikaroti*) each of the four fruits, which is inadmissible. If, on the other hand, the person (*puggala*) who has attained (*paṭipanna*) experience of any one of the four fruits by means of the vision of suffering (*dukkhadassana*) were gradually to abandon (*jahati*) the defilements (*kilesa*) dispelled by the acquisition of that fruit, if he were to abandon them, therefore, by quarters (*catubhāga*)—each quarter being abandoned through the vision of one of the Four Truths—each fruit would itself be divided into quarters and so would the corresponding level of holiness. In fact, that is impossible, since a quarter of an arahant, for example, is not an arahant as it does not correspond to the definition of an arahant. If clear comprehension were progressive, the

44. Ibid. II, 8.
45. Ibid. II, 9.

vision of the first three Truths would be incomplete (*apariniṭṭhita*) and it would not confer the right to the title of holy one. The vision of the fourth Truth alone would be complete (*pariniṭṭhita*) and would confer the right to that title. The vision of the first three Truths is therefore useless (*niratthiya*) for the acquisition of the fruits.

(20) The speech (*vohāra*) of the Buddha is not transcendental (*lokuttara*).[46]

If it were transcendental, only the transcendental ear (*sota*) could hear it, only consciousness (*viññāṇa*) could understand it, which is contrary to the experience that mankind has had, since even worldlings (*puthujjana*) have heard that speech and understood it. Furthermore, that speech does not have the properties of transcendental things, but indeed those of worldly things, since humans are enraptured (*rajjeyyuṃ*) by it, have found it likeable (*kamaniya*), intoxicating (*madaniya*), binding (*bandhaniya*), whilst others have hated (*dusseyyuṃ*) it and yet others, not understanding it, have found delusion (*muyheyyuṃ*) in it.

(21) There is only one cessation (*nirodha*).[47]

If there were two cessations, there would be two Truths of Cessation (*nirodhasacca*), hence two Nibbānas. If there were two Nibbānas, there would be a higher and a lower (*uccaniccatā*) one, a base and an excellent (*hīnapaṇītatā*) one, etc., there would be between them a frontier (*sīmā*), division (*bheda*), limit (*rājī*), interval (*antarikā*), which is impossible.

(22) The power (*bala*) of the Tathāgata is not common to the listeners (*sāvakasādhāraṇa*).[48]

If the power of the Tathāgata were common to the listeners, the latter would have the ten supernormal mental powers of the Tathāgata and would be identified with him, which is impossible.

(23) The power (*bala*) of the Tathāgata consisting in knowledge (*ñāṇa*) conforming to the reality (*yathābhūta*) of sound and unsound (*ṭhānāṭhāna*) conclusions and other powers, is not noble (*ariya*).[49]

In fact, that knowledge, which is one of the ten supernormal mental powers of the Tathāgata, is not included in any of the categories of noble

46. Ibid. II, 10.
47. Ibid. II, 11.
48. Ibid. III, 1.
49. Ibid. III, 2.

things, that is, proper to Buddhists, such as the four paths (*magga*) and four fruits (*phala*). It is the same for the other nine powers.

(24) A thought (*citta*) affected by craving (*sarāga*) is not delivered (*vimuccati*).[50]

It is inadmissible that a thought affected by craving, bad (*akusala*), worldly (*lokiya*), filled with impurities (*sāsava*), fetters (*saññojaniya*), ties (*ganthaniya*) . . . defilements (*saṅkilesika*), could be delivered. Neither is it a thought affected by contact (*saphassa*), perception (*sasaññā*), volition (*sacetanā*), wisdom (*sapaññā*) that can be delivered. Furthermore, if a thought affected by craving were delivered, craving (*rāga*) and thought would both (*ubho*) be delivered, which is impossible.

(25) The delivered person (*vimutta*) is not in the process of delivering himself (*vimuccamāna*).[51]

If the delivered person were to deliver himself, he would be partially (*ekadesaṃ*) delivered and partially nondelivered (*avimutta*), which is impossible. Or else it should be said that at the moment of arising (*uppādakkhaṇe*) he is delivered, and at the moment of decline (*vayakkhaṇe*) he is in the process of delivering himself, which is equally untenable.

(26) In the eighth-level (*aṭṭhamaka*) person (*puggala*), there is no abandonment (*pahāna*) of the obsessions (*paryuṭṭhāna*), speculative views (*diṭṭhi*) and uncertainty (*vicikicchā*).[52]

The eighth-level person, that is, the candidate to the fruit of streamwinning (*sotāpattiphala*), being different from the latter, cannot already abandon those two obsessions. Moreover, he has not yet cultivated (*bhāvita*) the Path (*magga*), which is necessary to achieve that abandonment.

(27) The eighth-level (*aṭṭhamaka*) person (*puggala*) possesses the five faculties (*indriya*) of faith (*saddhā*), vigour (*viriya*), mindfulness (*sati*), concentration (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*paññā*).[53]

Since the candidate to the *sotāpattiphala* possesses faith, vigour, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom, he possesses the corresponding faculties which are inseparable from them, just as, possessing a mind (*manas*),

50. Ibid. III, 3.
51. Ibid. III, 4.
52. Ibid. III, 5.
53. Ibid. III, 6.

gladness (*somanassa*) and life (*jīvita*), he possesses the mental, glad and life faculties.

(28) The divine eye (*dibbacakkhu*) is not a fleshly eye (*maṃsacakkhu*) based on things (*dhammūpatthaddha*).[54]

In fact, if the divine eye were a fleshly eye, a fleshly eye would reciprocally be a divine eye and all beings would be endowed with supernormal vision, which is obviously wrong.

(29) The divine ear (*dibbasota*) is not a fleshly ear (*maṃsasota*) based on things (*dhammūpatthaddha*).[55]

The same argumentation as the preceding one.

(30) The divine eye (*dibbacakkhu*) is not knowledge of the specific consequences of actions (*yathākammūpagatañāṇa*).[56]

(31) There is no restraint (*saṃvara*) among the gods (*deva*).[57]

There is no more restraint than nonrestraint (*asaṃvara*) among the gods since the latter are not exposed to the same temptations as humans.

(32) There is no perception (*saññā*) among nonperceptive beings (*asaññasatta*).[58]

Since perception is always accompanied by the other four aggregates, and since these do not exist among nonperceptive beings, the latter cannot possess perception.

(33) There is perception (*saññā*) in the sphere of neither perception nor nonperception (*nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*).[59]

In that sphere, four aggregates constitute the personality, among them perception. Only the aggregate of form is lacking.

(34) A lay person (*gihī*) is never an arahant.[60]

The arahant has definitively abandoned the lay fetters (*gihisaññojana*). He has abandoned conjugal life (*methuna dhamma*), family life (*puttasambādhasayana*), Banaras sandalwood (*kāsikacandana*), unguents, perfumes and garlands (*mālāgandhavilepana*), gold and silver (*jātarūparajata*), etc., etc.

54. Ibid. III, 7.
55. Ibid. III, 8.
56. Ibid. III, 9.
57. Ibid. III, 10.
58. Ibid. III, 11.
59. Ibid. III, 12.
60. Ibid. IV, 1.

(35) One does not become an arahant on being reborn (*upapattiyā*).[61]

One does not acquire the fruit of arahantship any more than the three lower fruits on being reborn. No example illustrates this case. The impurity of thought of him who is reborn prevents him from acquiring holiness at that moment.

(36) Not all (*sabbe*) the attributes (*dhamma*) of the arahant are devoid of impurities (*anāsava*).[62]

In fact, the body of an arahant is not devoid of material impurities and cannot enter into any of the categories, all spiritual, of things devoid of impurities.

(37) The arahant is not endowed (*samannāgata*) with the four fruits (*phala*).[63]

If an arahant were endowed with the four fruits, he would at the same time be an arahant, *sotāpanna, sakadāgāmī* and *anāgāmī,* which is contradictory. For similar reasons, an anāgāmī cannot be endowed with the first two fruits or a *sakadāgāmī* with the first.

(38) The arahant is not endowed (*samannāgata*) with six equanimities (*upekkhā*).[64]

(39) It is not because of Awakening (*bodhi*) that one is a buddha.[65]

The extremely sophistical argumentation rests on an artificial distinction between past, future and present Awakening.

(40) The Bodhisatta is not endowed with the marks (*lakkhaṇasamannāgata*) of a Great Man.[66]

It is easy to show that, nearly always, the nature of the Bodhisatta differs from that of the Cakkavattisatta.

(41) The Bodhisatta, that is, the future Buddha, Sakkamuni, did neither become a practitioner of pure conduct (*caritabrahmacariya*) nor was led into certainty (*okkantaniyāma*) due to the discourses of the Bhagavat Kassapa, an earlier buddha.[67]

61. Ibid. IV, 2.
62. Ibid. IV, 3.
63. Ibid. IV, 4.
64. Ibid. IV, 5.
65. Ibid. IV, 6.
66. Ibid. IV, 7.
67. Ibid. IV, 8.

If that had been so, the future Buddha would have been an ordinary listener (*sāvaka*) of Kassapa, which is contrary to his Buddha nature. In fact, one does not become a buddha by relinquishing (*hutvā*) the state of listener, but one is a buddha by oneself (*sayambhū*).

(42) The person (*puggala*) who has attained (*paṭipanna*) the realisation of holiness (*arahattasacchikiriyā*) is not endowed (*samannāgata*) with the three lower fruits (*phala*).[68]

(43) Holiness (*arahatta*) is not the abandonment (*pahāna*) of all the fetters (*sabbasaññojana*).[69]

In fact, holiness does not consist of abandoning all the fetters, but only those which had not yet been abandoned.

(44) He who possesses the knowledge of deliverance (*vimuttiñāṇa*) is not delivered (*vimutta*).[70]

There are several kinds of knowledge of deliverance, and there is only one deliverance worthy of that name, complete deliverance.

(45) The trainee (*sekkha*) does not have the knowledge (*ñāṇa*) of the trained (*asekkha*).[71]

It is basically the nature of their knowledge that distinguishes the trainee from the trained. Therefore, if the former had the knowledge of the latter, he would be identified with him, which is untenable.

(46) The attainment (*samāpatti*) based on the earth device (*paṭhavīkasiṇa*) does not engender perverse (*viparīta*) knowledge (*ñāṇa*) in the one who has attained it (*samāpanna*).[72]

The attainment based thus is good (*kusala*) and does not make one take what is impermanent (*anicca*) as permanent (*nicca*), painful (*dukkha*) as pleasant (*sukha*), impersonal (*anattā*) as personal (*attā*), unlovely (*asubha*) as lovely (*subha*). Furthermore, the arahant who uses this meditation method is not subject to the perversions (*viparyāsa*) of perception (*saññā*), thought (*citta*) and speculative view (*diṭṭhi*).

(47) For him who is not certain (*aniyata*), there is no knowledge (*ñāṇa*) leading to the certainty (*niyāmagamanā*) of the Path of Deliverance, no more

68. Ibid. IV, 9. See the demonstration above, thesis 37.
69. Ibid. IV, 10.
70. Ibid. V, 1.
71. Ibid. V, 2.
72. Ibid. V, 3.

than there is knowledge leading to absence of certainty for him who is certain.[73]

(48) Not all (*sabbe*) knowledge (*ñāṇa*) is analytical (*paṭisambhidā*) knowledge.[74]

(49) Conventional knowledge (*sammatiñāṇa*) has only the truth as its object (*saccārammaṇaññeva*) and has no other object (*na aññārammaṇa*).[75]

Knowledge resulting from the attainments (*samāpatti*) based on universal devices (*kasiṇa*) and the knowledge of those who give gifts (*dadanta*) of what is necessary such as medicaments and remedies for the sick (*gilānapaccayabhesajjaparikkhāra*) are conventional knowledges and yet their only object is the truth.

(50) It should not be said (*na vattabbaṃ*) that knowledge (*ñāṇa*) of another's thought processes (*cetoparyāya*) has only thought as its object (*cittārammaṇaññeva*) and has no other object (*na aññārammaṇa*).[76]

In fact, through that knowledge one discerns (*pajānāti*) that another's thought is endowed with or devoid of craving (*rāga*), hatred (*dosa*), delusion (*moha*), etc. Furthermore, knowledges having as their object contact (*phassa*), feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*), faith (*saddhā*), vigour (*viriya*), etc., are modes of knowledge of another's thought.

(51) There is no knowledge (*ñāṇa*) of the future (*anāgata*).[77]

No mode of knowledge enables one to know the future and, in particular, to know if one will acquire one or another of the four fruits.

(52) There is no knowledge (*ñāṇa*) of the present (*paccupanna*).[78]

One cannot discern (*pajānāti*) through a knowledge that one has a certain present knowledge, just as one cannot feel (*vedeti*) through a feeling (*vedanā*) a certain feeling or perceive (*sañjānāti*) through a perception (*saññā*) a certain perception, etc.

(53) The listener (*sāvaka*) has no knowledge (*ñāṇa*) of the fruit (*phala*) reached by others.[79]

73. Ibid. V, 4.
74. Ibid. V, 5.
75. Ibid. V, 6.
76. Ibid. V, 7.
77. Ibid. V, 8.
78. Ibid. V, 9.
79. Ibid. V, 10.

(54) Certainty (*niyāma*) is not unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*).[80]

If certainty were unconditioned, it would be like Nibbāna. There would therefore be two Nibbānas, which is impossible (see the argumentation for thesis 21). Furthermore, certainty does not have the characteristics of the unconditioned since one enters (*okkamanti*) it, one acquires (*paṭilabhanti*) it, one causes it to arise (*uppādenti*), etc., etc. On the other hand, if certainty were unconditioned, the Path (*magga*) would have to be, with greater reason, unconditioned. As the Path is fourfold, that would make, along with Nibbāna, five unconditioned things, therefore five Nibbānas, which is impossible, as we have seen.

(55) Dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) is not unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*).[81]

Each of the twelve links (*aṅga*) of dependent origination is conditioned, therefore the whole cannot be unconditioned.

(56) The Four Truths (*sacca*) are not unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*).[82]

Since suffering, its origin and the Path are conditioned, the Truths of Suffering, its origin and the Path cannot be unconditioned.

(57) The four formless attainments (*ārūpyasamāpatti*) are not unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*).[83]

(58) The attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*) is not unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*).[84]

(59) Space (*ākāsa*) is not unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*).[85]

In space, birds (*pakkhi*), the moon and the sun (*candimasuriyā*) and celestial bodies (*tārakarūpa*) shift; one works magical transformations (*iddhiṃ vikubbanti*), one moves (*cālenti*) one's arms (*bāhu*) and hands (*pāṇi*), one throws (*khipanti*) clods of earth (*leḍḍu*), sticks (*laguḷa*) and arrows (*usu*), all things that one cannot do in the unconditioned. Furthermore, by surrounding (*parivāretvā*) space, one builds (*karenti*) houses (*ghara*) or monastic cells (*koṭṭha*); by digging (*khaññamāna*) a well (*udapāna*), one acts so that what was not space (*anākāsa*) becomes (*hoti*) space; by filling (*pūriyamāna*) an

80. Ibid. VI, 1.
81. Ibid. VI, 2. See also the argumentation for thesis 21.
82. Ibid. VI, 3. See also the argumentation for thesis 21.
83. Ibid. VI, 4. See the argumentation for theses 21 and 54.
84. Ibid. VI, 5. See the argumentation for theses 21 and 54.
85. Ibid. VI, 6. See also the argumentation for thesis 21.

empty pool (*tuccha*) or empty hole (*koṭṭha*) or an empty jar (*kumbhī*), one causes space to disappear (*antaradhāyati*). In fact, the unconditioned cannot be created and made to disappear.

(60) Space (*ākāsa*) is invisible (*anidassana*).[86]

It is proved by experience that space is not seen directly by the eye.

(61) The elements of earth (*paṭhavīdhātu*), water (*āpodhātu*), fire (*tejodhātu*) and air (*vāyodhātu*) are invisible (*anidassana*).[87]

It is proved by experience that the four great elements are not seen directly by the eye.

(62) The eye faculty (*cakkhundriya*) is invisible (*anidassana*).[88]

(63) Bodily action (*kāyakamma*) is invisible (*anidassana*).[89]

(64) There are things (*dhamma*) that are included (*saṅgahita*) in other things.[90]

Hence, the spheres (*āyatana*) of form (*rūpa*), sound (*sadda*), odour (*gandha*), taste (*rasa*) and the tangible (*phoṭṭhabba*) are included in the aggregate of form (*rūpakkhandha*).

(65) There are things (*dhamma*) that are associated (*saṃpayutta*) with other things.[91]

Hence the aggregate of feeling (*vedanākkhandha*), which is coexistent (*sahajāta*) with the aggregate of perception (*saññākkhandha*), is associated with it.

(66) There are mental (*cetasika*) things (*dhamma*).[92]

These are things coexistent (*sahajāta*) with thought (*citta*), associated (*saṃpayutta*) with it, such as contact (*phassa*), feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*), volition (*cetanā*), faith (*saddhā*), vigour (*viriya*), etc.

(67) Giving (*dāna*) is not a mental (*cetasika*) thing (*dhamma*).[93]

In fact, giving consists only of material things, such as nourishment, clothing, medicaments, etc., and not mental things such as contact (*phassa*), perception (*saññā*), volition (*cetanā*), faith (*saddhā*), wisdom (*paññā*), etc.

86. Ibid. VI, 7.
87. Ibid. VI, 8.
88. Ibid. VI, 9 (PTS: VI, 8).
89. Ibid. VI, 10 (PTS: VI, 8).
90. Ibid. VII, 1.
91. Ibid. VII, 2.
92. Ibid. VII, 3.
93. Ibid. VII, 4.

(68) Whatever consists of enjoyment (*paribhogamaya*) does not increase (*vaḍḍhati*) merit (*puñña*).[94]

There is no merit for him who gives a gift (*dāna*), for example, without reflecting (*asamannāhāranta*), without thinking (*acetayanta*), without wishing to (*apatthayanta*), without wanting to (*appaṇidahanta*), or else who gives a gift with reasoning (*vitakka*) based on desire (*kāma*), ill-will (*byāpāda*), harmfulness (*vihiṃsā*). Conversely, there is merit if, the gift having been offered and accepted, he who received it does not enjoy it because he vomits (*chaḍḍeti*) it or rejects (*vissajjeti*) it, or if kings (*rājā*) or robbers (*cora*) take (*haranti*) it, or if fire (*aggi*) consumes (*dahati*) it or water (*udaka*) carries it away (*vahati*), etc.

(69) By what is given (*dinna*) here below (*ito*) one is not sustained (*yāpenti*) there above (*tattha*).[95]

It is obvious that one cannot enjoy, in another existence, things that one was given in this one. Furthermore, one is not the agent (*kāraka*) of the actions of another (*aññā*), one does not engender happiness or suffering (*sukhadukkha*) created by another (*parakata*), and one does not experience (*paṭisaṃvedeti*) them.

(70) The earth (*paṭhavī*) is not a fruition of action (*kammavipāka*).[96]

The earth is not associated (*saṃpayutta*) with either pleasant (*sukha*), unpleasant (*dukkha*), or with neither pleasant nor unpleasant feelings (*vedanā*), or with contact (*phassa*), or with perception (*saññā*), or with volition (*cetanā*), or with thought (*citta*); it is not endowed with an object (*sārammaṇa*), it arouses neither adverting (*āvajjanā*), nor ideation (*ābhoga*), nor reflection (*samannāhāra*), nor attention (*manasikāra*), nor volition, nor anticipation (*patthanā*), nor aspiration (*paṇidhi*). Furthermore, it is common (*sādhāraṇa*) to others (*para*), whereas the fruition of action is special.

(71) Aging and death (*jarāmaraṇa*) are not fruition (*vipāka*).[97]

The same demonstration as in the preceding thesis. Furthermore, the aging and death of good (*kusala*) or bad (*akusala*) things (*dhamma*) are always bad.

94. Ibid. VII, 5.
95. Ibid. VII, 6.
96. Ibid. VII, 7.
97. Ibid. VII, 8.

(72) There is a fruition of the noble things (*ariyadhammavipāka*).[98]

The great fruit (*mahapphala*) is the religious (*sāmañña*) life and the pure (*brahmañña*) life. Furthermore, the four fruits are fruition, being the fruits of giving (*dāna*), morality (*sīla*), cultivation (*bhāvanā*).

(73) Fruition (*vipāka*) is not a phenomenon of the nature of fruition (*vipākadhammadhamma*).[99]

If fruition were at the same time a cause of fruition, there would be no end (*antakiriyā*) of suffering (*dukkha*), or interruption of the cycle (*vaṭṭūpaccheda*) of existences, or complete and definitive Nibbāna (*anupādāparinibbāna*). Furthermore, the thought (*citta*) by means of which one has destroyed (*hanti*) another's life (*pāṇa*) would be the same one by means of which one cooks (*paccati*) in the hells (*niraya*), and the thought by means of which one gives a gift (*dānaṃ deti*) would be the same as the one by means of which one rejoices (*modati*) in the heavens (*sagga*).

(74) There are five (*pañca*) destinies (*gati*).[100]

In fact, the Buddha taught only five destinies. Furthermore, the Kālakañjika Asuras have the same colouring (*samānavaṇṇa*), same possessions (*samānabhoga*), same foods (*samānāhāra*), same life span (*samānāyuka*) as the Petas with whom, moreover, they intermarry (*āvāhavivāhaṃ gacchanti*).

(75) There is no intermediate existence (*antarābhava*).[101]

The intermediate existence is not included in the three existences alone accepted by the Buddha and which correspond to the three realms of Buddhist cosmology, nor between (*antare*) any two of those three kinds of existence, nor in the various destinies (*gati*), wombs (*yoni*), etc., accepted by the texts. Furthermore, there are neither actions (*kamma*) nor beings (*satta*) approaching (*upaga*) an intermediate existence. In the latter, beings are not born (*jāyanti*), do not age (*jiyyanti*), do not die (*miyyanti*), do not pass on (*cavanti*), are not reborn (*upapajjanti*), or possess the five aggregates. Finally, the Antarāparinibbāyī is an Anāgāmī who has attained complete Nibbāna, not in an intermediate existence, but in the midst of life in a certain heaven.

98. Ibid. VII, 9.
99. Ibid. VII, 10.
100. Ibid. VIII, 1.
101. Ibid. VIII, 2.

(76) The five kinds of sense-desire (*kāmaguṇa*) alone (*eva*) do not constitute the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*).[102]

In the realm of desire, there is also will (*chanda*), craving (*rāga*), intention (*saṃkappa*), joy (*pīti*), gladness (*somanassa*) associated with it (*tappaṭisaṃyutta*). There are also the eyes (*cakkhu*), ears (*sota*) . . . mind (*mano*) of mankind (*manussa*), their existence (*bhava*) their destiny (*gati*), that in which they are born (*jāyanti*), age (*jiyyanti*), die (*miyyanti*), pass on (*cavanti*), are reborn (*upapajjanti*), etc.

(77) The five sense spheres (*pañcevāyatanā*) do not constitute desire (*kāma*).[103]

The same demonstration as above.

(78) Formed (*rūpī*) things (*dhamma*) do not constitute the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*).[104]

The same demonstration as above.

(79) Unformed (*arūpī*) things (*dhamma*) do not constitute the formless realm (*arūpadhātu*).[105]

The same demonstration as above.

(80) In the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*), the personality (*attabhāva*) is not constituted of the six sense spheres (*saḷāyatana*).[106]

If the personality of beings in the realm of form were to consist of the six sense spheres, there would also have to exist in that realm the corresponding six objective spheres, forms, sounds, odours, tastes, tangibles and ideas. Apart from them, the others consist of form too coarse to exist in the realm of form. Therefore, the five sense spheres do not exist in that realm.

(81) There is no form (*rūpa*) in formless things (*arūpa*).[107]

There is total incompatibility between the nature of formless things and form.

(82) Bodily action (*kāyakamma*) which has a good (*kusala*) thought (*citta*) as its origin (*samuṭṭhita*) is not good form (*rūpa*).[108]

102. Ibid. VIII, 3.
103. Ibid. VIII, 4.
104. Ibid. VIII, 5.
105. Ibid. VIII, 6.
106. Ibid. VIII, 7.
107. Ibid. VIII, 8, and XVI, 9.
108. Ibid. VIII, 9.

Form is devoid of an object (*anārammaṇa*); it does not arouse either adverting (*āvajjanā*), or ideation (*ābhoga*), or reflection (*samannāhāra*), or attention (*manasikāra*), or volition (*cetanā*), or anticipation (*patthanā*), or aspiration (*paṇidhi*).

(83) The life-faculty (*jīvitendriya*) is not exclusively material (*arūpa*).[109]

Material (*rūpī*) things (*dhamma*) also have longevity (*āyu*), duration (*ṭhiti*), prolongation (*yapanā*), prorogation (*yāpanā*), progression (*iriyanā*), existence (*vattanā*), preservation (*pālanā*).

(84) The arahant does not regress (*parihāyati*) from holiness (*arahatta*) because of actions (*kammahetu*).[110]

(85) For him who sees the advantage (*ānisaṃsadassāvī*), there is no abandonment (*pahāna*) of the fetters (*saññojana*).[111]

Only he who pays attention (*manasi karoti*) to the impermanence (*anicca*) of conditioned things (*saṅkhāra*), to their suffering (*dukkha*), their diseases (*roga*), their swellings (*gaṇḍa*), their emptiness (*suñña*), their impersonality (*anatta*), their formula of transformations (*vipariṇāmadhamma*) can abandon the fetters.

(86) A fetter (*saññojana*) does not have the immortal as its object (*amatārammaṇa*).[112]

In fact, the immortal, that is, Nibbāna, has no relation with fetters of any kind.

(87) Form (*rūpa*) has no object (*anārammaṇa*).[113]

Form does not arouse adverting (*āvajjanā*), or ideation (*ābhoga*), or reflection (*samannāhāra*), or attention (*manasikāra*), or volition (*cetanā*), or anticipation (*patthanā*), or aspiration (*paṇidhi*).

(88) The latent tendencies (*anusaya*) are endowed with an object (*sārammaṇa*).[114]

The tendencies do not come into the categories of things without an object (*anārammaṇa*), that is, form (*rūpa*) and Nibbāna. Furthermore, they are identical to the obsessions (*paryuṭṭhāna*), fetters (*saññojana*), floods

109. Ibid. VIII, 10. See above, thesis 2.
110. Ibid. VIII, 11 [SBW: Footnote missing in original French].
111. Ibid. IX, 1.
112. Ibid. IX, 2.
113. Ibid. IX, 3.
114. Ibid. IX, 4.

(*ogha*), etc., which are all endowed with objects. Finally, they are included in the aggregate of mental formations (*saṅkhārakkhandha*) which is fully endowed with objects.

(89) Knowledge (*ñāṇa*) is endowed with an object (*sārammaṇa*).[115]

(90) Thought (*citta*) having the past as its object (*atītārammaṇa*) is endowed with an object (*sārammaṇa*).[116]

Thought that has taken as its object (*ārabbha*) the past (*atīta*) arouses adverting (*āvajjanā*) . . . and aspiration (*paṇidhi*), therefore it is endowed with an object.

(91) Thought (*citta*) having the future as its object (*anāgatārammaṇa*) is endowed with an object (*sārammaṇa*).[117]

The same demonstration as the preceding.

(92) Not all (*sabba*) thought (*citta*) is subject to reasoning (*vitakkānupatita*).[118]

There are concentrations (*samādhi*) devoid of reasoning (*avitakka*) and even of deliberation (*avicāra*).

(93) Sound (*sabba*) is not a diffusion of reasoning (*vitakkavipphāra*) everywhere (*sabbaso*) from reasoning (*vitakkato*) and deliberation (*vicārato*).[119]

(94) Speech (*vācā*) can conform to thought (*yathācitta*).[120]

(95) Bodily action (*kāyakamma*) can conform to thought (*yathācitta*).[121]

(96) One is not endowed (*sammanāgata*) with either the past (*atīta*) or the future (*anāgata*).[122]

In fact, the past no longer exists and the present does not yet exist.

(97) As long as the five aggregates (*khandha*) seeking to re-arise (*upapattesiya*) have not yet ceased (*niruddha*), the five active (*kiriya*) aggregates are not aroused (*uppajjanti*).[123]

If it were otherwise, there would be ten aggregates altogether (*samodhāna*) and in confrontation (*sammukhībhāva*).

115. Ibid. IX, 5.
116. Ibid. IX, 6.
117. Ibid. IX, 7.
118. Ibid. IX, 8.
119. Ibid. IX, 9.
120. Ibid. IX, 10.
121. Ibid. IX, 11.
122. Ibid. IX, 12.
123. Ibid. X, 1.

(98) The form (*rūpa*) of him who is equipped with the Path (*maggasamaṅgī*) is not the Path (*magga*).[124]

The Path is endowed with an object (*sārammaṇa*), and form, which is devoid of one, cannot be the Path.

(99) There is no cultivation of the Path (*maggabhāvanā*) for him who is equipped with the five sense consciousnesses (*pañcaviññāṇasamaṅgī*).[125]

The five sense consciousnesses have objects (*ārammaṇa*) and objective fields (*vatthu*) which are aroused (*uppanna*) and born previously (*purejāta*), internal (*ajjhattika*) objective fields and external (*bāhira*) objects, unmixed (*asambhinna*) and varying (*nānā*) objective fields and objects. They do not have as their object either emptiness (*suññatā*), or the past (*atīta*), or the future (*anāgata*), or contact (*phassa*), or feeling (*vedanā*), or perception (*saññā*), or volition (*cetanā*), or thought (*citta*).

(100) The five sense consciousnesses (*pañcaviññāṇa*) are neither good (*kusala*) nor bad (*akusala*).[126]

The same demonstration as above.

(101) The five consciousnesses are devoid of ideation (*anābhoga*).[127]

The same demonstration as above.

(102) He who is equipped with the Path (*maggasamaṅgī*) is not endowed (*samannāgata*) with the two kinds of morality (*sīla*), one worldly (*lokiya*), the other transcendental (*lokuttara*).[128]

He is no more endowed with the two kinds of morality than with the two kinds of contact (*phassa*), two kinds of feeling (*vedanā*), two kinds of faith (*saddhā*), two kinds of wisdom (*paññā*), etc. Furthermore, if he were endowed with worldly morality, he would become a worldling (*puthujjana*), which he no longer is.

(103) Morality (*sīla*) is mental (*cetasika*).[129]

It does not come into the categories of nonmental things (*acetasika*), such as form (*rūpa*) and Nibbāna, but it implies mental things such as feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*), volition (*cetanā*), faith (*saddhā*), wisdom

124. Ibid. X, 2.
125. Ibid. X, 3.
126. Ibid. X, 4.
127. Ibid. X, 5.
128. Ibid. X, 6.
129. Ibid. X, 7.

(*paññā*), etc. Furthermore, morality is a desirable fruit (*iṭṭhaphala*) and it is endowed with fruit (*saphala*) and fruition (*savipāka*).

(104) Morality (*sīla*) is a consequence of thought (*cittānuparivattī*).[130]

Same demonstration as above.

(105) Morality (*sīla*) caused by resolve (*samādānahetuka*) does not increase (*vaḍḍhati*).[131]

No more than contact (*phassa*), feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*), faith (*saddhā*), wisdom (*paññā*), etc., caused by resolve, morality caused by resolve does not increase. Furthermore, there cannot be two kinds of morality, one that increases and another that does not increase, since two things (*dhamma*) of the same category, morality, contact, feeling, perception, faith, wisdom, etc., cannot coexist.

(106) Intimation (*viññatti*) is not exclusively morality (*sīla*).[132]

Intimation can, in fact, be criminal.

(107) Non-intimation (*aviññatti*) is not exclusively immoral (*dussīlya*).[133]

Which is proved by experience.

(108) The latent tendencies (*anusaya*) are bad (*akusala*), endowed with causes (*sahetuka*) and associated with thought (*cittasaṃpayutta*).[134]

The tendencies are exclusively bad because they are identical to the obsessions (*pariyuṭṭhāna*), fetters (*saññojana*), floods (*ogha*), etc., which are bad by nature. Furthermore, they are not part of undefined things (*abyākata*), that is, form (*rūpa*) and Nibbāna. For the same reason, they are endowed with causes and associated with thought. Moreover, they are included (*pariyāpanna*) in the aggregate of mental formations (*saṃkhārakkhandha*) which is fully associated with thought.

(109) Nescience (*aññāṇa*) having been dispelled (*vigata*), thought (*citta*) remaining (*vattamāna*) dissociated from knowledge (*ñāṇavippayutta*), such a state can be called (*vattabba*) knower (*ñāṇī*).[135]

Just as, when craving (*rāga*), hatred (*dosa*), delusion (*moha*), the defilements (*kilesa*) have been dispelled, such states are respectively called freed

130. Ibid. X, 8.
131. Ibid. X, 9.
132. Ibid. X, 10.
133. Ibid. X, 11.
134. Ibid. XI, 1.
135. Ibid. XI, 2.

from craving (*vītarāga*), without hate (*adosa*), without delusion (*amoha*), without defilements (*nikkilesa*); when nescience is dispelled, such a state is called [without nescience, that is,] knower.

(110) Knowledge (*ñāṇa*) is associated with thought (*cittasaṃpayutta*).[136]

It does not belong to any of the categories of things dissociated from thought (*cittavippayutta*), that is, form (*rūpa*) and Nibbāna, but implies the existence of things associated with thought, such as wisdom (*paññā*). Furthermore, it is included in the aggregate of mental formations (*saṃkhārakkhandhaparyāpanna*), which is fully associated with thought.

(111) By saying (*bhāsant*) the word (*vācā*), 'This (*idaṃ*) is suffering (*dukkha*)', the knowledge (*ñāṇa*), 'This is suffering' does not appear (*pavattati*).[137]

The words 'This is the origin (*samudaya*). This is cessation (*nirodha*). This is the Path (*magga*)' do not cause knowledge of the other three Truths to appear, consequently the word 'This is suffering' does not cause the appearance of the knowledge of suffering.

(112) He who is equipped (*samannāgata*) [with the Path] cannot endure (*tiṭṭheyya*), by means of supernormal power (*iddhibala*), for a cosmic period (*kappa*).[138]

Longevity (*āyu*), destiny (*gati*), the acquisition of a personality, (*attabhāvapaṭilābha*) do not consist of supernormal power (*iddhimayika*). One cannot ensure that, by means of supernormal power, the five aggregates, once arisen (*uppanna*), are not destroyed (*niruddha*) or are permanent (*nicca*).

(113) Concentration (*samādhi*) is not a continuity of thought (*cittasantati*).[139]

If concentration were a continuity of thought, it would extend over the past (*atīta*) and future (*anāgata*) which do not exist, and would not exist either. Furthermore, it would be bad (*akusala*), accompanied (*sahāgata*) by craving (*rāga*), hatred (*dosa*), delusion (*moha*), etc.

(114) The stability of things (*dhammaṭṭhitatā*) is not perfected (*parinipphanna*).[140]

If it were otherwise, one could not put an end (*antakiriyā*) to suffer-

136. Ibid. XI, 3.
137. Ibid. XI, 4.
138. Ibid. XI, 5.
139. Ibid. XI, 6.
140. Ibid. XI, 7.

ing (*dukkha*), there would be no interruption of the cycle (*vaṭṭūpaccheda*) of existences, there would be no complete and definitive Nibbāna (*anupādāparinibbāna*).

(115) Impermanence (*aniccatā*), aging (*jarā*) and death (*maraṇa*) are not perfected (*parinipphanna*).[141]

Same demonstration as above.

(116) Restraint (*saṃvara*) and nonrestraint (*asaṃvara*) are not actions (*kamma*).[142]

Neither restraint nor nonrestraint of the faculties of the eye (*cakkhundriya*), ear (*sotindriya*), nose (*ghānindriya*), tongue (*jivhindriya*), body (*kāyindriya*) and mind (*manindriya*) constitute actions by the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind.

(117) Not every (*sabba*) action (*kamma*) is endowed with fruition (*savipāka*).[143]

Volition (*cetanā*) undefined (*abyākata*) as to fruition (*vipāka*) or action (*kiriyā*) is devoid of fruition (*avipāka*), therefore actions without fruition exist.

(118) Sound (*sadda*) is not fruition (*vipāka*).[144]

Sound is not associated (*saṃpayutta*) with pleasant (*sukha*) or unpleasant (*dukkha*) or neither pleasant nor unpleasant feelings (*vedanā*), it is devoid of an object (*anārammaṇa*) and it does not arouse adverting (*āvajjanā*) or aspiration (*paṇidhi*), etc.

(119) The six sense spheres (*salāyatana*) are not fruition (*vipāka*).[145]

Same demonstration as above.

(120) The person (*puggala*) who should be reborn seven times at the most (*sattakkhattuṃparama*) is not certain (*niyata*) of the obligation to be reborn seven times at the most.[146]

The *sotāpanna* can commit serious offences which oblige him to be reborn more than seven times, or again he can, thanks to intense effort, succeed in being reborn less than seven times.

141. Ibid. XI, 8.
142. Ibid. XII, 1.
143. Ibid. XII, 2.
144. Ibid. XII, 3.
145. Ibid. XII, 4.
146. Ibid. XII, 5.

(121) The person (*puggala*) who goes from one family to another (*kolaṃkola*) is not certain (*niyata*) of the obligation to go from one family to another.[147]

(122) The person (*puggala*) endowed with right views (*diṭṭhisampanna*) cannot intentionally (*sañcicca*) deprive (*voropeyya*) a living being (*pāṇa*) of life (*jīvita*).[148]

(123) For the person (*puggala*) endowed with right views (*diṭṭhisampanna*), the bad destinies (*duggati*) are not abandoned (*pahīna*).[149]

He may, in fact, crave (*rajjeyya*) a form (*rūpa*), a sound (*sadda*), an odour (*gandha*), a taste (*rasa*), a tangible (*phoṭṭhabba*) linked with unhappiness (*āpāyika*), he may practise (*paṭiseveyya*) sexual relations (*methuna dhamma*) with nonhuman females (*amanussitthī*), with female animals (*tiracchānagatitthī*), or with Nāga daughters (*nāgakaññā*), he may accept (*paṭiggaṇheyya*) goats and sheep (*ajeḷaka*), cocks and pigs (*kukkuṭasūkara*), elephants, cows, horses and mares (*hatthigavassavaḷavā*), partridges, quails, peacocks, francolins (*tittiravaṭṭakamorakapiñjala*), all things that a monk should not possess.

(124) For the person (*puggala*) who has attained the seventh existence (*sattamabhavika*), the bad destinies (*duggati*) are abandoned (*pahīna*).[150]

(125) He who should endure for a cosmic period (*kappaṭṭha*) cannot endure (*tiṭṭheyya*) for a cosmic period (*kappa*).[151]

(126) He who should endure for a cosmic period (*kappaṭṭha*) can acquire (*paṭilabheyya*) a good (*kusala*) thought (*citta*).[152]

He may give a gift (*dānaṃ dadeyya*), revere (*vandeyya*) a sanctuary (*cetiya*); therefore he can acquire a good thought.

(127) The person (*puggala*) attached to an immediate destiny (*anantarāpayutta*) cannot enter (*okkameyya*) the certainty of rightness (*sammattaniyāma*).[153]

(128) One who is certain (*niyata*) does not enter (*okkamati*) certainty (*niyāma*).[154]

147. Ibid. XII, 6.
148. Ibid. XII, 7.
149. Ibid. XII, 8.
150. Ibid. XII, 9.
151. Ibid. XIII, 1.
152. Ibid. XIII, 2.
153. Ibid. XIII, 3.
154. Ibid. XIII, 4.

(129) He who is exposed to hindrances (*nīvuta*) does not abandon (*jahati*) the hindrances (*nīvaraṇa*).[155]

The craver (*ratta*) does not abandon craving (*rāga*), the hater (*duṭṭha*) does not abandon hatred (*dosa*), the deluded (*muṭṭha*) does not abandon delusion (*moha*), the defiled (*kiliṭṭha*) does not abandon the defilements (*kilesa*).

(130) He who is confronted (*sammukhībhūta*) [by the fetters] does not abandon (*jahati*) the fetters (*saññojana*).[156]

The same demonstration as above.

(131) He who is enjoying attainment (*samāpanna*) does not taste (*assādeti*), does not desire absorptive meditation (*jhānanikanti*), does not have absorptive meditation as his object (*jhānārammaṇa*).[157]

A meditation cannot take itself as an object, just as contact (*phassa*) cannot touch (*phusati*) itself, feeling (*vedanā*) cannot feel (*vedeti*) itself, perception (*saññā*) cannot perceive (*sañjānāti*) itself, etc.

(132) There is no craving for the unpleasant (*asātarāga*).[158]

There are no beings (*satta*) who delight in suffering (*dukkhābhinandī*), who hope (*patthenti*) for suffering (*dukkha*), envy (*pihenti*) it, seek (*esenti*) it, etc.

(133) The thirst for mental phenomena (*dhammataṇhā*) is bad (*akusala*).[159]

It does not come into any of the categories of undefined things (*abyākata*). Like the thirsts for forms (*rūpataṇhā*), sounds (*saddataṇhā*), odours (*gandhataṇhā*), tastes (*rasataṇhā*) and tangibles (*phoṭṭhabbataṇhā*), it is bad, since every thirst (*taṇhā*), being covetousness (*lobha*), is bad, as was taught by the Buddha.

(134) The thirst for mental phenomena (*dhammataṇhā*) is the origin of suffering (*dukkhasamudaya*).[160]

Every thirst (*taṇhā*), being covetousness (*lobha*), is the origin of suffering.

(135) A bad root (*akusalamūla*) and a good root (*kusalamūla*) do not mutually adjust (*paṭisandahanti*) to each other.[161]

The good and the bad do not arise in the same conditions.

155. Ibid. XIII, 5.
156. Ibid. XIII, 6.
157. Ibid. XIII, 7.
158. Ibid. XIII, 8.
159. Ibid. XIII, 9.
160. Ibid. XIII, 10.
161. Ibid. XIV, 1.

(136) The six sense spheres (*saḷāyatana*) do not establish (*saṇṭhāti*) themselves simultaneously (*apubbaṃ acarimaṃ*) in the maternal womb (*mātukucchi*).[162]

(137) The hearing consciousness (*sotaviññāṇa*) does not arise (*uppajjati*) immediately after (*anantarā*) the visual consciousness (*cakkhuviññāṇa*) and, more generally, the five sense consciousnesses do not arise immediately after each other.[163]

They do not arise in the same conditions because they have different objects.

(138) Noble matter (*ariyarūpa*) is not derived (*upādāya*) from the great elements (*mahābhūta*).[164]

Noble matter is good (*kusala*), devoid of impurities (*anāsava*), fetters (*asaññojaniya*), ties (*aganthaniya*), corruptions (*asaṃkilesika*), etc., whereas the great elements are undefined (*abyākata*), endowed with impurities (*sāsava*), fetters (*saññojaniya*), ties (*ganthaniya*), corruptions (*saṅkilesika*), etc.

(139) The latent tendencies (*anusaya*) are not different (*aññā*) from the obsessions (*pariyuṭṭhāna*).[165]

The tendencies and obsessions are of the same types: craving for sense desires (*kāmarāga*), aversion (*paṭigha*), pride (*māna*), etc. In fact, *kāmarāga*, for example, can only be identical to *kāmarāgānusaya* and *kāmarāgapariyuṭṭhāna*. Therefore, the *kāmarāga* tendency is also identical to the *kāmarāga* obsession and, more generally, the tendencies are identical to the obsessions.

(140) The obsessions (*pariyuṭṭhāna*) are associated with thought (*cittasampayutta*).[166]

The obsessions do not come into any of the categories of things dissociated from thought (*cittavippayutta*), that is, form (*rūpa*) and Nibbāna. Furthermore, there exist bad (*akusala*), craving (*sarāga*), hating (*sadosa*), deluded (*samoha*) and defiled (*saṃkiliṭṭha*) thoughts (*citta*).

(141) Craving for form (*rūparāga*) does not prevail (*anuseti*) only in the realm of form (*rūpadhātu*), is not included only in the realm of form (*rūpadhātupariyāpanna*). Craving for the formless (*arūparāga*) does not prevail

162. Ibid. XIV, 2.
163. Ibid. XIV, 3.
164. Ibid. XIV, 4.
165. Ibid. XIV, 5.
166. Ibid. XIV, 6.

only in the formless realm (*arūpadhātu*), is not included only in the formless realm (*arūpadhātupariyāpanna*).[167]

(142) Speculative view (*diṭṭhigata*) is bad (*akusala*).[168]

It is not included in any of the categories of undefined things (*abyākata*), but implies bad things, such as false views (*micchādiṭṭhi*).

(143) Speculative view (*diṭṭhigata*) is included (*pariyāpanna*) in the three realms.[169]

It is not included in any of the categories of unincluded things (*apariyāpanna*) in the triple realm, such as Nibbāna, the Path (*magga*) and its fruits (*phala*).

(144) Causality (*paccayatā*) is not determined (*vivatthita*).[170]

Thus, experience (*vīmaṃsā*) is both condition (*paccaya*) in relation to cause (*hetupaccaya*) and condition in relation to sovereignty (*adhipatipaccaya*), will (*chanda*) is both condition in relation to sovereignty and condition in relation to coexistence (*sahajātapaccaya*), etc.

(145) The mental formations (*saṃkhāra*) are conditioned by ignorance (*avijjāpaccaya*), and, reciprocally, ignorance (*avijjā*) is conditioned by the mental formations (*saṃkhārapaccaya*).[171]

Ignorance is, in fact, coexistent (*sahajāta*) with the mental formations. It is the same with the other links (*aṅga*) of dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*), which is valid in both senses.

(146) The divisions of time (*addhā*) are not perfected (*parinipphanna*).[172]

The past (*atīta*), future (*anāgata*) and present (*paccuppanna*) are not perfected. There are no five past aggregates (*khandha*), another five future aggregates and another five present aggregates, but only five aggregates which were, are and will be. The three divisions of time are therefore not each independent realities.

(147) The instant (*khaṇa*), moment (*laya*) and second (*muhutta*) are not perfected (*parinipphanna*).[173]

167. Ibid. XIV, 7, and XVI, 10.
168. Ibid. XIV, 8.
169. Ibid. XIV, 9.
170. Ibid. XV, 1.
171. Ibid. XV, 2.
172. Ibid. XV, 3.
173. Ibid. XV, 4.

Same demonstration as above.

(148) The four impurities (*āsava*) are endowed with impurities (*sāsava*).[174]

(149) The aging and death (*jarāmaraṇa*) of transcendental (*lokuttara*) things (*dhamma*) are not transcendental.[175]

They do not come into any of the categories of transcendental things.

(150) It cannot be said (*na vattabbaṃ*) that the attainment of the cessation of feeling and perception (*saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti*) is transcendental (*lokuttara*) or worldly (*lokiya*).[176]

(151) He who is in the attainment (*samāpanna*) of the cessation of feeling and perception (*saññāvedayitanirodha*) cannot die (*kālaṃ kareyya*).[177]

He has no contact (*phassa*), or feeling (*vedanā*), or perception (*saññā*), or volition (*cetanā*), or thought (*citta*), therefore he cannot die. Furthermore, absorbed in supreme concentration, he cannot be killed by poison (*visa*), by a sword (*sattha*) or by fire (*aggi*).

(152) The attainment of the cessation of feeling and perception (*saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti*) is not frequented by nonperceptive beings (*asaññasattūpika*).[178]

For him who has acquired this attainment, there are no three good roots (*kusalamūla*) of the absence of covetousness (*alobha*), absence of hatred (*adosa*) and absence of delusion (*amoha*), or faith (*saddhā*), or vigour (*viriya*), or mindfulness (*sati*), or concentration (*samādhi*), or wisdom (*paññā*), or contact (*phassa*), or feeling (*vedanā*), or perception (*saññā*), or volition (*cetanā*), or thought (*citta*); there is, therefore, no further cultivation of the Path (*maggabhāvanā*).

(153) Action (*kamma*) is not different (*añña*) from the accumulation of actions (*kammūpacaya*).[179]

The accumulation of a thing, contact (*phassa*), feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*), wisdom (*paññā*), etc., is not different from that thing.

(154) One (*para*) cannot control (*niggaṇhāti*) the thought (*citta*) of another (*para*).[180]

174. Ibid. XV, 5.
175. Ibid. XV, 6.
176. Ibid. XV, 7 and 8.
177. Ibid. XV, 9.
178. Ibid. XV, 10.
179. Ibid. XV, 11.
180. Ibid. XVI, 1.

One cannot prevent another, directly, from craving (*rajjati*), hating (*dussati*), being deluded (*muyhati*), being defiled (*kilissati*), or prevent in him contact (*phassa*), feeling (*vedanā*), thought (*citta*), faith (*saddhā*), wisdom (*paññā*), etc., which have already arisen (*uppanna*) to cease (*nirujjhati*). Equally, one cannot make another know perfectly (*parijānāti*) suffering (*dukkha*), abandon (*pajahati*) its origin (*samudaya*), realise (*sacchikaroti*) its cessation (*nirodha*) and cultivate (*bhāveti*) the Path (*magga*). Finally, one cannot be an agent (*kāraka*) in place of another (*añña*), or cause (*karoti*) pleasure and suffering (*sukhadukkha*) created by another (*parakata*), or make him experience (*paṭisaṃvedeti*) those created by us.

(155) One (*para*) cannot support (*paggaṇhāti*) the thought (*citta*) of another (*para*).[181]

The same demonstration as above.

(156) One (*para*) can bestow (*anuppadeti*) one's happiness (*sukha*) on another (*para*).[182]

(157) Having perfectly understood (*adhiggayha*), one does not pay attention (*manasi karoti*).[183]

One does not understand (*pajānāti*) a thought (*citta*) by means of itself.

(158) Form (*rūpa*) is not a cause (*hetu*).[184]

Form is neither a good root (*kusalamūla*) nor a bad root (*akusalamūla*). Furthermore, it is devoid of an object (*anārammaṇa*) and does not arouse either adverting (*āvajjanā*), or aspiration (*paṇidhi*), etc.

(159) Form (*rūpa*) is causeless (*ahetuka*).[185]

Form is not caused by covetousness (*lobha*), or by hatred (*dosa*), or by delusion (*moha*), or by their absence. Furthermore, it is devoid of an object (*anārammaṇa*) and does not arouse either adverting (*āvajjanā*), or aspiration (*paṇidhi*), etc.

(160) Form (*rūpa*) is undefined (*abyākata*).[186]

Same demonstration as thesis 158.

(161) Form (*rūpa*) is not fruition (*vipāka*).[187]

181. Ibid. XVI, 2.
182. Ibid. XVI, 3.
183. Ibid. XVI, 4.
184. Ibid. XVI, 5.
185. Ibid. XVI, 6.
186. Ibid. XVI, 7.
187. Ibid. XVI, 8.

Same demonstration as thesis 159.

(162) There is no accumulation of merit (*puññūpacaya*) for an arahant.[188]

If an arahant were to increase his merit, he would also increase his demerit (*apuñña*), which is impossible. Furthermore, if an arahant accumulates merit, he performs (*karoti*) an action (*kamma*) that leads (*saṃvattaniya*) to a destiny (*gati*), an existence (*bhava*), supremacy (*issariya*), sovereignty (*adhipacca*), great delight (*mahābhoga*), a large retinue (*mahāparivāra*), prosperity among the gods (*devasobhagya*), prosperity among mankind (*manussasobhagya*), which is impossible since an arahant should not be reborn.

(163) Untimely death (*akālamaccu*) can occur for an arahant.[189]

An arahant can be killed (*ghātaka*), deprived of life (*jīvitā voropita*) by a slayer. His body (*kāya*) is not protected from destructive attempts by poison (*visa*), the sword (*sattha*) or fire (*aggi*).

(164) All this (*sabbamidaṃ*) is not due to action (*kammato*).[190]

Action is not due to action. Not all things have as their cause what was done previously (*pubbekatahetu*). Not everything is due to the fruition of action (*kammavipākato*). Hence, misdemeanours and offences, or moral actions such as giving, are not due to the fruition of action. Moreover, the fruition of action, being a fruit (*phala*), has no fruit (*aphala*), whereas offences, misdemeanours and moral actions have fruits (*saphala*).

(165) Even whatever is attached to the faculties (*indriyabaddhañña*) is not necessarily suffering (*dukkha*).[191]

Only that which is not attached to the faculties (*anindriyabaddha*) is impermanent (*anicca*), conditioned (*saṅkhata*), subject to the formula of dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppanna*), to that of destruction (*khayadhamma*), to that of decline (*vayadhamma*), to that of detachment (*virāgadhamma*), to that of cessation (*nirodhadhamma*), that of transformation (*vipariṇāmadhamma*). In fact, the Buddha taught, whatever is impermanent is suffering. Therefore, whatever is not attached to the faculties is suffering, but whatever is attached to the faculties is not necessarily suffering.

(166) The Noble Path (*ariyamagga*) excepted (*ṭhapetvā*), the remain-

188. Ibid. XVII, 1.
189. Ibid. XVII, 2.
190. Ibid. XVII, 3.
191. Ibid. XVII, 4.

ing (*avasesa*) conditioned things (*saṃkhāra*) are not necessarily suffering (*dukkha*).[192]

If it were not so, the origin of suffering (*dukkhasamudaya*) would be suffering, and there would therefore be only three Noble Truths (*ariyasacca*), whereas the Buddha taught four. Furthermore, if conditioned things were suffering because they are impermanent (*anicca*), the Noble Path, being impermanent, would also be suffering.

(167) The community (*saṃgha*) receives (*paṭiggaṇhāti*) donations (*dakkhiṇa*).[193]

The community is worthy of offerings (*āhuneyya*), worthy of hospitality (*pāhuneyya*), worthy of donations (*dakkhiṇeyya*), worthy of salutations (*añjalīkaraṇīya*), and it is the supreme (*anuttara*) field of merit (*puññakkhetta*) in the world (*loka*). Furthermore, it is made up of four pairs of men (*purisayuga*), eight human persons (*purisapuggala*), and it is advisable to give it gifts (*dānaṃ denti*).

(168) The community (*saṃgha*) purifies (*visodheti*) donations (*dakkhiṇa*).[194]

The same demonstration as above.

(169) The community (*saṃgha*) eats (*bhuñjati*), drinks (*pivati*), chews (*khādati*) and tastes (*sāyati*).[195]

Certain people (*keci*) prepare (*karenti*) food (*bhatta*) especially (*uddesa*) for the community and rice-based drinks (*yāgupāna*) for it. Furthermore, the Buddha taught the four kinds of nourishment (*bhojana*) and eight kinds of drinks (*pāna*) of the community.

(170) Whatever is given (*dinna*) to the community (*saṃgha*) yields a great fruit (*mahapphala*).[196]

Same demonstration as for thesis 167.

(171) Whatever is given (*dinna*) to the Buddha yields a great fruit (*mahapphala*).[197]

The Buddha is the highest (*agga*) of bipeds (*dipada*), the best (*seṭṭha*) of bipeds, the deliverance (*pamokkha*) of bipeds, the greatest (*uttama*) of bipeds, the most noble (*pavara*) of bipeds, unequalled (*asama*), incomparable (*asamasama*), etc. Consequently a gift to the Buddha yields a great fruit.

(172) A gift (*dāna*) is purified (*visujjhati*) by the beneficiary (*paṭiggāhaka*) and not by the donor (*dāyaka*).[198]

Certain (*keci*) beneficiaries, such as the community, are worthy of offerings (*āhuneyya*), worthy of hospitality (*pāhuneyya*), worthy of donations (*dakkhiṇeyya*), worthy of salutations (*añjalīkaraṇīya*) and constitute the supreme (*anuttara*) field of merit (*puññakkhetta*) in the world (*loka*). Four pairs of men (*purisayuga*) and eight human persons (*purisapuggala*) are worthy of donations. Some people, having given a gift (*dānaṃ datvā*) to a *sotāpanna,* or a *sakadāgāmī,* or an *anāgāmī,* or an arahant, are propitiated (*ārādhenti*) because of their donation (*dakkhiṇa*).

(173) The Bhagavant Buddha lived (*aṭṭhāsi*) in the world of mankind (*manussaloka*).[199]

There are residences of the Buddha (*buddhavuttha*), sanctuaries (*cetiya*), parks (*ārāma*), monasteries (*vihāra*), villages (*gāma*), market towns (*nigama*), towns (*nagara*), kingdoms (*raṭṭha*), countries (*janapada*), where he lived. He was born (*jāta*) in Lumbinī, he became fully awakened (*abhisambuddha*) at the foot (*mūla*) [of the tree] of Awakening (*bodhi*), the Wheel of the Dhamma (*dhammacakka*) was turned (*pavattita*) by the Bhagavant in Bārāṇasī, his vital element (*āyusaṅkhāra*) was cast off (*ossaṭṭha*) in the sanctuary at Pāvāla, he entered Parinibbāna in Kusinārā. In the suttas, the Buddha himself said he lived in such and such a place.

(174) The Dhamma was taught (*desita*) by the Bhagavant Buddha.[200]

The Dhamma could only be taught by a conqueror (*jina*), a master (*satthā*), fully and perfectly awakened (*sammāsambuddha*), all-knowing (*sabbaññū*), all-seeing (*sabbadassāvī*), master of the Dhamma (*dhammasāmī*), refuge of the Dhamma (*dhammapaṭisaraṇa*). It could therefore not have been taught by a magical creation (*abhinimmita*), or by Ānanda. Furthermore, the Buddha said, in the suttas, that he had taught the Dhamma.

192. Ibid. XVII, 5.
193. Ibid. XVII, 6.
194. Ibid. XVII, 7.
195. Ibid. XVII, 8.
196. Ibid. XVII, 9.
197. Ibid. XVII, 10.
198. Ibid. XVII, 11.
199. Ibid. XVIII, 1.
200. Ibid. XVIII, 2.

(175) The Bhagavant Buddha has compassion (*karuṇā*).[201]

He has compassion, just as he has goodwill (*mettā*), joy (*muditā*) and equanimity (*upekkhā*). Furthermore, he feels benevolence for the world (*lokahita*), sympathy for the world (*lokānukampaka*), interest in the world (*lokatthacara*), and he acquires (*samāpajji*) the attainment of great compassion (*mahākaruṇāsamāpatti*).

(176) The excrement and urine (*uccārapassāva*) of the Bhagavant Buddha do not greatly (*ativiya*) surpass (*adhiggaṇhāti*) other (*aññā*) perfumes (*gandhajāta*).[202]

The Buddha does not feed on perfumes (*gandhabhojī*), but he eats (*bhuñjati*) boiled rice and sour gruel (*odanakummāsa*).

(177) One does not realise (*sacchikaroti*) the four fruits of the religious life (*sāmaññaphala*) by means of only one (*eka*) Noble Path (*ariyamagga*).[203]

One obviously cannot realise them by means of any one of the three lower paths. Neither can one realise them by means of the path of the arahant, since it does not consist, like the other three, of the abandonment of the first fetters.

(178) One does not pass directly (*saṃkamati*) from one absorption (*jhāna*) to another absorption.[204]

Hence, one cannot pass directly from the first absorption to the third, or from the second to the fourth. Neither does one pass directly from one to the next, since they do not arouse adverting (*āvajjanā*), or even aspiration (*paṇidhi*), etc., do not arise in the same conditions and do not have the same constituents (*aṅga*).

(179) There are no intermediate stages between the absorptions (*jhānāntarika*).[205]

There are no intermediate stages between the second absorption and the third, or between the third and the fourth. Between the first and the second, there is concentration (*samādhi*) devoid of reasoning (*avitakka*) and with only deliberation (*vicāramatta*), but which should not count as an intermediate stage of absorption.

201. Ibid. XVIII, 3.
202. Ibid. XVIII, 4.
203. Ibid. XVIII, 5.
204. Ibid. XVIII, 6.
205. Ibid. XVIII, 7.

(180) He who is in an attainment (*samāpanna*) does not hear (*suṇāti*) sound (*sadda*).[206]

He who is in an attainment is completely insensible. For him, the five sense organs and five sense consciousnesses do not function. Only his mental consciousness (*manoviññāṇa*) still functions.

(181) Form (*rūpa*) is not seen (*passati*) by the eye (*cakkhu*).[207]

In fact, the eye is only material form, and form is not seen or recognised (*paṭivijānāti*) by form, which is insensible. It is mental consciousness (*manoviññāṇa*) that, centralising the senses, feels, hears, smells and tastes.

(182) One does not abandon (*jahati*) past (*atīta*), future (*anāgata*) and present (*paccupanna*) defilements (*kilesa*).[208]

Since past defilements no longer exist and future defilements do not yet exist, they cannot be abandoned. As for present defilements, neither can they be abandoned, since the craver (*ratta*) does not abandon craving (*rāga*), the hater (*duṭṭha*) does not abandon hatred (*dosa*), the deluded (*mūḷha*) does not abandon delusion (*moha*), the defiled (*kiliṭṭha*) does not abandon the defilements and, furthermore, craving is not abandoned by craving, or hatred by hatred, or delusion by delusion, or the defilements by the defilements.

(183) Emptiness (*suññatā*) is not included in the aggregate of mental formations (*saṃkhārakkhandhapariyāpanna*).[209]

In fact, the aggregate of mental formations is impermanent (*anicca*), conditioned (*saṃkhata*), subject to the formula of dependent origination (*paṭiccasammuppanna*), to that of destruction (*khayadhamma*), to that of decline (*vayadhamma*), to that of detachment (*virāgadhamma*), to that of cessation (*nirodhadhamma*), to that of transformation (*vipariṇāmadhamma*). Furthermore, emptiness equally characterises the five aggregates.

(184) The fruits of the religious life (*sāmaññaphala*) are not unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*).[210]

(185) The acquisitions (*patti*) are not unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*).[211]

206. Ibid. XVIII, 8.
207. Ibid. XVIII, 9.
208. Ibid. XIX, 1.
209. Ibid. XIX, 2.
210. Ibid. XIX, 3. See the argumentation of theses 21 and 54.
211. Ibid. XIX, 4. See the argumentation of theses 21 and 54.

(186) Suchness (*tathatā*) is not unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*).[212]

(187) The Nibbāna element (*nibbānadhatu*) is undefined (*abyākata*).[213]

It does not arouse either adverting (*āvajjanā*), or aspiration (*paṇidhi*), etc., and it is devoid of an object (*anārammaṇa*).

(188) There is no definitive certainty (*accantaniyāmatā*) for a worldling (*puthujjana*).[214]

A worldling can arouse (*uppajjeyya*) uncertainty (*vicikicchā*); he is therefore not certain of the good Path. He cannot abandon uncertainty or speculative views (*diṭṭhi*), since he does not follow any of the four good paths necessary for that abandonment.

(189) The five faculties (*indriya*) of faith (*saddhā*), vigour (*viriya*), mindfulness (*sati*), concentration (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*paññā*) are not exclusively transcendental (*lokuttara*).[215]

The Blessed One said, 'O monks, by surveying (*volokenta*) the world (*loka*) with the Buddha-eye (*buddhacakkhu*), I have seen (*addasaṃ ahaṃ*), in truth, beings (*satta*) with little dust (*apparajakkha*) or with much dust (*mahārajakkha*), with sharp faculties (*tikkhindriya*) or with blunt faculties (*mudindriya*), with good dispositions (*svākāra*) or with bad dispositions (*dvākāra*), easy to instruct (*suviññāpaya*) or difficult to instruct (*duviññāpaya*), few among them (*appekacce*) seeing the danger of faults in the other world (*paralokavajjabhayadassāvī*)'.

(190) He who has deprived (*voropetvā*) his mother (*mātā*) of life (*jīvitā*) without intending to (*asañcicca*) is not an offender with immediate fruition (*ānantarika*). More generally, the five offences only incur immediate fruition when they have been committed intentionally.[216]

Not every offence or misdemeanour exists as such if it has been committed unintentionally.

(191) A worldling (*puthujjana*) can possess knowledge (*ñāṇa*).[217]

A worldling can possess wisdom (*paññā*), discernment (*pajānanā*), investigation (*vicaya*), examination (*pavicaya*), investigation of the Dhamma

212. Ibid. XIX, 5. See the argumentation of theses 21 and 54.
213. Ibid. XIX, 6.
214. Ibid. XIX, 7.
215. Ibid. XIX, 8.
216. Ibid. XX, 1.
217. Ibid. XX, 2.

(*dhammavicaya*), characterisation (*sallakkhaṇā*), analysis (*upalakkhaṇā*), differentiation (*paccupalakkhaṇā*); he can attain (*samāpajjeyya*) the four absorptions (*jhāna*) and four formless attainments (*ārūpyasamāpatti*). He can give gifts (*dānaṃ dadeyya*); consequently he can possess certain knowledges.

(192) There are infernal guards (*nirayapāla*) in the hells (*niraya*).[218]

There are, in the hells as among humans (*manussa*), causes of actions (*kammakāraṇa*) and consequently agents (*kāraṇika*). Moreover, the Buddha taught which their various roles are.

(193) There are no animals (*tiracchānagata*) among the gods (*deva*).[219]

The world of the gods (*devaloka*) is not an animal destiny (*tiracchānayoni*). There are no insects (*kīṭa*) found there, or grasshoppers (*paṭaṅga*), or mosquitoes (*makasa*), or flies (*makkhikā*), or snakes (*ahi*), or scorpions (*vicchika*), or centipedes (*satapadī*), or earthworms (*gaṇḍupāda*). Neither are there found there grooms for elephants (*hatthibandha*) or grooms for horses (*assabandha*).

(194) The Path (*magga*) is not fivefold (*pañcaṅgika*).[220]

The Buddha taught that the Path is eightfold (*aṭṭhaṅgika*) and not fivefold, since right speech (*sammāvācā*), right conduct (*sammākammanta*) and right livelihood (*sammājīva*) are constituents of the Path (*maggaṅga*) just like the other five.

(195) Transcendental (*lokuttara*) knowledge (*ñāṇa*) does not have twelve objects (*dvādasavatthuka*).[221]

If it were otherwise, there would be twelve transcendental knowledges, twelve *sotāpatti* paths (*magga*), twelve *sakadāgāmī* paths, twelve *anāgāmī* paths, twelve arahant paths and, each time, twelve corresponding fruits (*phala*).

(196) The teaching (*sāsana*) is not revised (*nava kata*) during the councils.[222]

(197) A worldling (*puthujjana*) can be separated (*vivitta*) from the things (*dhamma*) of the three realms (*tedhātuka*).[223]

At the instant (*khaṇa*) that a worldling gives (*deti*) a monastic robe

218. Ibid. XX, 3.
219. Ibid. XX, 4.
220. Ibid. XX, 5.
221. Ibid. XX, 6.
222. Ibid. XXI, 1.
223. Ibid. XXI, 2.

(*cīvara*), etc., having attained (*upasampajja*) one of the four absorptions (*jhāna*) or one of the four formless attainments (*āruppasamāpatti*), he dwells (*viharati*) in them and, consequently, is separated from the things of the three realms.

(198) There is no fetter (*saññojana*) that is not abandoned (*appahāya*) by him who has acquired holiness (*arahattappatti*).[224]

The arahant is defined as having abandoned all the fetters, craving (*rāga*), hatred (*dosa*), delusion (*moha*), pride (*māna*), hypocrisy (*makkha*), malice (*paḷāsa*), tribulation (*upāyāsa*) and the defilements (*kilesa*).

(199) There is no intentional supernormal power (*adhippāyaiddhi*) among the listeners (*sāvaka*) or among the buddhas.[225]

Neither the buddhas nor the listeners can cause trees (*rukkha*) to have permanent leaves (*niccapaṇṇa*) or permanent flowers (*niccapuppha*) or permanent fruit (*niccaphalika*), the full moon (*juṇhā*), peace (*khema*), abundant alms (*subhikkha*), abundant rain (*suvuṭṭhikā*) to be permanent (*nicca*). Neither can they cause what has arisen (*uppanna*) not to cease (*nirujjhati*), the five aggregates, once arisen, not to cease and to be permanent. They cannot cause beings (*satta*) subject to the nature of birth (*jātidhamma*) not to be born (*jāyanti*), beings subject to the nature of aging (*jarādhamma*) not to age (*jīyanti*), beings subject to the nature of disease (*byādhidhamma*) not to be diseased (*byādhiyanti*), beings subject to the nature of death (*maraṇadhamma*) not to die (*miyyanti*).

(200) There are many (*bahu*) divergences in superiority (*atirekata*) between the buddhas.[226]

(201) The buddhas do not dwell (*tiṭṭhanti*) in all (*sabba*) the directions (*disa*).[227]

If the buddhas were to dwell in all the directions, what are the names (*nāma*), lineages (*jacca*), clans (*gotta*) of the buddhas in each direction, the names of their mothers and fathers (*mātāpitā*), their pairs of listeners (*sāvakayuga*), their assistants (*upaṭṭhāka*), of what kind are their monastic robes (*cīvara*) and alms-bowls (*patta*), in which villages (*gāma*), market towns (*nigama*), towns (*nagara*), kingdoms (*raṭṭha*), countries (*janapada*)

224. Ibid. XXI, 3.
225. Ibid. XXI, 4.
226. Ibid. XXI, 5.
227. Ibid. XXI, 6.

do they live? The adversary is indeed obliged to admit he knows nothing about this.

(202) Not all (*sabba*) things (*dhamma*) are fixed (*niyata*).[228]

Not all things are fixed on wrongness (*micchatta*) or on rightness (*sammatta*), and there is a group (*rāsi*) of things that is not fixed (*aniyata*), since the Buddha taught those three groups.

(203) Not all (*sabba*) actions (*kamma*) are fixed (*niyata*).[229]

The same demonstration as above.

(204) There is no fetter (*saññojana*) that is not abandoned (*appahāya*) in Parinibbāna.[230]

The same demonstration as thesis 198.

(205) The arahant does not attain complete Nibbāna (*parinibbāyati*) while having a good (*kusala*) thought (*citta*).[231]

An arahant cannot perform an action (*kamma*) consisting of merit (*puñña*), implying a new destiny (*gatisaṃvattaniya*), a new existence (*bhava*), supremacy (*issariya*), sovereignty (*adhipacca*), great delight (*mahābhoga*), etc., and at the same time attain complete Nibbāna. An arahant does not increase (*ācināti*) or decrease (*apacināti*), because he has decreased his stock of merit to the level of total abandonment. He does not abandon (*pajahati*) or take up (*upādiyati*), having abandoned everything.

(206) The arahant does not attain complete Nibbāna (*parinibbāyati*) while remaining (*ṭhita*) imperturbable (*āneñja*).[232]

The arahant attains complete Nibbāna while remaining in natural thought (*pakaticitta*), in a thought of fruition (*vipākacitta*) which is undefined (*abyākata*).

(207) There is no clear comprehension of the Dhamma (*dhammābhisamaya*) in the womb (*gabbhaseyyā*).[233]

In the womb there is no teaching of the Dhamma (*dhammadesanā*), or listening to the Dhamma (*dhammassavana*), or discussion concerning the Dhamma (*dhammasākacchā*), or questions (*paripucchā*), or taking on of moral-

228. Ibid. XXI, 7.
229. Ibid. XXI, 8.
230. Ibid. XXII, 1.
231. Ibid. XXII, 2.
232. Ibid. XXII, 3.
233. Ibid. XXII, 4.

ity (*sīlasamādāna*), or protection of the doors (*guttadvāratā*) of the senses (*indriya*), or moderation (*mattaññutā*) of delight (*bhoja*), or continuous practice of vigilance (*pubbarattāpararattaṃ jāgariyānuyoga*); therefore there can be no clear comprehension of the Dhamma during embryonic existence.

(208) There is no acquisition of holiness (*arahattappatti*) in the womb (*gabbhaseyyā*), or clear comprehension of the Dhamma (*dhammābhisamaya*) for him who dreams (*supinagata*), or acquisition of holiness for him who dreams.[234]

There is no clear comprehension of the Dhamma or acquisition of holiness for him who is asleep (*sutta*), indolent (*pamatta*), forgetful (*muṭṭhassati*), inattentive (*asampajāna*).

(209) Not all (*sabba*) the thoughts (*citta*) of him who dreams (*supinagata*) are undefined (*abyākata*).[235]

He who dreams can commit offences and misdemeanours, kill, steal, lie, etc., or in contrast, perform virtuous actions, which will yield fruits.

(210) A certain (*kāci*) conditioning of repetition (*āsevanapaccayatā*) exists.[236]

As the Buddha taught it, the fact of repeating an action increases its fruition.

(211) Not all (*sabba*) things (*dhamma*) have the duration of a single, instantaneous thought (*ekacittakkhaṇika*).[237]

The great earth (*mahāpaṭhavī*), the great ocean (*mahāsamudda*), Sineru the king of mountains (*pabbatarājā*), water (*āpo*), fire (*tejo*), wind (*vāyo*), grass (*tiṇa*), wood (*kaṭṭha*), trees (*vanappati*) do not subsist (*saṇṭhahanti*) for a single instant of thought. Furthermore, if all things were of only instantaneous duration, it would be impossible to explain the sense consciousnesses, since their various elements would not arise at the same time.

(212) The undertaking (*dhamma*) of sexual relations (*methuna*) should not be practised (*paṭisevitabba*), even with a single intention (*ekādhippāya*).[238]

Whatever the intention may be, the practice of sexual relations is, for a monk, an extremely serious misdeed which leads immediately to forfeiture

234. Ibid. XXII, 5.
235. Ibid. XXII, 6.
236. Ibid. XXII, 7.
237. Ibid. XXII, 8.
238. Ibid. XXIII, 1.

of religious status and expulsion from the Community. The Theravādins feared that by tolerating it, a growing laxity would be established, going so far as to the practice of offences, in the Community.

(213) Nonhuman beings (*amanussa*) do not practise (*paṭisevanti*) the undertaking (*dhamma*) of sexual relations (*methuna*) under the guise (*vaṇṇena*) of holiness (*arahanta*).[239]

Sexual practices being comparable to offences and misdemeanours, if nonhuman beings practise them under the guise of holiness, they would kill, steal, etc., under the same pretext.

(214) The Bodhisatta does not go (*gaccheti*) to a distressing destiny (*vinipāta*) in order to realise his sovereign desire (*issariyakāmakārikāhetu*).[240]

The contrary thesis is not based on any sutta. The Bodhisatta, of his own will, cannot be reborn (*upapajjeyya*) either in the hells (*niraya*) or among animals (*tiracchānagata*). Furthermore, the Bodhisatta does not possess any supernormal power (*iddhipāda*) by means of which he might descend (*okkamati*) into a womb (*gabbaseyyā*) chosen by him. The Bodhisatta does not carry out (*akāsi*) misdeeds (*dukkarakārikā*) of his own will in order to be reborn in the bad destinies which are their fruits. At least, no sutta attests this.

(215) There are no noncravings (*narāga*) resembling cravings (*rāgapaṭirūpaka*).[241]

(216) The five aggregates (*khandha*), twelve spheres (*āyatana*), eighteen elements (*dhātu*), twenty-two faculties (*indriya*) are perfected (*parinipphanna*), but suffering (*dukkha*) is not perfected.[242]

The aggregates, spheres, elements and faculties are impermanent (*anicca*), conditioned (*saṅkhata*), subject to the formula of dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppanna*), to that of destruction (*khayadhamma*), to that of decline (*vayadhamma*), to that of detachment (*virāgadhamma*), to that of cessation (*nirodhadhamma*), to that of transformation (*vipariṇāmadhamma*). What is impermanent is suffering and, in fact, the aggregates, spheres, elements and faculties are impermanent, therefore suffering is not perfected (!).

(217) On the attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*), a subtle (*sūksma*)

239. Ibid. XXIII, 2.
240. Ibid. XXIII, 3.
241. Ibid. XXIII, 4.
242. Ibid. XXIII, 5.

mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) exists, the aspect (*ākāra*) of which is unperceived (*asaṃvidita*) and which acts as nourishment (*āhāra*).[243]

(218) At the moment of conception, of death, etc., there exists a certain mental consciousness, the action of knowing and the object of which are unperceived.[244]

(219) There is a consciousness constituent of existence (*bhavāṅgavijñāna*).[245]

This special consciousness, which is a cause (*hetu*) of existence and unites the various successive existences, would be a forerunner of the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) of the Mahāyāna.

(220) In the chest there is the heart (*hṛdayavastu*), of material substance (*rūpadravya*), which serves as a sense organ (*indriya*) to mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*).[246]

(221) Faith (*śraddhā*) has the nature of desire (*abhirāma, chanda*).[247]

(222) There are no seeds (*bīja*) that are entities in themselves.[248]

The previous moment, either of form (*rūpa*) or of thought (*citta*), is, depending on its type, the seed of the later moment, either of form or of thought. Thus is the chain of cause (*hetu*) and fruit (*phala*) established.

243. LVP, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, pp. 142, 202–3, and 207.
244. Ibid., p. 198.
245. Ibid., pp. 179 and 196.
246. Ibid., pp. 281, 179 and 221. LVP, *Kośa* I, p. 32, note.
247. Ibid., p. 322.
248. Ibid., pp. 187, 188.

CHAPTER 34

The Abhayagirivāsins or Dhammarucikas

The Abhayagirivāsins form the first schismatic school of the Theravādins of Ceylon. Their main residence was the Abhayagirivihāra founded in Anurādhapura by Vaṭṭagāmani 217 years, ten months and ten days after the Mahāvihāra, therefore in 24 BCE, according to the tradition.[1] From the moment of its founding, this monastery harboured the seeds of heresy. A monk, Mahātissa, was expelled from the Community for having frequented the laity. His disciple Bahalamassutissa went to live at the Abhayagirivihāra where he founded a faction. The monks of that monastery followed this breakaway movement and soon constituted a distinct group from that of the Mahāvihāravāsins. Shortly after, the monks of the Dakkhiṇavihāra, founded by Uttiya, a friend of King Vaṭṭagāmani, who were at first united with those of the Abhayagirivihāra, broke away from them and formed an independent school of Dakkhiṇavihāravāsins, of whom we know no more. Disturbed by these schisms, King Vaṭṭagāmani assembled a council at which the Theravādin canon and commentaries (*aṭṭhakathā*), until then preserved orally, were set in writing.[2]

In the second quarter of the fourth century CE, King Goṭhakābhaya banished from the Abhayagirivihāra sixty monks who had adopted the doctrine of the Vetullakas.[3] This doctrine had entered Ceylon some time before and King Vohārikatissa, in the final years of the third century, had already tried to destroy it.[4]

1. *Mahāvaṃsa*, tr. Geiger, p. 235; Filliozat and Renou, *L'Inde classique*, p. 247, § 468.
2. *Mahāvaṃsa*, pp. 236–7. Since the reign of Vaṭṭagāmani ended in 12 BCE (at the latest), the chronology of these two schisms and of the council is not clearly established.
3. Ibid., p. 264. See below, ch. 38.
4. Ibid., pp. 258–9.

Some fifteen years later, a Chola monk by the name of Saṃghamitta, acquired from the Vetullakas, circumvented the young king Mahāsena and got him to destroy the Mahāvihāra, from which the monks fled. The Abhayagirivihāra was embellished. However, under strong pressure from the minister Meghavaṇṇābhaya, an adherent of the Mahāvihāravāsins, King Mahāsena withdrew his support of Saṃghamitta and the Abhayagirivihāra.[5] Faxian, who visited Ceylon in 412–14, attests that at that time the importance of the Abhayagirivihāra clearly eclipsed that of its rival. In the former, five thousand monks resided, and in the latter only three thousand.[6] At the beginning of the sixth century, King Dhātusena embellished the Abhayagirivihāra but repressed the Dhammarucika heresy, that is, precisely that of the Abhayagirivāsins, which had been adopted by the monks of the Cetiyavihāra.[7] A century later, King Sīlākala had again to repress the Vetullaka heresy, which had made its reappearance at the Abhayagirivihāra.[8] From the ninth century, the fight between the various Theravādin schools calmed down in the face of the Tamil invasions. In about 1160, King Parakkama Bāhu I attempted to create a complete fusion of the three schools at the heart of the Mahāvihāra.[9] Since then, no trace of the Abhayagirivāsins has been found.

We have very little information about the doctrine of the Abhayagirivāsins. A Sinhalese work from the end of the fourteenth century, the *Nikāyasangrahawa,* says that it had been borrowed from the Vajjiputtakas,[10] which is highly likely. The Sinhalese tradition often designates this doctrine by the name of Dhammarucika, from the name of its founder according to the work above,[11] but this term, 'who takes pleasure or causes the Dhamma to shine', can be an epithet bestowed by his adherents. We find a few indications of it in the vast Pāli and Sinhalese commentaries, such as the *Paramatthamañjusā* by Dhammapāla. Unfortunately, an analysis of these works from that point of view has not yet been made.

No work of the Abhayagirivāsins has come down to us, at least not in

5. Ibid., pp. 267–9.
6. Legge, *Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms,* pp. 102–111.
7. Kern, *Histoire du bouddhisme* II, p. 418 [date corrected].
8. Ibid., p. 419. Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism* II, p. 33.
9. See the preceding chapter.
10. Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism* II, p. 19.
11. Ibid.

their name. However, the Chinese canon contains a translation of a treatise entitled *Vimuktimārgaśāstra* by Upatiṣya, a translation made at the beginning of the sixth century by the Cambodian Saṃghabhadra.[12] P. V. Bapat, who devoted two profound studies to this work, concludes that it belonged to the Abhayagirivāsin school.[13] P. C. Bagchi states that the *Vimuttimagga* by Upatissa represents the Abhayagirivāsin recension, and the *Visuddhimagga* by Buddhaghosa the Mahāvihāravāsin version of one and the same work.[14] A study specifically concerned with certain characteristic elements (*asaṃskṛta; samādhi; vitarka* and *vicāra; prajñā; rūpaskandha* and derivatives; *saṃskāraskandha;* various *āyatanas;* four *satyas,* etc.)[15] enabled me to reach the following results: this work knows of only one *asaṃskṛta,* which characterises the Sinhalese Theravādins; the definitions given for other elements are identical to those found in the Pāli Abhidhamma-piṭaka, especially the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* and *Vibhaṅga,* and clearly different from those in the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma-piṭaka, the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* and *Satyasiddhiśāstra.* It is, therefore, certain that this work belonged to a Theravādin school in Ceylon and is based on the Pāli Tipiṭaka that we know. The slight divergences encountered make us think that it used a recension somewhat different from the one which has been transmitted to us by the Mahāvihāravāsins. Since this work is absolutely unknown to the repertories of Sinhalese postcanonical works and since Dhammapāla mentions it in the *Paramatthamañjusā* as containing a heresy,[16] it is certain, on the other hand, that it was not compiled by a monk from the Mahāvihāra. It can therefore only belong to the Abhayagirivāsins or Jetavanīyas and, much more probably, to the former rather than the latter if we consider their relative importance and that of the work, rightly compared to the famous *Visuddhimagga* by Buddhaghosa.

If, as it does indeed seem, the *Vimuttimagga* by Upatissa is the work of an Abhayagirivāsin, we can draw various conclusions from examining it. First

12. T 1648.
13. Bapat, "Vimuttimagga and Visuddhimagga," pp. 458–9, and *Vimuttimagga and Visuddhimagga.*
14. Bagchi, "On the original Buddhism, its Canon and Language," p. 113.
15. T 1648, pp. 427a–b; 406c; 415b; 444c; 445c; 447c; 448c–449a; 452a–b, etc. Furthermore, the list of dharmas given at pp. 447a–b, 448b and 453a–b is quite clearly at an earlier stage than the two lists given by the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* and *Vibhaṅga.*
16. '*Ekacce te Upatissatheraṃ sandhāya āha tena hi Vimuttimagga tathā vuttaṃ*' (Burmese ed., p. 113; Thai ed., p. 179).

of all, the diverse schools of Sinhalese Theravādins possessed in common the Pāli Tipiṭaka, or at least a large part of it, including the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* and *Vibhaṅga*. The Sinhalese tradition reproaches the Abhayagirivāsins only for rejecting the *Parivāra* of the Vinaya-piṭaka.[17] Furthermore, at the time they seceded, about 20 BCE, the Pāli Tipiṭaka was therefore completed or nearly so since at least two of the seven works in the Abhidhamma-piṭaka were already fixed at least partially and could serve as a basic reference for two schools. If, as the tradition would have it, the Abhayagirivāsins later incorporated into the canon a Vetulla-piṭaka,[18] which may have included Mahāyāna sūtras, they nonetheless had in common with the Mahāvihāravāsins the totality, or nearly, of the teaching enclosed in the Pāli Tipiṭaka and which the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, with the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi, Vibhaṅga* and certainly the *Puggalapaññatti* and the major part of the *Kathāvatthu,* had rigorously determined.

Xuanzang, who travelled in about 640 to the extreme south of India with the hope, alas unfulfilled, of visiting Ceylon, collected certain evidence on that island from which it appears that if the monks of the Mahāvihāra were strict Hīnayānists, those at the Abhayagirivihāra had adopted both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.[19] This seems to be confirmed by what we know of the doctrine of the Vetullakas,[20] who claimed to have much influenced the Abhayagirivāsins since the third century CE. However, as we have just seen, and this coincides very well with what Xuanzang says, this Mahāyānist teaching could only have been superimposed among the Abhayagirivāsins on the Hīnayānist doctrine enclosed in the Tipiṭaka which remained the basis of their canon.

We should recall that Xuanzang also met Sthaviras of the Mahāyāna, who belonged, perhaps if not to the Abhayagirivāsins, at least to a closely linked school, in Bodh-Gayā (1,000 monks in 1 monastery), Kaliṅga (500 monks in 10 monasteries), Bhārukaccha (300 monks in 10 monasteries) and Surāṣṭra (nearly 3,000 monks in 50 monasteries). Moreover, those in Bodh-Gayā resided in a monastery built by an early king of Ceylon.[21]

17. Kern, *Histoire du bouddhisme*, p. 368.
18. Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism* II, p. 33.
19. Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels* II, pp. 234–5.
20. Cf. below, ch. 38.
21. Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels* II, p. 136.

CHAPTER 35

The Jetavanīyas or Sāgalikas

The Jetavanīyas formed the second schismatic school of the Sinhalese Theravādins. Their residence was the Jetavanavihāra, founded by King Mahāsena in the mid-fourth century CE. After the death of Saṃghamitta, who had forced him to destroy the Mahāvihāra, Mahāsena built the Jetavanavihāra in Anurādhapura on the instigation of the monk Tissa, another adversary of the Mahāvihāra. Tissa was soon excommunicated after a complaint lodged by the Community with the king,[1] but the Jetavanavihāra became the seat of a new school, that of the Sāgalikas after the name of their founder.

The Jetavanīyas do not seem to have played a large part in the history of Sinhalese Buddhism. Neither Faxian, who lived in Ceylon from 412 to 414, nor Xuanzang, who even if he was not able to visit the island as planned, in about 640 collected much information on it, mention the Jetavanavihāra or the school centred there.[2]

The Sinhalese tradition records only one incident concerning them: in the seventh century, in the reign of Aggabodhi I, a quarrel broke out between the monks of the Jetavanavihāra and those of the Mahāvihāra.[3] In about 1160, King Parakkama Bāhu I attempted to bring together the two dissident schools, that of the Jetavanīyas and that of the Mahāvihāra.[4] No trace of the Jetavanīyas is to be found since that time.

We know nothing of their doctrine. Perhaps a complete and detailed

1. *Mahāvaṃsa*, tr. Geiger, pp. 269–70.
2. Legge, *Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms*, pp. 101–2; Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels*, pp. 234–6.
3. Kern, *Histoire du bouddhisme* II, p. 419.
4. Ibid., pp. 421–2; Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism* II, p. 33.

analysis of the Pāli commentaries might one day make good this lacuna. The tradition asserts that the Jetavanīyas rejected the two *Vibhaṅgas* of the Theravādin Vinaya-piṭaka[5] and that, like the Abhayagirivāsins, they added to the canon a Vetulla-piṭaka possibly containing Mahāyāna sūtras.[6] They therefore seem to have upheld a doctrine quite close to that of the Abhayagirivāsins and characterised, like the latter, by a Mahāyānist superstructure resting on a solid and vast Hīnayānist infrastructure constituted by the Pāli Tipiṭaka, even if amputated into several parts.

No work of Jetavanīya origin has come down to us, and it is highly unlikely that the *Vimuktimārgaśāstra* by Upatiṣya,[7] the Chinese version of which we possess, could have belonged to them.

5. Kern, *Histoire du bouddhisme*, p. 409.
6. Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism* II, p. 33.
7. T 1648.

CHAPTER 36

The Hetuvādins

We are very badly informed on the Hetuvādins or 'causalists'. Bhavya (list one) identifies them with the Sarvāstivādins and attributes to them as their fundamental thesis: 'What has arisen (*utpanna*), what arises (*utpadamāna*) and what should arise (*utpattavya*), everything is endowed with a cause (*sahetuka*)'. However, this proposition was accepted by all the Buddhist schools who claim that its origin goes back to the teaching itself of the Buddha with the theory of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*).

Buddhaghosa attributes ten theses in the *Kathāvatthu* to the Hetuvādins. Nowhere does he specify who these Hetuvādins were or what their origin was, but he distinguishes them from the Sarvāstivādins, to whom he ascribes four different opinions. Furthermore, two of the theses attributed by him to the Hetuvādins are the opposite of those of the Sarvāstivādins.[1] Since Buddhaghosa does not begin to meet the theses of the Hetuvādins until the fifteenth section of the *Kathāvatthu*, it does indeed seem that they were late in appearing. These are their propositions:

(1) The four impurities (*āsava*) are pure (*anāsava*).[2]

There are only four impurities, not one more. There is therefore not another one by means of which the first four could be made impure (*sāsava*). That is why the four impurities are pure.

(2) The attainment of cessation [of perception and feeling] (*saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti*) is transcendental (*lokuttara*).[3]

The attainment of cessation, not being worldly (*lokiya*), is necessarily transcendental.

1. *Kathāvatthu* XIX, 8, and XX, 2.
2. Ibid. XV, 5.
3. Ibid. XV, 7.

(3) The attainment of cessation is worldly.[4]

Not being transcendental, it is worldly. It is astonishing that these two contradictory theses should be maintained by members of the same school.

(4) The attainment of cessation is frequented (*upika*) by nonperceptive beings (*asaññasatta*).[5]

What seems to emerge from the somewhat confused commentary on the *Kathāvatthu* and from Buddhaghosa is that since in the attainment in question perception has ceased, the nonperceptive gods therefore fulfil the condition necessary for practising it.

(5) One (*para*) bestows (*anuppadeti*) one's happiness (*sukha*) on another (*para*).[6]

The venerable Udāyī said this: 'In truth, the Blessed One is the destroyer (*apahattā*) of many painful things (*dukkhadhamma*). In truth, the Blessed One is the bestower (*upahatta*) of many pleasant things (*sukhadhamma*). In truth, the Blessed One is the destroyer of many bad (*akusala*) things. In truth, the Blessed One is the bestower of many good (*kusala*) things'. Therefore, one person can bestow happiness on another.

(6) What is attached (*baddha*) to the faculties (*indriya*) is suffering (*dukkha*).[7]

That which is attached to the faculties is, like them, subject to the oppression (*paṭipīlana*) of growth (*udaya*) or decline (*vaya*). In fact, whatever is impermanent (*anicca*) is suffering (*dukkha*).

(7) With the exception of the Noble Path (*ariyamagga*), the remainder (*avasesa*) of the conditioned things (*saṅkhāra*) is suffering (*dukkha*).[8]

The Noble Path is excepted because it is defined as the way (*paṭipadā*) that leads (*gāminī*) to the cessation (*nirodha*) of suffering.

(8) The five faculties (*indriya*) of faith (*saddhā*), vigour (*viriya*), mindfulness (*sati*), concentration (*samādhi*) and wisdom (*paññā*) are not worldly (*lokiya*), but transcendental (*lokuttara*) only.[9]

(9) A worldling (*puthujjana*) has no knowledge (*ñāṇa*).[10]

4. Ibid. XV, 8.
5. Ibid. XV, 10.
6. Ibid. XVI, 3.
7. Ibid. XVII, 4.
8. Ibid. XVII, 5.
9. Ibid. XIX, 8.
10. Ibid. XX, 2.

If a worldling were to have knowledge, by means of that knowledge he would perfectly know (*parijānāti*) suffering (*dukkha*), he would abandon (*pajahati*) its origin (*samudaya*), he would directly realise (*sacchikaroti*) its cessation (*nirodha*) and he would cultivate (*bhāveti*) the Path (*magga*), which is impossible.

(10) Form (*rūpa*) is unperfected (*aparinipphanna*). The five aggregates (*khandha*), twelve spheres (*āyatana*), eighteen elements (*dhātu*) and twenty-two faculties (*indriya*) are unperfected. Suffering (*dukkha*) is perfected (*parinipphanna*).[11]

The argumentation recorded here is not clear.

11. Ibid. XXIII, 5.

CHAPTER 37

The Uttarāpathakas

Only Buddhaghosa, in his commentary on the *Kathāvatthu,* mentions these. Also, he gives no indication of either the meaning of the term or the place of the Uttarāpathakas in the table of the affiliation of the schools. It is to them he attributes, after the Andhakas, the greatest number of heresies (forty-five), which proves the importance of this group.

The name of Uttarāpathaka designates the northern (*uttara*) route (*patha*) and, more precisely, the region west of Sthāneśvara, that is, the whole Indus Basin, including the mountainous regions that border it to the north and west.[1] Buddhaghosa designates under the name of Uttarāpathaka the schools which resided in this vast region and which he cannot specify further. They have nothing in common except their geographical origin, whence the essentially eclectic nature of the totality of theses attributed to them. In fact, Buddhaghosa groups under their name propositions which were maintained by schools as different as the Sarvāstivādins, Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas, Sautrāntikas and the various Mahāsāṃghika schools. N. Dutt's hypothesis that the Uttarāpathakas appeared as an eclectic *school* having doctrines borrowed from both the Mahāsāṃghika groups and the Theravādins, and which really marks an intermediate stage between the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna,[2] seems to be wholly gratuitous and does not correspond to the state of affairs as manifested.

A study of all the theses attributed by Buddhaghosa to the Uttarāpathakas can therefore be of only purely geographical interest, which, nonetheless, should not be disdained. These are the propositions:

1. Law, *Geography of Early Buddhism*, pp. 48–9; Cunningham, *The Ancient Geography of India*, p. 13.
2. Dutt, *Early Monastic Buddhism* II, p. 172.

(1) There is holiness (*arahatta*) for the lay person (*gihī*).[3]

One can become a holy one (*arahant*) even while remaining tied to lay life (*gihīsaññojana*) and retaining the characteristics of a lay person (*gihibyañjane ṭhita*). This thesis represents an attempt at the laicisation of the Path of Deliverance which was to culminate in the Mahāyāna in the lay career of the bodhisattvas.

(2) One can become a holy one (*arahant*) on being reborn (*saha upapattiyā*).[4]

This is a peculiarly Sarvāstivādin thesis. As Buddhaghosa explains, this thesis, like the corresponding Theravādin one, arises out of the interpretation of a Prākrit term. Some render this as *upapajjaparinibbāyin,* hence the proposition above, and others as *upahaccaparinibbāyin,* that is, 'having entered complete Nibbāna by reducing (the life span)'. The term, however it is interpreted, designates the second type of Anāgāmin.

(3) All attributes (*dhamma*) possessed by the arahant are pure (*anāsava*).[5]

Since the arahant is pure, this means all things concerning him are pure.

(4) The arahant is endowed with four fruits (*phala*).[6]

The arahant should have successively gathered the three lower fruits, those of the *sotāpanna* or streamwinner (of the religious life), *sakadāgāmin* or once-returner (to existence) and *anāgāmin* or nonreturner (to existence) and have retained them.

(5) It is because of Awakening (*bodhi*) that one is a buddha.[7]

Awakening is defined by Buddhaghosa as knowledge (*ñāṇa*) of the four paths (*catumagga*) and omniscience (*sabbaññutañāṇa*). This thesis is another form of the one which radically distinguishes the career of the buddhas, characterised by *bodhi,* from that of the arahants.

(6) The bodhisatta is endowed with the marks (*lakkhaṇa*) of a Great Man (*mahāpurisa*).[8]

This proposition is a corollary of the previous one. The bodhisatta, being endowed with the marks, is predestined to become a buddha or Cakkavat-

3. *Kathāvatthu* IV, 1. Thesis of certain Uttarāpathakas.
4. Ibid. IV, 2. Cf. LVP, *Kośa* III, pp. 38–40, and VI, pp. 210–11.
5. *Kathāvatthu* IV, 3.
6. Ibid. IV, 4.
7. Ibid. IV, 6.
8. Ibid. IV, 7.

tin king, which distinguishes him from plain arahants. It follows that the career of the bodhisattas and buddhas is different from that of the arahants.

(7) The knowledge of a trainee (*sekkha*) can be wise (*asekkha*).[9]

This proposition is based on the canonical traditions according to which trainees such as Ānanda have demonstrated knowledges which can be interpreted as wise.

(8) For him who is not yet certain (*aniyata*) of the Path of Deliverance, there may be knowledge (*ñāṇa*) of the single fact that he is aiming at certainty (*niyāmagamana*).[10]

The person (*puggala*) who will enter (*okkamissati*) the certainty of rightness (*sammattaniyāma*) is capable (*bhabba*) of comprehending (*abhisametuṃ*) the Dhamma.

(9) The attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*) is unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*).[11]

The attainment of cessation is defined as the stopping (*appavatti*) of four aggregates (*khandha*). Since it does not display the characteristics (*lakkhaṇa*) of conditioned things (*saṅkhata*), one deduces from this that it is unconditioned.

(10) Space (*ākāsa*) is unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*).[12]

(11) There are six destinies (*gati*).[13]

In addition to the five destinies of the hells (*niraya*), animals (*tiracchānayoni*), ghosts (*pittivisaya*), humans (*manussa*) and gods (*deva*), the Uttarāpathakas count that of the titans (*asura*), which the other schools class among the ghosts.

(12) Form (*rūpa*) has an object (*sārammaṇa*).[14]

Form has an object inasmuch as it has conditions (*sappaccaya*), but not otherwise. This object is not perceptible like that of visual or other consciousness.

(13) The latent tendencies (*anusaya*) are devoid of an object (*anārammaṇa*).[15]

9. Ibid. V, 2.
10. Ibid. V, 4.
11. Ibid. VI, 5.
12. Ibid. VI, 6.
13. Ibid. VIII, 1.
14. Ibid. IX, 3.
15. Ibid. IX, 4. Thesis of certain Uttarāpathakas.

A worldling (*puthujjana*) who dwells (*vattamāne*) with a good or undefined (*kusalābyākata*) thought (*citta*) should be called (*vattabba*) devoid of tendencies (*sānusaya*). The tendencies, in fact, have no object.

(14) Thought (*citta*) having the past (*atīta*) or the future (*anāgata*) as its object (*ārammaṇa*) is devoid of an object (*anārammaṇa*).[16]

This is a consequence of the anti-Sarvāstivādin thesis. Since the past and the future do not exist, a thought that takes them as its object is therefore devoid of an object.

(15) All thought (*sabbaṃ cittaṃ*) is subject to reasoning (*vitakkānupatita*).[17]

Every thought is subject to reasoning both because of its object (*ārammaṇato*) and because of its associations (*saṃpayogato*) with other thoughts.

(16) Concentration (*samādhi*) is the continuity of thought (*cittasantati*).[18]

Concentration that can last for a very long time is defined as the continuity of thought during all that time.

(17) The person (*puggala*) who should be reborn seven times at the most (*sattakkhattuṃparama*) is certain (*niyata*) of the obligation to be reborn seven times at the most.[19]

The *sotāpanna* or streamwinner destined to be reborn seven times will not attain Nibbāna until he has been reborn seven times, not before, not after.

(18) For the person (*puggala*) endowed with [right] views (*diṭṭhisampanna*), the bad destiny (*duggati*) is abandoned (*pahīnā*).[20]

The person in possession of the right view of the Dhamma, that is, the *sotāpanna* or streamwinner, cannot fall back into the bad destinies.

(19) He who remains for a cosmic period (*kappaṭṭha*) in the hells cannot acquire (*paṭilabheyya*) a good (*kusala*) thought (*citta*).[21]

A major offender, condemned to remain for a cosmic period in the hells, is too hardened to acquire a good thought able to redeem him.

(20) The person (*puggala*) attached to an immediate destiny (*anantarāpayutta*) can enter (*okkameyya*) the certainty of rightness (*sammattaniyāma*).[22]

16. Ibid. IX, 6 and 7.
17. Ibid. IX, 8.
18. Ibid. XI, 6.
19. Ibid. XII, 5.
20. Ibid. XII, 8.
21. Ibid. XIII, 2.
22. Ibid. XIII, 3.

The person who is guilty of the five major offences (matricide, parricide, slaying an arahant, wounding the Buddha, schism) entailing immediate fruition (*antarāvipāka*) and generally considered as irredeemable or fixed (*niyata*), is not certain (*niyata*) of wrongness (*micchatta*), but is capable (*bhabba*) of entering the certainty of rightness.

(21) He who is subject to the hindrances (*nivuta*) abandons (*jahati*) the hindrances (*nīvaraṇa*).[23]

He who is subject to the hindrances, covered (*ophuṭa*), enveloped (*pariyonaddha*) by the hindrances abandons them thanks to the nature (*bhāva*) of the purity (*suddhi*) which should be accomplished (*kiccā*).

(22) There is a craving (*rāga*) for the unpleasant (*asāta*).[24]

This thesis is based on a sutta: 'He who feels (*vedeti*) a pleasant (*sukha*), painful (*dukkha*), or neither pleasant nor painful feeling (*vedanā*), delights (*abhinandati*) in and approves (*abhivadati*) of that feeling'.

(23) The hearing consciousness (*sotaviññāṇa*) arises (*uppajjati*) immediately after (*anantarā*) the visual consciousness (*cakkhuviññāṇa*). Or, more generally, the five sense consciousnesses (*viññāṇa*) mutually (*aññamaññassa*) arise immediately (*samanantarā*) one after the other.[25]

During a show of dancing (*nacca*), singing (*gītā*) and music (*vādana*), one sees (*passati*) forms (*rūpa*), one hears (*suṇāti*) sounds (*sadda*), one smells (*ghāyati*) perfumes (*gandha*), one tastes (*sāyati*) flavours (*rasa*), one touches (*phusati*) tangibles (*phoṭṭhabba*) at the same time, so that the five sense consciousnesses mutually arise in continuity.

(24) Noble form (*ariyarūpa*) is derived (*upādāya*) from the great elements (*mahābhūta*).[26]

Form derived from the four great elements includes material things which are not the raw great elements, earth (*paṭhavī*), water (*āpo*), fire (*tejo*) and wind (*vāyo*), but which derive from them, such as forms, sounds, odours, male and female conduct, intimation by gesture or speech, etc. Some of these things can be noble, such as right speech (*sammāvācā*), right conduct (*sammākammanta*), etc.

23. Ibid. XIII, 5.
24. Ibid. XIII, 8.
25. Ibid. XIV, 3.
26. Ibid. XIV, 4.

(25) Speculative view (*diṭṭhigata*) is undefined (*abyākata*).[27]

This thesis is based on a sutta also recognised by the Theravādins, who contest it. In reality, the Uttarāpathakas have misinterpreted the word *abyākata*. When the Buddha, in the Sutta, declares that contradictory speculative views are undefined, he clearly means that they are not certain, that they are false, illusory, and that it is foolish to believe them (see the *Brahmajālasutta*, recognised by all the schools). The Theravādins' critique proves that the Uttarāpathakas gave the word 'undefined' (*abyākata*) the meaning it usually has in Buddhist scholastics: neither good (*kusala*) nor bad (*akusala*).

(26) Form (*rūpa*) is cause (*hetu*) and caused (*sahetuka*).[28]

The four great elements (*mahābhūta*) are the causes of derived matter (*upādāyarūpa*). Form, being conditioned (*sappaccaya*), is therefore caused. The Uttarāpathakas take the word 'cause' (*hetu*) in its wider sense, whilst the Theravādins understand by *hetu* only moral causes: covetousness (*lobha*), hatred (*dosa*), delusion (*moha*) and their opposites.

(27) Giving (*dāna*) is purified (*visujjhati*) by the donor (*dāyaka*), not the beneficiary (*paṭiggāhaka*).[29]

If, on the contrary, giving were purified because of the beneficiary, if it were to yield a great fruit (*mahapphala*) because of the beneficiary, the giving would be done by the donor but the fruition (*vipāka*) would be produced (*nibbattito*) by the beneficiary. In that case, one (*añña*) would be (*bhaveyya*) the agent (*kāraka*) in relation to the other (*aññassa*), one would undergo (*āpajjeyya*) pleasure or pain (*sukhadukkha*) created by another (*parakata*), one would act (*kareyya*) and the other react (*paṭisaṃvedeyya*) to the effect of the action. In order to avoid this absurd and unfair consequence, it should be maintained that giving is purified by the donor and not by the beneficiary.

(28) The Bhagavant Buddha has no compassion (*karuṇā*), or good-will (*mettā*), or joy (*muditā*), or equanimity (*upekkhā*).[30]

These are the four great sentiments peculiar to the Buddha and which characterise his relations with beings. The Uttarāpathakas compare these sentiments to cravings (*rāga*) which link the Buddha with beings. Since

27. Ibid. XIV, 8.
28. Ibid. XVI, 5 and 6.
29. Ibid. XVII, 11.
30. Ibid. XVIII, 3.

the Buddha is devoid of all craving, he is therefore devoid of compassion, good-will, etc.

(29) The excrement (*uccāra*) and urine (*passāva*) of the Bhagavant Buddha greatly (*ativiya*) surpasses (*adhigganhāti*) other (*aññā*) perfumes (*gandha*).[31]

(30) One realises (*sacchikaroti*) the four (*cattāri*) fruits of the religious life (*sāmaññaphala*) by means of only one (*eka*) Noble Path (*ariyamagga*).[32]

This proposition should be compared to thesis 4 above, which it seems to contradict. In fact, the *Kathāvatthu* explains that the Buddha alone realises the four fruits by means of only one Path.

(31) One abandons (*jahati*) past (*atīta*), future (*anāgata*) and present (*paccuppanna*) defilements (*kilesa*).[33]

This is a thesis which was particularly upheld by the Sarvāstivādins, for whom cessation due to acquired knowledge (*pratisaṃkyānirodha*) is aimed at past, present and future defilements.

(32) The suchness (*tathatā*) of all things (*sabbadhamma*) is unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*).[34]

The suchness of all things is not form (*rūpa*), or feeling (*vedanā*), or perception (*saññā*), or mental formations (*saṅkhāra*), or consciousness (*viññāṇa*). Therefore it is unconditioned.

(33) There is definitive certainty (*accantaniyāmatā*) for a worldling (*puthujjana*).[35]

(34) He who has deprived (*voropetvā*) his mother (*mātā*) of life (*jīvita*) without intending to (*asañcicca*) is an offender with immediate fruition (*ānantarika*). More generally, the five offences of immediate fruition (*ānantarika*) are so even if the offender committed them unintentionally.[36]

(35) The teaching (*sāsana*) has been revised (*nava kata*).[37]

The teaching of the Buddha has been revised during three councils (*saṅgīti*). It therefore no longer represents the teaching of the Tathāgata, but a new and consequently apocryphal teaching.

31. Ibid. XVIII, 4.
32. Ibid. XVIII, 5.
33. Ibid. XIX, 1. Thesis of certain Uttarāpathakas.
34. Ibid. XIX, 5. Thesis of certain Uttarāpathakas.
35. Ibid. XIX, 7. Thesis of certain Uttarāpathakas.
36. Ibid. XX, 1. Thesis of certain Uttarāpathakas.
37. Ibid. XXI, 1. Thesis of certain Uttarāpathakas.

(36) A worldling (*puthujjana*) is not separated (*avivitta*) from the things (*dhamma*) of the three realms (*tedhātuka*).[38]

Since the things of the three realms are not perfectly known (*apariññāta*) by a worldling, the latter is not separated from them.

(37) All (*sabbe*) things (*dhamma*) are fixed (*niyata*).[39]

All things are fixed as to their own-nature (*sabhāva*) and never abandon (*vijahanti*) the latter. Hence, form (*rūpa*) is certain in the sense of form (*rūpaṭṭha*), in the own-nature of form. Without which form could develop feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*), mental formations (*saṅkhāra*) or consciousness (*viññāṇa*). This proposition should be compared to thesis 32, which makes suchness (*tathatā*) an unconditioned thing (*asaṅkhata*), that is, an absolute.

(38) All (*sabbe*) actions (*kamma*) are fixed (*niyata*).[40]

This proposition is parallel to the preceding one, of which it is a corollary. The fruition of actions is certain, that is, determined by them, in the same way that the latter are determined by the circumstances of their accomplishment (*diṭṭhadhammavedaniya*), their own-nature thus being certain. This thesis should be compared to that which makes dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) an unconditioned thing (*asaṃskṛta*), that is, an absolute.

(39) The arahant who remains (*ṭhita*) imperturbable (*āneñja*) can attain complete Nibbāna (*parinibbāyati*).[41]

This thesis is based on a sutta: 'The Bhagavant, having emerged (*vuṭṭhahitvā*) from the fourth absorption (*catutthajjhāna*), attained complete Nibbāna (*parinibbuta*) immediately afterwards (*samanantarā*)'. In fact, the stage called imperturbable pertains to the fourth absorption. It follows that the arahants can attain Nibbāna as the buddhas do. This thesis is therefore to be compared to those according to which the career of the *sāvakas* and that of the arahants are identical.

(40) There is clear comprehension (*abhisamaya*) of the Dhamma in the womb (*gabbhaseyyā*).[42]

38. Ibid. XXI, 2. Thesis of certain Uttarāpathakas.
39. Ibid. XXI, 7. Thesis of certain Uttarāpathakas.
40. Ibid. XXI, 8. Thesis of certain Uttarāpathakas.
41. Ibid. XXII, 3. Thesis of certain Uttarāpathakas.
42. Ibid. XXII, 4. Thesis of certain Uttarāpathakas.

He who became a streamwinner (*sotāpanna*) during a past existence (*atītabhava*) can acquire clear comprehension of the Dhamma when, in a new existence, he passes through embryonic life.

(41) There is acquisition (*patti*) of holiness (*arahatta*) in the womb (*gabbhaseyyā*), clear comprehension (*abhisamaya*) of the Dhamma and acquisition of holiness for him who dreams (*supinagata*).[43]

This threefold thesis is of the same order as the preceding one. Clear comprehension of the Dhamma and the acquisition of holiness can occur in states where consciousness is much reduced.

(42) All (*sabba*) thoughts (*citta*) of him who dreams (*supinagata*) are undefined (*abyākata*).[44]

This thesis contradicts the preceding one and could not have been upheld by the same schools. It is based on a word of the Buddha recorded in a sutta: 'The thought of him who dreams is unimportant (*abbohārika*)'. Therefore, whatever the actions he dreams about and of which he is the author, they will have no fruition, either good (*kusala*) or bad (*akusala*). Moral responsibility is not engaged by thoughts in a dream. This proposition is to be compared with the first thesis of Mahādeva.

(43) There is no conditioning (*paccayatā*) of repetition (*āsevana*).[45]

According to Buddhaghosa, the Uttarāpathakas based this thesis on the following argumentation: 'Since all things (*dhamma*) are instantaneous (*khaṇika*) and nothing endures (*ṭhitvā*) even for a moment (*muhuttam pi*) . . . there is no conditioning of repetition'. However, the *Kathāvatthu* clearly alludes to another order of facts: the repetition (*āsevana*), cultivation (*bhāvanā*), frequent repetition (*bahulīkamma*) of offences or moral actions and their respective fruition.

(44) Nonhuman beings (*amanussa*) practise (*paṭisevanti*) the undertaking (*dhamma*) of sexual relations (*methuna*) under the guise (*vaṇṇena*) of holiness (*arahantānam*).[46]

According to Buddhaghosa, these practices of nonhuman, divine or demoniacal beings are due to the example of depraved monks (*pāpabhikkhū*

43. Ibid. XXII, 5. Thesis of certain Uttarāpathakas.
44. Ibid. XXII, 6. Thesis of certain Uttarāpathakas.
45. Ibid. XXII, 7. Thesis of certain Uttarāpathakas.
46. Ibid. XXIII, 2. Thesis of certain Uttarāpathakas.

disvā). We can also see in this a trace of the laicisation of the career of the holy ones, which the Mahāyāna was to highlight, and even Tantric influences.

(45) Form (*rūpa*) and the other aggregates (*khandha*), the spheres (*āyatana*), elements (*dhātu*) and faculties (*indriya*) are not perfected (*aparinipphanna*), but suffering (*dukkha*) is perfected (*parinippahanna*).[47]

The argumentation recorded is not clear.

47. Ibid. XXIII, 5. Thesis of certain Uttarāpathakas.

CHAPTER 38

The Vetullakas

Buddhaghosa mentions these in his commentary on the *Kathāvatthu,* but without defining them in any way. He merely associates, the first time, the epithet of *mahāpuññavādīsaṅkhāta,* 'considered as adherents of great merit', with them.[1] The Sinhalese Chronicles only mention them in relation to the heretical tendencies of the monks at the Abhayagirivihāra in the reign of Sirināga I and his successors, that is, at the end of the third century and beginning of the fourth century CE.[2] No explanation of the term is given. It can be compared to the Sanskrit *vaipulya,* development, which characterises a whole class of Mahāyāna sūtras, based on the fact that the majority of theses attributed to them by Buddhaghosa seem to be Mahāyānist. They should perhaps also be identified with the Vājirīyas who belonged, along with the Andhakas and Hemavatikas, to a group of six later schools recognised by the Sinhalese Chronicles and by Buddhaghosa, without their relationship with the early schools being in any way defined. In fact, the Vājirīyas must have been adherents of the diamond, *vajira,* and can be identified with those of the Vajrayāna, or Diamond Vehicle, from which Buddhist Tantrism emerged. It will indeed be recognised that the final Vetullaka thesis is tainted with Tantrism. It should be remarked that the Indian missionaries who propagated the Vajrayāna in China in about 700 CE came from southern India or from the centre: Śubhakarasiṃha from Oḍra, Vajrabodhi from Malaya, at the extreme south of India, and Amoghavajra from Ceylon itself. The Sinhalese documents therefore enable us to

1. *Kathāvatthu* XVII, 6.
2. *Mahāvaṃsa* XXXVI, 46; *Dīpavaṃsa* XXII, 45.

rediscover the first manifestations of this movement in Ceylon from the end of the third century, in any case before the fifth century.

The doctrine of the Vetullakas as presented by Buddhaghosa is very eclectic. Theses 4 and 5 represent two contradictory positions of the Mahīśāsakas and Dharmaguptakas on the merits of giving to the Saṃgha and the Buddha. Theses 6 and 7 are clearly Lokottaravādin. As for the Tantric thesis, it is common to the Vetullakas and Andhakas. This leads us to think that the Vetullakas' doctrine had its roots in an Andhaka-Mahīśāsaka-Dharmaguptaka syncretism. It is doubtless they whom Xuanzang designates by the name of Mahāyāna-Sthaviras. These are their theses:

(1) It should not be said (*na vattabbaṃ*) that the Community (*saṃgha*) receives (*paṭiggaṇhāti*) a donation (*dakkhiṇā*).[3]

The true (*paramattha*) Community consists only of the fruits and the Path (*maggaphalāni*). There is no other Community than the fruits and the Path. The fruits and the Path do not, indeed, receive donations. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Community receives a donation.

(2) It should not be said (*na vattabbaṃ*) that the Community (*saṃgha*) purifies (*visodheti*) a donation (*dakkhiṇā*).[4]

The Community consists only of the Path and the fruits. These are, in fact, not capable (*sakkonti*) of purifying a donation. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Community purifies a donation.

(3) It should not be said (*na vattabbaṃ*) that the Community (*saṃgha*) eats (*bhuñjati*), drinks (*pivati*), chews (*khādati*) or tastes (*sāyati*).[5]

The Community consists of only the Path and fruits. Those, in fact, do not eat, drink, chew or taste. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Community eats, drinks, chews or tastes. These three theses are based on a uniquely spiritual conception of the Community, the latter not consisting of a totality of monks taken as whole persons, body and mind, but only of the common spiritual properties, the Path and the fruits, which effectively distinguishes it from the rest of beings. The Community is similar to what Christianity calls the *corpus mysticum.* Traces of this tendency are found in the *Satyasiddhiśāstra,*[6] but it is widespread in the Mahāyāna sūtras, which

3. *Kathāvatthu* XVII, 6.
4. Ibid. XVII, 7.
5. Ibid. XVII, 8.
6. T 1646, pp. 245b–247c.

make the spiritual Saṃgha a transcendent absolute. Here we are therefore in the presence of a Mahāyānist or, at least, pre-Mahāyānist teaching.

(4) It should not be said (*na vattabbaṃ*) that whatever is given (*dinna*) to the Community (*saṃgha*) yields a great fruit (*mahapphala*).[7]

(5) It should not be said (*na vattabbaṃ*) that whatever is given (*dinna*) to the Buddha yields a great fruit (*mahapphala*).[8]

In contrast to what occurred among the Mahīśāsakas and Dharmaguptakas, who were divided over this twofold problem, the Vetullakas jointly adopted both theses.

(6) It should not be said (*na vattabbaṃ*) that the Bhagavant Buddha lived (*ahasi*) in the world of mankind (*manussaloka*).[9]

This is clearly a Lokottaravādin thesis. The Buddha did not live (*vasati*) in the world of mankind. It is merely a corporeal image created by him (*nimittarūpamattaka*) which came (*āgacchati*) and showed (*dasseti*) itself in the world, when he was reborn (*nibbatta*) in the world of the Tusita gods (*tusitabhavana*).

(7) It should not be said (*na vattabbaṃ*) that the Dhamma was taught (*desita*) by the Bhagavant Buddha.[10]

This is again a clearly Lokottaravādin thesis. Staying (*ṭhita*) in the city of the Tusita gods (*tusitapura*), the Bhagavant sent (*pesesi*) an illusory creature (*abhinimitta*) with the aim of teaching the Dhamma (*dhammadesanatthāya*). The Dhamma was expounded by Venerable Ānanda who had received (*sampaṭicchitvā*) the teaching of the Dhamma (*dhammadesana*) through the intermediary of that illusory creature.

(8) The undertaking (*dhamma*) of sexual relations (*methuna*) should only be practised (*paṭisevitabba*) with a single intention (*ekādhippāyena*).[11]

By single intention should be understood, according to Buddhaghosa, either compassion (*kāruññā*) or aspiration (*paṇidhi*): 'We shall be (*bhavissāma*) united (*ekato*) in the round of rebirth (*saṃsāra*)', uttered after having paid homage to the Buddha (*buddhapūjā*) with a woman (*itthī*).

7. *Kathāvatthu* XVII, 9.
8. Ibid. XVII, 10.
9. Ibid. XVIII, 1.
10. Ibid. XVIII, 2.
11. Ibid. XXIII, 1.

Conclusion

One of the aims of this book was to present the schools of the Hīnayāna in their natural equilibrium, to the degree, however, to which all our documentation allows. Until now there was a tendency to consider the whole of the Small Vehicle in the light of the Theravādins alone, or of the Sarvāstivādins alone, or of these two schools alone, through a lack of being easily able to make use of the facts concerning other schools. It was, nonetheless, known that some of them, such as the Mahāsāṃghikas, Mahīśāsakas and Sammatīyas, had played as important a role as the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins in the development of early Buddhism, but it was thought best to ignore them because of the a priori suspect nature of the information concerning them. This resulted in a grave error of perspective which in turn risked engendering manifold errors of judgement on the history of Buddhist thought. It would be useless and, moreover, inappropriate to criticise this scepticism since, in the matter of knowledge, and particularly that concerning the history of the religious movements in India, it is a question of erring on the side of caution.

The comprehensive study we have just delivered has shown that this scepticism was fortunately somewhat excessive and that, in many cases, particularly in connection with the most important problems, the cross-checking of the data supplied by the most diverse of sources attests to the correctness and even precision of our information. The contradictions which we could expect in view of the diversity of our documents turn out to be very few in number. Furthermore, in many cases a critique enables us to re-establish the truth or show that it is not in fact a question of seeming contradictions, since the various subschools of one and the same school were able to uphold very different propositions.

It is appropriate, moreover, in order to appreciate the value of our information, to class it under three headings: history, literature and doctrine.

With regard to history, it is quite clear that we know very little, even if we know some things. We are, however, hardly more familiar with the history of the Sarvāstivādins than with that of other schools. Only the Theravādins are a little better known due to the Sinhalese Chronicles. When one thinks that we are still not in agreement in placing Vasubandhu in the fourth or fifth century, it would be useless to cavil over our ignorance of the exact circumstances of Mahādeva's schism.

In the field of literature, it can be said that, apart from the works that have been preserved for us, we know practically nothing.

The case is fortunately quite different with regard to the doctrines. First of all, our information is much more profuse, since it concerns nearly five hundred differing debates, most of which are accompanied by a commentary. A critical study of these data has proved to us that in many cases, the correctness and even precision of the attributions is most satisfying, so satisfying even that there are few reasons to suspect them in other cases. Doubtless, the habit of prudence obliges us not to consider all these data as absolutely certain, but their degree of probability makes them usable in their quasi-totality. Consequently, we can extract from the whole of them the spiritual and intellectual physiognomy of the various schools, and especially the most important of them. We can also, thanks to them, outline more sure solutions for certain important problems in the history of Buddhist thought.

However, there is another aspect of the question through which these documents acquire both absolute certainty and a much greater bearing. In fact, the near totality of our sources concerning the doctrines, the only ones that count here, are earlier than the fourth century CE, and most of them even very much earlier. All the ideas mentioned in them, even if the attributions of them are erroneous, had been conceived in India in the very first centuries of the Common Era, sometimes even before. In fact, a certain number of the problems which they purportedly resolve are not peculiar to Buddhism or even to India but are of interest to universal thought with its twofold philosophical and religious aspect. Does it matter that it was the Vibhajyavādins or Dārṣṭāntikas who had the idea of absolute time, does it matter that it was the Vātsīputrīyas who maintained the existence of the person, does it matter that it was the Lokottaravādins who made the Buddha

a transcendental figure rather than the Sarvāstivādins or Dharmaguptakas? The only fact that counts here is that these ideas were expressed in India, that they arose without resulting from outside influence, through a specifically intellectual and spiritual evolution, before the fourth century CE.[1]

Even better, the profusion of information and details added by the commentators enables us in most cases, by basing ourselves on the various stages of a given theory, a given notion, to grasp the curve of its evolution, and that is very important for the history of ideas. Undoubtedly we lack, and will always lack, many elements, but the most important ones, it seems, have been preserved for us, and we can and should use them. In this respect, we have plenty of reasons to rejoice at the wealth of our documents rather than deplore the unknown and irreparable losses we have incurred.

Thanks to all these data, we can therefore retrace, in its grand outline as well as in its mass of smaller lines, the history of Hīnayāna thought between about the middle of the fourth century BCE to the sixth century CE, that is, for eight or nine centuries when it was particularly bright. It was bright then; in fact, this thought of the Small Vehicle, which opened up a path in so many different domains, approached all the great problems posed since antiquity to universal thought and attempted to resolve them in so many different ways. It extended to all things, to the limits, in time and space, of a universe which it conceived to the best of its thirsting imagination of immensity, and which it peopled with myriads of mythical beings, fruits of a refined poetry. Doubtless it also had for the latter an interest not free from naivety, and it wanted to determine how they lived, how they thought, how they acted, what delights charmed their purified senses. However, alongside these puerilities which have their own charm and are in no way peculiar to India and to Buddhism, the scholars of the Small Vehicle approached serious problems of psychology, morality, mysticism and metaphysics and proposed to resolve them with solutions of which many prove the profundity and originality of their inventors' minds. Sometimes even, their thought, treading the length of paths proper to them, elaborated theories curiously similar to certain doctrines that did

1. Furthermore, only theses provided with a precise attribution have been used in this work. There are tens, hundreds of other ones in the *Vibhāṣā* and elsewhere which could have supplied us with valuable information in this respect.

not appear in the West until fifteen to twenty centuries later, but as a conclusion of very different reasoning.

This explosion of thought in the Small Vehicle of Buddhism from the fourth century BCE until the sixth century CE poses another problem. What role did it in fact play in the development of philosophical and religious thought in non-Buddhist India, that of Brahmanism, the Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya and Vedānta? In fact, it was precisely when the Hīnayāna was at its apogee, in the second century CE, that the Mahāyāna and other systems of Indian thought emerged from the darkness and appeared, fully armed with philosophies the traces of which were sought, usually in vain until now, in the preceding centuries.[2] Some of them, the Sāṃkhya and Yoga in particular, had attested their existence many centuries earlier, at the very dawn of Buddhism, but as glimmers that were feeble and unsure, sometimes hidden by the shadows of several centuries, those centuries during which, in contrast, the Small Vehicle of Buddhism shone at its brightest. It is highly probable that this is only a quirk of history and that, later, new and numerous documents will show that all these systems of thought had also followed their own line of evolution without being much influenced by the Hīnayāna. This is indeed possible, but it was perhaps not wholly useless to pose the question.

2. Only the history of Jaina thought at that time is well known, for reasons similar to those which enabled us to know the history of Buddhist thought. See Guérinot, *La religion djaina*, pp. 42–68 and especially 46–52.

Appendix 1

Classification of Controversies

In the pages that follow, the reader will find a collection of tables indicating the position taken by each school in each of the controversies that arose at the heart of the Hīnayāna. These controversies are methodically classed in such a way that the reader of these tables will be able to grasp, in a schematic though complete way, the whole of the speculative activity of the Hīnayāna in any sphere. They therefore constitute the skeleton of the history of the thought of the Small Vehicle and serve as a guiding plan to another work which will appear shortly and deals with this subject.[1]

N.B. The numbers are those of the theses. For example: Mahās 10 = thesis No. 10 of the Mahāsāṃghikas, refer to this in chapter 5 of part two.

The names of the schools are written in abridged form in order to make space. These abridged forms are clear enough not to need explanations (see Vasumitra, for the Mahāsāṃghikas and Mahīśāsakas). [Ed.: Mahās NW = Mahāsāṃghikas of northwest India. Mahās C = Mahāsāṃghikas of Central India.]

In some cases there might be some surprise at not finding the corresponding thesis at the number indicated. [In such cases] the thesis in question is actually either a corollary of the thesis indicated, or else it is maintained in the commentary.

A question mark indicates that the attribution is doubtful for various reasons (contradictory data, unclear attribution, only probable corollary of another thesis).

1. [Ed.: This work never appeared in print. Isabelle Szelagowski, personal correspondence, 17 July 2011.]

With regard to the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins, the theses' numbers are not always indicated. This concerns theses not referred to in the corresponding chapters, but which it is easy to find in the treatises of these two schools. When the numbers are not indicated after the name of another school, this concerns theses recorded in the first part of the corresponding chapter, before the numbered classification of the theses of that school.

[Ed.: For the purpose of the English edition this appendix, which was arranged in the original volume as a single continuous table thirty pages in length, has been divided into separate tables numbered consecutively. To assist access, the sequence and table number of the topics is as follows:

1. The Buddha
2. The Bodhisattva
3. The Arhat
4. Other Holy Ones
5. The Community
6. Worldlings
7. Offenders
8. Gods and Demons
9. Action
10. Causes
11. The Fruits of Actions
12. The Good, Bad and Undefined
13. Fetters and Passions
14. The Path and Deliverance
15. Purity and Morality
16. Giving
17. The Truths and the Fruits
18. Entering the Path of Deliverance
19. Stages of the Path of Deliverance
20. Regression
21. Deliverance and Nirvāṇa

22. Constituents of the Path of Deliverance
23. Liberating Knowledges
24. Sense Consciousness
25. The Object of Knowledge
26. Mental Formations
27. The Nature of Knowledge
28. Consciousness
29. Thought
30. Continuity of Thought
31. Sleep and Dreaming
32. Absorptions and Attainments
33. Meditation
34. The Triple World
35. The Kāmadhātu
36. The Rūpadhātu
37. The Ārūpyadhātu
38. Transcendental Things
39. Form
40. The Body
41. Life
42. Embryonic Life and Birth
43. Death
44. Ontology
45. Unconditioned Things
46. Conditioned Things
47. The Characteristics of Conditioned Things
48. Time and Space
49. The Person
50. Suffering
51. The Aggregates
52. The Order of the Universe

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
1. The Buddha (B.)		
Buddha is transcendental.	Mahās 1–Vetull 6	
B. is perfectly pure.	Mahās 2	
B. is free of appropriations.	Mahās 2	
B.'s birth-body is pure.	Mahās 2–Vibh 2	Sarv 92
B.'s *vohāra* is transcendental.	Andh 5	Ther 20
B. does not dwell among mankind.	Vetull 6	Ther 173
B. does not teach the Dharma.	Vetull 7	Ther 174
B. is always in concentration.	Mahās 12–Vibh 12	Sarv
B. always has the two supreme *jñānas.*	Mahās 15	
B. does not sleep or dream.	Mahās 10–Vibh 13	Sarv
B. says nothing but he is heard.	Mahās 12	
B. always turns the Wheel of the Dharma.	Mahās 3	Sarv 53
B. answers without the need of reflecting.	Mahās 11	
B.'s words manifest his essence.	Mahās 5	
B.'s words all conform to the meaning.	Mahās 5	Sarv 55
B.'s sūtras are all clear in meaning.	Mahās 42	Sarv 56
B. exists substantially.	Mahās 17	
Many B.s exist everywhere simultaneously.	Mahās 16	Ther 201
B.'s body is infinite.	Mahās 6	
B.'s life is infinite.	Mahās 8	
B.'s power is infinite.	Mahās 7	
The perfume of B.'s excrement is sweet.	Uttar 29–certain Andh 56	Ther 176–other Andh
B. knows everything in a single thought.	Mahās 14	
B. understands everything instantly.	Mahās 13	
With a single sound, B. teaches the whole Dharma.	Mahās 4	Sarv 54

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
1. The Buddha (B.) *continued*		
B. trains beings tirelessly.	Mahās 9	
B.'s power is noble.	Andh 8	Ther 23
One becomes a B. through awakening.	Uttar 5–*Śārip* 3	Ther 39
All B.s are equal.	Andh 65	Ther 200
B. sees the past and the future.	Sautr 21	Sarv
B. was won over by Kāśyapa.	Andh 15	Ther 41
B. has compassion.	Ther 175–Sarv 43–*Śārip* 3	Uttar 28
B.'s compassion is directed at beings.	Sarv 43	
B. and Listener have same deliverance.	Sarv 43–Mahīś 22	
—	Dharm 2	
B. and Listener have same career.	Mahīś 22	Dharm 2–Sarv 43 *Śārip* 3
—		
B. is included in the Community.	Mahīś 21–Sarv	Dharm 1–*Satyasid* 4
Giving to the B. yields a great fruit.	Ther 171–Dharm 1	Mahīś 21–Vetull 5
—	*Satyasid* 12	
B. and Listener have the same power.	Andh 7	
B. and Listener perform wonders.	Andh 64	Ther 22–*Śārip* 3
The Bodhisattva becomes B. in the *antarābhava.*	Vātsāp 33	Ther 199
2. The Bodhisattva (Bodh.)		
Bodh. is conceived without love or hatred.	Mahās 21–Vibh 36	Sarv 101
—	Haim 4	
Bodh. without *kalala, arbuda,* etc.	Mahās 18	
Bodh. conceived like a white elephant.	Mahās 19	
Bodh. is born from the right side of his mother.	Mahās 20	

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
2. The Bodhisattva (Bodh.) *continued*		
Bodh. has the marks of a Great Man.	Uttar 6–*Śārip* 3	Ther 40
Bodh. goes to the bad destinies.	Mahās 22–Andh 71	Ther 214
—	Cet 1–Sarv–Pūrv 1–Apar 1	
Bodh. is a worldling.	Sarv 45–Haim 1?	
3. The Arhat (A.)		
The A. is led astray by others.	Mahās 30–Pūrv 3	Ther 11–Sarv
—	Apar 3–Bahuś 2	Samm?–Vātsīp?
—	Cet 3–Haim 5	Mahīś?
The A. has nescience.	Mahās 30–Pūrv 4	Ther 12–Sarv
—	Bahuś 2–Cet 3	Samm?–Vātsīp?
—	Haim 5–Apar 4	Mahīś?
The A. has doubts.	Mahās 30–Pūrv 5	Ther 13–Sarv
—	Bahuś 2–Cet 3	Samm?–Vātsīp?
—	Haim 5–Apar 5	Mahīś?
The A. is informed by others.	Mahās 30–Pūrv 6	Ther 14–Sarv
—	Bahuś 2–Cet 3	Samm?–Vātsīp?
—	Haim 5–Apar 6	Mahīś?
The A. can regress.	Sarv 14–Vātsīp 13	Ther 2–Mahās 37
—	Samm 2, 14	Mahīś 17–Vibh 18
—	Bhadr–Pūrv 15	
The A. regresses because of his actions.	Pūrv 15–Samm 14	Ther 84
The A. is subject to *pratītyasamutpāda.*	Sarv 29	
The A. receives fruition of his actions.	Sarv 40	
There is an increase of merit for the A.	Andh 55–Sarv 30–Mahīś 9?	Ther 162–Mahīś 9?
The A. is totally *anāsrava.*	Uttar 3–Dharm 4	Ther 36–Sarv 38
—	Dārṣṭ 2?	
The A. has *naivaśaikṣānāśaikṣas*	Sarv 38	

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
3. The Arhat (A.) *continued*		
The four fruits are obtained by means of a single path.	Certain Andh 57–Uttar 30	Ther 177–Other Andh
The A. is endowed with the four fruits.	Uttar 4	Ther 37
The A. candidate already has three fruits.	Certain Andh 16	Ther 42–Other Andh
All A.s have *anutpādajñāna.*		Sarv 15
The *ārya* of the *bhavāgra* is A. without the Path.	Vibh 22	Sarv 133
The A.s acquire the absorptions.	Sarv 39	
One can become A. without the absorptions.	Sarv 21	
The A. attains Nirvāṇa with a good thought.	Andh 69	Ther 205
The A. attains Nirvāṇa in the *āneñjya.*	Certain Uttar 39	Ther 206–Sarv 42
—		Other Uttar
There is a *samaśirṣin* A.	Vibh 22–Mahīś 12–Ther–*Śārip* 57	Sarv 133
The A. can die prematurely.	Ther 163–Sarv 126	Rājag 9–Siddh 7
—		Prajñ 6–Dārṣṭ 57
One becomes A. on being reborn.	Sarv–Certain Uttar 2	Ther 35–*Śārip*
		Other Uttar
One becomes A. in the embryo.	Certain Uttar 41	Ther 208–Other Uttar
One becomes A. while sleeping.	Certain Uttar 41	Ther 208–Other Uttar
A layman can be A.	Uttar 1	Ther 34
The A. in Nirvāṇa retains a fetter.	Mahās 75–Certain Andh 68	Ther 204–Other Andh
The A. abandons all the fetters.	Ther 198–Certain Andh	Mahās 75–Other Andh 68
Holiness is the abandonment of the fetters.	Certain Andh 17–*Śārip* 27	Ther 43–Other Andh

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
3. The Arhat (A.) *continued*		
The A. has no further reasons to return to this world.	Mahās 28	
4. Other Holy Ones		
The holy one is endowed with two virtues.	Mahās 57	Ther 102–*Śārip* 72
The holy one's form is the Path.	Mahīś 26–Mahās 55	Ther 98
—	Samm 15–*Śārip* 9	
The *srotāpanna* can regress.	Mahās 37–Mahīś 17	Ther 3–Sarv 14
The *srotāpanna* acquires the absorptions.	Mahās 50–Mahīś 31	Sarv 57
—	Vibh 37	
The *sakṛdāgāmin* acquires the absorptions.	Vibh 37	Sarv 57
The *srotāpanna* knows his nature.	Mahās 29	
The *srotāpanna* can commit certain misdeeds.	Mahās 41	
The *dṛṣṭivant* can be an offender.	Pūrv 21	Ther 122
The *dṛṣṭivant* abandons the *durgatis*.	Uttar 18	Ther 123
The *srotāpanna* is reborn just seven times.	Uttar 17	Ther 120–Sarv
The *srotāpanna* candidate abandons two obsessions.	Andh 10–Samm 7	Ther 26–*Śārip* 78
The *srotāpanna* candidate has five faculties.	Ther 27–*Śārip* 36	Andh 11
The *jñāna* of the *śaikṣa* is *aśaikṣa*.	Uttar 7	Ther 45
The *śaikṣa* dharmas have *vipāka*.	Kāś 4	
The Listener has knowledge of the fruit.	Andh 25	Ther 53
The powers of the Buddha are common to the Listener.	Andh 7	Ther 22–*Śārip* 3
The Listener can perform wonders.	Andh 64	Ther 199

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
4. Other Holy Ones *continued*		
Buddha and Listener have same deliverance.	Dharm 2–Mahīś 22	
—	Sarv 43	
Buddha and Listener have same Path.	Mahīś 22	Dharm 2–Sarv 43
—	*Śārip* 3	
5. The Community		
The Buddha is included in the Saṃgha.	Mahīś 21–Sarv	Dharm 1–*Satyasid* 4
Giving to the Saṃgha yields a great fruit.	Ther 170–Mahīś 21	Vetull 4–Dharm 1
—	Sarv–*Satyasid* 12	
The Saṃgha is transcendental.	Bahuś 6–Vetull 1–3	Ther 167–169
The Saṃgha receives a donation.	Ther 167	Vetull 1
The Saṃgha purifies a donation.	Ther 168	Vetull 2
The Saṃgha enjoys a donation.	Ther 169	Vetull 3
6. Worldlings		
The worldling abandons *kāma* and *vyāpāda*.	Sarv 16–Samm 5	Ther 6–Mahīś 5
—	Vātsīp 7	Dārṣṭ 22
The *tīrthika* has the five *abhijñās*.	Sarv 17–Vātsīp 6	Mahīś 6–Dharm 3
—		Haim 2?
The worldling has knowledges.	Ther 191–Sarv	Hetuv 9–Uttar 8
—	*Śārip*	
The worldling is only included in the three realms.	Sarv 93–Certain Uttar 36	Ther 197–Other Uttar
The worldling is only included in the *kāmadhātu*.	Vātsīp 20	Sarv 93–Ther 197
The worldling's nature is defiled.	Vātsīp 20	Sarv 93
The worldling can die with a good thought.	Sarv 41	

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
6. Worldlings *continued*		
The worldling can be predestined to deliverance.	Uttar 33	Ther 188
The worldling has noble things.	Sautr 5	
The worldling's nature exists.	Sarv 94	Dārṣṭ 20
The non-predestined can have the *jñānas*.	Uttar 8	Ther 47
7. Offenders		
The *ānantarya* enters the *niyāma*.	Uttar 20	Ther 127
The predestined enters the *niyāma*.	Pūrv 22–Apar 8	Ther 128
The *kalpasthā* endures for a *kalpa*.	Rājag 7	Ther 125
The *kalpasthā* has a good thought.	Ther 126	Uttar 19
He who is hindered abandons the hindrances.	Uttar 21	Ther 129
The involuntary offender undergoes punishment.	Certain Uttar 34	Ther 190–Other Uttar
8. Gods and Demons		
There is *virāga* in the Uttarakuru.		Sarv 23
There is *virāga* among the Asaṃjñins.		Sarv 23–*Śārip* 19
There is *brahmacarya* among the gods.	Ther 4–Sarv 18	Samm 3–Mahīś 7
—	Dharm 5–*Śārip* 19	Haim 3
There is *saṃjñā* among the Asaṃjñins.	Andh 13–Sarv	Ther 32
There is *saṃjñānirodhasamāpatti* among the Asaṃjñins.	Hetuv 4	Ther 152
There is actual *ātmagrāha* among the Asaṃjñins.		Sautr 31
Among the *ārūpya devas* the mental series supports itself.	Sautr 22	Sarv
There are animals among the gods.	Andh 63	Ther 193
There are infernal guardians.	Ther 192	Andh 62

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
8. Gods and Demons *continued*		
Among nonhumans, *methuna dhamma* is a holy practice.	Certain Uttar 44	Ther 213–Other Uttar
9. Action		
The *pratītyasamutpāda* is *asaṃskṛta*.	Mahās 43–Mahīś 19	Ther 55–Sarv 6, 28
—	Vibh 8–*Śārip* 10	Vātsīp 38
—	Dharm 13–Pūrv 9	
The *pratītyasamutpāda* is reversible.	Ther 145	Mahās 72
Every action is endowed with fruition.	Mahās 67	Ther 117–*Śārip* 33
There is no *avyākṛta*.	Mahās 39	Ther–Sarv 37
—		*Śārip* 33
All actions are fixed.	Andh 67–Certain Uttar 38	Ther 203–Other Uttar
Everything comes from action.	Rājag 10–Siddh 8	Ther 164
All suffering comes from action.	Prajñ 7	
Action and its fruition exist together.	Later Mahās 5	
Man does not act.	Prajñ 5	
There are four kinds of certainty of actions.	Dārṣṭ 3	Sarv
The three *rāśis* exist everywhere.	Dārṣṭ 44	Sarv 131
Action differs from accumulation.	Andh 51–Samm 19	Ther 153
The involuntary offender undergoes punishment.	Certain Uttar 34	Ther 190–Other Uttar
The fruit is not realised through accumulation.	Prajñ 9	
All actions are reversible.	Dārṣṭ 28	Sarv 119
Beyond *cetanā*, there are no actions.	Dārṣṭ 54–Sautr 16	Sarv 117–Ther
—	Later Mahīś 4	*Śārip* 42–Mahīś 27, 28
Bodily actions conform with thought.	Ther 95–Later Mahīś 5	Pūrv 19

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
9. Action *continued*		
Vocal actions conform with thought.	Ther 94–Later Mahīś 5	Pūrv 18
Form can be action.	Mahīś 28–Samm 12	Ther 82
—	*Śārip*	
Abhidyā, vyāpāda and *mithyādṛṣṭi* are mental actions.	Dārṣṭ 4	Sarv 118
—	Vibh 10	
Restraint and nonrestraint are actions.	Mahās 66–Sarv *Śārip* 73	Ther 116
—		
Ājīva differs from words and actions.	Dārṣṭ 37	Sarv 120
Bodily actions are visible.	Andh?	Ther 63–*Śārip* 53
10. Causes		
Cetanā alone is cause.	Dārṣṭ 11–Ther	Sarv 75–Mahās 54
—		*Śārip* 49
Citta and *caittas* alone are causes.	Mahās 54	Ther–Sarv 75
—		*Śārip* 49
Form can be a cause.	Uttar 26–*Śārip* 29	Ther 158–Mahās 54
—	Sarv 75, 76–Mahīś 28?	Dārṣṭ 11
—	Samm 12?	
The five aggregates can be causes.	Sarv 75–*Śārip* 49	Mahās 54–Ther
—		Dārṣṭ 11
The *cittaviprayuktas* can be causes.	Sarv 75, 76–*Śārip* 49, 29	Mahās 54–Ther
—		Dārṣṭ 11
The *asaṃskṛtas* can be causes.	Sarv	Sautr 20–Ther
—		*Śārip* 62
Noble things are causes of fruition.	Ther 72–*Śārip* 35	Andh 32

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
10. Causes *continued*		
The *śaikṣa* dharmas are causes of fruition.	Kāś 4	
There are only past causes.	Kāś 3	Sarv–Sautr 19
There are *sahabhūhetus.*	Sarv	Sautr 19
Rūpa is a *rūpasahabhūhetu.*	Sarv	Dārṣṭ 1
Causality really exists.	Sarv 71, 98	Dārṣṭ 9
The relation of causality is determined.	Mahās 71	Ther 144
There is a causality of repetition.	Ther 210–Other Uttar	Certain Uttar 43
There are four kinds of causality.	Later Mahās 2	
The good is a cause of existence.	Sarv 51	Mahīś 16
Citta and *caittas* are *samanantarapratyayas.*	Sarv 110	Dārṣṭ 52
11. The Fruits of Actions		
Feeling alone is a fruit.	Dārṣṭ 11	Sarv 75–Ther
—		Mahās 54, 69–*Śārip* 49
Citta and *caittas* alone are fruits.	Mahās NW 54–Ther	Dārṣṭ 11–Sarv 75
—		*Śārip* 49
Form can be fruition.	Mahās C 69–Andh 52	Ther 161–Dārṣṭ 11
—	Sarv 75, 76–Samm 21	Mahās NW 54
—	*Śārip* 20	
Form is endowed with causes.	Uttar 26–*Śārip* 29	Ther 159–Dārṣṭ 11
—	Sarv 75, 76	Mahās NW 54
The six *āyatanas* are fruition.	Mahās C 69–*Śārip* 24	Ther 119–Dārṣṭ 11
—		Mahās NW 54

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
11. The Fruits of Actions *continued*		
Sound is fruition.	Mahās 68–*Śārip* 23	Ther 118–Sarv 121
—	Vibh 1–Vātsīp 22	
The five *skandhas* can be fruits.	Sarv 75–*Śārip* 49	Ther–Dārṣṭ 11
—		Mahās NW 54
Vipāka is *vipākadharma.*	Andh 33	Ther 73
The earth is fruition.	Andh 30–*Śārip* 28	Ther 70
Aging and death are fruition.	Andh 31	Ther 71–*Śārip* 55
Latent tendencies are endowed with causes.	Ther 108–Sarv	Mahās 63–Samm 17
Cessation has no causes.	Dārṣṭ 12	Sarv 78
Giving fructifies in another life.	Rājag 6–Siddh 6	Ther 69
12. The Good, Bad and Undefined		
The five consciousnesses are good or bad.	Mahās?	Ther 100–*Śārip* 65
The five faculties are only good.	*Śārip* 69	Sarv 60–Ther
—	Mahās 38–Mahīś 13	
—	Vibh 3–Hetuv 8	
Form can be good or bad.	Mahīś 27, 28–Samm 13, 20	Ther 160–Mahās 54?
—	*Śārip* 14	Dārṣṭ 11?
The *nirvāṇadhātu* is good.	Andh 61–Sarv	Ther 187
—	*Śārip* 12	
The defilements are only bad.	Dārṣṭ 21	Sarv 85
Latent tendencies are undefined.	Mahās 63–Samm 17	Ther 108–Sarv
Śīlavrata and *vicikitsā* are undefined in the higher realms.	Vibh 30	Sarv 132
Dṛṣṭigata is undefined.	Andh 50–Uttar 25	Ther 142

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
12. The Good, Bad and Undefined *continued*		
Dharmatṛṣṇā is undefined.	Pūrv 23	Ther 133
The thoughts of a dreamer are undefined.	Certain Uttar 42	Ther 209–Other Uttar
There are undefined things.	Ther–Sarv 37	Mahās 39
—	*Śārip* 33	
The good and bad roots adjust to each other mutually.	Mahās 70	Ther 135
The good is a cause of existence.	Sarv 51	Mahīś 16
13. Fetters and Passions		
The fetters exist.	Dārṣṭ 25–Vātsīp 21	
—	Sarv 99	
The objects of the fetters exist.	Sarv 99–Vātsīp 21	Dārṣṭ 25
What has the immortal as its object is a fetter.	Pūrv 16	Ther
Regression is a product of the defilements.	Sarv	Vibh 18
The four *āsravas* are *anāsrava.*	Hetuv 1	Ther 148
Latent tendencies differ from obsessions.	Mahās 46–Mahīś 4	Ther 139–Sarv 27
—	Vibh 38–Andh 47	
Obsessions are dissociated from thought.	Andh 48	Mahās 46–Mahīś 4
—		Vibh 40–Ther 140
—		Sarv
Latent tendencies are dissociated from thought.	Mahās 46, 63–Mahīś 3	Ther 108–Sarv 26
—	Vibh 39–*Śārip* 5	Other Uttar
—	Dārṣṭ 13–Vātsīp 37	
—	Samm 17–Andh 39	
—	Certain Uttar 13	

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
13. Fetters and Passions *continued*		
Latent tendencies are mental and have objects.	Ther 88–Sarv 26	Mahās 45–Mahīś 3
—	Other Uttar	Andh 39–Dārṣṭ 13
—		Certain Uttar 13
Latent tendencies are undefined and devoid of causes.	Mahās 63–Samm 17	Ther 108–Sarv
Latent tendencies are always present.	Later Mahīś 9	
The Path and the defilements arise together.	Later Mahās 4	
Dṛṣṭi and *avidyā* are always *sarvatrāga.*	Vibh 24	Sarv 73
Avidyā and *bhavatṛṣṇā* are *sarvatrāga.*	Dārṣṭ 10	Sarv
Tṛṣṇā and *māna* are *sarvatrāga.*	Vibh 24	Sarv 74
Abhidhyā, vyāpāda and *mithyādṛṣṭi* are mental actions.	Dārṣṭ 4	Sarv 118
—	Vibh 10	
Aviññatti is *dussīlya.*	Mahās 62	Ther 107
Only a defiled thought ensures continuity between existences.	Sarv 101	Vibh 36
Only *rāga* and *pratigha* ensure continuity between existences.	Dārṣṭ 26	Sarv 102
All the defilements ensure continuity between existences.	Sarv 102	Dārṣṭ 26
The five consciousnesses are *sarāga.*	Mahās 24–Mahīś 10	Vātsīp 5–Samm 24
—	Sarv 32–*Śārip* 17	
The five consciousnesses are *virāga.*	Mahās 24–Mahīś 10	Vātsīp 5–Sarv 32
—		*Śārip* 17–Samm 24
A *sarāga* thought is delivered.	Andh 9–Dārṣṭ 14	Ther 24–Sarv 80
—	Vibh 23?	
There is *rūparāga* in the *rūpadhātu* only.	Andh 49, 54–Samm 18	Ther 141
There is *arūparāga* in the *arūpadhātu* only.	Andh 49, 54–Samm 18	Ther 141

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
13. Fetters and Passions *continued*		
There is craving for what is unpleasant.	Uttar 22	Ther 132
There are noncravings that resemble cravings.	Andh 72	Ther 215
The five *kāmaguṇas* are the *kāmadhātu.*	Pūrv 12	Ther 76
The five *āyatanas* are *kāma.*	Pūrv 13	Ther 77
The *vibhavatṛṣṇā* is abandoned through vision.	Vibh 14	Sarv 79–Ther
—		*Śārip* 47
There is *īrṣyā* and *matsara* in the *brahmaloka.*	Vibh 35	Sarv 97
The *srotāpanna* can commit misdeeds.	Mahās 41	
The *dṛṣṭivant* can commit misdeeds.	Pūrv 21	Ther 122
The arhats have nescience and doubts.	Mahās 30–Pūrv 4, 5	Ther 12, 13–Sarv
—	Bahuś 2–Cet 3	
—	Haim 5–Apar 4, 5	
The *parinirvāyin* retains a fetter.	Mahās 75–Certain Andh 68	Ther 204–Other Andh
There are undefined defilements.	Sarv 85	Dārṣṭ 21
All the perverse tendencies are abandoned by vision only.	Sarv 115	Vibh 15
The eighth-level person abandons *dṛṣṭi* and *vicikitsā.*	Andh 10–Samm 7	Ther 26–*Śārip* 78
Śīlavrataparāmarśā and *vicikitsā* are undefined in the higher realms.	Vibh 30	Sarv 132
The *dharmatṛṣṇā* is undefined.	Pūrv 23	Ther 133
The *dharmatṛṣṇā* is the origin of suffering.	Ther 134	Pūrv 24
Dṛṣṭigata is undefined.	Andh 50–Uttar 25	Ther 142
Dṛṣṭigata is not included in the world.	Pūrv 26	Ther 143
The *satkāyadṛṣṭi* is devoid of an object.	Dārṣṭ 6	Sarv 63
There are four perverse tendencies.	Sarv 115	Vibh 15

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
13. Fetters and Passions *continued*		
The defilements are abandoned one by one.	Samm 4	Ther 5
14. The Path and Deliverance		
Buddha and Listener have the same Path.	Mahīś 22	Dharm 2–Sarv 43
—		*Śārip* 3
One cultivates the Path, being endowed with five consciousnesses.	Mahās 56	Ther 99–Sarv
—		*Śārip* 75
Consciousness is a constituent of the Path.	Sarv 66	Vātsīp 16
Knowledge is a constituent of the Path.	Sarv 66–Vātsīp 16	
The Path is fivefold.	Mahīś 30–*Śārip* 58?	Ther 194
There is no *vicāra* in the Noble Path.	Bahuś 3	
Except for the Path, everything is suffering.	Hetuv 7	Ther 166
The aggregates are destroyed by the Path alone.	Sautr 2	Ther–Sarv
—		*Śārip*
Suffering is abandoned by means of the Path.	Haim 6	
Suffering leads to the Path.	Mahās 31	
Saying 'O suffering' can help.	Mahās 32	
Saying 'O suffering' makes suffering known.	Andh 43	Ther 111–Sarv
Suffering is a nutriment.	Mahās 34–Pūrv 8	Ther 16
There is vocal utterance for whoever is in possession of the Path.	Mahās 27, 30–Pūrv 7	Ther 15–Sarv 52
—	Bahuś 2–Cet 3	

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
14. The Path and Deliverance *continued*		
—	Haim 5–Apar 7	
The Path is acquired through merit.	Prajñ 10–Mūlas 8?	
The Path can be cultivated.	*Śārip* 60–Sarv	Prajñ 11
The Path cannot be destroyed.	Prajñ 12	
By means of a single Path, the four fruits are obtained.	Uttar 30–Certain Andh 57	Ther 177–Other Andh
The form of a Holy One is the Path.	Mahās 55–Mahīś 26	Ther 98
—	Samm 15–*Śārip* 9	
The Path is unconditioned.	Mahās 43–Mahīś 19	Ther 21–Sarv 112
—	Vibh 9	*Śārip* 10
The Path is mental.	Ther–Sarv	Prajñ 8
—	*Śārip* 59	
The Path and the defilements arise together.	Later Mahās 4	
15. Purity and Morality		
External form is *anāsrava.*	Dārṣṭ 2	Sarv
The four *āsravas* are *anāsrava.*	Hetuv 1	Ther 148
Vitarka and *vicāra* are *anāsrava.*	Ther–Sarv 50	Mahīś 15
—	*Śārip* 68	
The five faculties are *anāsrava* alone.	Mahās 38–Mahīś 13	Sarv 59–Ther
—	Vibh 3–*Śārip* 69	
Morality caused by *samādāna* increases.	Mahās 60	Ther 105
Morality is mental.	Ther 103	Mahās 58–*Śārip* 22
Morality is a consequence of thought.	Ther 104	Mahās 59–*Śārip* 22
Morality is *vijñapti.*	Mahās 61–Samm 16	Ther 106
Immorality is *avijñapti.*	Mahās 62	Ther 107
Virāga is the abandonment of the fetters through cultivation.	Vātsīp 7	Sarv
Merit caused by rejoicing increases.	Samm 9–Rājag 5	Ther 68

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
15. Purity and Morality *continued*		
—	Siddh 5	
Whoever is equipped with the Path is endowed with two kinds of morality.	Mahās 57	*Śārip* 72–Ther 102
Methuna dhamma should only be undertaken with a single intention.	Andh 70–Vetull 8	Ther 212
Among nonhumans, *methuna dhamma* is a holy practice.	Certain Uttar 44	Ther 213–Other Uttar
16. Giving		
Giving fructifies in the other world.	Rājag 6–Siddh 6	Ther 69
Giving is mental.	Rājag 4–Siddh 4	Ther 67
The Saṃgha accepts a donation.	Ther 167	Vetull 1
The Saṃgha purifies a donation. The Saṃgha enjoys a donation.	Ther 168	Vetull 2
The Saṃgha enjoys the use of a donation.	Ther 169	Vetull 3
Giving to the Saṃgha yields a great fruit.	Ther 170–Mahīś 21	Vetull 4–Dharm 1
—	Sarv–*Satyasid* 12	
Giving to the Buddha yields a great fruit.	Ther 171–Dharm 1	Vetull 5–Mahīś 21
—	Sarv–*Satyasid* 12	
The donor purifies the gift.	Uttar 27	Ther 172
Paying homage to a *caitya* yields a great fruit.	Dharm 6–Mūlas 6	Cet 2–Pūrv 2
—		Later Mahīś 8–Apar 2
One bequeaths one's happiness to another.	Hetuv 5	Ther 156
17. The Truths and the Fruits		
Saṃvṛtijñāna has no object other than the truth.	Ther 49	Andh 21

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
17. The Truths and the Fruits *continued*		
Three Truths: of suffering, ordinary and noble.	Bahuś 4	
The Four Truths are unconditioned.	Pūrv 10	Ther 56–Sarv 8
—		*Śārip* 32
The *abhisamaya* of the truths is progressive.	Andh 4–Later Mahās 1	Ther 19–Vibh 17
—	Sarv 9–Samm 6	Mahīś 2–Mahās 23
—	Bhadr	
The *abhisamaya* of the fruits is progressive.	Andh 4–Samm 6	Ther 19–Sarv 24
—	Bhadr	
There is *abhisamaya* in the embryo.	Certain Uttar 40	Ther 207–Other Uttar
There is *abhisamaya* in a dream.	Certain Uttar 41	Ther 208–Other Uttar
The arhat is endowed with the four fruits.	Uttar 4	Ther 37
The arhat candidate has three earlier fruits.	Certain Andh 16	Ther 42–Other Andh
The four fruits are acquired by means of a single Path.	Uttar 30–Certain Andh 57	Ther 177–Other Andh
The Listener has knowledge of the fruit.	Andh 25	Ther 53
The four fruits are unconditioned only.	Pūrv 29–Vibh 32 *Śārip* 11	Ther 184–Sarv 103
18. Entering the Path of Deliverance		
There are fifteen *pratipanna* thoughts.	Sarv 12	Vātsīp 9–Samm 25
There are twelve *pratipanna* thoughts.	Vātsīp 9–Samm 25	Sarv 12
There is *niyāma* and fruit without absorptive meditation.	Sarv 21	
An offender can enter the *niyāma*.	Uttar 20	Ther 127

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
18. Entering the Path of Deliverance *continued*		
The predestined can enter the *niyāma.*	Pūrv 22–Apar 8	Ther 128
There is *niyāma* for the worldling.	Uttar 33	Ther 188
There is *niyāma* through the view of the suffering of conditioned things alone.	Dārṣṭ 43–Mahīś 35	Sarv 130
There is *niyāma* through meditation on *kāma.*	Sarv 11	
There is *niyāma* in the *kāmadhātu* alone.	Sarv 22–Vātsīp 32	
There is *niyāma* through *animittasamādhi* alone.	Dharm 12	Sarv 10
Niyāma is unconditioned.	Andh 26–*Śārip* 10	Ther 54–Sarv 6
—		Mahās 43– Mahīś 19
When one enters the *niyāma,* one abandons all fetters.	Mahās 40	
19. Stages of the Path of Deliverance		
Only that which is *prahīna* is *parijñā.*	Kāś 2	
There is regression as from the three *prayogas.*	Sarv 13	
The *laukikāgradharmas* are instantaneous.	Sarv 13, 62	Vibh 34
The *laukikāgras* are fixed and free from regression.	Sarv 13	
There is *laukikāgra* in the *kāmadhātu.*	Mahās 77–Mahīś 36	Sarv 61–Vātsīp 35
—	Dharm 8	
There is *laukikāgra* in the *rūpadhātu.*	Mahās 77–Mahīś 36	
—	Dharm 8–Sarv 61	
—	Vātsīp 35	
There is *laukikāgra* in the *ārūpyadhātu.*	Vātsīp 35–Mahīś 36	Mahās 77–Sarv 61
—	Dharm 8	

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
19. Stages of the Path of Deliverance *continued*		
There are *aparyāpanna laukikāgras.*	Dharm 8	Mahās 77–Mahīś 36
—		Sarv 61–Vātsīp 35
The *laukikāgras* are the five faculties.	Vātsīp 14	Sarv
Patience is knowledge.	Dārṣṭ 35	Sarv 113
Pure patience is vision.	Sarv 113	Dārṣṭ 35
The *dhyānas* are included in the *smṛtyupasthānas.*	Sarv 20	
The *mārgāṅgas* are in the *smṛtyupasthānas.*	Mahīś 18	
Everything is included in the *smṛtyupasthānas.*	Andh 1–Sarv 25	Ther 9
Good wisdom is vision.	Sarv 114	Dārṣṭ 53
The perverse views are abandoned by vision alone.	Sarv 115	Vibh 15
Vibhavatṛṣṇā is abandoned by cultivation.	Sarv 79–Ther	Vibh 14
—	*Śārip* 47	
There are *bodhyaṅgas* in seven attainments.	Sarv 19	
One becomes buddha through *bodhi.*	Uttar 5–*Śārip* 3	Ther 39
20. Regression		
The arhat can regress.	Vātsīp 13–Samm 2, 14	Mahās 37–Mahīś 17
—	Sarv 14–Pūrv 15	Vibh 18–Ther 2, 84
—	Bhadr	
The arhat regresses because of his actions.	Pūrv 15–Samm 14	Ther 84
The *srotāpanna* can regress.	Mahās 37–Mahīś 17	Ther 3–Sarv 14
One can regress from the *nirodhasamāpatti.*	Dārṣṭ 41	Sarv

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
20. Regression *continued*		
Regression is the arousal of defilements.	Sarv	Vibh 18
There is regression from the Path, not from the fruit.	Vibh 18	Sarv
Regression has no reality.	Dārṣṭ 59	Sarv
There is regression everywhere up to the *gotrabhūmis*.	Mahās 36	
21. Deliverance and Nirvāṇa		
Whoever knows deliverance is delivered.	Andh 18	Ther 44
Whoever is attached to existence is not delivered.	Sarv 44	
The deliverances of the Buddha and Listener are identical.	Sarv 43–Mahīś 22	
—	Dharm 2	
A *sarāga* thought is delivered.	Andh 9–Vibh 23?	Ther 24–Sarv 80
—	Dārṣṭ 14	
There is abandonment of the fetters when the advantages of morality are seen.	Andh 38	Ther 85
The two cessations are unconditioned.	Mahīś 19–Mahās 43	Ther 21–Vātsīp 38
—	Sarv 6–Andh 6	
—	*Śārip* 10–Sautr 9	
The three cessations really exist.	Sarv 81	Dārṣṭ 15–Sautr 9
Nirvāṇa is only *naivaśaikṣanāśaikṣa*.	Sarv 83–Ther	Vibh 27, 28–Vātsīp 19
—		*Śārip* 12
Nirvāṇa is good.	Andh 61–Sarv	Ther 187
—	*Śārip* 12	
The *pudgala* subsists in Nirvāṇa.	Haim 7?–Vātsīp 1?	Sarv–Ther
—	Samm 1?	

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
21. Deliverance and Nirvāṇa *continued*		
It should not be said that Nirvāṇa is distinct from or identical to things.	Vātsīp 11	
It should not be said that Nirvāṇa does or does not exist.	Vātsīp 12	Sautr 9–Mahīś 1
—		Sarv–Dārṣṭ 15
Whoever dispels the defilements is reborn in the higher worlds.	Dārṣṭ 27	Sarv 104
There is a fetter having the immortal as its object.	Pūrv 16	Ther 86
22. Constituents of the Path of Deliverance		
There are forty-one qualities of awakening.	Vibh 19	Sarv
The five faculties are only *anāsrava*.	Vibh 3–Mahās 38	Sarv 59–Ther
—	Mahīś 13–*Śārip* 69	
The five faculties are only transcendental.	Mahīś 13–Mahās 38	Sarv 36–Ther 189
—	Hetuv 8–*Śārip* 7	
Rightview is only transcendental.	Ther–Mahās 38	Sarv 35
—	*Śārip* 8–Mahīś 13?	
The five faculties are only good.	Mahās 38–Mahīś 13	Sarv 60–Ther
—	Vibh 3–*Śārip* 69	
—	Hetuv 8	
The beginner possesses the five faculties.	Ther 27–*Śārip* 36	Andh 11
Good wisdom is vision.	Sarv 114	Dārṣṭ 53
There are two simultaneous wisdoms.	Mahīś 25	
Wisdom causes suffering to cease.	Mahās 33	
The nature of power is *vīrya*.	Dharm 10	Sarv
The powers of the Buddha are common to the Listener.	Andh 7	Ther 22–*Śārip* 3

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
22. Constituents of the Path of Deliverance *continued*		
The power of the Buddha is a noble *jñāna.*	Andh 8	Ther 23
The might of the Buddha is infinite.	Mahās 7	
The fetters are abandoned through the path of happiness.	Andh 38	Ther 85
Happiness is abandoned to others.	Hetuv 5	Ther 156
Livelihoods are different from words and actions.	Dārṣṭ 37	Sarv 120
23. Liberating Knowledges		
Knowledge is a constituent of the Path.	Sarv 66–Vātsīp 16	
The power of the Buddha is a noble *jñāna.*	Andh 8	Ther 23
The nonpredestined has knowledges.	Uttar 8	Ther 47
The worldling has knowledges.	Ther 191–Sarv *Śārip*	Hetuv 9–Uttar 8
—	Sautr 21	
The Buddha sees the past and the future.		
The Buddha always has two supreme *jñānas.*	Mahās 15	
The Buddha knows everything with a single thought.	Mahās 14	
The Buddha knows everything with a single *prajñā.*	Mahās 13	
The *jñāna* of a *śaikṣa* is *aśaikṣa.*	Uttar 7	Ther 45
Patience has the nature of consciousness.	Dārṣṭ 35	Sarv 113
The Listener has knowledge of the fruit.	Andh 25	Ther 53
All the arhats have *anutpādajñāna.*		Sarv 15
The *pṛthivīkṛtsna* gives a false *jñāna.*	Andh 19	Ther 46
All *jñāna* is *pratisaṃbhidā.*	Andh 20	Ther 48

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
23. Liberating Knowledges *continued*		
The *saṃvṛtijñāna* knows only the truth.	Ther 49	Andh 21
The *paracittajñāna* knows only thought.	Andh 22	Ther 50
There is knowledge of the future.	Andh 23–Sarv *Śārip* 76	Ther 51
—		
There is knowledge of the present.	Andh 24–*Śārip* 76	Ther 52
A single *jñāna* knows everything.		Sarv 64
The *lokottara jñāna* has twelve objects.	Pūrv 31–Apar 10	Ther 195
The teaching was revised by the councils.	Certain Uttar 35	Ther 196–Other Uttar
Tīrthikas have the five *abhijñās.*	Sarv 17–Vātsīp 6	Haim 2?–Dharm 3
—		Mahīś 6
The divine eye is the fleshly eye.	Andh 12–Samm 8	Ther 28–*Śārip* 56
24. Sense Consciousness		
The six sense spheres are fruition.	Mahās C 69–*Śārip* 24	Ther–Dārṣṭ 11–Mahās NW 54
The six spheres are established from conception.	Pūrv 25–Apar 9	Ther 136
The five spheres constitute desire.	Pūrv 13	Ther 77
The five spheres exist in the *rūpadhātu.*	Andh 36–Samm 11	Ther 80–Sarv
—	Mahās 25	*Śārip* 15
There is no sense sphere in the *rūpadhātu.*	Ther 80	Andh 36–Samm 11
—		Sarv–Mahās 25
—		*Śārip* 15
The five sense faculties are visible.	Andh?	Ther 62–*Śārip* 38
The eye sees forms.	Sarv–*Śārip* 25	Ther 181–Sautr 17
—	Certain Mahās 26	Dārṣṭ 8–Other Mahās 26

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
24. Sense Consciousness *continued*		
A single eye sees.	Vātsīp 17	Sarv 69
The whole of the aggregates see forms.	Dārṣṭ 8	
Feeling is, alone, a fruit.	Dārṣṭ 11	Sarv 75–*Śārip* 49
—		Ther–Mahās 54, 69
There is *saṃjñā* among the Asaṃjñins.	Andh 13–Sarv	Ther 32
There is *saṃjñā* in the *naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana.*	Ther 33	Andh 14
The contact of consciousness really exists.	Sarv 124	Dārṣṭ 39
25. The Object of Knowledge		
There are consciousnesses without an object.	Andh 40–Dārṣṭ 48	Ther 89–Sarv 91
All consciousness has an objective domain.	Sarv 91	Dārṣṭ 48
The latent tendencies are devoid of an object.	Mahās 45–Mahīś 3	Ther 88–Sarv 26
—	Andh 39–Dārṣṭ 13	Other Uttar
—	Certain Uttar 13	
The *ālambanapratyaya* engenders consciousness.	Samm 27	Sarv 136–Sautr 26
The *ālambanapratyaya* constitutes agglomerated atoms.	Sautr 26	Sarv 136–Samm 27
The *ālambanapratyaya* constitutes atoms taken in isolation.	Sarv 136	Samm 27–Sautr 26
A thought whose object is the future of the past is devoid of an object.	Uttar 14–*Śārip* 2	Ther 90, 91–Sarv 1
Satkāyadṛṣṭi has a real object.	Sarv 63	Dārṣṭ 6
Form has no object.	Uttar 12	Ther 87–*Śārip* 44–Sarv
Objects of the fetters exist.	Sarv 99–Vātsīp 21	Dārṣṭ 25

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
25. The Object of Knowledge *continued*		
Certain fetters have the immortal as object.	Pūrv 16	Ther 86
Citta and *caitta* have objects.	Sarv 34–Ther	
—	*Śārip* 51	
The *dharmāyatana* is entirely knowable.	Sarv 3–*Śārip* 31	Mahās 48
—	Later Mahīś 3	
The knowable is expressible and inexpressible.	Vātsīp 10–Samm 26	
The five sense faculties are visible.	Andh?	Ther 62–*Śārip* 38
Bodily action is visible.	Andh?	Ther 63–*Śārip* 53
Space is visible.	Andh 28	Ther 60–*Śārip?*
The four great elements are visible.	Andh 29	Ther 61–*Śārip* 37
26. Mental Formations		
The *cittaviprayuktas* are among the *saṃskāras.*	Sarv 4–*Śārip* 63	Ther
Emptiness is among the *saṃskāras.*	Andh 60	Ther 183
Names, letters, etc., are among the *saṃskāras.*	Sarv 70	Dārṣṭ 45
The characteristics are among the *saṃskāras.*	Sarv 4	
Birth increases the *saṃskāras.*	Mahīś 33	
The latent tendencies are dissociated from thought.	Mahās 46, 63–Mahīś 3	Ther 108–Sarv 26
—	Vibh 39–*Śārip* 5	Other Uttar
—	Dārṣṭ 13– Vātsīp 37	
—	Samm 17–Andh 39	
—	Certain Uttar 13	
Thought and mental factors do not know each other.	Mahīś 25	

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
26. Mental Formations *continued*		
Citta and *caittas* of the *srotāpanna* know each other.	Mahās 29	Sarv
Citta and *caittas* are *samanantarapratyayas.*	Sarv 110	Dārṣṭ 52
The *caittas* know each other.	Mahās 29	Sarv
Morality is mental.	Ther 103	Mahās 58–*Śārip* 22
The Path is mental.	Ther–Sarv *Śārip* 59	Prajñ 8
—		
Citta and *caittas* alone are causes.	Mahās 54	Sarv 75–Ther *Śārip* 49
—		
Citta and *caittas* alone are fruits.	Mahās 54–Ther	Sarv 75– Dārṣṭ 11 *Śārip* 49
—		
There are mental things.	Ther 66–Sarv 34 *Śārip* 54	Rājag 3–Siddh 3
—		
Giving is mental.	Rājag 4–Siddh 4	Ther 67
Mental things have objects.	Sarv 34–Ther *Śārip* 51	
—		
Cetanā is mental action.	Sarv–*Śārip*	Sautr 24
There are bodily and vocal actions beyond *cetanā.*	Sarv 117–*Śārip* 42	Dārṣṭ 54–Sautr 16
—	Ther–Mahīś 27, 28	Later Mahīś 4
Cetanā alone is a cause.	Dārṣṭ 11–Ther	Sarv 75–Mahās 54 *Śārip* 49
—		
Cetanā and *manojalpa* are thoughts.	Dārṣṭ 19	Sarv 89–Ther *Śārip* 50
—		
Every thought has *vitarka.*	Uttar 15	Ther 92–Sarv *Śārip*
—		
The six consciousnesses are associated with *vitarka.*	Mahīś 11	
Citta and *caittas* evolve together.	Sarv 110–Mahīś 20	
Vitarka and *vicāra* are mental factors.	Sarv 90–Ther	Dārṣṭ 47

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
26. Mental Formations *continued*		
—	*Śārip* 48	
Vitarka and *vicāra* are associated with thought.	Ther–Sarv 90	
—	*Śārip* 48–Later Mahīś 6	
Vitarka and *vicāra* can be pure.	Ther–Sarv 50	Mahīś 15
—	*Śārip* 68	
Vitarka and *vicāra* are everywhere.	Dārṣṭ 23	Sarv 95–Ther *Śārip* 70
—		
There is no *vicāra* in the Noble Path.	Bahuś 3	
Sound is the diffusion of *vitarka.*	Pūrv 17	Ther 93
Having perfectly understood, one pays attention.	Pūrv 27	Ther 157
Avijñapti really exists.	Sarv 105– *Śārip* 34	Ther
—	Mahās 62	Sautr 14–Dārṣṭ 29
Morality is *vijñapti.*	Mahās 61–Samm 16	Ther 106
Immorality is *avijñapti.*	Mahās 62	Ther 107
The *kāyavijñaptirūpa* is shape.	Sarv 140	Dārṣṭ 61–Vātsīp 40
—		Samm 28
Kāyavijñapti is movement.	Vātsīp 40–Samm 28	Sarv 140–Dārṣṭ 61
Kāyavijñapti is engendered by thought.	Dārṣṭ 61	Sarv 140–Samm 28
—		Vātsīp 40
Thought and mental factors arise together.	Sarv 72	Dārṣṭ 46
27. The Nature of Knowledge		
Knowledge is a constituent of existence.	Sarv 66	Vātsīp 16

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
27. The Nature of Knowledge *continued*		
There are knowledges without objects.	Andh 40–Dārṣṭ 48	Ther 89–Sarv 91
All knowledge has an objective domain.	Sarv 91	Dārṣṭ 48
Jñānaviprayukta thought is *jñāna.*	Ther 109	Mahās 64
Knowledge is dissociated from thought.	Pūrv 20	Ther 110
There is knowledge of the future.	Andh 23–Sarv	Ther 51
—	*Śārip* 76	
There is knowledge of the present.	Andh 24–*Śārip* 76	Ther 52
A single *jñāna* knows everything.		Sarv 64
Every *jñāna* is *pratisaṃbhidā.*	Andh 20	Ther 48
Saṃvṛtijñāna knows only the Path.	Ther 49	Andh 21
Knowledge knows.	Sarv 65	
A person knows.	Vātsīp 15	Sarv–Mahīś 32
Jñāna and *vijñāna* can be simultaneous.	Sarv 68	Dārṣṭ 7
There is no ordinary meaning.	Mahās 53	
28. Consciousness		
Everything is included in the *nāmarūpa.*	Sarv 2–Ther	
Being endowed with five consciousnesses, one cultivates the Path.	Mahās 56	Ther 99–Sarv
—		*Śārip* 75
Consciousness is a constituent of the Path.	Sarv 66	Vātsīp 16
Consciousness is a constituent of existence.	Sarv 66–Vātsīp 16	
There is a persisting *bhavaṅgavijñāna.*	Ther 219–Vibh 41	
There is subtle *manovijñāna* at conception, death, in *nirodhasamāpatti,* etc.	Ther 218–Sautr 29	

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
28. Consciousness *continued*		
There is a root-consciousness.	Mahās 78	
The heart is the organ of *manovijñāna.*	Ther 220	
The five consciousnesses are good or bad.	Mahās?	Ther 100–*Śārip* 65
The five consciousnesses are *sarāga.*	Mahīś 10–Mahās 24	Vātsīp 5–Samm 24
—	Sarv 32–*Śārip* 17	
The five consciousnesses are *virāga.*	Mahīś 10–Mahās 24	Vātsīp 5–Sarv 32
—		*Śārip* 17–Samm 24
The five consciousnesses have no discrimination.	Sarv 33	
The six consciousnesses are associated with *vitarka-vicāra.*	Mahīś 11	
Manovijñāna has as objects the five sense *vijñānas.*	Sarv 109	Dārṣṭ 32
The six consciousnesses also have internal objects.	Sarv 109	Dārṣṭ 33
The six consciousnesses have the internal faculties and consciousnesses as their objects.	Sarv 109	Dārṣṭ 33
The six evolving consciousnesses are seeds.	Sautr 28	
The five consciousnesses are *sābhoga.*	Mahās 76	Ther 101
Hearing consciousness follows visual consciousness.	Uttar 23	Ther 137
Jñāna and *vijñāna* are simultaneous.	Sarv 68	Dārṣṭ 7
The six *vijñānas* exist in the *rūpadhātu* and *arūpyadhātu.*	Mahās 25	Ther 80, 81–Sarv
—		*Śārip* 16
None of the five sense consciousnesses are in the *rūpadhātu.*	Ther 80	Mahās 25–Sarv
—		*Śārip* 15

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
28. Consciousness *continued*		
The six *vijñānas* have no simultaneous support.	Sautr 30	
The consciousnesses can be simultaneous.	Mahās 79	
29. Thought		
The thought of a *srotāpanna* knows its nature.	Mahās 29	Sarv
Thought knows its nature.	Mahās 29	Sarv
Thought and mental factors know each other.	Mahīś 25	
There is thought in the *saṃjñāsamāpatti*	Dārṣṭ 58–Vibh 5	Sarv
There is subtle thought in the *nirodhasamāpatti.*	Dārṣṭ 40–Vibh 6	Sarv 128
—	Sautr 29–Ther 217	
Thought and mental factors arise together.	Sarv 72	Dārṣṭ 46
Thought and mental factors are mutual *samanantarapratyayas.*	Sarv 110	Dārṣṭ 52
Thought and mental factors evolve together.	Mahīś 20–Sarv 110	Later Mahās 7
There is matter in thought.	Mahās 51	Ther–Sarv *Śārip* 71
—		
Vitarka and *vicāra* are thought.	Dārṣṭ 47	Sarv 90–Ther–*Śārip* 48
Thought and the body are mutual seeds.	Sautr 18	
Thought and mental factors know what is associated with thought.	Dharm 9	Sarv
Thought is pure by nature.	Mahās 44–Vibh 23 *Śārip* 6	Sarv 80
—		
A *sarāga* thought is delivered.	Andh 9–Vibh 23?	Ther 24–Sarv 80

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
29. Thought *continued*		
—	Dārṣṭ 14	
Life is a consequence of thought.	Vibh 4–Ther	Sarv 125–*Śārip* 64
All thought possesses *vitarka.*	Uttar 15	Ther 92–Sarv *Śārip*
—		
Morality is a consequence of thought.	Ther 104	Mahās 59–*Śārip* 22
A thought can last for a long time.	Andh 3–*Śārip* 26	Ther 17
Two thoughts arise together.	Later Mahās 3	Sarv 67
Thought is *sarvatrāga.*	Vibh 24	Sarv 74
One controls another's thought.	Mahās 74	Ther 154
Citta and *caittas* are causes.	Mahās 54	Sarv 75–Ther *Śārip* 49
—		
Knowledge is dissociated from thought.	Pūrv 20	Ther 110
Citta and *caittas* alone are fruits.	Mahās 54–Ther	Sarv 75–Dārṣṭ 11 *Śārip* 49
—		
Thought penetrates the whole body.	Later Mahās 8	
Speech conforms to thought.	Ther 94–Later Mahīś 5	Pūrv 18
Bodily action conforms to thought.	Ther 95–Later Mahīś 5	Pūrv 19
Cetanā and *manojalpa* are thoughts.	Dārṣṭ 19	Sarv 89–Ther *Śārip* 50
—		
A knowing thought has no nescience.	Dārṣṭ 36	Sarv 116
A doubting thought has no certainty.	Dārṣṭ 36	Sarv 116
A coarse thought has no subtlety.	Dārṣṭ 36	Sarv 116
Thought exists.	Sarv 34	
Thought is devoid of an object.	Sarv 34–Ther *Śārip* 51	
—		
Thought is dissociated from thought.	Sarv 34	Ther–*Śārip* 52
Thought dissociated from knowledge does not know.	Mahās 64	Ther 109

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
30. Continuity of Thought		
Only *rāga* and *pratigha* are factors of *cittasantati.*	Dārṣṭ 26	Sarv 102
All the *kleśas* are factors of *cittasantati.*	Sarv 102	Dārṣṭ 26
A defiled thought alone is a factor of *cittasantati.*	Sarv 101	Vibh 36
A pure thought is a factor of *cittasantati.*	Vibh 36	Sarv 101
In the *ārūpyadhātu, cittasantati* has no support other than itself.	Sautr 22	Sarv
Concentration is *cittasantati.*	Sarv 58–Uttar 16	Ther 113
31. Sleep and Dreaming		
There is *abhisamaya* during a dream.	Certain Uttar 41	Ther 208–Other Uttar
There is acquisition of holiness during a dream.	Certain Uttar 41	Ther 208–Other Uttar
A thought in a dream is undefined.	Certain Uttar 42	Ther 209–Other Uttar
A dream really exists.	Sarv 84	Dārṣṭ 16
The Buddha never sleeps or dreams.	Mahās 10–Vibh 13	Sarv
32. Absorptions and Attainments		
The arhat acquires the *dhyānas.*	Sarv 39	
The *srotāpanna* acquires the *dhyānas.*	Mahās 50–Mahīś 31	Sarv 57
—	Vibh 37	
The *sakṛdāgāmin* acquires the *dhyānas.*	Vibh 37	Sarv 57
One enters *niyāma* by meditating only on the suffering of conditioned things.	Mahīś 35–Dārṣṭ 43	Sarv 130
One enters *samāpatti* by the view of the suffering of conditioned things.	Bahuś 5	

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
32. Absorptions and Attainments *continued*		
One enters *niyāma* by meditating on desire.	Sarv 11	
Without *dhyāna,* one can have *niyāma* and the arhat fruit.	Sarv 21	
All the *dhyānas* have *aṅgas.*	Sarv 129–Ther	Vibh 21
—	*Śārip* 77	
Happiness is purely bodily in the first three *dhyānas.*	Dārṣṭ 5	Sarv
The attainer tastes the absorptions.	Andh 46	Ther 131
The *pṛthivīkṛtsna* gives *viparītajñāna.*	Andh 19	Ther 46
There are intervals between the *dhyānas.*	Samm 22–Sarv	Mahīś 29–Other Andh 58
—	Certain Andh 59	
There are *lokottara dhyānas.*	Sarv 49–Ther	Mahīś 14
—	*Śārip* 67	
There is a mixture of *dhyānas.*	Dārṣṭ 42	Sarv
All the *dhyānas* are in the *smṛtyupasthānas.*	Sarv 20	
The arhat enters Nirvāṇa in the *āneñjya.*	Certain Uttar 39	Ther 206–Sarv 42
—		Other Uttar
The *āneñjya* is unconditioned.	Mahīś 19	Sarv 6–Ther 21
—		*Śārip* 10–Mahās 43
One is endowed with the three times in *dhyāna.*	Andh 41	Ther 96
Contiguous stages are only good.	Dārṣṭ 55	Sarv
One can dwell for a long time in the eighth stage.	Mahās 35	
33. Meditation		
There is *bodhyaṅga* only in the seven *samāpattis.*	Sarv 19	

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
33. Meditation *continued*		
One enters *samādhi* by the view of the suffering of conditioned things.	Bahuś 5	
There is vocal utterance in *samādhi.*	Mahās 27, 30–Pūrv 7	Ther 15–Sarv 52
—	Bahuś 2–Cet 3	
—	Haim 5–Apar 7	
Saying 'O suffering' makes suffering known.	Andh 43	Ther 111–Sarv
There is disciplined thought in *samādhi.*	Mahās 27	
In *samāpatti,* one hears sound.	Pūrv 28	Ther 180
The Buddha always dwells in *samādhi.*	Mahās 12–Vibh 12	Sarv
Samādhi is *cittasantati.*	Sarv 58–Uttar 16	Ther 113
Samādhi is only concentration of thought.	Sautr 32	Sarv
One enters *niyāma* by a single *animittasamādhi.*	Dharm 12	Sarv 10
There is thought in the *asaṃjñāsamāpatti.*	Dārṣṭ 58–Vibh 5	Sarv
There is *saṃjñā* among the Asaṃjñins.	Andh 13–Sarv	Ther 32
There is *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* among the Asaṃjñins.	Hetuv 4	Ther 152
There is death in *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha.*	Rājag 8	Ther 151
Saṃjñāvedayitanirodha is *lokottara.*	Hetuv 2	Ther 150
Saṃjñāvedayitanirodha is *laukika.*	Hetuv 3	Ther 150
One does not die while in concentration.	Sarv 42	
There is *saṃjñā* in *naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana.*	Ther 33	Andh 14
Nirodhasamāpatti is unconditioned.	Andh 27–Uttar 9	Ther 58–Sarv 6
—		*Śārip* 10–Mahās 43–Mahīś 19

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
33. Meditation *continued*		
There is subtle thought in *nirodhasamāpatti.*	Dārṣṭ 40–Vibh 6	Sarv 128
—	Sautr 29–Ther 217	
There is regression from *nirodhasamāpatti.*	Dārṣṭ 41	Sarv
34. The Triple World		
There are worldly things.	Dharm 7–Sarv	
—	*Śārip* 45	
The three *rāśis* exist everywhere	Dārṣṭ 44	Sarv 131
There are six destinies.	Andh 34–Uttar 11	Ther 74–Sarv
—	Vātsīp 36	*Śārip* 18
The *dṛṣṭivant* abandons the *durgatis*	Uttar 18	Ther 123
The bodhisattva enters the *durgatis*	Andh 71–Cet 1–Pūrv 1	Ther 214
—	Mahās 22–Sarv	
—	Apar 1–Haim 1?	
35. The *Kāmadhātu*		
One enters *niyāma* only in the *kāmadhātu.*	Sarv 22–Vātsīp 32	
There are *laukikāgradharmas* in the *kāmadhātu.*	Mahās 77–Mahīś 36	Sarv 61–Vātsīp 35
—	Dharm 8	
Īrṣyā and *matsara* exist only in the *kāmadhātu.*	Sarv 97	Vibh 35
The five *kāmaguṇas* constitute the *kāmadhātu.*	Pūrv 12	Ther 76
Śīlavrataparāmarśā and *vicikitsā* are undefined outside the *kāmadhātu.*	Vibh 30	Sarv 132

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
36. The *Rūpadhātu*		
There are six *vijñānas* in the *rūpadhātu.*	Mahās 25	Ther 80–Sarv
—		*Śārip* 15
There are four *vijñānas* in the *rūpadhātu.*	Sarv–*Śārip* 15	Mahās 25–Ther 80
There is only one *vijñāna* in the *rūpadhātu.*	Ther 80	Mahās 25–Sarv
—		*Śārip* 15
There are six *āyatanas* in the *rūpadhātu.*	Andh 36–Samm 11	Ther 80–Sarv
—	Mahās 25	*Śārip* 15
There are four *āyatanas* in the *rūpadhātu.*	Sarv–*Śārip* 15	Ther 80–Andh 36
—		Samm 11–Mahās 25
There is only one *āyatana* in the *rūpadhātu.*	Ther 80	Sarv–*Śārip* 15
—		Mahās 25–Andh 36
—		Samm 11
There is *rūparāga* in the *rūpadhātu.*	Andh 49, 54–Samm 18	Ther 141
There is *rūpa* in the *rūpāvacara.*	Andh 36, 53–Mahās 25	Ther 80
—	*Śārip* 15–Vibh 20	
—	Sarv–Samm 11	
Formed things constitute the *rūpadhātu.*	Andh 35	Ther 78
There are *laukikāgradharmas* in the *rūpadhātu.*	Sarv 61–Vātsīp 35	
—	Mahās 77–Mahīś 36	
—	Dharm 8	

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
36. The *Rūpadhātu* *continued*		
There is *īrṣyā* and *matsara* in the Brahmaloka.	Vibh 35	Sarv 97
37. The *Ārūpyadhātu*		
There are *laukikāgradharmas* in the *ārūpyadhātu.*	Vātsīp 35–Mahīś 36	Sarv 61–Mahās 77
—	Dharm 8	
There is *arūparāga* in the *ārūpyadhātu.*	Andh 49, 54–Samm 18	Ther 141
There are six *vijñānas* in the *ārūpyadhātu.*	Mahās 25	Ther 81–Sarv
—		*Śārip* 16
There is only one *vijñāna* in the *ārūpyadhātu.*	Ther 81–Sarv	Mahās 25
—	*Śārip* 16	
The *arūpin* dharmas constitute the *ārūpyadhātu.*	Andh?	Ther 79
There is *rūpa* in the *ārūpyadhātu.*	Andh 37, 53–*Śārip* 13	Ther 81–Sarv 108
—	Mahās 25–Vibh 20	
The four *ārūpyasamāpattis* are unconditioned.	Mahās 43–*Śārip* 10	Ther 57–Sarv 6
—		Mahīś 19–Vātsīp 38
In the *ārūpyadhātu,* the *cittasantati* has no support but itself.	Sautr 22	Sarv
38. Transcendental Things		
The *laukikāgradharmas* are *aparyāpanna.*	Dharm 8	Sarv 61–Vātsīp 35
—		Mahās 77–Mahīś 36

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
38. Transcendental Things *continued*		
The Buddha is transcendental.	Mahās 1–Vetull 6	
The *vohāra* of the Buddha is transcendental.	Andh 5	Ther 20
Saṃjñāvedayitanirodha is *lokottara.*	Hetuv 2	Ther 150
Saṃjñāvedayitanirodha is *laukika.*	Hetuv 3	Ther 150
The five faculties are only *lokottara.*	Mahās 38–Mahīś 13	Ther 189–Sarv 36
—	Hetuv 8–*Śārip* 7	
Right view is only *lokottara.*	Mahās 38–Mahīś 13?	Sarv 35
—	Ther–*Śārip* 8	
The Saṃgha is transcendental.	Bahuś 6–Vetull 1–3	Ther 167–169
Dṛṣṭigata is *aparyāpanna.*	Pūrv 26	Ther 143
The death of the *lokottaras* is *lokottara.*	Mahās 73	Ther 149–*Śārip* 74
There are *lokottara dhyānas.*	Sarv 49–Ther	Mahīś 14
—	*Śārip* 67	
The *lokottara jñāna* has twelve objects.	Pūrv 31–Apar 10	Ther 195
Five teaching points are *lokottara.*	Bahuś 1	
39. Form		
There is *rūpa* in the *rūpadhātu.*	Andh 36, 53–Mahās 25–*Śārip* 15	Ther 80
—	Sarv–Vibh 20–Samm 11	
There is *rūpa* in the *ārūpyadhātu.*	Andh 37, 53–Mahās 25	Ther 81–Sarv 108
—	Vibh 20–*Śārip* 13	
The form of the holy one is the Path.	Mahīś 26–Mahās 55	Ther 98
—	Samm 15–*Śārip* 9	
Citta and *rūpa* are mutually *bījas.*	Sautr 18	

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
39. Form *continued*		
Rūpa is *rūpasahabhūhetu.*	Sarv	Dārṣṭ 1
External form is *anāsrava.*	Dārṣṭ 2	Sarv
Form is a fruit of action.	Sarv 75, 76–*Śārip* 20, 29	Mahās 54–Ther 159
—	Uttar 26	Dārṣṭ 11
Form is the fruition of action.	Andh 52–Samm 21	Ther 161–Mahās 54
—	Mahās 69	Dārṣṭ 11
—	Sarv 75, 76–*Śārip* 20	
Form is cause.	Sarv 75, 76–*Śārip* 29	Mahās 54–Ther 158
—	Uttar 26–Mahīś 28?–Samm 12?	Dārṣṭ 11
Form is action.	Samm 12–Mahīś 28	Ther 82
Form is cause and caused.	Uttar 26–*Śārip* 29	Ther 159–Mahās 54
—		Dārṣṭ 11
Form is good or bad.	Mahās 27, 28–Samm 13, 20	Ther 82, 160–Mahās 54
—	*Śārip* 14	Dārṣṭ 11?
Noble form is derived from the *mahābhūtas.*	Uttar 24–*Śārip* 30	Ther 138
There is form in thought.	Mahās 51	Ther–Sarv *Śārip* 71
—		
Rūpin dharmas constitute the *rūpadhātu.*	Andh 35	Ther 78
Arūpin dharmas constitute the *ārūpyadhātu.*	Andh?	Ther 79
Form is endowed with an object.	Uttar 12	Ther 87–*Śārip* 44–Sarv
Everything is included in the *nāmarūpa.*	Sarv 2–Ther	

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
39. Form *continued*		
The atom has mass.	Sautr 25	Sarv 135
Atoms touch each other.	Sautr 25	Sarv 135
The four great elements are visible.	Andh 29	Ther 61–*Śārip* 37
The great elements evolve.	Mahīś 20–Later Mahās 7	
Earth is a fruition of action.	Andh 30–*Śārip* 28	Ther 70
The earth element lasts for a *kalpa.*	Later Mahīś 7	
Sounds and images exist.	Sarv 106	Dārṣṭ 50, 51
Sound is a fruition of action.	Mahās 68–Vibh 1	Ther 118–Sarv 121
—	Vātsīp 22–*Śārip* 23	
Sound is the diffusion of *vitarka.*	Pūrv 17	Ther 93
40. The Body		
The body of the Buddha is infinite.	Mahās 6	
The birth-body of the Buddha is pure.	Mahās 2–Vibh 2	Sarv
The *sukhendriya* is only bodily in the first three *dhyānas.*	Dārṣṭ 5	Sarv
The strength and weakness of the body are distinct.	Sarv	Vibh 25
Thought penetrates the whole body.	Later Mahās 8	
41. Life		
The life of the Buddha is eternal.	Mahās 8	
The life faculty does not exist.	Sautr 15	
Life follows upon thought.	Vibh 4–Ther	*Śārip* 64–Sarv 125
The life faculty is material.	Ther 83	Pūrv 14–Samm 13 Sarv–*Śārip* 21
—		
There is an intermediate existence.	Pūrv 11–Samm 10	Ther 75–Vibh 7
—	Sarv 31	Mahās 49–Mahīś 8

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
41. Life *continued*		
—	Vātsīp 33–Later Mahīś 2	*Śārip* 4
42. Embryonic Life and Birth		
The six *āyatanas* exist from conception.	Pūrv 25–Apar 9	Ther 136
The bodhisattva does not become *arbudha, kalala,* etc.	Mahās 18	
There is *abhisamaya* for an embryo.	Certain Uttar 40	Ther 207–Other Uttar
There is acquisition of holiness for the embryo.	Certain Uttar 41	Ther 208–Other Uttar
The embryo bodhisattva has neither *kāma* nor *vyāpāda.*	Mahās 21–Vibh 36	Sarv 101
—	Haim 4	
The bodhisattva is conceived as a white elephant.	Mahās 19	
The bodhisattva is born from his mother's right side.	Mahās 20	
Birth increases the *saṃskāras.*	Mahīś 33	
43. Death		
There can be untimely death.	Sarv 126	Prajñ 6–Dārṣṭ 57
There can be untimely death of an arhat.	Ther 163–Sarv 126	Rājag 9–Siddh 7
—		Prajñ 6–Dārṣṭ 57
One can die in *saṃjñānirodhasamāpatti.*	Rājag 8	Ther 151
The death of the *lokottaras* is *lokottara.*	Mahās 73	Ther 149–*Śārip* 74
One can die while meditating.		Sarv 42
The arhat attains Nirvāṇa in the *āneñjya.*	Certain Uttar 39	Ther 206–Sarv 42

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
43. Death *continued*		
—		Other Uttar
Aging and death are fruition.	Andh 31	Ther 71–*Śārip* 55
Aging and death are perfected realities.	Andh 45	Ther 115
44. Ontology		
Everything exists, particularly the past and the future.	Sarv 1–Later Mahīś 1	Ther 7–Sautr 10
—		Mahīś 1–Mahās 47
—		*Śārip* 2–Andh 2
Thought having future or past objects is devoid of an object.	Uttar 14–*Śārip* 2	Ther 90, 91–Sarv 1
The *pudgala* exists.	Vātsīp 1–Samm 1	Ther 1–Sautr 3, 99
—	Haim 7?	Dārṣṭ 25–Sarv 46
—		*Śārip* 1–Tāmraś
A certain past exists.	Kāś 1	Ther 8–Sarv 1, 77
—		Andh 2–Mahās 47
—		Mahīś 1–*Śārip* 2
All things both exist and do not exist.	Andh 2–Prajñ	Ther 10–Sarv 1
—	*Satyasid* 6	Mahīś 1–*Śārip* 2
Everything is only denomination.	Mahās–Ekav	Sarv 1–Ther 7
—	Prajñ–*Satyasid* 2	Mahīś 1
All conditioned things are only designations.	Prajñ	Sarv
Only transcendental things exist.	Lokot	Sarv 1–Ther 7
—		Mahīś 1–Ekav
—		Prajñ–Andh 2
All things are only ashes.	Gokul	Ther 18
There are two kinds of emptiness.	Lokot	Ther–Sarv
—		*Śārip* 46
There are two truths, conventional and absolute.	Prajñ–*Satyasid* 1	

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
44. Ontology *continued*		
—	Sarv	
Suffering is absolute reality.	Prajñ 4	
Suffering is *pariniṣpanna.*	Hetuv 10–Certain Uttar 45	Ther 216–Other Uttar 45
Dharmasthitatā is *pariniṣpanna.*	Andh 44	Ther 114
Impermanence is *pariniṣpanna.*	Andh 45	Ther 115
Aging and death are *pariniṣpanna.*	Andh 45	Ther 115
Skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, indriyas are *pariniṣpanna.*	Ther 216–Certain Uttar 45	Hetuv 10–Other Uttar 45
—		Prajñ 2?
Āyatanas are perfected realities.	Ther 216–Sarv 1	Prajñ 2
A worldly nature exists.	Sarv 94	Dārṣṭ 20
Buddha exists as a substance.	Mahās 17	
Unconditioned things exist.	Sarv 1–Mahīś 1	Sautr 9–*Satyasid* 18
The three *nirodhas* exist.	Sarv 81	Dārṣṭ 15–Sautr 9 *Satyasid* 18
—		
Space exists.	Sarv 1–Mahīś 1	Sautr 9–*Satyasid* 18
The *prāptis* exist.	Sarv 111	Sautr 11–Dārṣṭ 34
Duration exists.	Sarv–*Śārip* 61	Sautr 13–Ther Mahīś 23
—		
The life faculty exists.	Sarv	Sautr 15
Bodily action exists.	Sarv 117	Sautr 16–Dārṣṭ 54
Coexistent causes exist.	Sarv	Sautr 19
Conditions as causes exist.	Sarv 71, 98	Dārṣṭ 9
Avijñapti exists.	Sarv 105–Mahās 62	Sautr 14–Dārṣṭ 29
—	*Śārip* 34	Ther
Names, letters, etc., exist.	Sarv 70	Dārṣṭ 45
A dream exists.	Sarv 84	Dārṣṭ 16
Characteristics exist.	Sarv 7, 86	Dārṣṭ 17
The fetters exist.	Dārṣṭ 25–Sarv 99	

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
44. Ontology *continued*		
—	Vātsīp 21	
Objects of the fetters exist.	Sarv 99–Vātsīp 21	Dārṣṭ 25
Transformed things exist.	Sarv 123	Dārṣṭ 38, 56
The contact of consciousness exists.	Sarv 124	Dārṣṭ 39
Mental factors exist.	Sarv 34–Ther 66–*Śārip* 54	Rājag 3–Siddh 3
Sounds and images exist.	Sarv 106	Dārṣṭ 50, 51
Beings are only designations of successive existences.	Sarv 46	
Graspables are only designations.	Vātsīp 2	
A geometric figure is only a designation.	Sautr 23	Sarv
Regression is only a designation.	Dārṣṭ 59	Sarv
All things are fixed in their own-nature.	Andh 66–Certain Uttar 37	Ther 202–Other Uttar
There are no things included in others.	Rājag 1–Siddh 1	Ther 64–*Śārip* 39
There are no things associated with others.	Rājag 2–Siddh 2	Ther 65–*Śārip* 40
The four aggregates are fixed in their own-nature.	Sautr 6	
Everything is included in own-nature.	Sarv 100	Vibh 31
The great elements evolve.	Mahīś 20–Later Mahās 7	
Thought and mental factors evolve.	Mahīś 20–Sarv 110	Later Mahās 7
Action and its fruit evolve together.	Later Mahās 5	
The abandonment of good roots has no own-nature.	Dārṣṭ 60	Sarv
45. Unconditioned Things		
Unconditioned things exist.	Sarv 1–Mahīś 1	Sautr 9–*Satyasid* 18
Unconditioned things are causes.	Sarv	Sautr 20–Ther

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
45. Unconditioned Things *continued*		
—		*Śārip* 62
Nirvāṇa alone is unconditioned.	Ther 21–Vātsīp 38	Sarv 6–Mahās 43
—	Samm?	Mahīś 19–Andh 6, 26, 27
—		*Śārip* 10–Vibh 8, 9, 29
—		Uttar 10, 32–Dharm 13
—		Sautr 9–*Satyasid* 17
The two cessations are unconditioned.	Sarv 6–Sautr 9	Ther 21–Vātsīp 38
—	Mahās 43–Andh 6	
—	Mahīś 19–*Śārip* 10	
Space is unconditioned.	Mahīś 19–Sarv 6	Ther 59–Vātsīp 38
—	Uttar 10–Mahās 43	*Śārip* 10
—	Sautr 9–*Satyasid* 17	
Pratītyasamutpāda is unconditioned.	Mahās 43–Mahīś 19	Ther 55–Sarv 6, 28
—	Dharm 13–Vibh 8	Vātsīp 38
—	Pūrv 9–*Śārip* 10	
The *dharmasthitatā* is unconditioned.	*Śārip* 10	Sarv 6–Ther 21
—		Mahās 43–Mahīś 19
Tathatā is unconditioned.	Mahīś 19–Certain Uttar 32	Ther 186–Sarv 6
—		*Śārip* 10–Other Uttar
—		Mahās 43
The Path is unconditioned.	Mahās 43–Mahīś 19	Sarv 6, 112–Ther 21
—	Vibh 9	*Śārip* 10
Niyāma is unconditioned.	Andh 26–*Śārip* 10	Ther 54–Sarv 6

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
45. Unconditioned Things *continued*		
—		Mahās 43–Mahīś 19
The *āneñjya* is unconditioned.	Mahīś 19	Sarv 6–Ther 21
—		*Śārip* 10–Mahās 43
The four *ārūpyasamāpattis* are unconditioned.	Mahās 43–*Śārip* 10	Ther 57–Sarv 6
—		Mahīś 19
The *nirodhasamāpatti* is unconditioned.	Andh 27–Uttar 9	Ther 58–Sarv 6
—		*Śārip* 10–Mahās 43
—		Mahīś 19
The characteristics are unconditioned.	Vibh 29	Sarv 87–Ther 21–Dharm 11
The *nirodhalakṣaṇa* is unconditioned.	Dharm 11–Vibh 29	Sarv 87–Ther 21
The *anityatānirodha* is unconditioned.	Vibh 26	Sarv 82–Ther 21
The four fruits are only unconditioned.	Pūrv 29–Vibh 32	Ther 184–Sarv 103
—	*Śārip* 11	
The *prāptis* are unconditioned.	Pūrv 30	Ther 185–Sarv 6
—		*Śārip* 10
The Four Truths are unconditioned.	Pūrv 10	Ther 56–Sarv 8
—		*Śārip* 32
46. Conditioned Things		
All conditioned things are only designations.	Prajñ 3	Sarv 1
All conditioned things are suffering.	Hetuv 7–Prajñ 3	Ther 166
One enters *niyāma* by meditating on the suffering of conditioned things.	Dārṣṭ 43–Mahīś 35	Sarv 130
One enters *samādhi* by the view of the suffering of conditioned things.	Bahuś 5	
Conditioned things only involve two times.	Dārṣṭ 49	Sarv

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
47. The Characteristics of Conditioned Things		
The characteristics are unconditioned.	Vibh 29	Dharm 11–Sarv 87
—		Ther 21
The characteristics exist.	Sarv 7, 86	Dārṣṭ 17
An instant has three characteristics.	Sarv 88	Dārṣṭ 18
The characteristics are in the *saṃskāraskandha.*	Sarv 4	
The characteristics are attributed to the moment.	Sarv 139–Sautr 27	Samm 29
The characteristics are attributed to a prolonged state.	Samm 29–Sautr 27	Sarv 139
Things arise in four ways.	Later Mahās 2	
Things arise one after the other.	Dārṣṭ 24	Sarv 96
Duration exists.	Sarv–*Śārip* 61	Sautr 13–Ther Mahīś 23
—		
The *nirodhalakṣaṇa* is unconditioned.	Dharm 11–Vibh 29	Sarv 87–Ther 21
Cessation has a cause.	Sarv 78	Dārṣṭ 12
The three cessations exist.	Sarv 81	Dārṣṭ 15–Sautr 9
—		*Satyasid* 18
Everything is destructible.	Mahīś 34	
Destruction exists.	Mahās 52	
All things are instantaneous.	Pūrv 32–Apar 11	Ther 211
—	Mahīś 23–Sarv 47	
—	Kāś 5–Vātsīp 4	
The aggregates last for an instant, a whole lifetime or until the end of *saṃsāra.*	Mahīś 37	
Conditioned things involve only two times.	Dārṣṭ 49	Sarv
Everything is impermanent.	Sautr 8	
The *anityatānirodha* is unconditioned.	Vibh 26	Sarv 82–Ther 21
Impermanence is *parinispanna.*	Andh 45	Ther 115

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
47. The Characteristics of Conditioned Things *continued*		
Time is permanent.	Dārṣṭ 30–Vibh 33	Sarv
Five points of teaching are *lokottara.*	Bahuś 1	
48. Time and Space		
An instant has three characteristics.	Sarv 88	Dārṣṭ 18
There is no future cause.	Kāś 3	Sarv–Sautr 19
One is endowed with things of the three times.	Andh 41	Ther 96
There is knowledge of the future.	Andh 23–Sarv	Ther 51
—	*Śārip* 76	
There is knowledge of the present.	Andh 24–*Śārip* 76	Ther 52
One abandons the defilements of the three times.	Sarv–Certain Uttar 31	Ther 182–Other Uttar
The latent tendencies are eternally present.	Later Mahīś 9	
The aggregates, etc., are eternally present.	Later Mahīś 10	
Time is distinct from the aggregates.	Dārṣṭ 30–Vibh 33	Sarv 107
Time is permanent.	Dārṣṭ 30–Vibh 33	Sarv
The *prāptis* exist.	Sarv 111	Sautr 11–Dārṣṭ 34
The *prāptis* are unconditioned.	Pūrv 30	Ther 185–Sarv 6
Theory of seeds.	Sautr 12	Sarv–Ther 222
Thought and form are mutually seeds.	Sautr 18	
Seeds become shoots.	Later Mahās 6	
The earlier moment pervades the subsequent moment.	Dārṣṭ 62	
Emptiness is in the *saṃskāraskandha.*	Andh 60	Ther 183
Space is unconditioned.	Uttar 10–Mahīś 19	Ther 59–Vātsīp 38
—	Sarv 6–Sautr 9	*Śārip* 10

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
48. Time and Space *continued*		
—	*Satyasid* 17–Mahās 43	
Space is visible.	Andh 28	Ther 60–*Śārip?*
49. The Person		
The *pudgala* exists.	Vātsīp 1–Haim 7?	Ther 1–Sarv 99
—	Samm 1	Sautr 3–Dārṣṭ 25
—		*Śārip* 1–Tāmraś
The indestructible, arising with action, yields fruit.	Samm 30	
The *pudgala* is neither identical to nor different from the aggregates.	Vātsīp 1–Samm 1	
The *pudgala* transmigrates.	Vātsīp 3–Samm 1?	Mahīś 24–Ther 1
—		Sarv 48–*Śārip* 1
The *pudgala* knows.	Vātsīp 15	Sarv 3–Mahīś 32
Beings are only the *prajñapti* of the *bhavas.*	Sarv 46	
The five aggregates transmigrate.	Sautr 1–Samm 23?	Sarv–Ther
—		Vātsīp 3
—		Mahīś 24–*Śārip* 41
The *pudgala* subsists in Nirvāṇa.	Vātsīp 1?–Samm 1?	Sarv 3–Ther 1
—	Haim 7?	
There is a root consciousness.	Mahās 78	
There is a consciousness constituent of existence that persists.	Ther 219–Vibh 41	
There is an aggregate which endures until the end of the round of rebirth.	Mahīś 37	
50. Suffering		
Saying 'O Suffering!' makes suffering known.	Andh 43	Ther 111–Sarv

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
50. Suffering *continued*		
Saying 'O Suffering!' can help.	Mahās 32	
Suffering leads to the Path.	Mahās 31	
Suffering is a nutriment.	Pūrv 8–Mahās 34	Ther 16
Whatever is attached to the faculties is suffering.	Hetuv 6	Ther 165
All conditioned things are suffering.	Hetuv 7–Prajñ 3	Ther 166
One enters *niyāma* by meditating only on the suffering of conditioned things.	Dārṣṭ 43–Mahīś 35	Sarv 130
One enters *samādhi* by the view of the suffering of conditioned things.	Bahuś 5	
Suffering is *parinispanna.*	Hetuv 10–Certain Uttar 45	Ther 216–Other Uttar
Suffering is an absolute reality.	Prajñ 4	
Suffering differs from the aggregates.	Prajñ 1	
All suffering comes from actions.	Prajñ 7	
One abandons suffering by means of the Path.	Haim 6	
All things are only ashes.	Gokul	Ther 18
Wisdom causes suffering to cease.	Mahās 33	
There are three truths: suffering, ordinary and noble.	Bahuś 4	
The teaching of suffering is *lokottara.*	Bahuś 1	
51. The Aggregates		
The aggregates have a root and an end.	Sautr 4	
The aggregates have only one taste.	Sautr 4	
The four aggregates are fixed in their own-nature.	Sautr 6	
The five aggregates transmigrate.	Sautr 1–Samm 23?	Sarv 48–Ther
—		Vātsīp 3
—		Mahīś 24–*Śārip* 41

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
51. The Aggregates *continued*		
The five aggregates are causes.	Sarv 75–*Śārip* 49	Ther–Mahās 54
—		Dārṣṭ 11
The five aggregates are fruits.	Sarv 75–*Śārip* 49	Ther–Mahās 54
—		Dārṣṭ 11
The aggregates are *parinispanna.*	Ther 216–Certain Uttar 45	Hetuv 10–Other Uttar
—		Prajñ 2?
Suffering differs from the aggregates.	Prajñ 1	
There is continuity between the aggregates of two successive lives.	Andh 42	Ther 97
The Path alone destroys the aggregates.	Sautr 2	Ther–Sarv
—		*Śārip*
The aggregates have *mūlāpattis.*	Sautr 7	
Time is distinct from the aggregates.	Dārṣṭ 30–Vibh 33	Sarv 107
The aggregates always exist.	Later Mahīś 10	
There is an aggregate which endures until the end of the round of rebirth.	Mahīś 37	
There are new beings.	Mahīś 38	
The whole of the aggregates sees forms.	Dārṣṭ 8	
52. The Order of the Universe		
Buddha and Listener can perform wonders.	Andh 64	Ther 199
Through transformation, one can endure for a *kalpa.*	Mahās 65	Ther 112
Form is cause.	Sarv 75, 76–*Śārip* 29	Mahās 54–Ther 158
—	Uttar 26–Mahīś 28?–Samm 12?	Dārṣṭ 11

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
52. The Order of the Universe *continued*		
Form is a fruit of action.	Sarv 75, 76–*Śārip* 20, 29	Mahās 54–Ther 159
—	Uttar 26	Dārṣṭ 11
Form is fruition of action.	Andh 52–Samm 21	Ther 161–Mahās NW 54
—	Sarv 75, 76–*Śārip* 20	Dārṣṭ 11
—	Mahās C 69	

Appendix 2

Doctrinal Affinities

An examination of the five hundred or so theses assembled enables us to ascertain the doctrinal affinities which exist between the various schools. It should first of all be noted that the sources rarely contradict each other, at the most some ten times. It should also be noted that nearly every time, the contradictions concern groups of schools, such as the Mahāsāṃghikas, or schools having possessed various subschools, such as the Mahīśāsakas. In such cases, the contradiction is only apparent since we know that the subschools of such groups were themselves in disagreement over a specific problem, as has been clearly shown by Vasumitra in particular. What is striking and truly remarkable is, in contrast, the agreement between the various sources, yet so different in their doctrinal and geographic origins.

An examination of the theses, however, presents a major difficulty. In 90 percent of the cases, in fact, we only partly know which subschools or schools upheld them and which others refuted them. These are for most of the time purely local problems which were only posed in a region or among subschools of one and the same school. Thus it is that a detailed study of the three Abhidharma-piṭakas in our possession does not enable us, far from it, to know the opinion of the schools of which they are the doctrinal expression on the majority of these problems. It is difficult to find much more than a hundred problems common to the Sarvāstivādins and Theravādins, more than eighty common to the Theravādins and the school of the *Śāriputrābhidharma,* and seventy common to the latter and the Sarvāstivādins, which is very few in relation to the entirety of theses assembled here, the number of which, as we have seen, exceeds five hundred.

Nevertheless, there are forty-four problems on which we are well informed. In relation to them, we know the doctrinal position of the Sarvāstivādins in forty-two cases, that of the Theravādins in thirty-nine cases, that of the *Śāriputrābhidharma* in thirty cases, that of the Mahāsāṃghikas in thirty-one

cases, that of the Mahīśāsakas in twenty-eight cases, that of the Sammatīyas in twenty cases, that of the Vibhajyavādins[1] in seventeen cases, that of the Vātsīputrīyas in sixteen cases and that of the Andhakas in fifteen cases. By studying these problems, which one can call great general problems of the Hīnayāna since they preoccupied the Buddhists of Ceylon as much as those of Kashmir, Theravādins as much as Mahāsāṃghikas, Mahīśāsakas as much as Andhakas or Sammatīyas, it is therefore possible to derive indications on the doctrinal affinities of the various schools.

These are the theses [see figure on pp. 411–12].

This is how the affinities established in the previous table relate[2] [see figure on p. 413].

This table highlights some remarkable affinities. Nothing, however, could foresee some of them.

(1) A doctrinal group enclosing the Mahīśāsakas and Mahāsāṃghikas (19/3), a group to which the Vibhjyavādins are clearly linked (10/0 and 13/0) and, a little less so, the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* (13/5, 15/6 and 10/0) and the Andhakas (6/2, 8/1, 5/1 and 8/2), who are the Mahāsāṃghikas from the south. Note should especially be taken that the relationships of the affinities between the Vibhajyavādins and the other three schools all show that no disagreement existed among them (10/0, 13/0 and 10/0).[3] This clearly proves that the Vibhajyavādins of the *Vibhāṣā* belonged to the Mahīśāsaka-Mahāsāṃghika doctrinal group. The affinities of the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* are equally remarkable and fully confirm the hypothesis of its Dharmaguptaka origin, as is also proved by its relationship of affinities with this last school (3/0). This treatise belongs to that group, but does not originate with either the Mahāsāṃghikas or the Mahīśāsakas, since there are some disagreements with them. Since the hypothesis of a Kāśyapīya origin has to be rejected as it denies the existence of all the past and all

1. This is the school so-named in the *Vibhāṣā* of the Sarvāstivādins.

2. In each relationship, the numerator indicates the number of agreements and the denominator that of the disagreements.

3. T. Kimura, in his *Recherches sur l'Abhidharma* [ed. in Japanese] had already noted that the doctrine of the *Śāriputrābhidharma* was very close to that of the Vibhajyavādins of the *Vibhāṣā* and *Abhidharmakośa*. Similarly, C. Akanuma and T. Kimura, in articles in the Japanese journal *Shūkyō Kenkyū* (vol. II, 1925, pp. 705–26 and 839–70) link these same Vibhajyvādins doctrinally with the Mahāsāṃghika school (according to Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," p. 57, note, and p. 49, note).

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
Mahādeva's five points on the Arhat.	Mahās Pūrv Bahuś Cetiya Haimav	Ther Sarv Samm Vātsīp Mahīś
The person (*pudgala*) exists.	Vātsīp Samm	Ther Sarv *Śārip* Sautr Dārṣṭ Mahīś
Everything exists (*sarvam asti*).	Sarv later Mahīś	Mahās Mahīś Ther Vibh *Śārip* Andh Sautr Dārṣṭ? Uttar
There is an intermediate existence (*antarābhava*).	Sarv Samm Pūrv later Mahīś Dārṣṭ	Mahās Mahīś Ther Vibh *Śārip*
The *anuśayas* are *cittaviprayukta*.	Mahās Mahīś Vibh *Śārip* Dārṣṭ Vātsīp Samm Andh Certain Uttar	Ther Sarv
The *anuśayas* differ from the *paryavasthānas*.	Mahās Mahīś Vibh Andh	Ther Sarv
The *paryavasthānas* are *cittaviprayukta*.	Andh	Mahās Mahīś Vibh Ther Sarv
The *anuśayas* are *anālambana*.	Mahās Mahīś Andh Dārṣṭ Certain Uttar	Ther Sarv
The arhat can regress.	Samm Vātsīp Sarv Later Mahās Pūrv	Mahās Mahīś Vibh Ther Sautr
The *srotāpanna* can regress.	Mahās Mahīś	Ther Sarv
The *srotāpanna* acquires the *dhyānas*.	Mahās Mahīś Vibh	Sarv
The five noble faculties are worldly.	Sarv Ther	Mahās Mahīś *Śarip* Hetuv
Right view is worldly.	Sarv	Mahās Ther *Śārip* Mahīś ?
The two cessations are unconditioned.	Mahās Mahīś Sarv *Śārip* Andh	Ther Samm Vātsīp
Space is unconditioned.	Mahās? Mahīś Sarv, Uttar	Ther Samm Vātsīp *Śārip*
The *pratītyasamutpāda* is unconditioned.	Mahās Mahīś Vibh *Śārip* Dharm Pūrv	Ther Sarv Samm Vātsīp
The *mārga* (or *niyāma*) is unconditioned.	Mahās Mahīś Vibh Andh *Śārip*	Ther Sarv Samm Vātsīp
Tathatā (or *dharmasthitā*) is unconditioned.	Mahīś Certain Uttar *Śārip*	Ther Sarv Samm Vātsīp Mahās
The four *ārūpyasamāpattis* are unconditioned.	Mahās *Śārip*	Ther Sarv Mahīś Samm Vātsīp
The four fruits are unconditioned only.	Vibh *Śārip* Pūrv	Ther Sarv

the future without distinction, there can therefore be no doubt that it is a work by the Dharmaguptakas, the only school to our knowledge that could belong to that group.

(2) The doctrinal group of the Sinhalese Theravādins and Kashmiri Sarvāstivādins. The relationship of their affinities (20/13) is much more dis-

Table *continued*

Theses	Agreements	Disagreements
The form of a holy one is *mārga*.	Mahās Mahīś *Śārip* Samm	Ther
Form can be good or bad.	Mahīś Sarv Samm *Śārip*	Ther Mahās? Dārṣṭ ?
Form is fruition.	*Śārip* Andh Samm Sarv	Ther Mahās Dārṣṭ
Nirvāṇa is good.	*Śārip* Andh Sarv	Ther
Nirvāṇa can be *śaikṣa* or *aśaikṣa*.	*Śārip* Vātsīp Vibh	Sarv Ther
Thought is naturally pure.	Mahās Vibh *Śārip*	Sarv
Sound is fruition.	Mahās Vibh *Śārip* Vātsīp	Sarv Ther
The bodhisattva is conceived without *kāma* or *vyāpāda*.	Mahās Vibh Haimav	Sarv
The bodhisattva goes to the *durgatis*.	Mahās Andh Sarv Cetiya	Ther
Buddha and *śrāvaka* have an identical career.	Mahīś	Dharm Sarv *Śārip*
There is *brahmacarya* among the gods.	Dharm Sarv later Mahīś? Ther *Śārip*	Mahīś Haimav Samm
Tīrthikas acquire the five *abhijñās*.	Sarv Vātsīp	Mahīś Haimav Dharm
The *pṛthagjana* abandons the *kleśas*.	Samm Sarv	Ther Mahīś Dārṣṭ
There are six destinies (*gati*).	Andh Uttar Vātsīp	Ther *Śārip* Sarv
There is form (*rūpa*) in the *ārūpyas*.	Vibh Andh *Śārip* Mahās	Ther Sarv
There are five sense spheres in the *rūpadhātu*.	Mahās Andh Samm	Ther Sarv *Śārip*
There is no sense sphere in the *rūpadhātu*.	Ther	Mahās Andh Samm Sarv *Śārip*
There are five sense consciousnesses in the *rūpadhātu*.	Mahās	Ther Sarv *Śārip*
There is no sense consciousness in the *rūpadhātu*.	Ther	Mahās Sarv *Śārip*
There are five sense consciousnesses in the *ārūpyadhātu*.	Mahās	Ther Sarv *Śārip*
The five sense consciousnesses are *sarāga*.	Mahās Mahīś Sarv *Śārip*	Vātsīp
The five sense consciousnesses are *virāga*.	Mahās Mahīś	Vātsīp *Śārip* Sarv
The *abhisamaya* of the truths is progressive.	Andh later Mahās Sarv Samm Bhadr	Mahās Mahīś Vibh Ther

tant than in the preceding case, which is quite naturally explained by the enormous geographical distance, 3,500 km as the crow flies, separating the domains of these two schools. However, their relationships of the negative affinities with the Mahīśāsakas (11/14 and 8/19), Mahāsāṃghikas (8/18

	Theravāda	Sarvāstivāda	Mahīśāsaka 1	Vibhajyavādin	*Śāriputrābhidharma*	Mahāsāṃghika 1	Andhaka	Vātsīputrīya	Sammatīya
Theravāda	38	20/13	11/14	5/ 8	12/17	8/18	2/12	7/ 8	7/11
Sarvāstivāda	20/13	41	8/19	1/15	15/17	8/22	7/ 9	8/ 8	12/6
Mahīśāsaka 1	11/14	8/19	27	10/0	13/ 5	19/ 3	6/ 2	3/10	6/10
Vibhajyavādin	5/8	1/15	10/0	16	10/0	13/0	5/1	3/3	1/5
Śāriputrābhidharma	12/17	15/17	13/5	10/0	31	15/6	8/2	4/10	6/11
Mahāsāṃghika 1	8/18	8/22	19/ 3	13/ 0	15/ 6	30	8/ 1	3/ 9	4/ 9
Andhaka	2/12	7/ 9	6/ 2	5/ 1	8/ 2	8/ 1	15	2/ 2	4/ 2
Vātsīputrīya	7/ 8	8/ 8	3/10	3/ 3	4/10	3/ 9	2/ 2	16	10/ 0
Sammatīya	7/11	12/ 6	6/10	1/ 5	6/11	4/ 9	4/ 2	10/ 0	19
Dharmaguptaka	1/1	2/2	2/2	1/0	3/0	1/0	0	0/2	0/2
Pūrvaśaila	0/5	2/3	1/3	2/2	2/1	2/2	0	1/2	2/2
Dārṣṭāntika	3/2	1/4	5/0	2/0	3/0	3/0	2/0	1/1	1/2
Sautrāntika	3/0	1/2	3/0	2/0	2/0	2/0	1/0	0/2	0/2
Haimavata	0/ 2	0/ 4	2/ 1	1/ 0	0/ 1	2/ 0	0	0/ 2	1/ 1
Mahīśāsaka 2	1/ 2	3/ 0	0/ 3	0/ 2	1/ 2	0/ 2	1/ 0	0	1/ 1
Mahāsāṃghika 2	0/ 2	2/ 0	0/ 2	0/ 2	0	0/ 2	1/ 0	1/ 0	2/ 0
Bahuśrutīya	0/ 1	0/ 1	0/ 1	0	0	1/0	0	0/1	0/1
Caitiya	0/1	0/1	0/1	0	0	1/0	0	0/1	0/1

and 8/22), the *Śāriputrābhidharma* (12/17 and 14/18) are wholly comparable. These relationships, although remaining negative, differ with regard to the Andhakas (2/12 and 7/9) and Vibhajyavādins (5/8 and 1/15) because the former are only known to the Theravādins and the latter to the Sarvāstivādins and because, in both cases, the sources are silent over the affinities of these schools with their own, merely noting the disagreements considered as heresies.

(3) The very homogenous group (10/0) of the Vātsīputrīyas and Sammatīyas, the former being known to us only through the sources from Kashmir and the latter through those of Ceylon. This remarkable agreement, which we would expect, fully justifies the confidence we have placed in our sources. This group is characterised nearly always by negative relationships, though often close to 1, with the two preceding ones. This confirms that this group evolved separately, subjected to the somewhat similar influences

coming from the other two as well as the north and south. Its geographical position in the west of India explains this.

(4) Although the numbers of their theses examined here is quite low for us to be able to draw any firm conclusions, noted here can be the affinities of the Dārṣṭāntikas and Sautrāntikas between them and the schools of the first group. We might wonder whether, by separating from the Sarvāstivādins, they were not subjected to a certain degree to the influence of the Mahāsāṃghikas and Mahīśāsakas. As for the secondary subschools of these last two schools, they seem to have been preponderantly influenced by the Sarvāstivādins. In contrast, and whatever Vasumitra might say, the affinity of the Haimavatas seems to veer away from the Sarvāstivādins and turn towards the Mahāsāṃghikas. However, yet again, the number of theses examined is far too few for us, in these three cases, to be able to draw any conclusions.

An examination of the some four hundred secondary theses is, by comparison, deceptive since the number of common problems is extremely small except, obviously, with regard to the Theravādins, Sarvāstivādins and the school of the *Śariputrābhidharma,* whose Abhidharma-piṭaka we are fortunate enough to possess [see figure on p. 415].

If we take into account the very important fact that in the majority of cases, we only know the disagreements, considered as heresies by the various sources, and that we are practically always ignorant of the agreements, it can be understood how unwise it would be to draw conclusions from a statistical study of the secondary problems.

There are, nonetheless, cases where we should, through lack of anything better, use both the lesser and greater problems: it is that of the small schools, on which we have very little information. Once again, we can only draw some conclusions from their examination with the greatest reservations.

(1) A study of the Uttarāpathakas, a composite group badly defined from the doctrinal point of view, supplies no statistical information worth interpreting.

(2) A study of the Dharmaguptakas merely reveals a barely noticeable agreement (4/0) with the *Śāriputrābhidharma,* and disagreements with the Sarvāstivādins (5/8), Mahīśāsakas (2/6), Vātsīputrīyas (0/2) and Sammatīyas (0/2).

(3) The Haimavatas are notable for their agreements with the Mahāsāṃghikas (2/0) and Mahīśāsakas (2/1) and their disagreements with the Sarvāstivādins (0/4) and Theravādins (0/2). However, it should not be forgotten that our main informants, Vasumitra and Bhavya, contradict each other over the position of the Haimavatas regarding the two major problems that interested them.

	Mahīśāsaka	Mahāsāṃghika	Andhaka	Vibhajyavādin	*Śāriputrābhidharma*	Vātsīputrīya	Sammatīya	Theravāda	Sarvāstivāda
Mahīśāsaka	11	1/1	1/1	0	3/4	2/2	1/1	5/6	5/6
Mahāsāṃghika	1/1	45	2/0	3/0	2/6	0/1	0	3/28	2/20
Andhaka	1/1	2/0	57	3/2	5/3	0	5/1	0/57	10/15
Vibhajyavādin	0	3/0	3/2	25	1/5	0	0	0/7	0/25
Śāriputrābhidharma	3/4	2/6	5/3	1/5	48	2/0	2/2	32/16	32/6
Vātsīputrīya	2/2	0/1	0	0	2/0	15	1/0	1/2	4/10
Sammatīya	1/1	0	5/1	0	2/2	1/0	11	1/10	2/1
Theravāda	5/6	3/28	0/57	0/7	32/16	1/2	1/10	180	50/20
Sarvāstivāda	5/6	2/20	10/15	0/25	32/6	4/10	2/1	50/20	90

(4) The Dārṣṭāntikas are obviously in agreement with the Sautrāntikas (7/0), Vibhajyavādins (6/0), Mahīśāsakas (5/0) and Andhakas (3/0). In contrast, their disagreement with the Theravādins (5/13) and the *Śāriputrābhidharma* (4/12) is noteworthy.[4]

(5) The agreement of the Sautrāntikas with the Dārṣṭāntikas (7/0) is the only notable fact concerning the former. [Ed. See note to (4) above.]

(6) The agreement of the later Mahīśāsakas with the Sarvāstivādins (5/0), whose basic thesis they adopted, and their disagreement with the Mahāsāṃghikas (0/3) and early Mahīśāsakas (1/3) are of no surprise.

(7) Similarly, the agreement can be noted of the later Mahāsāṃghikas with the Sarvāstivādins (2/1) and Sammatīyas (2/0) and their disagreement with the Theravādins (0/2), Mahīśāsakas (1/3), Vibhajyavādins (0/2) and early Mahāsāṃghikas (0/2).

(8) Note should be taken of the agreement of the Prajñaptivādins and the Hetuvādins of Buddhaghosa (3/0) as well as their disagreements with the

4. We can hardly take into account the relationships of these two schools with the Sarvāstivādins (0/44 and 0/24) since we only know their doctrines through the intermediary of the latter, who obviously only record the disagreements.

Sarvāstivādins (0/2 and 0/2), with which certain sources claim to identify the second. Since this agreement concerns the great theory of suffering and since Buddhaghosa is unaware of the Prajñaptivādins, we might wonder whether the two schools should be identified with each other.

(9) Noteworthy are the Lokottaravādin theses of the Vetullakas, as much concerning the Buddha (three theses) as concerning the Saṃgha (four theses), which clearly link them to the more advanced schools of the Mahāsāṃghikas.

(10) The geographical proximity between their respective territories is possibly the only explanation of the positive relationship of the Sammatīyas with the Andhakas (8/1) and Pūrvaśailas (4/0), but it should not be forgotten that we only know the doctrines of these three schools from a single Sinhalese source, which could not indicate the doctrinal disagreements existing among them.

(11) There is also an undeniable link between certain theses of the Prajñaptivādins and those of the Rājagirikas and Siddhārthikas.

An examination of the relationships of affinities of other schools reveals no notable fact.

Consequently, only a statistical study of the relationships of the affinities on the major problems can supply information worth taking into consideration. Let us return to these results, the most important of which is indeed the demonstration of a doctrinal group including the early Mahāsāṃghikas and Mahīśāsakas, the Vibhajyavādins of the *Vibhāṣā* and the authors of the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra,* and try to establish the bases of the common doctrine.

(1) The past and the future have no real existence.

This is a rejection of the *sarvāstivāda* thesis[5] and compromises which were proposed by the Kāśyapīyas and certain Mahāsāṃghika schools such as the Andhakas.

(2) There is no intermediate existence (*antarābhava*) between death and the next rebirth.

(3) The latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) are dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayukta*), devoid of an object (*anālambana*) and different from the obsessions (*paryavasthāna*) which are themselves associated with thought (*cittasaṃprayukta*).

5. It is because of this that they are designated as Vibhajyavādins by the Sarvāstivādins.

(4) Clear comprehension (*abhisamaya*) of the Four Noble Truths (*āryasatya*) takes place once and not progressively.

(5) Right vision (*samyagdṛṣṭi*) and the five faculties (*indriya*) of faith (*śraddhā*), vigour (*vīrya*), mindfulness (*smṛti*), wisdom (*prajñā*) and concentration (*samādhi*) are only transcendental (*lokottara*) and never worldly (*laukika*).

(6) The *srotāpanna* can regress but not the arhat. The *srotāpanna* acquires the absorptions (*dhyāna*).

(7) Cessation by means of acquired knowledge (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha*), cessation without acquired knowledge (*apratisaṃkhyānirodha*), dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) and the Path (*mārga*) or certainty (*niyāma*) of the Path and the higher absorptions (*dhyāna*), the immovable (*aneñjya*) or the four formless attainments (*ārūpyasamāpatti*) are unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*). The list of their unconditioned things is variable but always includes nine terms.

(8) The form (*rūpa*) of a holy one, that is, right speech (*samyagvāc*), right conduct (*samyakkarmānta*), right livelihood (*samyagājīva*) and right bodily effort (*samyakkāyavyāyāma*), is the Path (*mārga*).

(9) Thought (*citta*) is clear (*prabhāsvara*) by its original nature. It is adventitious (*āgantuka*) defilements (*kleśa*) that sully it.

(10) Sound (*śabda*) is fruition (*vipāka*).

To this collection of theses should doubtless be added the following:

(1) The person (*pudgala*) does not really exist.

(2) The bodhisattvas, when they are conceived, have no desire (*kāma*) or harmfulness (*vihiṃsā*).

(3) There is form (*rūpa*) in the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*).

(4) The four fruits of the religious life (*śrāmaṇyaphala*) are only unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*).

Appendix 3

The Origins of the Mahāyāna

The problem of the origins of the Mahāyāna has probably not ceased to be of interest to Western and Oriental researchers. In fact, it is one of the most important as well as most obscure in the history of Buddhism. If we set aside certain traditions and the little information we can extract from a comparative study of documents of the Small and Great Vehicles which have come down to us, no datum has been preserved for us on the passage from the Hīnayāna to the Mahāyāna. On the one hand, the traditions concerning this transmission are very few in number, late and suspect. On the other hand, a comparative study can only be based on the works of the truly Hīnayānist or Mahāyānist schools and on the information supplied by the *Kathāvatthu,* Vasumitra, Bhavya, Vasubandhu, etc.

Faced with the complexity of the problem, it is appropriate to draw up an inventory of the facts on which today rests the possibility of a solution or, at least, a hypothesis.

(A) Facts Concerning the Canon:

(1) Paramārtha, in the mid-sixth century, records that the schools of the Mahāsāṃghika group incorporated the Mahāyāna sūtras into the canon, in particular the *Prajñāpāramitās,* the *Avataṃsaka, Mahāparinirvāṇa, Śrīmālā, Vimalakīrti* and the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa,* which they cite.[1]

(2) The *Satyasiddhiśāstra* by Harivarman, with good reason considered by Paramārtha as a work of the Bahuśrutīyas, quotes as its authority a canon

1. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 20, 41 and 43.

in five parts: Sūtra-, Vinaya-, Abhidharma- (with six *pādas*), Saṃyukta- and Bodhisattva-piṭakas.[2]

(3) According to Xuanzang, the canon of the Mahāsāṃghikas also consisted of five parts: Sūtra-, Vinaya-, Abdhidharma-, Bodhisattva- and Dhāraṇī-piṭakas.[3]

(4) According to Paramārtha, the Dharmaguptakas possessed a canon in four or five parts: Sūtra-, Vinaya-, Abhidharma-, Bodhisattva- and, according to one tradition, Dhāraṇī-piṭakas.[4]

(5) The *Nandimitrāvadāna,* which Sylvain Lévi and Przyluski attribute to the Dharmaguptakas, quotes as its authority a canon in four parts consisting of Sūtra-, Vinaya-, Abhidharma- and Bodhisattva-piṭakas.[5]

(6) The preface to the *Ekottarāgama* translated into Chinese at the end of the fourth century by Gautama Saṃghadeva cites a canon in four parts consisting of Sūtra-, Vinaya-, Abhidharma- and Saṃyukta-piṭakas, the last containing 'the sūtras that enclose, by development, the meaning of the Mahāyāna'. In fact, this *Ekottarāgama* is purported to be of Mahāsāṃghika origin, on the basis of certain indications.[6]

(7) The *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras,* some of which were translated into Chinese from the end of the second century, probably form the oldest class of Mahāyāna sūtras. Indeed, a tenacious tradition states that the *Prajñāpāramitā* began the *pradakṣiṇa* in India in a southerly direction, and this peculiarity has not escaped eminent Western and Eastern Indianists. However, the interpretation of this fact is somewhat uncertain, as É. Lamotte clearly saw. However, even while refusing to see in this tradition an indication of a southern origin of the *Prajñāpāramitā,* the latter is willing to accept that 'there are good reasons to believe that the Mahāyāna sūtras in general, and the Prajñās in particular, originate in the south (Andhra country)'.[7]

(8) The canon described by the author of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra,* who is a Mādhyamika and probably Nāgārjuna himself, is that of the Sarvāstivādins.[8]

2. T 1646, p. 352c and 300b.
3. Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels* II, pp. 160–1.
4. Demiéville, "Origine des sectes bouddhiques," pp. 23 and 61–2.
5. T 2030.
6. T 125.
7. Lamotte, *Traité* I, p. 25, n. 1.
8. Ibid., pp. 103–12.

(B) Facts Concerning the Teaching:

(1) The concept of the Buddha and bodhisattva among the schools of the Mahāsāṃghika group is very close to that of the Mahāyāna, as we have seen.[9]

(2) We do not know all the concepts of the Buddha and bodhisattva among the Sautrāntikas, but the silence of their great adversaries, the Sarvāstivādins, over this question is proof that their opinion on this point hardly differed from that of the orthodox schools of the Sthaviran group and was, consequently, far from that of the Mahāyāna.[10]

(3) The concept of the Buddha and bodhisattva among the Dharmaguptakas and in the *Śāriputrābhidharma,* without being as advanced as that of the Mahāsāṃghikas and related schools, at least represent a first step on the path which leads to the Mahāyāna teaching.

(4) The ontology of the schools of the Mahāsāṃghika group, although presented under varying aspects, is generally close to that of the Mahāyāna.

(5) It is the same for the ontology of the *Satyasiddhiśāstra* by Harivarman. It is precisely the ontological position of this work that particularly contributed to acknowledging that it had a possibly Sautrāntika, possibly Bahuśrutīya or Prajñaptivādin, origin.

(6) The ontology of the Sautrāntikas and Dārṣṭāntikas, in contrast, is much less close to that of the Mahāyāna than a superficial examination had so far led us to believe.

(C) Facts Concerning Geography:

(1) Nāgārjuna is purported to have been born and lived for a long time in Andhra country, particularly around Nāgārjunikoṇḍa and Amarāvatī, protected by the friendship of the king of the Śātavāhana dynasty. Other

9. See above, app. 1. Also see LVP, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi,* pp. 762–813.
10. La Vallée Poussin has done justice to the opinion which attributed to the Sautrāntikas, alone among the scholars of the Hīnayāna, a doctrine of the three bodies of the Buddha identical to that of the Mahāyāna (LVP, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi,* p. 762). In contrast, the Mahāsāṃghikas seem to have upheld the theory of the three bodies, with the *nirmāṇakāya* (thesis 6) and *saṃbhogakāya* (thesis 9). As for the *dharmakāya* it is much less difficult to attribute it to them also since even the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins accepted it (LVP, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi,* pp. 764–76).

traditions place him in relations with Kashmir and with Nālandā in Magadha.[11]

(2) Aśvaghoṣa is placed in relations with Kaniṣka and Kashmir, but was supposedly born in Oudh, at Sāketa.[12]

(3) Āryadeva was born in Ceylon and lived in southern India, in Coḷa country.[13]

(4) Harivarman was a native of central India.[14]

(5) Bhāvaviveka was born in southern India, doubtless in Malayagiri, and lived for a long time in Andhra country, at Dhanakaṭaka.[15]

(6) Buddhapālita was born in southern India, in Tambala country.[16]

(7) Candrakīrti was born in the south, at Samaṇṭa.[17]

(8) Diṅnāga was born in the south, near Kāñcī.[18]

(9) Sthiramati was born in the south, at Daṇḍakārañja.[19]

(10) Dharmapāla was born in the south.[20]

(11) Asaṅga and Vasubandhu were born in Puruṣapura, at the gateway of Kashmir, and spent part of their life in Ayodhyā.[21]

(12) From the end of the third century there appeared in Ceylon the Vetullakas, some of whose theses are apparently Mahāyānist, even Tantric.[22]

(13) The adherents of the Vajrayāna who propagated this teaching in China from 700 onwards all came from southern or central India: Śubhakarasiṃha from Oḍra, Vajrabodhi from Malaya, Amoghavajra from Ceylon.

(14) Xuanzang, during his travels to India in the first half of the seventh century, met adherents of the Mahāyāna in the following places: Kapiśa (5,000), Lampa (a few), Paluṣa (50), Uḍḍiyāṇa (a few), Takṣaśilā (a few),

11. Lamotte, *Traité* I, pp. X–XIV.
12. Grousset, *Histoire d'Extrême-Orient*, p. 78.
13. Ibid., p. 76; Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels* II, p. 224.
14. *Hōbōgirin*, fascicule annex: tables du Taishō Issaikyō, ed. S. Lévi and J. Takakusu, Tokyo 1931, p. 142a.
15. Watters, *On Yuan-chwang's Travels* II, pp. 215, 222, 224; Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte*, p. 136.
16. Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Geschichte*, p. 135.
17. Ibid., p. 147.
18. Ibid., p. 130.
19. Ibid., p. 129.
20. Ibid., p. 160.
21. Takakusu, "The Life of Vasubandhu by Paramārtha."
22. Cf. above, ch. 38 of part two.

Takṣaśilā region (300), Madhyadeśa (1,100), Mahāśāla (a few), Śvetapura (a few), Magadha (8,000), Puṇyavardhana (700), Orissa (10,000), Kośala (10,000), Parvata (100), Varaṇa (300), Ghazni region (10,000), Yarkhand (100), Khotan (4,000). He records the presence of both vehicles in: Jālandhara (2,000), Mathurā (2,000), Kanauj (10,000), Ayodhyā (3,000), Vṛjji (1,000), Nepal (2,000), Puṇyavardhana (3,000), Koṅkaṇapura (10,000), Mahārāṣṭra (5,000), Mount Abu region (1,000), Ujjayinī (300), Parvata (1,000), Baluchistan coast (6,000), Huo (some hundreds). Finally, he encountered some Mahāyāna-Sthaviras in Bodh-Gayā (1,000), Kaliṅga (500), Bhārukaccha (300), Surāṣṭra (2,500) and, it seems, in Ceylon. Therefore, at the beginning of the seventh century, the Mahāyāna flourished particularly in Kapiśa, the Ghazni area, the Ganges Basin, Konkan, Orissa, Mahākośala and Khotan, thus constituting three kernels, one in the northwest, in the valleys of upper Kabul and upper Helmand (15,000), another encompassing the whole northern half of the Deccan (35,000) and the last stretching over the whole Ganges Basin (20,000).[23]

It was in southern India, apart from Ceylon, that the Mahāyānists were the least numerous but this in no way preconceives a more favourable earlier situation. Moreover, at the time of Xuanzang, Buddhism, as much that of the Hīnayāna as the Mahāyāna, was in clear retreat in the south of the peninsula.

(D) 'Negative' Facts:

Finally, one aspect remains of the question which we have barely considered and yet which is very troubling, if we think about it. Whilst the works of the Great Vehicle in no way refrain from citing and often criticising the opinions of the Hīnayāna, no work of the Small Vehicle cites or refutes the theses necessarily and only belonging to the Mahāyāna. Certainly, it is understood that the very word 'Mahāyāna' is absent from the canonical and doctrinal literature of the Small Vehicle, as much that of the Theravādins as that of the Sarvāstivādins. The few theses of a Mahāyānist tendency in the *Kathāvatthu* which Buddhaghosa attributes to the Vetullakas, for example,

23. For these calculations, we arbitrarily presumed that in the regions where both Vehicles were represented, their adherents were equal in number and we have taken half the figures indicated by Xuanzang.

can very well have been upheld by the 'advanced' Hīnayānists and, in any case, there is nothing specifically Mahāyānist about them. In fact, at the time of Buddhaghosa, Vasubandhu and Saṃghabhadra, the Mahāyāna had already existed for at least five centuries and had been known by Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and many other famous thinkers. Perhaps a very close study of the *Vibhāṣā* would reveal, among the anonymous theses or those attributed to the Tīrthikas, in principal non-Buddhists, some clearly Mahāyānist ideas, but this would scarcely advance us, even from the chronological point of view, since the *Vibhāṣā* postdates Nāgārjuna and the latter presupposes the existence of an already considerable literature of Māhāyana sūtras. This silence is all the more strange in that the *Vibhāṣā* and other doctrinal works of the Hīnayāna were fully cognisant of, frequently cited and refuted, as moreover did those of the Mahāyāna, the Tīrthika theses of all kinds. Why this exclusion, as much among the Sarvāstivādins of the northwest as among the Theravādins of Ceylon, whilst, of all the ideas to dispute on the level of thought, those of the Mahāyāna should logically, necessarily, be the most important, both as Buddhist and as revolutionary, such as those which were most to cause the orthodox, the preservers of the Small Vehicle to cry shame? To explain this silence, we are reduced to hypotheses.

The works by Vasubandhu and Saṃghadeva are clearly centred on a polemic between two precise schools, the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, and this is easily proved by the fact that, except in a very small number of cases, one as much as the other of these thinkers makes no allusion to any other school. It is therefore not surprising that they do not speak of the Mahāyānists and their theses. We should note in passing, an interesting fact that confirms this point, that Saṃghabhadra briefly cites, among four or five schools, without stopping over them, the Prajñaptivādins, for whom all things are devoid of own-nature (*svabhāva*) and comparable to sky flowers (*khapuṣpa*), which is clearly Mahāyānist. Equally, if Buddhaghosa, in his commentary upon the *Kathāvatthu,* attributes no thesis to the Mahāyāna, it is because none of them is specifically Mahāyānist.

Such is not the case, in contrast, for the *Vibhāṣā,* which attacks the Vibhajyavādins, as well as the Dārṣṭāntikas, Mahāsāṃghikas, Mahīśāsakas, Vātsīputrīyas, Kāśyapīyas, Dharmaguptakas, Tīrthikas and Nirgranthas. Neither is it the case for the *Kathāvatthu* itself. In fact, the *Vibhāṣā* and *Kathāvatthu* were completed in about the year 250 of the Common Era at the latest, whilst Vasubandhu and Saṃghabhadra lived in the fifth century

as did Buddhaghosa. The situation must have changed considerably during those two hundred years. Furthermore, account should be taken of the fact that the *Vibhāṣā* from Kashmir, even if it fully cognises the opinions of the schools in the northwest, is unaware of those of the Andhakas and Theravādins and that, on its own account, the *Kathāvatthu* from Ceylon knows very little of the Sarvāstivādins, since Buddhaghosa only acknowledges four of their theses. Consequently, the knowledge of the opinions of the schools is inversely proportionate to the distance which separates their main stronghold where the collection of controversies were compiled, be it the *Vibhāṣā* in Kashmir or the *Kathāvatthu* in Ceylon.

Everything occurs as if, towards the end of the second century CE, the Mahāyāna, just starting out, was confined to a region far away from both Kashmir and Ceylon, but doubtless closer to the latter region since some of its influences were felt among the theses denounced in the last part of the *Kathāvatthu,* whilst nothing similar transpired, as far as we can actually tell, among the opinions criticised in the *Vibhāṣā.*[24] If this was indeed so, neither could the seat of the Mahāyāna at that time be found in a region much frequented by pilgrims, such as that of Magadha. We then think of the region of Konkan, Orissa, Mahākośala, located between Andhra country and the Ganges valley, and where Xuanzang, in the seventh century, noted the presence of the most important Mahāyānist centre in India. It was a relatively wild region, situated far from the great centres of civilisation and pilgrimage as well as the main routes used by pilgrims.

This hypothesis, however, comes up against a serious difficulty. If the Mahāyāna was confined, in the India of the end of the second century, to a region north of the Deccan plateau, how can we explain the first Chinese translations of the Mahāyāna sūtras being made, from the second half of that same second century, by Parthian, Sogdian and Khotanese monks? From the mid-second century, therefore, there existed outside India, and on its northwestern borders, a Mahāyānist community. In fact, the only route by means of which Indian missionaries, come to convert those dis-

24. If we do find Mahāyānist theses criticised in the *Vibhāṣā*, they can only be among the anonymous ones, and this anonymity, so contrary to the usage of its authors, would be proof that they were unaware of the names of their partisans, and, consequently, that the latter were not well known in northwest India.

tant regions to the Mahāyāna, could pass crosses the stronghold of the Sarvastivādin-Vaibhaṣikas, the northwest of India. It is hardly likely, to begin with, that those assuredly zealous missionaries would have crossed this region where Buddhism was then flourishing, thanks to the protection of the Kushana kings, without having been noticed, without their passage and especially their doctrine, so heterodox to Sarvāstivādin eyes, having drawn the attention of the latter so that they thought it necessary to debate and refute it in the *Vibhāṣā.* Perhaps they were so few in number, and their passage rapid, that the event remained purely local and was quickly forgotten on the Sarvāstivādin territory whilst, outside India, their mission found virgin terrain favourable to rapid development. Perhaps also, in that distant time, the emissaries of the Mahāyāna who crossed northwest India also bore names well known to the Sarvāstivādins, Mahāsāṃghikas and even Vibhajyavādins, and the Mahāyāna sūtras that they transported and taught were only a part of the Saṃyukta-piṭakas and Bodhisattva-piṭakas of the canon of those schools, then in full doctrinal evolution.

We can formulate a hypothesis according to which the land of origin of the Mahāyāna would be the region enclosed between the Godavarī and the Ganges, that is, Konkan, Mahākośala and Orissa. The Buddhist communities of this area were to receive two streams of influence, one coming from the north, from Magadha, holy land of Buddhism, where all the schools mixed in their pilgrimages, and the other coming from the south, from Andhra country where, from before the Common Era a group of subschools that emerged late from the Mahāsāṃghikas came to settle and develop.

As we have seen, the traditions concerning the canon, although relatively late, are formal and concordant on a twofold point. On the one hand, the canon of the schools of the Mahāsāṃghika group or influenced by the latter consists of more than three baskets, notably a Bodhisattva-piṭaka[25] which reveals a clearly pre-Mahāyānist tendency to the particular cult of the bodhisattva, and a Saṃyukta-piṭaka of which one source at least formally explains a Mahāyānist tendency. On the other hand, the schools of the Mahāsāṃghika group incorporated into their canon the main sūtras of the Mahāyāna. One difficulty arises: the acknowledgement of the Tripiṭaka

25. A single work known by this title, T 316, is a Mahāyānist sūtra of the *Mahāratnakūṭa* class.

of the Sarvāstivādins as the orthodox canon by a Mādhyamika master who could well have been Nāgārjuna himself.

The traditions concerning the geographical origin are equally formal: all the great masters of the Mādhyamika school, the oldest of those of the Mahāyāna, were natives of southern or central India and, furthermore, it was from Ceylon and the extreme south of India that, later, the missionaries of the Vajrayāna set out for China.

However, this is not a matter of difficult-to-control or even uncontrollable traditions, whose only merit is their convergence and even their existence. Much more serious, in contrast, are their doctrinal data.

The Mahāyāna, according to the definition itself which is given to it, is above all a Buddhological doctrine, which is characterised by the importance given to the career and nature of the bodhisattvas and buddhas considered as superhuman, marvellous, and by the depreciation of the nature and career of the arhats.

Indeed, it is an established fact that the Hīnayāna schools which are differentiated by a doctrine making the Buddha and the bodhisattva transcendent and supernormal beings, while they considered the nature and career of the arhat with scorn, all belonged to the Mahāsāṃghika group. Some of these theses are equally attributed by Buddhaghosa to the Vetullakas and by the *Vibhāṣā* to the Vibhajyavādins. The latter fact is of extreme importance because neither the *Vibhāṣā,* nor Vasubandhu, nor Saṃghabhadra attribute any theses of Buddhology, not just of pro-Mahāyānist tendency but any thesis of Buddhology whatsoever, to the Sautrāntikas or Dārṣṭāntikas. In contrast, the latter upheld a thesis exalting the nature of the arhat, namely, that the form of his body is pure (*anāsrava*). It is clear that if the Sautrāntikas or Dārṣṭāntikas had defended, as did the Vibhajyavādins and Mahāsāṃghikas, theses of Buddhology of Lokottaravādin or Mahāyānist tendencies, the Sarvāstivādins, particularly the authors of the *Vibhāṣā* and Vasubandhu or Saṃghabhadra, were only too happy to seize this additional occasion to pillory them. Their total silence over this point is clear proof that the doctrine of the Buddha and the bodhisattva among the Sautrāntikas and Dārṣṭāntikas was identical to that of the Sarvāstivādins, who were far from Mahāyānist or even Lokottaravādin. This point is now well established.

In contrast, we find in the Buddhology of the Mahāsāṃghikas and schools associated with them several traits which reveal an indisputable affinity with the Mahāyāna. So it is that as well as the *dharmakāya,* accepted, or so

it seems, by all the schools, the Mahāsāṃghikas accepted the existence of the *nirmāṇakāya* (thesis 6) and *saṃbhogakāya* (thesis 9). The life of the Buddha is eternal and, in order to convert beings, he does not enter Nirvāṇa (thesis 9).

The question of ontology is much more debatable. In the eyes of certain Western scholars, the Sautrāntikas purportedly maintained that things are not substances (*dravya*) but mere designations (*prajñapti*).[26] I admit on my part never having encountered, seemingly no more than La Vallée Poussin who knew them so well, such a thesis attributed to the Sautrāntikas.[27] I have the impression that this idea arose from a misinterpretation and wrong generalisation of a body of theses effectively defended by the Sautrāntikas and Dārṣṭāntikas.[28] If both declare that the two cessations and empty geometrical space have no real existence, no more than do the past and the future, a dream, objects created by transformation, sound, images reflected in water or in a mirror, regression, the characteristics of conditioned things, names, phrases, syllables, contact, the objects of craving, the life faculty, shape, non-intimation, acquisitions and non-acquisitions, the nature of the worldling and even causes and conditions, there is nothing surprising there. Reacting against the extremist realism of the Sarvāstivādins, they refused to consider as existing things that normal good sense and common experience showed them to be pure phenomena or modalities without concrete existence. Their argumentation, moreover, proves this clearly, and much recalls the rough good sense of the most orthodox, of the most archaistic school of the Small Vehicle, the Theravādins, among whom no one would even dream of going in search of the origin of the Mahāyāna. Moreover, like the Sautrāntikas, the Theravādins and Mahīśāsakas refused to accept the existence of the past and the future. The interest would have been otherwise

26. For example: Glasenapp, *La philosophie indienne*, p. 262.

27. See index and the part of the introduction of the *Kośa* devoted to the Sautrāntikas and Dārṣṭāntikas.

28. After much research, it seems to me that the origin of the opinion according to which the ontology of the Mahāyāna arose among the Sautrāntikas should be sought in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* by Mādhava, a Hindu author of the end of the fourteenth century. This late, even very late, date should have called for the greatest prudence. Mādhava's evidence is all the more suspect to our eyes in that he knew of only two Hīnayāna schools, the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas. This says a lot about the confidence that should be attributed to such a source.

if the Sautrāntikas had maintained that things as 'real', as concrete as form, thought, etc., are merely pure designations. However, this is not the case, and the silence of the *Vibhāṣā*, Vasubandhu and Saṃghabhadra over this point is sure proof that the Sautrāntikas or Dārṣṭāntikas never thought like that. Were it otherwise, we could be assured that their adversaries would not have refrained from attacking them, and with some violence, on this point.

The instanteism of the Sautrāntikas has also been invoked as proof of their Mahāyānist tendencies. This is to forget that the same doctrine was defended by the Mahīśāsakas, Vātsīputrīyas, Kāśyapīyas and even the Sarvāstivādins, all schools which could not exactly pass as pro-Mahāyānist. Do they refuse, it is argued, to consider duration as one of the characteristics of conditioned things? Certainly, but the Theravādins and Mahīśāsakas do the same.

Could it be said that the Sautrāntikas mark a turning point of Buddhist thought in that they subject the panrealism of the Sarvāstivādins to fierce criticism? This is to forget that, many years, perhaps even centuries, before their appearance and since the arising of the Sarvāstivādins, the latter came up against the vigorous and critical opposition of the Vibhajyavādins, Theravādins, Mahīśāsakas, then the Kāśyapīyas.

In sum, a study of the doctrine of the Sautrāntikas and Dārṣṭāntikas does not reveal any clear Mahāyāna tendency, and the only points where it is claimed they might be found being equally defended by other very Hīnayānist schools such as the Theravādins, Mahīśāsakas, Vātsīputrīyas, etc., the latter should be attributed with at least a part in the formation of the Mahāyāna, and all the more so in that they are the oldest by one, two or three centuries. The thesis of a Sautrāntika origin of the Mahāyāna rests on the dangerous illusion that the Sarvāstivādins made up the whole of the Hīnayāna or, at least, that they constituted the most important and oldest part of it. This is lending an all too willing ear to the insinuations by Vasumitra and other Sarvāstivādin authors and holding all the other sources truly cheap.

Since this is so, the problem now posed can be formulated in these terms: do there exist, among the doctrines of the schools of the Small Vehicle, any ontological theses demonstrating clear Mahāyānist tendencies? This question, in all certainty, can be answered in the affirmative. In all certainty, because of the diversity of the concordance of the sources outside the

schools in question, in all certainty also because we possess an indisputable witness, a text: the *Satyasiddhiśāstra* by Harivarman. The schools in question all belonged to the Mahāsāṃghika group.

There is, first of all, that thesis of the Andhakas according to which all things, past, future, present, form, thought, etc., exist and do not exist at the same time, and which, although close to common good sense, still has a very slight Mahāyānist aspect, be it only through its paradoxical side. There are those theses of the Andhakas in the terms of which the stability of things, impermanence, aging and death are perfected realities. There are the ontological theses of the Ekavyāvahārikas, Lokottaravādins and Bahuśrutīyas, which we unfortunately only know of from a single late source, Paramārtha. According to the former, everything is mere designation (*prajñapti*). For the latter, worldly things, which include the most concrete realities, such as form, thought, feeling, etc., are fictitious, unreal, whilst there only exist transcendental things, which are all abstractions. Furthermore, the Lokottaravādins taught the emptiness of things as did the Mahāyāna. If we can hardly doubt the truth of Buddhaghosa's indications concerning the Andhakas, it is nevertheless permissible to have reservations regarding Paramārtha's concerning the Ekavyāvahārikas and Lokottaravādins. However, the opinions he attributes to them are so close to those of the Prajñaptivādins and the *Satyasiddhiśāstra* that doubt is much weakened.

The Prajñaptivādins distinguished absolute truth from conventional truth like Harivarman and, also like him, they declared that everything is mere designation (*prajñapti*). Paramārtha, Vasumitra, Bhavya and even Saṃghabhadra are in agreement on this point. Kuiji, moreover, informs us that the Prajñaptivādins were differentiated from the Ekavyāvahārikas and Lokottaravādins in that they maintained that things are both fictional and real. This last opinion is curiously close to that of the Andhakas quoted above, according to which things exist and do not exist at the same time. Furthermore, for the Prajñaptivādins, as for the Hetuvādins and certain Uttarāpathakas, suffering is a perfected and distinct reality, but neither the aggregates, nor the spheres, nor the elements, nor the faculties are so. For them, the most concrete, the most tangible things do not constitute things in themselves whilst certain abstractions, in contrast, do so. This is exactly the opposite of what was thought by the Theravādins and also, everything leads us to believe, as we have seen, the Sautrāntikas. Indeed, this reversal of

ontological values, as we find it among the Prajñaptivādins and Hetuvādins in particular, has a very clearly Mahāyānist nature in its paradoxical aspect. If one rereads the *Prajñāpāramitā* sūtras, if one rereads Nāgārjuna, this is what leaps to the eye.

However, were not these Prajñaptivādins precisely Sautrāntikas, who would therefore have had two names? This is contrary to all the early and even later facts. Indeed, all the early traditions concerning the genealogy of the schools clearly distinguish the Prajñaptivādins, always counted among the Mahāsāṃghikas alongside those same Bahuśrutīyas to whom Paramārtha attributes the *Satyasiddhiśāstra*, from the Sautrāntikas or Saṃkrāntivādins, always included in the Sthavira group and, nearly always, as a school that emerged from the Sarvāstivādins. How, moreover, could the Prajñaptivādins, who are so often purported to have arisen from those Gokulikas who, of the whole canon, retained only the Abhidharma, be identified with the Sautrāntikas who rejected the Abhidharma categorically themselves and only kept the Sūtras, whence their name? How then could Saṃghabhadra and Vasuvarman, who knew the Sautrāntikas so well, distinguish them from the Prajñaptivādins to whom they attributed, one the fundamental thesis of the *prajñaptivāda*, and the other the Bahuśrutīya thesis of the three truths of suffering, ordinary and noble?[29] For one as much as for the other of these two Sarvāstivādin masters, it is evident that the Prajñaptivādins were distinct from the Sautrāntikas and, for Vasuvarman at least, it is obvious that they were associated with the Bahuśrutīyas with whom he seems to confuse them.

We must therefore, as Sylvain Lévi would have it, seek the origin of the Mahāyāna among the schools of the Mahāsāṃghika group, and possibly in particular among the Prajñaptivādins and Bahuśrutīyas who formed a transitional subgroup between the early Mahāsāṃghikas and the later ones, between those of the north, in the Indo-Gangetic region, and those of the south, in Andhra country. In fact, only two inscriptions concerning the Bahuśrutīyas have been found, one in Nāgārjunikoṇḍa and the other near Peshawar, which seems proof of a role as liaison agent between the two main Mahāsāṃghika centres. The great Mahāyānist centre of the seventh

29. T 1563, p. 901b–c; T 1562, p. 630c; T 1647, p. 380a.

century located in north Deccan is exactly situated between those, formerly Mahāsāṃghika, of Andhra and the Indo-Gangetic Basin.

During their travels in India in the seventh century, Xuanzang and Yijing noted virtually nowhere the presence of Mahāsāṃghikas and, apart from Bamīyān, which remained the Lokottaravādins' great centre, the figures given are insignificant, especially compared to those of the Sammatīyas, Sarvāstivādins and Sthaviras. Conversely, Xuanzang records the presence of many Mahāyānists, particularly in the northwest, Kāpiśa and the Ghazni region, and throughout the whole northern half of the Deccan, in Konkan, Mahākośala and Orissa, that is, the regions where the Mahāsāṃghikas had resided or adjacent to them. To explain both the disappearance of the Mahāsāṃghikas and the apparently spontaneous generation of the Mahāyānists, it is possible to suppose that the Mahāsāṃghikas had gradually passed from the Hīnayāna to the Mahāyāna.

It seems that we can interpret in the same way the mysterious disappearance of the Vibhajyavādins (Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas) whose doctrines were, as we have seen, closely linked to those of the Mahāsāṃghikas and which could have followed the latter in their evolution towards the Mahāyāna. We thus get the following table:

2nd cent.	Sthav	Sarv	Samm	Vibh Mahās	(unknown)
7th cent.	Sthav	Sarv	Samm	(disappeared)	Mahāyāna

As we have seen, it is the silence of the Kashmiri *Vibhāṣā* and the Sinhalese *Kathāvatthu* over the doctrines of the Mahāyāna that urges us to place the early home of the latter far from the centres where the Sarvāstivādins and Theravādins resided, that is, the extreme northwest and Ceylon, and also the regions where pilgrimages obliged them to frequent, that is, the Middle Ganges Basin, from Kapilavastu in the north to Bodh-Gayā in the south, and from Mathurā in the west to Nālandā in the east. The information supplied by Xuanzang concerning the presence of a very important Mahāyānist centre in the whole of the northern part of the Deccan, between the Godavarī and the Ganges, although late, leads us to suppose that this region, where the Mahāyāna was so flourishing in the seventh century, could have been its cradle. This region is indeed surrounded by old Mahāsāṃghika centres, revealed by second- and third-century inscriptions, such as Mathurā, Karle, Amarāvatī, Nāgārjunikoṇḍa, or by the accounts of

Faxian's travels at the beginning of the fifth century, such as Pāṭaliputra, where the Chinese monk collected several Mahāsāṃghika works of which one, in fact, was in a Mahāyāna monastery. At the end of the seventh century, when the Mahāsāṃghikas were in full decline, it was in these same regions, Lāṭa, Sindhu, Magadha, Bengal and Andhra, that Yijing found their last communities. Consequently, the northern part of the Deccan plateau was at all times subjected everywhere to Mahāsāṃghika influences coming from various centres surrounding it. It is therefore probable that it early on yielded to those influences and became another Mahāsāṃghika centre before passing to the Mahāyāna by a process of self-evolution.

Is this to say that other regions and other schools played no part in the formation of the Mahāyāna? It would indeed be unwise to claim so, but it seems that their influence was secondary and later. It is thus that the northwest, the Middle Ganges Basin and southern Deccan probably consisted, from the third century CE or even the end of the second, of active Mahāyāna centres, certainly because of the presence of major Mahāsāṃghika communities in those regions. It is also most probable that certain schools of Sthaviran origin, such as the Dharmaguptakas, Haimavatas and even Mahīśāsakas, soon turned to the Mahāyāna due to the strong Mahāsāṃghika influences to which it had been subjected earlier.[30] Przyluski's theory, according to which certain schools each split into two subschools, one Hīnayānist and the other Mahāyānist, is not only very plausible in itself, but confirmed by certain documents, such as Xuanzang's evidence on the Mahāyānistic syncretism of the schools of Uḍḍiyāṇa at the beginning of the seventh century. However, this is probably a matter of secondary movements, due to the missionary activity of monks of the Mahāyāna from its early home.

30. We are thinking of the affinities of the Vibhajyavādins, Dharmaguptakas, Mahīśāsakas, etc., with the Mahāsāṃghikas.

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Supplementary Bibliography

Research on the Early Schools of Buddhism since 1955

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This supplement to Bareau's original bibliography does not seek to be exhaustive. While Bareau's book is a comprehensive survey of the schools, academic responses to it have focussed on narrower tasks in order to make further progress in the field, and there has been no monograph treatment that revises or updates Bareau's volume. If the primary motif of Bareau's work is to give doctrinal positions primary position in constructing an institutional history, subsequent authors have explored a number of nondoctrinal criteria for understanding what may have lain, institutionally or otherwise, behind the school names we have inherited from this phase of Buddhist history. More recent approaches to the task have included:

- further work on doctrinal differences—i.e., the continuation of the methodology employed by Bareau in this volume;
- the investigation of the languages used by early schools;
- the role of monastic regulations and ordination lineage rather than doctrine in determining differentiation;
- interrogation of the validity of the categories that scholars employ in discussion of the subject;
- re-evaluation of the evidence for schism from Aśoka's edicts;
- evidence for the early schools from non-Buddhist sources;
- assessment of the rhetorical dimension of traditional material recounting 'schism' and 'school';
- the differentiation of early and developed doctrinal positions within a single school;
- comparison of parallel texts from different schools;
- the investigation of ancient manuscripts and inscriptions as the products of individual schools; and
- the exploration of Vinaya literature, particularly that of the Mūlasarvāstivāda, for material relating to the realia of monastic life and thought.

Each of these categories and more is represented in the bibliography below, and it is reasonable to see them all as facilitated at one level or another by Bareau's work. Typically also archeological, codicological and epigraphic work now also takes account of school affiliation. (The inscriptional corpus has been completely revised.) While scholarly investigation of distinctive Theravāda positions has continued, there has been a relative burgeoning of our understanding of Sarvāstivāda and, some way behind, of the Pudgalavāda (i.e., the doctrines espoused by the Sammatīyas). Under a variety of influences, publishing on Buddhism and its history expanded exponentially during the second half of the twentieth century, and a sizeable proportion of this material touches more or less on the present subject. The task of the bibliographer thus becomes to a significant degree a matter of exclusion as well as discovery.

The emphasis in this supplement is on printed English-language secondary sources. This policy is most prejudicial in relation to the rich field of Japanese-language publication in this area, which is not represented here. The Anglophone reader can gain some appreciation of this through perusal of the Japanese sources section of the bibliography in Hirakawa (below). To establish further reasonable limits, several other subject areas or categories of work have also been excluded. These include translations of primary sources; publications of original manuscripts of texts belonging to early schools; publications on the inscriptional record and archaeology pertaining to the early schools; publications on the origins of Mahāyāna Buddhism; individual encyclopedia entries dealing with any aspect of the early Buddhist schools (of which there are many; see s.v. *Encyclopedia* below); and finally, publications dealing with the early schools prior to 1955. It is worth noting that Bareau's own bibliography does not give an exhaustive picture of the published research on the early schools prior to his own work.

Two areas of Bareau's study not covered by this supplementary bibliograhy nevertheless demand further comment. First, Bareau's account of the inscriptional record pertaining to the early schools is incomplete. A more exhaustive and up-to-date study of the subject is Tsukamoto 1996–8. (Inscriptions are transcribed in the Roman alphabet. Indic names are indexed.) Second, research on early Mahāyāna and its origins is an area in which Bareau's approach, mainly doctrinal and thereby typical for his day, has been significantly re-visioned. A clear distinction is now understood between doctrinal beliefs of the individual (*vāda*) and their monastic identity as established by the vinaya tradition that they observed (*nikāya*). For example, it is now no longer regarded as logically incompatible for a monk to have simultaneous early school and Mahāyāna identities, since each would have been based on different and nonexclusive criteria. A representative bibliography of such research developments would be very substantial. Readers may obtain a taste of their character by consulting the following: Bechert 1973; Drewes 2009; Harrison 1995; Sasaki 1997 and 2009; Shimoda 2009; and by perusing the index to Schopen 2005 for this subject, as discussed in various of his articles compiled in that volume.

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